Marg and alternative metaphysical assumptions.

[_Coggins7]

A general observation of marg's epistemplogical assumptions from another thread (and I disagree it wasn't relevant. These preconceptions color everything you've said there).




It needs to be born in mind here that marg is clearly, from this thread and others, coming from an alternaive religous perspective that I will here just call naturalism or metaphysical materialism. The core metaphysical concepts of this belief systems are a stern epistemological empiricism and positivism which claims, not simply a methadological validity to scientific method and the necessity of observation and empirical confirmation in such normative matters, but claims also, a priori we should keep firmly in mind, that outside of these methadologies or intellectual templates, no other reality exists (including gold plates, God, heaven or what have you)

It must be kept in mind that these are metaphysical assmuptions, not any possible extrapolations from the intellectual framework of the methadologies themselves. Logic, empiricism, and the scientific method are excellent tools for the level of reality with which they deal and within which they were created and to which they have direct reference. Outside of this particular mortal realm, they have little, if any epistemological value. This template has severe limitations balencing their definate strengths, and cannot be used as oracles to tell us anything beyond the perceptive range dictated by their inherant attributes.

This is the fundamental problem of scientism and metaphysical materialism generally: the attempt to push methdologies and cognitive frameworks beyond their bounds into realms outside their stict delimitations, and then to claim that anything remaining outside those delimitations does not exist. At the same time, we demand that any possible spheres of existence outside what we call the "natural" world conform to both our present understanding of that world and the perameters of the intellectual superstructures we've developed to explain it and the methadologies we've developed to explore and discover its features.

The problem is, of course, that the human methadologies and templates cannot be extracted from the very natural world within which they arose to explain that very natural world; their perceptual range, or shall we say, their perceptual depth of field, is embedded within the same empirical world as the phenomena they attempts to study and explain, and are therefore conditioned and limited by the rule, laws, and charactistics of that world