Apostates, Whistleblowers, Law, and Social Control
James T. Richardson
This is an interesting essay with more pertinent citations. He is exploring the previously mentioned fact that although there is correlation between the type of organization and the type of leavetaker, there are some exceptions to the rule. He first states that it is reasonable to assume that most people who leave the organization voluntarily will be simple “defectors”, who just “leave and go on with their lives”. However, there are “examples of the adoption of apostate and whistleblower roles by voluntary exiters, some of which will be discussed therein.” (p 171)
The examples of voluntary exiters becoming apostates and whistleblowers usually involve something dramatic happening that sours the participant on the group and its leaders in a somewhat rapid and dramatic way. However, as scholars have noted, what appears dramatic and rapid may actually have been developing over a period of time, with some event then becoming the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.”
The apostate and whistleblower roles may also develop from circumstances of “extraction”; this is more likely to occur with organizations in high tension with the external environment. Bromley (Ch 2 this volume) refers to these organizations as “Subversive” in a very specific sense: they are perceived and labeled “Subversive” by oppositional groups as a tactic for status degradation that legitimates implementation of extraordinary social control measures. Some research, such as that by Solomon and Lewis and Bromley shows that deprogramming is actually a form of radical resocialization that sometimes results in the deprogrammee adopting a quite negative perspective toward the former group of membership. Indeed, deprogrammers might define development of this negative perspective as a successful deprogramming. It is instructive on this point that a number of prominent deprogrammers have themselves been deprogrammed, sometimes quite dramatically. Thus deprogramming has sometimes resulted in a person changing from devoted member to avid apostate and even whistleblower, as he or she acts out a new role of deprogrammer (or “exit counselor” as some now prefer to be called.) (p 172)
Apparently, given Juliann’s latest comments, it is necessary once again to explain the term “Subversive” in the specific sense it is used in this text: “they are perceived and labeled “Subversive” by oppositional groups as a tactic for status degradation that legitimates implementation of extraordinary social control measures.”
The label “Subversive” has nothing to do with a moral judgment on the part of the author’s, or on my part when I utilize it. It has to do with how the larger host society views the NRM. That view may well be inaccurate, or it may be accurate. The view has been developed by the intentional actions of the oppositional coalition who wants to escalate social concern about this group in order to put pressure on social groups to exert external social control on the NRM in question.
This chapter will examine the role of apostates and whistleblowers in exerting social control over controversial new or minority religious groups, especially examining the role played by apostates and whistleblowers within the legal arena as part of social control efforts. As the examination proceeds, the issue of the derivation of apostates and whistleblowers will also be addressed, in an effort to better understand how apostasy and whistleblowing develop within the context of the world of newer and smaller faiths.
SOCIAL CONTROL OF DEVIANT RELIGIOUS GROUPS
Social control in the context of minority religious groups refers to attempts to exercise formal or informal authority over these religious groups, including efforts by governmental authorities as well as by private parties. Such efforts often involve legal or regulatory actions, but also may include use of media and other means to assist in constructing certain definitions of minority religious groups that facilitate exertions of social control over the groups.
Former members of controversial religious groups often play a major legitimating role in efforts at social control. They can claim to have been eye witnesses to key events, and can offer interpretations as an insider of the group of former membership. As such, the disaffected former members are apostates, playing the role of whistleblower, with claims to unique knowledge about the inside workings of a given religious group.
These claims can be thought of as “atrocity tales”, or unique “accounts” in the technical sense of those terms used in sociology. Atrocity tale is a concept developed by Bromley, Shupe and Ventimiglia which refers to events that flagrantly violate some fundamental cultural value and which evoke moral outrage to the extent that social control actions against the group perpetrating the event are warranted. Apostates acting in the role of whistleblower can claim to have seen or participated in events, while a member, that meet the definition of atrocity tale, and their account of what happened can legitimate social control efforts. (p 173)
I share this to, once again, demonstrate the context in which the term “apostate” and “apostate narrative”, along with the embedded “captivity” and “atrocity” tales are used in this particular text. The point of the oppositional coalition is not simply to share negative information about the NRM, but rather to influence the opinion of the larger host society. If there is enough concern in the host society about either the NRM as a whole, or one specific activity in particular (this is explained more later), then pressure can be applied to regulatory units to step in and intervene. This is the goal of the oppositional coalition. This is why “atrocity tales” are needed, and only apostates who offer such atrocity tales can be utilized. That is why the pressure exists for apostates who want to be used by such groups to modify their stories accordingly.
Accounts are functional for those proposing them, and they can have a major self-serving element. Apostates’ accounts also may serve the interests of those trying to discredit such groups, and thus such defectors can achieve a position of prominence with organizations opposed to certain religious groups. This confluence of interests of anti-cult movements and apostates from new religions is often a key feature in legal battles that attempt to exert social control over new and minority religions, and the apostate qua whistleblower often plays a lead role in such battles. (p 173)
Once again, the context demonstrates that apostates are used by oppositional coalitions – apostates do not constitute the entire coalition. Moreover, they are used with a specific purpose in mind.
Social control of deviant religious or political groups is dicey business, however, particularly in a society that values free expression. Effective social control requires authorities willing to exert official authority and a populace willing for that to happen (assuming, of course, that the populace is aware of the effort at control). Neither of those elements is automatically present, but must be engineered. (p 173)
This sentence is very relevant: Neither of those elements is automatically present, but must be engineered.
It is in the engineering of those elements that the apostate narrative is utilized, and pressure applied to make sure that tale fits the specified parameters.
There are times when the accusations are so outrageous that it is easy to engineer these elements, the author point out, as is the case with allegations of child abuse. And, of course, sometimes these elements and values change over time. Richardson points out that when certain communal groups such as the Moonies began recruiting in the late 60s and early 70s, the host society was not automatically negative in its reaction to aggressive proselytizing. In fact, they were sometimes praised for keeping kids off of drugs and giving them a moral purpose. But as time went on, social opinion changed and proselytizing was “redefined as ‘stealing children’”, and they were accused of actual brainwashing techniques.
Most of the commentary regarding engineering social elements in order to persuade regulatory units to intervene has focused on Subversive organizations up to this point. Richardson makes the salient observation, however, that sometimes Contestant organizations can be vulnerable but the focus is normally on one particular practice that is seen as dangerous by mainstream society, instead of the entire group, such as is the case with a Subversive organization. One such example is the practice of the Christian Science group to counsel their members to avoid medical intervention, even with their children. In the past this was viewed as a more benign practice, but as some notorious cases gained public spotlight, the attitude has changed towards this practice. So although the Christian Science group is not a Subversive organization as the term is utilized in this text, it is Contestant in that this one particular practice has opened the door to the creation of oppositional coalitions determined to get the government to intervene in behalf of children whose health is endangered, according to these oppositional groups.
Of course, often the government will not intervene, in which cases private groups attempt to address the perceived need for social control. This was already seen in the phenomenon in which, once the government would not intervene supportively in the brainwashing allegations, the niche was filled instead with private counselors.
Some social control efforts are private in nature, even if they receive great attention from the general public. That is, they involve private citizens who feel strongly enough about something to spend their time and resources trying to change a situation that allows the activity in question to occur. In the history of controversial religious groups some of the most ardent critics have been former members of some of the groups. When former members adopt such a critical stance and act on their views they easily fit the definitions of apostate-turned-whistleblower that informs this collection. Some of those strong critics have become involved in dramatic activities, including deprogramming and whistle-blowing-type claims that have provoked official action against the groups. Motivations are not always obvious in such instances, but what is clear that sometimes former members devote their lives to efforts at social control. They may spend large amounts of time educating media representatives, governmental officials (including those in law enforcement), and others about the alleged evils of a group.
Such self-help social control actions are given impetus when official authorities cannot or will not take action that some detractors think is warranted. (p 176)
Note again, the context these remarks: this is more than vocal critics of a NRM; this is a group of individuals who want the state to intervene and exert some form of control over the group (or over one particular practice in the group). If the state refuses to do so, self-help groups may try to fill the niche. Normally, most of this is originated in opposition to the “Subversive” groups, although, as noted with the Christian Science example, one particular practice could be targeted in a Contestant group. (or even an Allegiant group, as with the child abuse scandal and the catholic church)
Richardson goes on to provide examples from the Church Universal and Triumphant which was, of course, accused of brainwashing and ended up in legal courts. The same was true with his next example, the Unification Church taken to court. His Hare Krishna example followed suit, as did the example from the Children of God, who had been accused of wide spread child abuse. The Contestant example was the previously mentioned Christian Science practice of avoiding medical treatment, even for their children.
Efforts at social control by authorities may be validated by whistleblowing-type claims made by ex-members, and self-help social control efforts by ex-members can be tacitly sanctioned as well, because of claims some former members are willing to make. Some claims are more obviously factual than others (a claim based on the fact that a child has died has more concreteness than a claim that someone was “brainwashing,” for instance), but even if such claims are not borne out after investigation, the claims can still be very disruptive for the groups involved. (p 184)
In trying to make a case that exmormons on groups such as RFM fit this model, I suppose one could claim that the group is pointing to, in general, a deliberate act of deception on the part of church leaders who choose to hide certain problematic information from members. This, of course, is difficult to prove, although Mauss seems to feel it is valid:
Interestingly enough, however, the Tanner case, by its very singularity, illustrates the difficulty in maintaining visible apostate careers when a successful movement like Mormonism moves increasingly in the Allegiant direction. Although modern Mormonism certainly has its enemies, they are no longer numerous or powerful enough to constitute a large oppositional market for products like those of the Tanners. Indeed, from the viewpoint of Mormon leaders, perhaps the most vexing uses of the Tanner materials have been by those curious subscribers within the Mormon fold (or marginal to it), who simply want access to controversial documents and information that the leaders themselves try to keep out of circulation! Yet the Tanners have earned a certain grudging respect in Utah for their sincerity and integrity. Although they sometimes use inflammatory rhetoric and naïve reasoning, they have usually substantiated their claims carefully, and they have avoided tabloid scandal-mongering for its own sake (unlike Ex-Mormons for Jesus). Furthermore, the Tanners were among the first to suspect fraud in Mark Hofmann’s “discoveries” of certain debunking “historical documents” from early Mormonism, and to say so publicly. (p 63)
But to try and build a case that exmormons are attempting to exert “social control” seems rather far fetched. Instead, they seem to be engaged in whistleblowing activities outside the connection with an “apostate narrative”.
Richardson states that all type of exiters can occur in all types of organization, but the examples he provides from Contestant organizations specifically address one particular practice, not the entire religious organization, such as the Christian Science example.
For instance, a persona may, after observing some major breach of ethics by a leader or experiencing some traumatic event not covered adequately by a group’s theodicy or practice, become disillusioned, leading to apostasy. This apostasy might come to the attention of other groups in conflict with the original group of membership (such as anti-cult organizations). Such opposing groups could cultivate the apostate, seeking to turn him or her into a whistleblower. (p 186)
Once again, context is crucial to understanding. What other groups are in conflict with Mormonism other than exmormons themselves, and the already mentioned anti-cult ministries? Mormonism is simply not that controversial within the larger society anymore, although it certainly once was.
This process of “courting apostates” deserves more attention than it has been given. Plainly, one might predict that such a process would be more prone to develop in situations involving strong oppositional groups. This leads to the prediction that groups more in conflict with the values of the dominant culture (“Subversive” according to Bromley) would be more prone to experience the whistleblowing phenomenon. But, ‘apostate courting’ might also occur with traditional groups, usually on specific issues. (p 186)
One of Richardson’s footnotes is revealing in regards to the nature of Subversive groups:
1. Another variable of import in this process is communal versus non-communal, which may be related to the typology developed by Bromley. As Richardson, van der Lans, and Derks note, the three major types of leaving – voluntary exiting, extraction, and expulsion operate differently, depending on the type of organization (communal or non-communal) the participant leaves. And the labeling that takes place, both before and after the leaving event, and the accounts of the leaving that are developed by major parties vary in terms of type of organization. The greater the tension with the external environment (ie, the more “Subversive” a group was perceived) the more leaving such a group would be conducive to the development of contradictory and dramatic labeling and accounts. (p 186)
This is another demonstration of what I’ve been saying: the Subversive groups tend to be ones that actually remove its members from the larger society and hence creates the need for an “atonement” for the act of joining the group in the first place, as well as the assurance that it won’t happen again and the individual wants re-entry into traditional society. Although certainly the LDS church “separates” families in the eternities, and in certain situations like temple weddings (when nonLDS or unworthy LDS are not allowed entry) but it certainly is not comparable to what is being discussed in this text.