Daniel Peterson wrote:Dr. Shades wrote:Perhaps it's the newest strategy of Internet Mormonism: Convince everyone that the question of whether or not Smith was a genuine prophet doesn't really matter.
Except that (even if one were to accept the silly "internet"/"chapel" dichotomy) there's no particular reason to brand either Terryl or Reid an "internet Mormon" and neither Terryl nor Reid has suggested that "the question of whether or not Smith was a genuine prophet doesn't really matter."
Daniel Peterson wrote:Gadianton wrote:If I were to play devil's advocate, I would ask, how can a historian assess whether someone is a "prophet"?
I don't believe that a historian, qua historian, can do so.
Of course one cannot meaningfully set out to divide people into the two groups of 'prophet' and 'non-prophet' unless one believes that there is some meaningful content to the proposition [A] that "X is/was a prophet".
Whether or not one has to believe that there is a deity before affirming that [A] is meaningful is not clear.
For believers in the Abrahamic religions, a prophet is usually someone who is held to effectually convey the intentions or judgments of their deity to the rest of humanity. But what if one holds that there is no deity? Some might say that it is still possible to define a prophet by his or her function - i.e. that he or she is held by the members of a religion to be a genuine channel of revelation from the deity believed in by members of that religion. On those grounds an atheist engaged in studying the sociology of religion might describe Smith is a prophet because he is held by believing LDS to be a genuine channel of revelation from the deity they believe in.
Thus one could as an atheist meaningfully say: "I believe the teachings of the CoJCoLDS about the existence of a deity to be false; Joseph Smith is the principal LDS prophet". But it would be a good idea to state explicitly that one was using "prophet" here in a purely sociological sense, since otherwise one's statement might be read as expressing beliefs one did not hold.
So while I agree with DCP that historians do not as historians normally feel professionally qualified to address the question about the existence of a deity that underlies the decision about whether Smith was a prophet in a religious sense, I feel that they could perfectly well decide (say) that Smith was an LDS prophet in the sociological sense, and that Lucy Mack Smith was not.
Another question that historians are perfectly well equipped to address is whether somebody who produced a document claimed to be written by a person or persons in the remote past did actually recover a real ancient text, or whether they or other persons had deliberately written the document with the intention to mislead others as to its origins and nature. I need not give examples here. To that extent it would be possible for historians to discuss whether or not Smith (or somebody behind Smith) had produced the Book of Mormon, or the Book of Abraham, with the intention to mislead others.
Now a person who does things like producing fake documents to mislead others is what we commonly call a fraud. Therefore it is legitimate for historians to discuss whether Smith was a fraud. To conclude, an atheist historian of religion might conclude meaningfully and simultaneously:
(a) Smith was in certain respects a fraud.
(b) Smith is the principal prophet of the CoJCoLDS (in the sociological sense).
The conclusion that would then follow for LDS who hold Smith to be a prophet in the religious sense:
EITHER:
(c) The historians are wrong that Smith was a fraud
OR:
(d) The LDS deity has no problem with his prophet committing fraud.
Somehow I think they will go for (c). Either way, discussion of the question of whether or not Smith was a fraud seems an indispensable part (though certainly not the whole) of any multi-person and multi-disciplinary attempt to 'Re-appraise' Smith in the 21st century.
So why would one want to bypass the question?