Philosophy and Physics agree about God?

[_huckelberry]

One of the concepts of idealism is that consciousness is universal, and that all entities are composed of mind and/or spirit - what this means is a debate unto itself as there is a whole range of idealists beliefs and timbres. We are not questioning whether human consciousness occurs independent of a body, rather asking for evidence that any consciousness at all exists independent of a physical host.

I can see that it is correct to observe there is a range of idealist beliefs. The idea that all entities are composed of mind or spirit sounds a lot more like animism than any sort of philosophical idealism however. It sounds like some variety of early Mormon speculative thought, (was it Parley Pratt?) wherein things obeyed God consciously because they agreed he was just and deserved obedience. That is some distance away from Plato Aristotle and the idealist tradition in Christian thought. If things are a result of,or are pure ideas in the mind of God that would not imply that each thing had its own consciousness.

In the link Mikwut povided Keith Ward proposes his own consciousness as the starting point for considering mind. He mentions, perhaps awkwardly that he could imagine thought without a body but also stated he did not know if such could be possible. I am not sure where or how you could look for such an uncertain event.

[_Ceeboo]

Dear and beloved thread participants,

Thank you all for the enormous headache!

(I can't believe I just read this entire thread)

Love you all and peace to you all,
Ceeboo

[_Maksutov]

Dear and beloved thread participants,

Thank you all for the enormous headache!

(I can't believe I just read this entire thread)

Love you all and peace to you all,
Ceeboo

We'll all survive it somehow.

[_Chap]

I see this thread is dying the death foreordained for all threads, but just for the record:

viewtopic.php?p=974635#p974635

I'm interested in science. I don't see anything in the discussions that have occupied several pages of this thread that would actually lead to different practical decisions about how to do scientific research on the brain in relation to consciousness. It's essentially all about what words one might use when talking about consciousness. Fine for those who are interested.
...

Doing science is interesting. Talking about philosophy is interesting, but in a different way. So far I have not seen (or at least failed to perceive) anything on this thread that amounts to something interesting that philosophy has to suggest to brain scientists about the way they might actually do their research.

If there is something interesting that philosophy, as represented in this thread, has to suggest to brain scientists about the way they might actually do their research, I'd like to hear it.

And yet, I am told ...

... my advice Chap is that if you don't care about the discussion, then don't particpate in it. Don't sneer at it and demand everyone else's interests be your own.

I think EAllusion may be addressing somebody else, perhaps an imaginary Chap constructed from straw?

On the second level, you're asking why some fundamental questions in epistemology and ontology are important. This sort of reminds me of someone who demands that all scientific research have an immediate practical application.

I don't think that the analogy between the early stages of blue-sky work in the sciences on the one hand and philosophy (as opposed to science) on the other is a very good one. Notoriously, blue-sky and apparently pointless science often has led to unexpected useful applications. How often have 'epistemology and ontology' done that? Note that this does not mean they are unworthy objects of human attention.

Phil of Mind also does have practical implications for cog science related fields ...

I have given up hoping that you will cash this out by actually giving an example of how one might (for instance) do brain research differently in practice as a result of the conclusions of philosophical discussions on the mind.

The relationship is similar to phil of science to science.

Now you're depressing me. I say that because my overwhelming impression from seeing a fair bit of philosophy of science done is that it is an, at times, quite interesting branch of philosophy that studies philosophical problems generated by science. The traffic of ideas in the reverse direction is at best no more than a tiny trickle in comparison.

[_EAllusion]

How often have 'epistemology and ontology' done that? Note that this does not mean they are unworthy objects of human attention.

Well, science and how we understand how to do science itself derives from them, so a lot?

I have given up hoping that you will cash this out by actually giving an example of how one might (for instance) do brain research differently in practice as a result of the conclusions of philosophical discussions on the mind.

Phil of mind has a lot to say about what sorts of artificial intelligence might be possible to create, what sorts of problems they can solve, and therefore what might be productive to spend time on. Is a conscious mind reducible into computable phenomena? If so, we might be able to build one. If not, should we even try? Does it matter?

What about dangers of A.I.? Is it possible to build strong A.I. - or something that looks like strong A.I. that can obey red-line instructions? Do functioning minds allow for this?

...

[_EAllusion]

Now you're depressing me. I say that because my overwhelming impression from seeing a fair bit of philosophy of science done is that it is an, at times, quite interesting branch of philosophy that studies philosophical problems generated by science. The traffic of ideas in the reverse direction is at best no more than a tiny trickle in comparison.

Scientists talk of philosophy of science all the time. It's built directly into the language of methodology, evidence, and theory-crafting. Perhaps this isn't done in a rigorous fashion - it usually isn't - but it most importantly informs how scientists conceptualize evidence and derive means to find it. Some of this is diffuse and develops out of the sociological process of scientists doing science that is later studied by philosophers of science. Some of this is the result of formal philosophy of science filtering back through the ranks of science from those that read/study it to those that don't.

[_cognitiveharmony]

This seems relevant to this thread. Elon Musk thinks that the odds that we're living in a simulation are extremely likely.

http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/2/11837874/elon-musk-says-odds-living-in-simulation

[_DrW]

This seems relevant to this thread. Elon Musk thinks that the odds that we're living in a simulation are extremely likely.

http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/2/11837874/elon-musk-says-odds-living-in-simulation

Interesting pop science concept. Might even be true. Unfortunately, it is no more of a cosmology than is goddidit.

[_EAllusion]

http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/2/11837874/elon-musk-says-odds-living-in-simulation

Interesting pop science concept. Might even be true. Unfortunately, it is no more of a cosmology than is goddidit.

Not really. The reasoning is very similar to the reasoning that informs the idea that it is likely there is intelligent life in the universe not on Earth. That reasoning is in error, but it is super-popular even among scientifically well-educated people.

If you start trying to explain features of the universe, why something is this way instead of that, simply by saying, "Because that's how the simulation is set up" then you have a "goddidit" style explanation.

There are queer aspects of the universe. There are things we cannot currently reasonably explain like quantum entanglement. It'd be easy and effectively worthless to say, "Well, that could happen in a simulation, The simulation explains it." And it would be so for the exact same reason that "It's that way because this is something God wants" is a failed explanation of anything. But merely proposing that the universe is likely a simulation is not doing that.

[_EAllusion]

Musk's argument is as follows:

1) Progression in technology has demonstrated that it is possible for an intelligent species to create a simulation of reality that is sufficient to be indistinguishable from our experience of reality.

2) It is possible to create many more simulated universes than there exists natural universes.

3) Given sufficient time, an intelligent species will have developed many simulated universes.

4) Intelligent species with technological progression beyond present-day humans likely exist.

5) Therefore, if you find yourself in a universe, it's probably a simulated one.