Lack of free will as an objective disproof of Mormonism

[drumdude]

I suppose it would seem random to the material being, but it wouldn’t be random to the independent supernatural soul which is actually calling the shots.

But then we have the same question about free will in the supernatural realm. I guess that realm would need to be free of the limitations of cause and effect.

durmdude, I think a realm free of cause and effect would be utter chaos. It would be so meaningless that we would be unable to perceive anything or do anything.

I think it only makes sense to value the cause and effect patterns that make our thought and decisions possible.

It sounds very much like some of the Christian conceptions of heaven. A place of pure timeless being and one-ness.

The Mormon concept of heaven has always seemed way too space-opera.

[Rivendale]

That is like saying why do different landscapes appear on a planet? Shouldn't everything look the same?

Rivendale, are you saying that if things were all random then everyplace on the planet would look the same. Ok I can see that, it would be very dull.

The interactions of matter are subjected to different conditions resulting in different pathways. The initial conditions and subsequent surrounding conditions will create unique outcomes. Humans are one of the few biological organisms that can imagine the future which enables planning and enhances creativity.

[Physics Guy]

What concrete scenario would be possible if you had free will, but would be impossible if you were a material being in a deterministic universe?

Would you mind framing this question in an example?

This might not be the best scenario to illustrate the difference between free will and determinism, because I don't believe there is a difference. But it's the best example I can find of the kind of scenario I have in mind for someone else to propose.

Let the entire state of the universe at one moment be such that that in the next moment my lips will say, "Yes." That's what the nerve impulses, the electrons, the photons are heading to do, so that's what will happen under the laws of nature. Under the deterministic laws of nature it will be impossible for me to say, "No." But (I'm proposing that someone else might say) in the case where I have free will, I can somehow nonetheless say, "No" instead of, "Yes."

That's the closest I can come to an example of the kind of concrete scenario that I'd like to see offered. If someone offered this scenario as an answer to my question, I would then ask, "In the case where all the particles are heading for 'Yes' but you have free will, what would make the difference between you saying, 'Yes' and you saying, 'No'?"

I would expect an answer like, "My intention would make the difference. If I want to say, 'No,' and I have free will, the laws of nature will just have to bend and let my lips utter, 'No.'"

I would then ask for agreement, expecting it to be granted, that even if you have free will, you will still never say, 'No' when all the particles are heading for 'Yes,' if you also want to say, 'Yes'.

I will then interpret this as an admission that if you have free will then your intention is still just another deterministic causal factor along with all the neurons and electrons. If all of the causal factors, including your intention, are heading for "Yes," then you will always say, "Yes." Only if at least one causal factor were different—namely, your intention—might you instead utter, "No."

My conclusion will be that free will is still completely deterministic.

[honorentheos]

Would you mind framing this question in an example?

This might not be the best scenario to illustrate the difference between free will and determinism, because I don't believe there is a difference.

I wonder if the term "free will" can be the same as determinism if the former suggests things could have been otherwise had all inputs and conditions been the same? If by saying there is no meaningful difference, one means our experience is no different since we perceive ourselves being involved in selecting the outcome, fine. Free will being an illusion is different from saying it does not exist, and I agree.

[huckelberry]

Dr. Drum Dude,

I am all for objective tests of various beliefs, including within the domain of religion.

A trouble with making such a test in this case is: 1) domain experts don't widely agree even that libertarian free will is ruled out by arguments such as Sam Harris's; and 2) there are other definitions of free will aside from the libertarian definition, and the Latter-day Saint scripture does not tell us which one to use.

For instance, Daniel Dennett argues that free will is compatible with soft determinism (we are able to do what we desire). And there are Latter-day Saint thinkers--such as BYU psychology professor Harold Miller and the late Clark Goble--who hold to precisely that same view of free will.

From another angle, David Bentley Hart and other Orthodox Christian thinkers argue that libertarian free will has never been what free will means in fundamental Christian theology. They cite early Christian thinkers to argue for a very different conception of free will, one which, despite not being materialist in its basis like Dennett's, doesn't require us to be actually able to do other than what we do.

Since Mormon scripture doesn't define free will in philosophical terms, it would be difficult to know whether free will as mentioned there has been disproved. So, I don't think your argument above works.

Don

It is curious that this statement is as close to a statement supporting freewill as existing that has occurred in the thread. It doesn't actually support it.It notes that LDS does not have to be different than a more usual Christian view which sees determinism as the fundamental reality but that we have a responsibility for choices we make even though they occur in the context of cause and effect.

I went back to the video in the open post and was put off by vague comments about responsiblity and the new discovery this is supposed to be. Determinism is not new and Jonathan Edwards who laid out the demonstration of determinism was not creating a new idea just clarifying some of the arguments.

It does not require an experiment though such provides confirmation, for me to follow the vegetable choice process in my mind. I become aware of a question ,which veg, it goes into the back closet of my mind and out pops celery. I get the impression that was the first thing lying about but the process is not consscious it is just what I notice. Most decisions are more complicated and involve multiple loops of conscious and unconscious reflection. They could involve research, review of past learning , imagining possibilities reflection on relative value, perhaps what I heard on tv or from the fellow down the street. I think of these things not to try and create free will which I view as a straw man but to point to the personal value our decision making process has.

[Rivendale]

What concrete scenario would be possible if you had free will, but would be impossible if you were a material being in a deterministic universe?

This seems applicable.

You would find that investigating human nature or why humans take actions would be immediately debunked and a false premise because they are unbound by past actions. We’d find that your childhood predicted no behavioural outcomes as an adult. Mental health issues would become untreatable as you either are capable of willing yourself out of them or you are not effected by the cause and effect of medication. I could go on for a while about each avenue of life but it literally breaks science to imagine a true free will.

[honorentheos]

...a more usual Christian view which sees determinism as the fundamental reality but that we have a responsibility for choices we make even though they occur in the context of cause and effect.
...

I think of these things not to try and create free will which I view as a straw man but to point to the personal value our decision making process has.

I'm curious about two things here:

First to whom is one responsible?

Second, describing decision making as a process that has value leaves me wondering what that value entails?

[dastardly stem]

Would you mind framing this question in an example?

This might not be the best scenario to illustrate the difference between free will and determinism, because I don't believe there is a difference. But it's the best example I can find of the kind of scenario I have in mind for someone else to propose.

Let the entire state of the universe at one moment be such that that in the next moment my lips will say, "Yes." That's what the nerve impulses, the electrons, the photons are heading to do, so that's what will happen under the laws of nature. Under the deterministic laws of nature it will be impossible for me to say, "No." But (I'm proposing that someone else might say) in the case where I have free will, I can somehow nonetheless say, "No" instead of, "Yes."

That's the closest I can come to an example of the kind of concrete scenario that I'd like to see offered. If someone offered this scenario as an answer to my question, I would then ask, "In the case where all the particles are heading for 'Yes' but you have free will, what would make the difference between you saying, 'Yes' and you saying, 'No'?"

I would expect an answer like, "My intention would make the difference. If I want to say, 'No,' and I have free will, the laws of nature will just have to bend and let my lips utter, 'No.'"

I would then ask for agreement, expecting it to be granted, that even if you have free will, you will still never say, 'No' when all the particles are heading for 'Yes,' if you also want to say, 'Yes'.

I will then interpret this as an admission that if you have free will then your intention is still just another deterministic causal factor along with all the neurons and electrons. If all of the causal factors, including your intention, are heading for "Yes," then you will always say, "Yes." Only if at least one causal factor were different—namely, your intention—might you instead utter, "No."

My conclusion will be that free will is still completely deterministic.

Why would intention be something separated from “nerve impulses, the electrons, the photons”?

It’s like saying a team intends to run the ball on the next play but the quarterback runs a pass play. The play goes and the qb drops back to pass, everyone else thinks they’re running. If the team intends to run the ball then that would include the qb. Saying the team intends to run the ball while the qb intends to throw means the team does not intend to run at all. If the “the intention” was no then not all the “nerve impulses, the electrons, the photons” were not pointing to yes.

[huckelberry]

...a more usual Christian view which sees determinism as the fundamental reality but that we have a responsibility for choices we make even though they occur in the context of cause and effect.
...

I think of these things not to try and create free will which I view as a straw man but to point to the personal value our decision making process has.

I'm curious about two things here:

First to whom is one responsible?

Second, describing decision making as a process that has value leaves me wondering what that value entails?

Honorentheos it is possible you are thinking of a question I am missing. I am afraid fairly simple responses are what come to my mind.

We might be responsible to a spouse, boss, friend, ones self. Depending upon context we might have different sorts of responsibility to all sorts of people though to oneself might be the most persistent.

Value? it is better not to make lousy decisions.

[honorentheos]

I'm curious about two things here:

First to whom is one responsible?

Second, describing decision making as a process that has value leaves me wondering what that value entails?

Honorentheos it is possible you are thinking of a question I am missing. I am afraid fairly simple responses are what come to my mind.

We might be responsible to a spouse, boss, friend, ones self. Depending upon context we might have different sorts of responsibility to all sorts of people though to oneself might be the most persistent.

Value? it is better not to make lousy decisions.

Perhaps we then need to identify what it means to make a decision in this context?