Hello everyone
I am the Christian at intelligentscience.org that was arguing with Bad at badidea.wordpress.com.
I'd like to copy a part of a reply I gave Bad on my blog in the comments section of this post:
http://intelligentscience.wordpress.com ... omment-133I think it will help clarify my point to Bad about explanations. And we can discuss from there. This reply went unanswered by Bad, possibly because he went of vacation shortly after but that's just me giving Bad the benefit of the doubt. Those in italics are quotes from Bad.
“I would put “uniformity of nature” down as simply a subset of the ontological nature of the universe. All my criticisms are exactly the same for all such claims: there’s no actually explanation going on in this explanation. You keep getting hung up on me calling it an “explanation” and then saying that it’s not really one: my meaning is that it is an alleged explanation (i.e. you call it an explanation, and I refer to it like that), but one that does not actually do what an explanation needs to do. It fails as an explanation of anything.”
Ok, I see what’s going on here. My response to this paragraph will respond to most of the post, so I apologize if it seems like I’ve skipped over some of your points.
Let’s briefly define some terms first. If you disagree with any of these definitions we can, of course, discuss them. Empericism: the idea that the only true knowledge can be gained through the studying of our sense experience. Scientific results are “emperical” results. Metaphysical: describes phenomena that cannot be viewed with our senses or tested as a sense experience. Worldview: a set of presuppositions that cannot be emperically tested that are the basis for one’s beliefs. Everything we reason through is filtered through the basic presuppositions of our worldview. See “Worldviews are for Everyone”.
When I state the premise, “Science requires the uniformity of nature”, this is a metaphysical premise. We can’t test it empirically. When I ask the question, “What worldview (set of presuppositions) better explains our collective presupposition that nature is uniform?”, this is metaphysical question. When I say, “God explains the uniformity of nature”, this is a metaphysical answer. When you say, “Well that’s not an explanation at all, it doesn’t do what explanations should do,” you are expecting an empirical answer to a metaphysical question. In fact, you reject all of my “explanations” as not being explanations. You are correct, they are NOT empirical explanations. But I’m not asking empirical questions. I’m not putting forth empirical evidence. There can be no empirical explanations for metaphysical issues such as the uniformity of nature and the existence of God.
Now, what you might be thinking is something along the lines of, “Well, if metaphysical issues cannot be tested empirically then there is no point in discussing them, they are useless” (I have gathered you lean in this direction, if I’m wrong then please let me know). You’ll have two problems, #1: You’ll have to define your idea of “utility” and prove that metaphysics are indeed useless but #2, (and this is the big one) EVERY SINGLE empirical result REQUIRES a metaphysical assumption. As you’ve touched on, in order to get an empirical result you must first assume that matter exists (a metaphysical assumption). You must also assume that nature is uniform, which is the point of this discussion.
To pass over your metaphysical assumption and focus on the empirical results based on it, is to be irrational and inconsistent. To expect empirical explanations to metaphysical issues (Does God explain the uniformity of nature or the beginning of the universe?) is to be disingenuous.
I said: “I have a simple premise; Science requires that nature is uniform.
You responded: “Only in the sense that we could not do science without that being true. But if it wasn’t true, then we couldn’t do science. So what?”
EXACTLY. Every single empirical result you get is useless without the metaphysical assumption that nature is uniform.
“They are simply your beliefs: a hypothetical assertion that you a) can’t provide any reason to believe is true and b) can’t provide any reason to believe is useful for explaining any mysteries about the natural world."
Ok, here’s the problem. You have a worldview too. The most basic presupposition of your worldview is that “God doesn’t exist”. You can say, “No, I just haven’t seen enough evidence to convince me…”, but you start your reasoning with the assumptions that God doesn’t exist. “God doesn’t exist” is what you believe; if you didn’t believe that you wouldn’t be an atheist. You can’t provide any empirical reason that this is true, and “God doesn’t exist” isn’t useful for emperically explaining the mysteries about the natural world.
But, here’s the MAIN POINT: Atheism can’t provide any METAPHYSICAL explanations EITHER. Your atheistic metaphysics has no explanation for the uniformity of nature, because, by definition, the universe was a chance occurance and is unguided by anything, nothing sustains the universe and causes it to be ANY certain way. You have no reason to believe that nature is uniform, you must simply have blind faith that it is so.
“If you want to play the game with a being that can do anything, I’ll just counter with a universe in which anything can happen. So what? That doesn’t really explain anything either.”
But see, that’s the problem, you have no metaphysical or empirical reason to think that “anything can happen” in the universe. And if you do postulate some all powerful universe that can do “anything”, you have merely replaced the word “God” with the word “universe” because the word “God” doesn’t allow you to be an atheist anymore. Also, again you are expecting an empirical explanation for metaphysical statements and you are incorrect that Christians believe God can do “anything”.
I'm not sure if that backtracks, or helps, the discussion going on here but I hope it helped it. I look forward to the comments I get.