Hume: 'Is-Ought'

[_Ren]

Hey, good to see you too! I got a bit tired of the mental gymnastics at MADB... I'm sure you understand. :P

Yeah - I get where ya comin' from ;)

Simply because a concept can be rationally validified doesn't necessarily make it absolutely true, but rather it makes it a) consistent with the data against which it was verified, b) within the computational system within our brains we call "logic". Can we know absolutely that human rationality is reliable? I don't think so, but since it's the best we have, we make do. I think we've done pretty well thus far.

Indeed. No problem with the notion that rationality isn't our golden ticket to absolute answers.

My question isn't 'Does rationality allow us to be truly certain about anything?'. I think you're saying that it doesn't, and I agree.

My question is 'Is there any other legitamte system of thought in our arsenal in determining what IS'. Are we ever justified using any other kind of thought processes when trying to determine what IS - so that we might call them 'better' at doing that job?

Of course, when we attempt to define "is" at a social (as opposed to individual) level, the increased value of empirical evidence comes into play. While experiential evidence may be personally useful, it is by nature not as reliable as data which can be obtained repeatably by anyone. The overvaluing of experiential evidence and the misinterpretation thereof (caused by stamping memories with desired implications) was my greatest logical fault as a believing Mormon, and I don't think I'm alone in that.

Hmm. I think I get what you're saying in general, but I'm intreagued as to how it would relate to Mormon belief. Would you mind sharing the details there? If not, not a prob. Just interested...

[_Canucklehead]

I was out walking for two hours this morning thinking about this topic because of your thread. I'll try to organise my thoughts and contribute something.

...or maybe I'll just keep my thoughts to myself. I'm undecided :P

[_Thama]

Indeed. No problem with the notion that rationality isn't our golden ticket to absolute answers.

My question isn't 'Does rationality allow us to be truly certain about anything?'. I think you're saying that it doesn't, and I agree.

My question is 'Is there any other legitamte system of thought in our arsenal in determining what IS'. Are we ever justified using any other kind of thought processes when trying to determine what IS - so that we might call them 'better' at doing that job?

Not that we've discovered so far, I don't think. However, I don't think the idea of logical positivism is... well... logical. I'm not advocating another system of thought, I simply question the human brain as being as capable of contemplating the universe as we'd like it to be.

Hmm. I think I get what you're saying in general, but I'm intreagued as to how it would relate to Mormon belief. Would you mind sharing the details there? If not, not a prob. Just interested...

Sure... what I was really getting at was the basis of a testimony. In my experience (or when I thought I had one), a testimony is made up of an initial spiritual experience (conditioned by a desire to believe) followed by life experiences and further spiritual experiences which support the conclusion already made. However, it is the nature of human memory to preserve only those experiences deemed meaningful and to discard the rest, and so it is with a testimony. Those experiences deemed in support of the desired belief are internally referenced countless times, while those which conflict softly with it are ignored. hard conflicts produce cognitive dissonance, but in those cases the person has usually built up enough supportive experiences that this dissonance may be repressed.

Hence the unreliability of experiential evidence even as a method for determining personal "is" and "ought". The data isn't fraudulent (though memories are easily altered, so this isn't even certain), just selective. We all do it, both as religious and secular people, but this seems to make little sense when examined.

[_Gadianton]

Renagade,

It's tough not to read too much into this. Somewhere in that same article or a related one you might come across David Lewis's example of a work of art. Without explaining the reduction, it seems straightforward that the beauty of a work of art is constrained by the exact placement of every little pixel. If you have two works of art, atom for atom identical, identical down to all quantum properties (which is probably physically impossible but not logically impossible) then you'd be hard pressed to say that they differ in beauty. You can debate the meaning of beauty all day and whether it's derived by human minds or intrinsic, radically emergent or a fiction we invented but however you cut it up, the truth remains that beauty is entirely constrained by the arrangement of the dots on the paper (you can extend this to historical context etc. for those who want to be picky). So to extend that to oughts, or the example of Hitler, it may be that you decide he's OK or whatever, but however you call it, you can't really imagine 2 physically identical worlds with the moral judgement varying. So some how or another, the moral judgement supervenes on the physical makeup of the universe.

[_Ren]

Not that we've discovered so far, I don't think. However, I don't think the idea of logical positivism is... well... logical. I'm not advocating another system of thought, I simply question the human brain as being as capable of contemplating the universe as we'd like it to be.

Hmm - I'm not sure whether you mean the very idea of logical positivism isn't logical, or whether taking it 'too seriously' isn't logical... Perhaps there is some kind of distinction there...

Sure... what I was really getting at was the basis of a testimony. In my experience (or when I thought I had one), a testimony is made up of an initial spiritual experience (conditioned by a desire to believe) followed by life experiences and further spiritual experiences which support the conclusion already made. However, it is the nature of human memory to preserve only those experiences deemed meaningful and to discard the rest, and so it is with a testimony. Those experiences deemed in support of the desired belief are internally referenced countless times, while those which conflict softly with it are ignored. hard conflicts produce cognitive dissonance, but in those cases the person has usually built up enough supportive experiences that this dissonance may be repressed.

Interesting, and I'm sure I agree.
Would it be accurate to say the final conclusion to be derived from this line of thinking is that the weight of 'spiritual experience' isn't quite as great or 'water-tight' as many Mormons would like to believe? Not throwing that out as a challenge - just to clarify if that's where the above is leading...

It's tough not to read too much into this

Yeah - that's true! :)

If you have two works of art, atom for atom identical, identical down to all quantum properties (which is probably physically impossible but not logically impossible) then you'd be hard pressed to say that they differ in beauty. You can debate the meaning of beauty all day and whether it's derived by human minds or intrinsic, radically emergent or a fiction we invented but however you cut it up, the truth remains that beauty is entirely constrained by the arrangement of the dots on the paper (you can extend this to historical context etc. for those who want to be picky). So to extend that to oughts, or the example of Hitler, it may be that you decide he's OK or whatever, but however you call it, you can't really imagine 2 physically identical worlds with the moral judgement varying. So some how or another, the moral judgement supervenes on the physical makeup of the universe.

OK.
Hmm - isn't this like saying that I am always going to read an 'S' character as an 'S' character? That given a certain 'reality', I'm always going to interperet it the same way? I mean - yeah sure. But - I'm not sure what the point is.
I mean, it doesn't change the fact that we humans invented the notion of an 'S' character - it didn't have the relavence it has as an S character until we came along and decided it would have that relavence. Isn't that the point? Maybe not - I guess I'm having trouble latching onto the real relavence of this thought experiment. I'm sure there is one, but I'm not getting it so far...

I mean, I think I get that the Ought is inherently linked to the 'is'. But that connection seems inherent on our ability to make a judgement. If there were no consious entities, there would be no 'Ought'.

Imagine the painting you describe surviving past all living things exist. I guess it's just a variation on a 'Can a sound exist if nobody can hear it?'. The vibrations woudl still exist of course, but if it's never heard, do we ever have the justification to call those vibrations a 'noise'?

Still haven't really dived into that link yet. Maybe that'll help...

I was out walking for two hours this morning thinking about this topic because of your thread. I'll try to organise my thoughts and contribute something.

...or maybe I'll just keep my thoughts to myself. I'm undecided :P

Na come on! Don't be a spoil sport! Heh :D

[_Thama]

Hmm - I'm not sure whether you mean the very idea of logical positivism isn't logical, or whether taking it 'too seriously' isn't logical... Perhaps there is some kind of distinction there...

Hmmm... I think it's more a matter of not taking it too seriously. I think we can get a decent idea of how seriously to take it by observing the intelligence of other animals, and comparing that with our perspective.

Imagine a monkey stuck in a cage at the end of a runway at an airport. As the planes take off over him, he is frightened and shakes the cage and screams. As he does so, the plane travels overhead and eventually the sound fades into the distance. Each time the planes come, he rattles the cage, and each time he is rewarded with the disappearance of the noise from the plane. He then concludes that his rattling of the cage is what rids him of the noise from the planes.

The monkey's logic is riddled with flaws from our perspective, but it is unlikely that he would be able to comprehend any of those flaws. And so, I have to ask myself, in the grand scheme of things are we so different than the monkey? It seems to me that the difference is likely one of degree, nothing more. What fundamental assumptions and flaws exist in our basic methods of reasoning and computation which result from the limitations of our nature?

Interesting, and I'm sure I agree.
Would it be accurate to say the final conclusion to be derived from this line of thinking is that the weight of 'spiritual experience' isn't quite as great or 'water-tight' as many Mormons would like to believe? Not throwing that out as a challenge - just to clarify if that's where the above is leading...

Yeah, basically. Hey, if someone really did have a real testimony based on non-contrived spiritual knowledge, then more power to them. I don't discount the possibility of reality existing outside of the rational and material. However, in my own experience, I found that those experiences on which I was willing to base my beliefs and life's decisions were inherently flawed.

[_Gadianton]

It is a big deal, or it least it ought to be a big deal. If oughts are entirely constrained by the physical, if in particular, it is not logically possible for two physically identical worlds to differ in moral characteristics, then there is nothing extra, such as say, a spiritual force or "intelligence" or light of Christ, or anything else that morals hold a dependency relation to. Unless those things are physical as well. There is not a difference morally between a brute physical world where everything is just atoms, and a world where there is a nonphysical "something extra" spiritual dimension.* If that could make a difference, then it would be logically possible to imagine a physical indentical world where Hitler is good.

*note that saying spiritual is physical ("no such thing as immaterial matter" Joseph Smith stuff) just adds a turtle to the stack and doesn't address the ontological question that this objection aims for.

[_Ren]

It is a big deal, or it least it ought to be a big deal. If oughts are entirely constrained by the physical, if in particular, it is not logically possible for two physically identical worlds to differ in moral characteristics, then there is nothing extra, such as say, a spiritual force or "intelligence" or light of Christ, or anything else that morals hold a dependency relation to. Unless those things are physical as well. There is not a difference morally between a brute physical world where everything is just atoms, and a world where there is a nonphysical "something extra" spiritual dimension.* If that could make a difference, then it would be logically possible to imagine a physical indentical world where Hitler is good.

*note that saying spiritual is physical ("no such thing as immaterial matter" Joseph Smith stuff) just adds a turtle to the stack and doesn't address the ontological question that this objection aims for.

Ahhh - ok. I get where ya comin' from (I think). And I agree. The 'Ought' isn't constructed .via some function obtained from some kind of unseen 'spiritual' realm or extra layer of reality.

But then, coming to a firm conclusion on that doesn't resolve (for me) how the 'Is-Ought' gap is bridged .via rationality alone. If it does for you, then I'd be interested in knowing how it does. Or maybe you're not saying that - not quite sure...

Imagine a monkey stuck in a cage at the end of a runway at an airport. As the planes take off over him, he is frightened and shakes the cage and screams. As he does so, the plane travels overhead and eventually the sound fades into the distance. Each time the planes come, he rattles the cage, and each time he is rewarded with the disappearance of the noise from the plane. He then concludes that his rattling of the cage is what rids him of the noise from the planes.

Heh - good little senario. I like it.

Ok - so first of all, let's endow this funky little monkey with a little more smarts - and allow it to work out a little experiment.
The next time a plane flies over, the monkey purposefully does NOT rattle it's cage - to see what happens.

The noise still goes away.

So what 'rational' conclusion should the monkey come to?

...is it that the rattling of it's cage has nothing to do with the noise staying or going away?
Seems reasonable doesn't it. The only trouble is it's a fairly brave statement - based on relatively little evidence. Were pretty sure that the monkey would happen to be right...

I mean, the monkey shaking it's cage really does have nothing to do with what the plane does. ...right? That's what rationality tells us - or at least what it tells me. But we can only trust rationality 'so much' - right? Maybe the monkey shaking it's cage and the plane are connected in some significant way, and we just don't know how...

...but should we put it down to a 'lucky guess'? I mean, the monkey knows nothing about planes. It probably doesn't know much about the cage it's shaking. It doesn't 'know' it's not connected based on any real understanding of either.

What if instead of that conclusion, the monkey reaches this conclusion:
"While it's possible shaking the cage and the noise are connected in some mysterious way, the evidence thus far gives me no reason to think there is any connection".

How about that conclusion? Well - I'd say this one smart monkey!

Basically, I think what I'm trying to drive at is:
We were looking at the idea of not taking rationality 'too seriously'.

But does that equate to:
We should only trust rationality so much - ever

...or, does it mean...

Rationality CAN be absolutely relied upon, as long as it's limitations are accepted?

Maybe it's a subtle difference. But I think there is some kind of distinction to be made there...

[_Thama]

Ok - so first of all, let's endow this funky little monkey with a little more smarts - and allow it to work out a little experiment.
The next time a plane flies over, the monkey purposefully does NOT rattle it's cage - to see what happens.

The noise still goes away.

So what 'rational' conclusion should the monkey come to?

...is it that the rattling of it's cage has nothing to do with the noise staying or going away?
Seems reasonable doesn't it. The only trouble is it's a fairly brave statement - based on relatively little evidence. Were pretty sure that the monkey would happen to be right...

I mean, the monkey shaking it's cage really does have nothing to do with what the plane does. ...right? That's what rationality tells us - or at least what it tells me. But we can only trust rationality 'so much' - right? Maybe the monkey shaking it's cage and the plane are connected in some significant way, and we just don't know how...

...but should we put it down to a 'lucky guess'? I mean, the monkey knows nothing about planes. It probably doesn't know much about the cage it's shaking. It doesn't 'know' it's not connected based on any real understanding of either.

What if instead of that conclusion, the monkey reaches this conclusion:
"While it's possible shaking the cage and the noise are connected in some mysterious way, the evidence thus far gives me no reason to think there is any connection".

How about that conclusion? Well - I'd say this one smart monkey!

The important part about the monkey in this thought experiment is that it is a valuable way for us to conceptualize the limits of our own mind as might be seen by a superior intelligence (whether alien, divine, or whatever). You are right in noting that this would be "one smart monkey" if he were to apply the scientific method to his situation! Though I'm hardly an expert on animal psychology, I'm pretty sure that this is a thought process outside the known capabilities of any animal besides human beings.

So, we have to decide: Have humans reached some sort of mental threshold, where our logic is finally "complete", our science is able to take on any problem, and our perspective faces no insurmountable barriers... or are we simply a step or two above this monkey, with our science and reason just as fundamentally flawed in ways that are completely outside our capability to comprehend?

Empiricism can be used to argue for both propositions, in a way. Science has presented many observations that defy our innate logic, particularly in the realm of quantum mechanics. Effects coming before causes, particles existing in multiple locations simultaneously... these are the sorts of things which appear (to me) to cast doubt on our form of rationality as being sufficient to really describe the universe at a fundamental level. However, the very fact that we are becoming aware of these limitations through empiricism suggests that we may have indeed crossed some sort of epistemological threshold, and that perhaps our ability to systematically observe the world and synthesize this data may prove to be the necessary check against our innate mental flaws.

Basically, I think what I'm trying to drive at is:
We were looking at the idea of not taking rationality 'too seriously'.

But does that equate to:
We should only trust rationality so much - ever

...or, does it mean...

Rationality CAN be absolutely relied upon, as long as it's limitations are accepted?

Maybe it's a subtle difference. But I think there is some kind of distinction to be made there...

I'd honestly have to go with the first one, simply because it's impossible to know where all of the limitations in rationality are by using rational means. No finite system can truly comprehend itself, or so I've been told. ;)

[_Moniker]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem

...can it be 'solved' by purely rational means?
...I say no, but I'm interested in other people's responses.

I think rationality - clearly - is the ONLY thought processes one should use to attempt to determine what 'is'. To use any other method is farcical.
...I also think that rationality can form some 'part' of bridging the 'Is-Ought' divide. But I can't see how it can be bridged whilst restricting ones self to rationality alone. At least, not in any kind of meaningful manner...

To me, it seems there has to be at least one 'irrational' component. Some minimum amount of 'gut feeling', or 'instinct'.

Okay, I may totally be missing the point here, yet, it appears to me that an 'is' can be determined and the 'ought' is not all about rationality. Doesn't part of the 'ought' come from our limbic system when they flood our bodies with emotions and reactions to certain behaviors? This is NOT rational. Of course there are problems with looking at ethics purely from an evolutionary standpoint as there are behaviors such as reciprocal altruism and then on the flipside we actually encode into legislation or individually (and collectively) take actions that would go against our self interest.

We can have heated debates about what is the ethical thing to do in a variety of circumstances. Got together and discuss the 'is' and then have a broad range of answers to the 'ought' -- is it something about our intuitions/gut instincts that make certain scenarios more universal in agreeing to 'oughts'?