Another Term Ends for the Roberts Court

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Res Ipsa
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Another Term Ends for the Roberts Court

Post by Res Ipsa »

Last week concluded the end-of-term festival for Supreme Court watchers. No more queuing up at the live edition of Scotusblog to learn who got presents and who got coal. Now we're into law's equivalent of the hot stove league, where pundits try to understand what the Court has done and what next season will look like.

in my opinion, the big winner this term was judicial power. Ironically, the big loser was the Supreme Court itself. The discovery that several of the Justices have been engaging in conduct that would be considered corruption by any other public officials, including the judges of every other court in the United States has fatally damaged the credibility of the institution. I think the corruption scandal will be the legacy of the Roberts court, unless he steps up and introduces ethics reform within the institution.

In terms of judicial power, the Roberts court is proving to be the most activist court in decades. This term alone, the Court exceeded well-recognized limitations on its constitutional power. In 303 Creative Design, LLC v. Elenis, the Court blew through the "case or controversy" requirement, rendering an opinion on the hypothetical actions of a government body in response to the hypothetical actions of a hypothetical business. Under Supreme Court precedent, the case should have been dismissed as "not ripe." The Supreme Court exceeded its jurisdiction and decided it anyway.

A second long-standing limitation on the court's power has been not reaching constitutional issues when they can be decided on another basis. Yet, in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, the Court disregarded this limitation by finding that the affirmative action policies at issue violated both the Civil Rights statutes and the Constitution. Under long standing precedent, the Court should have stopped after finding that the statutes were violated.

As anyone who watched the torrent of litigation after the 2020 presidential election will remember, standing is a very important requirement in order to bring a suit for violation of the constitution. In Nebraska v. Biden, the Court accepted a thin, convoluted argument for standing that it would generally never have accepted in other cases.

This activist practice is consistent with past actions of the Roberts court, including taking jurisdiction over lower court cases on its own in order to issue injunctions and deciding Constitutional issues on its "shadow docket." For all the criticism dished out by conservatives over the years about "activist judges," the Roberts court is proving to be activist on steroids.

One of the significant cases that is not getting as much press as others this term is Groff v. DeJoy, which was a 9-0 decision of the court. It's a great example of judicial gaslighting -- changing the law while telling the citizenry they are doing no such thing. It also expands the sphere of privileges to which religious believers are entitled as contrasted with their nonreligious counterparts.

To appreciate the judicial slight of hand, you have to start with the case that the Court pretended to follow rather than overrule: Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Hardison was a TWA employee who underwent a religious conversion, including adopting a strong belief that he could not work on the Sabbath (which he believed started Friday evening). He asked TWA not to be scheduled to work on Saturdays based on his religious convictions.

Unfortunately, Hardison worked in a department that operated 24/7. The employees also had a union contract under which work schedules were decided by seniority. Initially, he worked in a building where he had sufficient seniority to generally avoid working on Saturday. Later on, he requested to move to a second building, where he had no seniority. As most senior employees preferred to have Saturday and Sunday off, Hardison was regularly scheduled for work on Saturdays. Even worse for him, when he changed buildings, he gave up the seniority he had at the first building. So, his problem couldn't be fixed by simply moving back to his original position.

TWA agreed, per its normal policy, that if the union steward could find a more senior employee who was willing to swap schedules, that the two employees could swap schedules. None of the more senior employees wanted to switch. TWA was also willing to require a swap if the union agreed to modify the seniority rights in the contract, but the union would not agree. Hardison proposed that he keep his current work schedule, but not be required to work on the scheduled Saturdays. TWA declined. When Hardison refused to show up for work on Saturday, TWA fired him.

Hardison sued TWA for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming discrimination on the basis of religion. This was a somewhat unusual case because Hardison had been treated the same as every other TWA employee. Most discrimination cases had been based on claims of unequal treatment when compared with other employees. So, the Court had to start pretty much from scratch, starting with the language of the statute:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -- "
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
In 1972, Congress added the following clarification to the statute:
The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
So, under the statute, TWA was reasonably required to accommodate Hardison's religious-based unwillingness to work on Saturdays unless doing so would result in "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of TWA. Here are the key parts of its holding:

1. The seniority system itself was a reasonable accommodation to employees who had religious objections to working on specific days of the week because the system was neutral in terms of religion. It had also attempted to accommodate Hardison by allowing him to swap schedules with another employee, but it could not do so without violating its contract with the union.

2. Depriving other employees of their preferred work schedules based on Hardison's religious beliefs would constitute discrimination on the basis of religion. The same is true of depriving them of their contractual rights under the union contract.

3. Seniority systems are given special treatment under the Civil Rights statute, which states that bona fide applications of seniority or merit systems to the terms and conditions of employment do not violate the law unless they were put in place with an intent to discriminate.

4. Requiring TWA to bear more than a "de minimus" cost to give Hardison Saturday's off IS an undue burden.

5. An employer cannot be required to discriminate against some employees in order to give other employees the benefit of enjoying their sabbath.
By suggesting that TWA should incur certain costs in order to give Hardison Saturdays off, the Court of Appeals would, in effect, require TWA to finance an additional Saturday off and then to choose the employee who will enjoy it on the basis of his religious beliefs. While incurring extra costs to secure a replacement for Hardison might remove the necessity of compelling another employee to work involuntarily in Hardison's place, it would not change the fact that the privilege of having Saturdays off would be allocated according to religious beliefs.
The opinion is pretty clear: First, imposing more than a de minimus cost on an employer in order to accommodate an employee's religious belief is an undue burden under the statute. Second, the statute doesn't require an employer to discriminate in favor of an employee and against other employees on the basis of religion.

You don't have to take my word for it: read it for yourself. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/432/63/#T15

With that background, we can turn to Groff, who is an evangelical Christian. He became employed by the Postal Service at a time when very little Sunday work was required in general. That changed when the Postal Service contracted with Amazon to do some of its Sunday deliveries. He changed to a rural station to which the Amazon arrangement did not apply. However, after a time, that station also began to do Sunday deliveries for Amazon.

Groff refused to work on Sundays. Other employees had to work his Sunday shifts for him. They were not happy, and one filed an employment grievance over being forced to work Groff's Sunday shifts. Meanwhile, Groff had been subjected to progressive discipliner. He finally resigned.

Groff sued for violation of title VII. The Supreme Court's opinion rummages through footnotes and cherry picks bits and pieces to "courtsplain" that the opinion in Hardison doesn't really say what it clearly says. It replaces "more than de minimus costs" with "substantial" "costs" or "expenditures." Notice how each word is quoted separately? That's because they are cherry picked and do not appear together in anything resembling a holding in Hardin. That's part of the sleight of hand. How much is a "substantial" cost? I don't know, and the court doesn't say. But its ciearly bigger than de minimus.

But that's not the biggest part of the trick. Remember the second holding of Hardin: the law doesn't require an employer to discriminate against people who aren't members of an employee's religion when deciding who has to work on the weekends? While pretending not to overrule or alter Hardin, the Court makes that part of the holding disappear. Well, that's an understatement. It actually holds the opposite. Whatever the conduct of an employer's business is, the terms and conditions of its employees' employment is not part of it.
Specifically, a coworker’s dislike of “religious prac- tice and expression in the workplace” or “the mere fact [of] an accommodation” is not “cognizable to factor into the un- due hardship inquiry.” Id., at 89–90. To the extent that this was not previously clear, we agree. An employer who fails to provide an accommodation has a defense only if the hardship is “undue,” and a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice cannot be considered “undue.” If bias or hostility to a religious practice or a religious accommodation pro- vided a defense to a reasonable accommodation claim, Title VII would be at war with itself.
According to the majority opinion in Groff, an employer can be required to grant special privileges to religious people at the expense of employees who do not belong to that religion. If you've been working for your employer for 20 years and don't have a union or other written contract, the fact that your employer has always allocated who has to work weekends based on seniority means nothing as of last week. That 20 year-old evangelical who was hired last week does not have to work on Sundays, even if that means you have to cover their shifts.

This is not an opinion that simply follows what the court "really" held in its last case on the issue. It's a pretty big change in the interpretation of Civil Rights law. Rather than the law being applied in a way that doesn't disadvantage religious folks, it requires granting special privileges to people on the basis of their religious beliefs. And, given that keeping the sabbath day holy is one of the big 10, that's lots of people of the book who can lay claim to a religious belief that they should not be forced to work on the sabbath.

Now, we'll have to see how this all works out. Maybe "substantial cost" is going to end up being lots closer to "more than de minimus cost" than one might think just by reading the opinion. Maybe we'll be seeing more written employment contracts, including union contracts. Who knows?

The most interesting question for me is: do evangelical religious folks now have a right to preach to their fellow employees?

My big objection is to making this kind of significant change, while pretending to change nothing. (Note, the concurring opinion addresses the issue of considering the impact on other employees, so that's something, I guess.)
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Re: Another Term Ends for the Roberts Court

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Thanks for the update Res.
I think the corruption scandal will be the legacy of the Roberts court, unless he steps up and introduces ethics reform within the institution.
Maybe by legal scholars. I don't think the public cares much unless the crime is on the other side of the fence. I was just remarking about corruption on the Biden crime family thread, noting that in my tiny world I appear to have stricter rules regarding accepting gifts or advances than the executive and legislative branch of government, and it looks like that extends to the high court also.

How long has it been, or has it always been the case, that the Supreme court votes down party lines? My argument for the public not caring about corruption begins here. Why would the average citizen believe there is objective truth in the world if the highest court in the land, which to the public equates to, supposedly, the most qualified judges, always ends up ruling per their own narrative? If the best of the best can't be objective then why not accept reality and play to win rather than fool oneself about doing what's right? I'm not a very experienced voter, but in 2020, I noticed the ballot was full of judges, some of which had no opposition, and few of whom disclosed party membership. I looked up a few and couldn't always determine it, and it seemed like the idea was that as judges, they aimed for impartiality and isolating oneself from party influence would make sense. How does it go from low-ranking local judges advertising their non-partisanship to high-ranking federal judges putting it up in neon lights?

You've provided more evidence of the "imperial court", which is concerning as was that airline-worker ruling. Hopefully everyone on the forum will read your post.

I do have a question about that state-legislature theory ruling. To me, that was the most concerning ruling. The news reported it as a win for Democrats but that the three most unhinged voted in favor of it was deeply concerning. Why was it 6-3 rather than 9-0, when all of Trump's nonsense filings were almost always 9-0 or they didn't hear it?
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Re: Another Term Ends for the Roberts Court

Post by Res Ipsa »

Gadianton wrote:
Tue Jul 04, 2023 12:34 am
Thanks for the update Res.
I think the corruption scandal will be the legacy of the Roberts court, unless he steps up and introduces ethics reform within the institution.
Maybe by legal scholars. I don't think the public cares much unless the crime is on the other side of the fence. I was just remarking about corruption on the Biden crime family thread, noting that in my tiny world I appear to have stricter rules regarding accepting gifts or advances than the executive and legislative branch of government, and it looks like that extends to the high court also.

How long has it been, or has it always been the case, that the Supreme court votes down party lines? My argument for the public not caring about corruption begins here. Why would the average citizen believe there is objective truth in the world if the highest court in the land, which to the public equates to, supposedly, the most qualified judges, always ends up ruling per their own narrative? If the best of the best can't be objective then why not accept reality and play to win rather than fool oneself about doing what's right? I'm not a very experienced voter, but in 2020, I noticed the ballot was full of judges, some of which had no opposition, and few of whom disclosed party membership. I looked up a few and couldn't always determine it, and it seemed like the idea was that as judges, they aimed for impartiality and isolating oneself from party influence would make sense. How does it go from low-ranking local judges advertising their non-partisanship to high-ranking federal judges putting it up in neon lights?

You've provided more evidence of the "imperial court", which is concerning as was that airline-worker ruling. Hopefully everyone on the forum will read your post.

I do have a question about that state-legislature theory ruling. To me, that was the most concerning ruling. The news reported it as a win for Democrats but that the three most unhinged voted in favor of it was deeply concerning. Why was it 6-3 rather than 9-0, when all of Trump's nonsense filings were almost always 9-0 or they didn't hear it?
I agree with your comments about the current general public. But a court's legacy is generally determined by legal scholars and court watchers years after that court is in the rear view mirror. I don't think that folks removed in time from today's politics will look kindly at all on Supreme Court Justices who secretly allowed themselves to be "groomed" by special interests. It's getting lost in the sheer amount of chaff in the air today, but is exactly the type of thing that defines a court.

The Supreme Court doesn't always vote on party lines. Even this court has produced some surprising agreement between its conservative and liberal members. Roberts and Kavanaugh are not reliable conservative votes, whereas Thomas's vote on any given case is almost 100% predictable. For example, Roberts, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined with the liberals to reject the independent state legislature theory. That one was always a long shot, though, as it would require the Supreme Court to cede its power to exercise review over the actions of state legislators.

Roberts, Kavanaugh and Coney Barrett also joined with the three liberal justices to uphold the Indian Child Welfare Act. So did Gorsuch, who is head and shoulders above any other Justice when it comes to understanding Federal Indian Law. Gorsuch also joined with the liberals in dissenting from a decision adverse to the Navajo Nation on water rights.

Also, the responsibilities and experiences of being a Supreme Court Justice often lead to behavior that is surprising. Two of Nixon's appointed Justices were expected to be consistent conservatives, but turned out to be swing votes.

Still, there are distinct conservative and liberal theories of Constitutional jurisprudence and so Justices have been labeled "conservative" "liberal" and "swing" as far back as the Warren Court. Maybe earlier.

Judicial elections are supposed to be non-partisan, but all judges have a judicial philosophy. Because the two major parties typically align themselves with a judicial philosophy, they end up appearing partisan. But I don't think that reflects identification with party as much as it does judicial philosophy. Partisan Trump appointees would not have ruled against him in the election cases as much as they did if they were loyal to party. If the Republican Party diverges from conservative philosophy of the Justices on the Court, I'd expect to see the Justices go with their philosophies and not positions of the party.

I forgot to mention two other examples of the "imperial court." One is the rejection of the independent state legislature theory. The other is the "major question" doctrine the Court created out of whole cloth. Congress has the power to enact laws. The Executive has the power to enforce those laws. That requires the executive to promulgate regulations so that the laws are administered uniformly. In the past, the Court has intervened only when the executive was clearly exceeding or acting contrary to the law passed by Congress. This involved a degree of deference to the executive authority that promulgated regulations, recognizing the the Court generally lacked the specific expertise required to implement Congressional statutes. As long as the enforcement agency was acting within the statutory authority passed by Congress, the Court did not substitute its judgment for that of the Congress in delegating authority or the agency in exercising that authority.

The "major questions" doctrine inserts the Court directly into policy making. Even if the enforcement agency is exercising authority that is clearly within the scope of powers given to it by Congress, if the Court thinks an agency action is really, really significant, it will overrule the agency action on the ground that Congress did not use specific enough words for the delegation. Before this doctrine was invented, Congress had the power to delegate enforcement power however it saw fit. The only issue for the Court was whether the agency had exceeded that authority. How, the Court has given itself the power to overrule Congress's ability to perform it's core constitutional function if it doesn't like the words it used. For a judicial philosophy that claims to decry judicial activism, this is activism on steroids. It is this doctrine that Court has been using to overrule environmental regulations even though the regulations literally fall within the scope of authority Congress delegated to the EPA.

As to your question about the independent state legislature ruling, I haven't read the dissent. But I suspect the answer is that, for the Court, it isn't about Trump at all. The question before the court was gerrymandering, not some crazy Trump claims of election fraud. To the extent the Court spoke on the Trump claims, the major issue was standing. For example, Texas lacks standing to object to how Wisconsin conducts its presidential election. If I recall correctly, the independent state legislature theory was first proposed before Trump was elected. So, although it cited as a justification for the conspiracy to overturn the result of the 2020 election, it wasn't just a crazy Trump claim. It's been a hard right judicial theory, and so we saw the most conservative justices favor it.
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