Killing in the name of...

[_just me]

False to all.

[_brade]

Hi Brade,

Regarding your answer to 3: The reason I gave my answer to 3 as false/no is based on my own understanding of the fallibility of the mind combined with the consequences of being wrong. If I can not say that I KNOW God commanded it but only have a sincere belief it's God's will then to act in this case is unconscionable. The cost (taking the life of my own child) of being wrong is far, far outweighed by the consequences of being being right in my belief but failing to act on it, in my opinion. At this point, the notions of "good" become so twisted as to deconstruct my entire moral framework.

Of note, I think Abraham is described as having direct conversations with God, contesting God's will, thinking on it for days before acting. Abraham is in direct communication with God yet precisely due to the damage this appears to cause his own moral framework he has a very hard time acting. He KNOWS God commanded it, yet doesn't want to do it. The moral philosopher Susan Neiman has suggested that it is precisely because Abraham contests with God whenever God's commands appears to contradict his idea of good that makes Abraham a moral model for us today. I'd agree with her thought.

So, I disagree that even the most rigorous standards for having sincere belief justify acting on this belief when the consequences are so costly. One has to KNOW.

As a real world example, consider the level of sincere belief people held in 2002/2003 regarding the probability that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons and had weapons of mass destruction ready to be used on the US. in my opinion, the consequences of war were poorly understood by most of us, while we over-inflated our sense of security in our sincere belief this was so. Many people will not get to live their lives due to that type of thinking, and many many more will go through their lives with physical and emotional scars they will never be able to fully recover from. If there is any reason to suspect that we only believe rather than know, the cost of acting needs to be the primary concern. It's why I am generally opposed to the death penalty unless there is very, very compelling evidence. The cost to a just society of taking a life wrongfully is too high to risk being wrong.

If I understand you correctly you're saying that (3) is false as it is because people can have mistaken sincere beliefs. I agree with that. My nuanced response to (3) was that I think it true in the case where the evidence is sufficiently good. I think we're in agreement there; you just happen to be more specific about what would count as sufficiently good evidence - you would have to know. In other words (3) is false generally. However, some other version of (3) is true. And what it looks like to me is that the version of (3) that's true is just (1). Does that make sense?

[_Sethbag]

False to all. We try to set up a problem with an articifially-created moral framework, but then ask us to judge it by our real moral framework. It's a context problem. So I say false, and if you reply that "but God really does exist, really is good, and He commands you to kill your child!" then I say that God can “F” himself.

The real moral framework within which I currently make real-world value judgments precludes me from accepting a hypothesized framework in which gods go around telling people to slaughter their children for whatever screwed up reason religious people think gods sometimes do this.

[Guest]

If I understand you correctly you're saying that (3) is false as it is because people can have mistaken sincere beliefs. I agree with that. My nuanced response to (3) was that I think it true in the case where the evidence is sufficiently good. I think we're in agreement there; you just happen to be more specific about what would count as sufficiently good evidence - you would have to know. In other words (3) is false generally. However, some other version of (3) is true. And what it looks like to me is that the version of (3) that's true is just (1). Does that make sense?

I agree, with the addition we need to do a cost/benefit analysis whenever (3) is the case which is most of the time. Even if God is real and good, I think the example of Abraham (especially as examined by Susan Neiman as I pointed out above) shows us the moral wo/man should go so far as to debate GOD him/her self before acting on something that does so much damage to one's moral framework.

What do you think? Am I messing up some essential understanding of the question by focusing on consequences and that they should be more of a consideration in the case of (3)/(4)? Or even (1)and (2), the more I think about it?

ETA - Correction, I misremembered that Neiman spoke on the story of Sodom and Gomorah not Isaac's sacrifice.

[_ajax18]

I think the woman should have the right to choose. After all, she's doing most of the work to raise the child. Just working and sending a paycheck isn't enough of an investment to allow you any choice in the matter.

[_Hoops]

False to all. We try to set up a problem with an articifially-created moral framework, but then ask us to judge it by our real moral framework. It's a context problem. So I say false, and if you reply that "but God really does exist, really is good, and He commands you to kill your child!" then I say that God can f*** himself.

Then the moral framework by which you make your lovely comment may some day allow you to kill your neighbor. Or, better yet, your neighbor may make the same claim for killing you. And you have no moral ground to stand on. Certainly a legal one, but not a moral one.

The real moral framework within which I currently make real-world value judgments precludes me from accepting a hypothesized framework in which gods go around telling people to slaughter their children for whatever f****d up reason religious people think gods sometimes do this.

Great! Then I'll see you at the next anti-abortion rally. I'll bring the rice krispy treats.

Oh wait! Your indignation is only reserved for God? Well, your moral code certainly is confusing if not convenient.

[_honorentheos]

Kant on the question -

"If God should really speak to man, man could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for man to apprehend the infinite by his senses, nor distinguish it from sensible beings, and recognize it as such. But in some cases man can be sure the voice he hears is not God’s. For if the voice commands him to do something contrary to moral law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may be, and no matter how it may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he must consider it an illusion."

“For example the myth of the sacrifice that Abraham wanted to make based on the divine command, the slaughter and the fire offering of his only son (the poor lad also had to carry the wood in his ignorance). Even if the voices were to resound from a visible heaven, Abraham should have answered the alleged, divine voices by saying, ‘that I should not kill my good son is clear to me; but that you, who appear to me, be God, that is not at all clear and can also never become clear."

[_Stormy Waters]

I've tried to imagine what it would be like to kill my own children, and I have to answer false to all of them. Is this good God going to punish me for not killing my own children?

If a parent killing their own child can be considered "good" then good is meaningless and arbitrary.

[_Gadianton]

Brade,

Under a modern view, the answer given for "3" in your post is flawed. If a child can be killed so long as God makes it plain as day that you should do it, there is no point. Understanding that the child's quick death will be followed by a guaranteed reign of eternal glory forever, its amazing more TBMs don't exploit this loophole and and sacrafice their own salvation for the sake of their children.

At worst, losing a child this way is akin to running your PacMan into a ghost, knowing he'll emerge from the box in full health. This is no test. God will only ask you to do such a thing if there is a great deal of uncertainty, such that the matter becomes an opportunity to prove your faith.

If you have to wait for God's clear edict, you've already failed the test.

[_honorentheos]

Gad,

I disagree with your assessment on the following grounds -

We are given only two postulates that we must assume are true: God is real, and God is good.

I believe your analysis is only valid in so far as we become certain that the command of God corresponds with the person's sincere belief. Yet, I'd argue that our given postulate "God is Good" conflicts with the so-called test. I agree with Kant - the act of commanding this act calls into question that a being giving this command could be called "God" on the grounds s/he can not be called good. Again, if God is real as well as good, if the command is questionably "not good", it stands to reason it is equally questionable that it is truly of God.

The question of it being a test of one's faithfulness is, in and of itself, another matter. For all we know, a truly Good God may wish to assess just how far his/her creations are willing to go in holding to right principles - even to the point of questioning God. In other words, who's to say the recorder of the myth has it right that Abraham actually passed the test?