The Moral Argument for Theism

[_KevinSim]

It would be a mistake to place God within the realm of the natural.

Stakhanovite, why do you think so?

[_MrStakhanovite]

Stakhanovite, why do you think so?

If you put God in the universe, with a physical body, God becomes a thing among things, even if he is THE thing among things, God now becomes a scientific question, and the existence of God becomes the exact type of question empirical science is good at doing, telling us what is in this natural universe.

[_EAllusion]

It would be a mistake to place God within the realm of the natural.

Why? Outside of the tradition of calling God supernatural, it doesn't appear to be something that has to be the case. Again, the main driver of the problem is that there isn't a good coherent demarcation between natural and supernatural for this kind of thing. It's more based on convention about what has been called natural and supernatural. You can play along with that, but I don't think it is the basis for the strict ontology he wants to set up. What's your definition of natural?

[_EAllusion]

I think that these two premises can be defended quite plausibly. Let’s start with the claim that the basis of moral facts is not natural. Obviously this is a real bone of contention, because a large number of atheists consider themselves moral and also recognise a lot of things in the world around them as either moral or immoral: Charity is morally good. Rescuing prisoners of war is morally good. The pursuit of justice, love and so on. Most atheists also believe that some things are morally wrong: Child molestation, torturing people for fun, greed etc. When people in general – atheist or otherwise – see these things, we don’t just think “well that’s not in keeping with our social norms.” We actually think that as a matter of fact those things ought not to be done. And given that atheists in general believe this, they are hesitant to believe that moral facts couldn’t be natural, because a thoroughgoing atheist worldview is, I think, best construed as entirely naturalistic. There is nothing other than what is natural, so if moral facts aren’t natural, then we’d have to doubt that they exist at all, which seems enormously counter-intuitive in light of what people tend to find themselves instinctively knowing about the world.

But could moral facts just be facts of nature? I don’t think so. I know that some atheists have tried to argue that moral facts are just natural facts with no need of a divine lawgiver, but I don’t see that they’ve been very successful. The reason is that moral facts have to do, not with the way that things just are in the world, but rather to do with the way that things should be in the world. But if there world is not here for a reason. If unintended nature is all there is, then there simply is no way that things were meant to be. Natural facts are facts about what is, not facts about the way things should be. We observe animals killing and eating each other and we don’t regard it as a moral atrocity because it is merely a fact of nature. It is that way. But if natural facts are the only kinds of facts, then the same is true of human beings, surely. People maim and torture each other, they rape, exploit and terrorise each other, and that is they way it is.

I figured he'd try to defeat moral naturalism with the open question argument.

If moral statements are referent of natural properties, then they are natural statements. Not that I believe this, but if "Torturing babies for fun is wrong" mapped onto "Torturing babies for fun causes aggregate pain" then the former statement is a natural statement. This does not necessarily account for moral motivation, though. The "oughtness" of the moral claim can be interpreted as "If you were to be moral, then you would do X." People must supply their own motivation to be moral on this analysis through their disposition to do so. It is, in Humean terms, a sentiment. Moral statements tell me what is and is not moral, and I bring to the table my desire to be moral or not. Why ought I to be moral is a question that can't be answered without begging the question.

But suppose that is not satisfactory; he really mucks up the problem in that a divine lawgiver does not account for moral motivation the way he wants either. It doesn't help explain anything. If he asserts that God can simply create moral truths that force oughtness in their very nature, then why can't they exist with that nature anyway? If he asserts that moral motivation is a consequence of God's capacity to reward and/or punish good and bad behavior, then all that says is that one should do what is in one's interest. That's just ethical egoism, which is true or false regardless of whether God exists. And it still doesn't tell us why one ought to behave in one's interest. Why should I do that? Even if I had a disposition to do so, that doesn't mean I should do it.

Regarding his final line, it does not follow from the fact that it is natural for people and animals to behave in ways that we describe as immoral that moral naturalism entails viewing those things as moral. It could still be the case that it is a fact that that behavior is wrong where "wrong" refers to some describable state of affairs (such as thwarting aggregate desire fulfillment.)

[_Gadianton]

I think that these two premises can be defended quite plausibly. Let’s start with the claim that the basis of moral facts is not natural. Obviously this is a real bone of contention, because a large number of atheists consider themselves moral and also recognise a lot of things in the world around them as either moral or immoral:

Next time you talk to your friend Stak, thank him for throwing us this bone. I'll return the favor, as I discuss science, I will make sure to always note that a large number of Christians consider themselves rational.

When people in general – atheist or otherwise – see these things, we don’t just think “well that’s not in keeping with our social norms.” We actually think that as a matter of fact those things ought not to be done.

I don't think it's quite this simple. There are some discussions to be had with his fellow Mormons regarding presentism. But this is nearly a side issue for this discussion.

And given that atheists in general believe this, they are hesitant to believe that moral facts couldn’t be natural, because a thoroughgoing atheist worldview is, I think, best construed as entirely naturalistic.

David Hume who posed the is-ought problem and Gregory Moore who invented the "naturalistic fallacy" and argued for moral non-naturalism and realism, were both atheists for all intents and purposes. Dated? Maybe, but let's not think that non-naturalism has significant roots in "supernatural" or theistic morality. In fact,

Somewhat surprisingly, Moore in effect also argues that most forms of non-naturalism are also guilty of what he calls the naturalistic fallacy. In particular, he argues that so-called “metaphysical ethics,” according to which goodness is a non-natural property existing in “supersensible reality” also are guilty of the naturalistic fallacy. So, for example, a view according to which goodness is the property of being commanded by God where God is understood as existing outside of Nature is also charged with having committed the naturalistic fallacy.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral ... sm/#ExpSup

But could moral facts just be facts of nature? I don’t think so. I know that some atheists have tried to argue that moral facts are just natural facts with no need of a divine lawgiver, but I don’t see that they’ve been very successful. The reason is that moral facts have to do, not with the way that things just are in the world, but rather to do with the way that things should be in the world.

Is-ought? Thanks David Hume.

Natural facts are facts about what is, not facts about the way things should be.

But the tables can be turned. (This is one of my favorite SEP articles, by the way) As physicalist positions nuance, the discussion of morality changes. We have a hard time imagining how an ought is derived from an is, but we might also have a hard time imagining a world where morals do not supervene on the physical world.

Global supervenience theses are perhaps the most plausible ones, claiming merely that two entire possible worlds cannot differ only in their moral properties without also differing in some of their natural properties. To deny this thesis would be to allow that it could have been the case that the world was exactly like the actual world in all of its naturalistic features but in that world what Hitler did was not wrong. Since all the natural facts are the same in this possible world it will still be true that Hitler killed the same people, had the same intentions, etc. Such bare moral differences seem inconceivable.

Whether this argument can win is contested in the article and there is a lot more to the discussion, but this is a pretty solid "intuitive" point scored in my opinion that rivals the intuition of the is-ought distinction.

What am I ultimately trying to say here?

I do not have the answer to morality, or even a preferred theory. But--

(1) I wish to point out that the apologists online oversimplify the problem of morals into John Adam's Center level discourse and easily reassure the choir. This guy has a Phd, I'm sure he knows much more about ethics than I do, but it's fashionable for believers of an analytical bent to oversimplify and make their victories of God-centered belief look easy. It's a Meridian thing.

(2) I wish to point out that the discussion of non-naturalism vs. naturalism has nothing intrinsically to do with theism. Read this whole article, God barely rears his head. I'm not saying that theists can't adopt positions invented by atheists to their advantage, but the way I've seen apologists present the problem of morals over the years, it's like, morality is the theist's sturdy hull that atheists have bruised their bodies over the years trying to breech. But in reality, the most fruitful discussions of morals and values stem from philosophical wrangling that is at the very least, agnostic.

[_EAllusion]

Divine command theory, the position he favors, is so rarely argued in moral theory that I can think of only one notable modern expert in the field who adopted it. And Quinn's material on it took the tone of, "It's not as bad as you think guys..." I'm sure there are more, but it is a highly fringe view to the point that it is correct to say the field is secular. The existence of a god doesn't help solve any vexing problems in the field and grounding morality in its will/nature creates several new ones (see Euthyphro dilemma). When you rely on God's magical ability to solve any problem by simply saying "God could make it that way" you haven't solved anything and the other side can play the same game by saying, "Reality could be like that."

So to act as though atheists are struggling to come up with some passable alternative to the towering fortress that is the position of a divine moral lawgiver does come across as framing the issue dubiously.

[_MrStakhanovite]

It would be a mistake to place God within the realm of the natural.

Why? Outside of the tradition of calling God supernatural, it doesn't appear to be something that has to be the case. Again, the main driver of the problem is that there isn't a good coherent demarcation between natural and supernatural for this kind of thing. It's more based on convention about what has been called natural and supernatural. You can play along with that, but I don't think it is the basis for the strict ontology he wants to set up. What's your definition of natural?

Before I answer, is the "he" in this KevinSims?

[_MrStakhanovite]

Divine command theory, the position he favors, is so rarely argued in moral theory that I can think of only one notable modern expert in the field who adopted it. And Quinn's material on it took the tone of, "It's not as bad as you think guys..." I'm sure there are more, but it is a highly fringe view to the point that it is correct to say the field is secular. The existence of a god doesn't help solve any vexing problems in the field and grounding morality in its will/nature creates several new ones (see Euthyphro dilemma). When you rely on God's magical ability to solve any problem by simply saying "God could make it that way" you haven't solved anything and the other side can play the same game by saying, "Reality could be like that."

So to act as though atheists are struggling to come up with some passable alternative to the towering fortress that is the position of a divine moral lawgiver does come across as framing the issue dubiously.

In this blog post, Dr. Peoples gives a brief summarization of the literature available:

Indeed nearly all Christian philosophers I am aware of who have commented on that premise maintain that it is true, so there is no shortage of places to look. You could start with the fairly popular level treatments by philosopher William Lane Craig (who touches fairly briefly on the issue in his book Reasonable Faith (or perhaps the somewhat simpler On Guard and has discussed the issue at more length with Richard Taylor in their debate “Is the basis of Morality natural or Supernatural?” Other popular level works that offer some considerations in favour of this premise include C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith or (getting more detailed) Paul Copan’s chapter on the moral argument in the book he edited with Paul Moser, The Rationality of Theism. If you’re interested in really delving into the moral argument and the relationship between God and morality in more depth in a book length treatment, something like John Hare’s God and Morality: A Philosophical History, John Rist’s Real Ethics: Reconsidering the Foundations of Morality or Robert Adams’ magisterial work Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics may be more your cup of tea.

[_MrStakhanovite]

Philosopher Stephen Law has also commented on Dr. Peoples' blog post, here is a good snippet:

Glenn and others want to create a smokescreen of technicality to disguise the fact that his argument, looks, prima facie, like a dismal flop given its based on a series of "more probable than not" premises. The rule I am applying is: to get the highest probability you can assign to the conclusion in a valid deductive argument, you just multiply the probabilities of the basic premises.

Now yes, there are some exceptions to this general rule. So for example, when a premises is redundant, like so: A, B therefore A. Here, you don't factor in the probability of B, for obvious reasons. Also, when the conclusion is a tautology, its probability will be 1, irrespective of the probability of the premises (though the premises are then all redundant, of course). Also, simple multiplication is not appropriate where there's a logical or known causal connection between premises. The probability of the conclusion may then be either higher or lower than the figure you get by simple multiplying. E.g.

A is male
A is female
Therefore A is male and A is female.

Given our background knowledge that being male makes it highly unlikely you are female (unless a hermaphrodite), it's clear we should not give a value of 26% to the conclusion given a prob of 51% to each premise. The probability is LOWER than you get by simply multiplication. Given that further background knowledge. Ditto (and here the we’re dealing with logical exclusion – the conclusion has a mathematically guaranteed probability of 0):

A is 60 years old
A is 61 years old
A is 60 years old and A is 61 years old.

Other times the probability of the conclusion can indeed be higher.

So yes, there are exceptions to the rule. But the point is they are exceptions to a general rule that does otherwise generally apply and which we'll be entitled to suppose applies in the case of Glenn's moral argument too, unless Glenn can explain why it doesn’t. At this point, we cannot tell for sure, because Glenn won’t even clearly set out what the basic premises of his argument actually are. In which case, we should just shrug and walk away. Glenn’s given us nothing.

Incidentally the “upper bound” stuff, while it looks awfully impressive especially when articulated using long strings of formulae, appears to be based on some rather dubious ideas. I cannot find any reference to it outside of theistic circles (e.g. Tim McGrew). Can you point me to some?

Craig’s reference to it is opaque, by the way, in the context of what he says. That looks like an attempt to baffle with BS.

[_EAllusion]

Stak -

By "he" I mean Dr. People's. Or you depending on what you think. As I have pointed out, I'm a skeptic in there being a meaningful demarcation between natural and supernatural required here. You can call things natural if they are in principle amenable to empirical inquiry, if they operate according to a stable of set rules, if they are the sort of things posited as existing by modern science, or if they are the sort of things we have conventionally called natural. All those options allow us to use the term helpfully in come cases. "Moral naturalism" relies on the third definition with a little bit of the fourth for good meausre. But when you want to set up a strict ontology of supernatural and natural things, then more precision is needed. If there were some case for the existence of a deity that operated according to some coherent, internal nature, then I'd call that deity a natural thing. I don't see why I shouldn't do this. What does it mean to be supernatural?