EAllusion wrote:Oddly, this very thing came up in chat the other day. To reiterate my points there:
1) The idea that beliefs are chosen (doxastic volunteerism) at all is quite questionable and a view I'd happily argue against.
But what if one doesn't believe, in the classical sense as, "either-or", but one proposes and then points to a system of belief as being reasonable, and even more reasonable, from one's perspective, than any other system of belief that one has had the option of making choices between? In my case, I move forward with a plausible belief based upon available information and experience. Faith in its simplicity. I don't believe, in a concrete, black and white fashion, as if there aren't any other alternatives available. I recognize that I could be wrong.
But I chose to exercise plausible belief, conditionally. I am willing to accept the propositions of Mormonism as providing a reasonable framework for moving forward in faith/hope. And I am choosing to do so.
EAllusion wrote:2) Suppose beliefs are chosen. How does having information reduce the freedom of those choices? What's the relationship? If it is because information makes one option irresistibly compelling, doesn't that argue point #1?
More information may restrict the easy/simple choices. More information may result in readjusting/altering, if necessary, previous choices that were made with less information. But that's not to say that the same core belief choices aren't still available as one gains and assimilates new/more information.
EAllusion wrote:3) Suppose #2 is resolved. Further suppose we have a state of affairs where the case for and against a complicated set of propositions like Mormonism is perfectly balanced. Isn't the rational thing to do then to withhold judgement rather than pick one? How can such a choice be called anything other than random? The moral case Terryl attempts to fashion out of air and twigs is a case nonetheless. Either the balance is gone and one side ought to be more compelling or it isn't.
In a sense, that's what we do if we are exercising faith. We don't know for sure so in a sense we are withholding final judgment until the facts are known...we die. But until then, to make a choice based upon available knowledge, experience, and intuition, I don't see as being completely random. Only in the sense that you're making one choice over many that are available. But making a educated choice among many alternatives is not random. Making an uneducated or uninformed choice is.
EAllusion wrote:4) Why is it a desirable thing to lack information sufficient to reasonably inform a choice? If I am to buy a car, I don't turn down the opportunity to look under the hood to achieve the greater good of being more "free" in my choice. Why would I? Even if we accept that knowledge harms one's freedom, that doesn't explain why such freedom is an overriding good that justifies withholding information.
It may not be desirable. But in fact, we do lack information, so we have to go with what is available. You seem to be second guessing why God would withhold information or let information become distorted over time. I'm not sure that this is a reasonable place to build a fort. I am of the opinion that if there is a God, I'm not the one to tell Him how to run the show. He knows what he's doing and I can only figure out as much as I am capable of. Then I have to either choose skepticism or plausible belief.
EAllusion wrote:5) It's awfully convenient that whatever amount of information Terryl thinks exists as a case for Mormonism is enough to not be "will-damaging" in a bad way, but anymore would be even though what people know varies through time and place. It reminds one of God just happening to explain whatever our current gaps in knowledge are.
I think that becomes a judgment call from person to person. Everyone has a different threshold.
EAllusion wrote:Finally, it's worth noting that Mormon mythology is replete with countless examples of God both supplying fairly strong evidence of things to people and also fairly severely curtailing people's freedom of choice. Reconciling this fact with the above free will defense is a daunting project to say the least. Laughable, really.
But that supports Givens' point, doesn't it? Doesn't this "repleteness" create a sense of doubt for you?
Regards,
MG