Tal's epistemology (and DCP's)

[_tojohndillonesq]

Everyone who posts here is an apologist.

---What would you say Tarski, for example, is an "apologist" for on this thread?

About BYU and its undergrad degrees in history, philosophy, etc., yes they are recognized by other universities. BYU is an accredited university.

I also have a soft spot for C.S. Lewis, although I do think his argument, I think in "Mere Christianity", that the nonsensical nature of the Christian myth is evidence that it's true, is about as lame as anything we might find in on the MADness board. It's amazing how creative bright people get when they wish to defend ideas incompatible with everything else we know about the world, and even logic itself.

Universities are not accredited; departments are. I searched the BYU website pretty hard and found no accreditation claims for those majors, though I DID find claims for many other departments. In the history department I thought it was interesting that they proudly called out that they offer an accredited degree in "Family History and Geneology," but that other traditional history degrees were not cited.

CS Lewis is definitely not perfect. But he does practice full disclosure and generosity. In your example, I do not believe Lewis argues that the strange stories in the New Testament prove Christianity is true, but that they invalidate the argument that the New Testament is propoganda. A propagandist does not include a Christ who apparently doubts on the Cross, an apostle who denies his Messiah, another apostle who is a murderer, apostles who argue about who gets to be on the Messiah's right hand, etc. Nor would they fail to get their story straight; who saw Jesus after the resurrection, when, where, etc. These problems say that whatever else you may believe, the theory that a "bunch of liars made it up to gain followers" is really weak.

The human capacity for deception - and self-deception - is astonishing. Scientists have an astonishing track record of self-deception. Kuhn cites numerous specific examples in "The Structure of Scientific Revolution." This is just historical fact.

The other understanding that comes out of Kuhn - and other luminaries such as Michael Polanyi - is that Science operates as a system of faith. Scientists "believe in" theories... or not... often based on incomplete evidence. The difference is that science eventually allows the accumulation of new evidence to change what is seen as true. Sometimes, as Kuhn points out, all the "powers that be" in the scientific world must die or retire for the new paradigm to be accepted. So science as a whole does not ascribe to dogma, though individual scientists do so all the time. Religions do have certain dogmas that no amount of external evidence will ever change.

So yeah, Tarksi is an apologist, as were Carl Sagan or Bertrand Russel when discussing religion. They attempt to convince others that their system of thought is rational and valid.

I'd like to end with a question: Do you find that atheists react with more hostility to Christianity than to Buddhism or Hinduism? You cannot be really angry with that which you believe to be fictional. You might dislike Harry Potter fans, but you don't loath Voldemort. I think the hostility signifies something deeper going on in the psyches of those who fight hardest against - or for - Christianity. Real belief does not generate anger but calm curiousity.

[_KimberlyAnn]

I'd like to end with a question: Do you find that atheists react with more hostility to Christianity than to Buddhism or Hinduism? You cannot be really angry with that which you believe to be fictional. You might dislike Harry Potter fans, but you don't loath Voldemort. I think the hostility signifies something deeper going on in the psyches of those who fight hardest against - or for - Christianity. Real belief does not generate anger but calm curiousity.

TJDesq.,

Do you find that ex-Mormons react with more hostility to Mormonism, than say, Buddhism or Hinduism? They cannot really be angry with that which they believe to be fictional. :)

You see, TJDesq., the fact that someone is angry with a religion doesn't at all mean they do not believe it to be fictional. There are atheists who not only sincerely believe Christianity is fictional, but that it is also damaging to people. I'm not an atheist, and I do not think the liberal strains of Christianity are damaging, though I cannot say the same for the more fundamentalist strains.

No doubt hostility signifies something deep going on inside of us, but the idea you posit doesn't apply in most cases, though it may in some.

KA

PS - You know your poetry, so I was looking forward to your book thread. Did you decide not to post it?

[_Gadianton]

I'd like to end with a question: Do you find that atheists react with more hostility to Christianity than to Buddhism or Hinduism?

How is Buddhism or Hinduism relevant to virtually any western atheists? I'm really, really curious. Note that, atheists and skeptics also get riled up over paranormal claims and UFOs. Does they also believe in aliens?

You cannot be really angry with that which you believe to be fictional

That's right, you can't really be frustrated with at a immortal galactic seeder who doesn't exist. But you can be angry with believers in an immortal galactic seeder. And you can especially be angry with a large institution that brainwashed you into believing in an immortal galactic seeder and constantly pressed for 10% of your income to support his galactic exploits.

[_tojohndillonesq]

TJDesq.,

Do you find that ex-Mormons react with more hostility to Mormonism, than say, Buddhism or Hinduism? They cannot really be angry with that which they believe to be fictional. :)

You see, TJDesq., the fact that someone is angry with a religion doesn't at all mean they do not believe it to be fictional. There are atheists who not only sincerely believe Christianity is fictional, but that it is also damaging to people. I'm not an atheist, and I do not think the liberal strains of Christianity are damaging, though I cannot say the same for the more fundamentalist strains.

No doubt hostility signifies something deep going on inside of us, but the idea you posit doesn't apply in most cases, though it may in some.

KA

I don't believe ex-Mormons are angry with the theology of Mormonism. I believe they are angry with the practitioners... with the damage other Mormons inflicted on their personal lives and relationships. And the impact of a belief - the consequences - is not a valid measure of the truth or falsehood of the theology. ("Ad consequentiam" - appeal to consequences.)

So even if the person was actually angry with the theology due to the way it damages people (which we can posit, though I do not accept it as fact), the "reason" for their anger is a perfect example of invalid logic. Exactly the kind of thinking of which atheists accuse Christians. Atheists want to hold religion to a standard they do not meet themselves. Which was my whole point. Atheists demand rigorous honesty and logic from Christians, while failing to meet those standards themselves. (Bertrand Russel is a joke.) The Christian failure to meet those standards is not inherent in the theology - it is an artifact of the flaws of those who profess Christianity. (I could say the same for Bertrand Russel; his inability to argue effectively does not mean his arguments are wrong.) When I see anger - on either side - I see fear and doubt... and a total breakdown in the logic in which science places all its faith.

[_KimberlyAnn]

TJDesq.,

Do you find that ex-Mormons react with more hostility to Mormonism, than say, Buddhism or Hinduism? They cannot really be angry with that which they believe to be fictional. :)

You see, TJDesq., the fact that someone is angry with a religion doesn't at all mean they do not believe it to be fictional. There are atheists who not only sincerely believe Christianity is fictional, but that it is also damaging to people. I'm not an atheist, and I do not think the liberal strains of Christianity are damaging, though I cannot say the same for the more fundamentalist strains.

No doubt hostility signifies something deep going on inside of us, but the idea you posit doesn't apply in most cases, though it may in some.

KA

I don't believe ex-Mormons are angry with the theology of Mormonism. I believe they are angry with the practitioners... with the damage other Mormons inflicted on their personal lives and relationships. And the impact of a belief - the consequences - is not a valid measure of the truth or falsehood of the theology. ("Ad consequentiam" - appeal to consequences.)

So even if the person was actually angry with the theology due to the way it damages people (which we can posit, though I do not accept it as fact), the "reason" for their anger is a perfect example of invalid logic. Exactly the kind of thinking of which atheists accuse Christians. Atheists want to hold religion to a standard they do not meet themselves. Which was my whole point. Atheists demand rigorous honesty and logic from Christians, while failing to meet those standards themselves. (Bertrand Russel is a joke.) The Christian failure to meet those standards is not inherent in the theology - it is an artifact of the flaws of those who profess Christianity. (I could say the same for Bertrand Russel; his inability to argue effectively does not mean his arguments are wrong.) When I see anger - on either side - I see fear and doubt... and a total breakdown in the logic in which science places all its faith.

TJDesq., I enjoy your posts. I do, however, disagree that the inability of Christians to meet rigorous standards of logic is solely due to the flaws of professed Christians and not the theology itself. Doesn't Christian theology defy logic? Isn't it supposed to? Is logic really applicable to religious faith of any kind? I'm willing to admit that my lingering belief in God, but not religion, is illogical. It's irrational to believe in a completely unobservable God, at least to a strict definition of rationality, don't you think?

And yes, Mormon theology damages people. It's a repressive religion that controls people with guilt and threats and in which there is no grace at all.

Perhaps the discussion of the rationality or irrationality of believing in God and or the logic of Christian theology should be moved to another thread. This one has been seriously derailed!

KA

[_tojohndillonesq]

Tojohn wrote: I'd like to end with a question: Do you find that atheists react with more hostility to Christianity than to Buddhism or Hinduism?

How is Buddhism or Hinduism relevant to virtually any western atheists? I'm really, really curious.

Good question; relevance. Atheists claim that they argue against God because such a "superstition" is harmful to the world. (Invalid reasoning - ad consequentiam).

Christians represent far less than half of the WW religious population, and is not the fastest growing. And yet somehow atheists focus on Christianity as the religon that needs to be attacked. (Note that Mormons are most emphatically NOT Christian. Christians do not believe in the "galactic seeder.") Is this simply an American bias? So I would flip the question and ask "How is Christianity MOST relevant to the subject of God?" and "What is it specifically about the Christian faith that arouse such opposition?" (Leaving out ad consequentiam.)

Note that, atheists and skeptics also get riled up over paranormal claims and UFOs. Do<es> they also believe in aliens?

My experience on the JREF site (like this one, only focused on the paranormal) says that atheists are merely dismissive of UFOs, the Loch Ness Monster, etc. It is the paranormal (anything that hints of the supernatural, an afterlife, a higher power, etc.) that hits the skeptic/atheist hot button.

You cannot be really angry with that which you believe to be fictional.

That's right, you can't really be frustrated with an immortal galactic seeder who doesn't exist. But you can be angry with believers in an immortal galactic seeder. And you can especially be angry with a large institution that brainwashed you into believing in an immortal galactic seeder and constantly pressed for 10% of your income to support his galactic exploits.

Well... I think we agree on all that. Ex-Mormons are angry with individual behavior, not the belief itself. Which does not invalidate the belief. We have to refute the theology of Mormonism, not its practices, else we make two logical errors - ad consequentiam and ad secundem. There is an emotional method of arguing and a logical method of arguing. Each influential in its own way. If you want to get to the intellectual crowd, logic is more effective.

Where we apparently differ is on the usefulness of hostility. I find that approach to be ineffective as a way of influencing people's beliefs... except insofar as it may actually set them against you emotionally. Essentially the opposite of the effect one would normally want. Hostility and anger are also statistically proven to be unhealthy.

A couple of axioms:
"Being angry with others is like drinking poison to make them get sick."

"No one ever had his opinions changed by being made fun of."

I don't think they are necessarily universally true, but they make good working propositions.

[_tojohndillonesq]

TJDesq., I enjoy your posts. I do, however, disagree that the inability of Christians to meet rigorous standards of logic is solely due to the flaws of professed Christians and not the theology itself. Doesn't Christian theology defy logic? Isn't it supposed to? Is logic really applicable to religious faith of any kind? I'm willing to admit that my lingering belief in God, but not religion, is illogical. It's irrational to believe in a completely unobservable God, at least to a strict definition of rationality, don't you think?
KA

My understanding of logic is not that it can be used to prove "truth," but that it can be used to demonstrate that the argument is not inherently invalid or irrational. So religion can - I would contend it must - be argued logically.

That is differentiated from "scientific," which religion is not. (Full circle! My first post was arguing that science and religion have no overlap.) Science is about the material universe, and religion - anyhow my religion - is openly immaterial. One cannot physically demonstrate the existnece of God, or point a telescope at heaven; there are no particles or waves to point at. God does NOT exist "in" this Universe, and this Universe is not all there is.

1) Logic can be applied to any subject.
2) Science can be applied only to the physical Universe. (Mathematics is logic that can be applied to science.)
3) God is not part of the physical Universe. (Nor heaven, angels, my soul, etc.)
Conclusions: A) Logic applies to theology, B) Science does not apply to the question of God. C) You can be a rational scientist and believe in God.

I think that argument holds up... Weak point might be my definition of Science as applicable only to the physcial universe. My quantum physics is not exactly doctoral level.

We can move the thread... though Epistomology is all about what can be known and how we can know it... that seems to apply here.

[_Tal Bachman]

No I don’t see this as the same thing. We aren’t talking about qualia or something that can’t be explained in functional terms.

---My point was only to suggest that "external behaviour" as an object of inference about the mechanics of cognition is as valid when applied to animals as when applied to humans. (I only used the inference of subjective states to suggest the validity of inference based on external behaviour).

You see a difference between my deciding to slow down after running around the room and crashing into things a bit to often and on the other hand my little car slowing down for the same “reason” right?

---I don't really know what the difference in principle is, when any two things modify (future) behaviour in accordance with (past) input. Maybe you could try to explain it to me. Also, I certainly don't know that we need language for a basic level of that process, especially when it is viewed as something like homeostatic.

We don’t have to have direct access, enough testing could in principle lead us to draw conclusions about whether an organism is doing something simple and analogue or whether it is doing something combinatorial like instantiating logical symbolic steps or using a mental language. It wouldn’t be easy but we are talking “in principle”.
Do you think that spiders use a language? Most cognitive scientists think not I believe.

---Honestly Tarski, I am not really sure what the difference in principle to this process is. I think at least that the levels of complexity hugely differ, and I suppose that language enables increasingly sophisticated thought. But in principle? I don't know about a difference in principle. "Inductive inference" sounds like an overly exalted term for what a spider - or even, uh, a plant - might do; after all, plants don't have brains for one thing, whereas we are talking about a sort of reasoning. But...there is a pattern all throughout nature, where organisms respond to information; that is, they modify their own behavioural processes in accordance with some estimate about what "is really happening, and what will continue to happen", so as to enhance their survival prospects or achieve a goal. In effect, somehow or other, what they do at least has the same effect as if they had made an estimate about the unobserved (including the future), based on the observed.

I suppose neither of us would dispute that human beings do this. Leaving aside automated cars for a moment, what of animals? Sterelny, in the article you posted a link to, mentions that rats behave just as though they were making inductive inferences in experiments (and grants that at a certain level, this is going on), and of course animals have done this in many hundreds of experiments. One classic experiment (I think Skinner did this) is to put a hungry pigeon in a box, and then, at a particular (random) moment, release food. What will happen is that the pigeon will draw an inference: it will (wrongly, of course) infer that what it had just been doing - perhaps preening its left wing, or bobbing its head - was the cause of the effect of receiving food. And when it is hungry again, it will try the same behaviour again. If food is given again, its confidence will grow in its "theory", and in fact it may henceforth exaggerate that behaviour. What is also interesting, however, is that if, say, preening its left wing triggers the release of food ten times in a row, but then stops triggering it...it will modify its behaviour in response to its observation that that particular behaviour is not working anymore. And so on it will go.

So, the hungry pigeon, in effect, draws an inference based on what he has just observed; on that basis, it makes a prediction: "the next time I preen my left wing, food will arrive". It then records the accuracy of that prediction based on what happens next time it preens its left wing. Variations or falsifications are noted, just as much as regularities and seeming verifications, and its understanding and behaviour are modified accordingly. The pigeon, in other words, (at a particular level) does just what we do as we try to figure out how the world works.

But where this gets sort of strange is in the case of organisms which have no organ of reason, like plants. For example, Sterelny, in his book "Thought in a Hostile World", mentions the "behaviour" of corn. After discussing the example of the decision-making processes of female reed warblers, he writes

"(Let's) consider the dilemma of a plant faced with unpredictable levels of threat from plant-eating bugs. Such a plant can devote all of its resources to growth, and hence to fast seed production should it survive. Or it can devote some fraction of its resources to the manufacture of chemical defenses that minimize damage from its enemies. But what fraction should the plant spend, if the level of threat is variable? Corn puts few resources into chemical warfare against plant-eating bugs, but it does have a system of inducible defense. If it is damaged in certain ways, it secretes a chemical that attracts the enemies of its attackers...Though variation in the environment matters, it must be detectable by the organism. If there is no sign the corn can use to detect changes in bug abundance, being able to crank up its defenses is no advantage.

On the other hand, it seems at least possible that what appears to superficially (and maybe only probabilistically) have the same behavioral effect as logical induction might just be a simpler behavior modifying trick –even in a conscious being and even in an unconscious machine. by the way, I am with Dennett on the consciousness thing—it isn’t a nonmaterial epiphenomenon—but again beside the point. I am thinking in terms of programs and neural operations.

---Do you mean that something which appears to us to be inductive reasoning might not be a form of reasoning at all? That perhaps it is pre-reason? What might it be?

Pain as quale is irrelevant to my concern.

---Sure, but not the point that if we are justified in inductively inferring pain (based on external signs), there is no reason to suppose we are not as justified in inductively inferring the ability to inductively infer.

The whole thing could be phrased for machines that unconsciously either reason inductively to achieve behavior modification or some other, say connectionist or purely analogue nondiscursive method.
Think of the little car again.

---K....

Again, the issue is whether neural/computational rules and steps are being followed that we would recognize as logical steps involving symbols whose content refers to what is supposedly being reasoned about. I doubt a spider is doing such a thing. One can probe a black box machine to reverse engineer it in principle at least. Subjectivity and first person perspectives are not at issue.

---My question is: if we could not "probe" but to a limited extent, the black box, and were left to try to figure out how it works just based on what it does; and we made certain inferences based on our observations of that, which were supported by more and more observations; and we then applied the very same method to understanding how the red box works (which appears to work in about the same way), with the same results, on what basis could we justifiably assume that the inner workings of the two boxes were in principle different? I don't know of any basis. Do you?

If we cannot think of any such basis, then I am not sure on what grounds we could regard the inner workings (vis-a-vis the particular issue we're talking about) of, say, an automated car, a human being, a pigeon, or even - I am embarrassed to say - a plant, as in principle different...I think it was P. F. Strawson who suggested once that "inductive reasoning" needed no logical justification, since it was pretty much equivalent to reason itself...but could it be equivalent to something more fundamental?

Something which at least has just the effects which we attribute to inductive inference seems to be a constant throughout nature, doesn't it?

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Good question; relevance. Atheists claim that they argue against God because such a "superstition" is harmful to the world. (Invalid reasoning - ad consequentiam).

You are mistaken here. Ad consequentiam is when one argues a proposition is untrue because it leads to undesirable consequences. Arguing that something is worthy of opposition because it leads to undesireable consequences is not an example of this. Indeed, if it were, that would consequentialist theories of ethics a trivial example of a logical fallacy, which it obviously is not. Presumably, the atheist thinks belief is wrong for other reasons. And most of them think - or at least say they think - it is harmful. It is the latter that is the justification for opposition and is no more an example of this fallacy than opposing dietary supplements sold on informercials. There are good and bad ways to confront atheists. In think you are in error here.

[_Gadianton]

Christians represent far less than half of the WW religious population,

john, it's quite simple, Christianity is close to home. Buddhism isn't.

It is the paranormal (anything that hints of the supernatural, an afterlife, a higher power, etc.) that hits the skeptic/atheist hot button.

Indicating that atheists must believe in voodoo and remote viewing.

Code: Select all

Well... I think we agree on all that. Ex-Mormons are angry with individual behavior, not the belief itself. Which does not invalidate the belief. We have to refute the theology of Mormonism, not its practices

You're right, no ex-mo's are angry at the belief Joseph Smith had that it was ok to coerce a 15 year old girl into a sexual relationship.

Nobody said hostility and anger are good things. You're losing context, son. I was merely making it clear that you were missing the point by suggesting there is hostility and anger towards a non-existent God.