Theodicy

[_Droopy]

"Innocent suffering" involves the needless affliction of those who lack the ability to comprehend and grow from their pain and suffering.

1. This term "needless" is being thrown around as if its an assumption, not a premise to be supported with evidence. How, and under what conditions, do you determine that which is "needless" affliction and that which has a teleological basis?

2. Who, and under what conditions does, such and such a person "lack the ability to comprehend and grow from their pain and suffering?" The gospel presupposes that human beings are eternal, self aware entities for whom personality continues on from phase to phase of existence (preexistence to mortality to resurrected, post mortal state), and hence, no possible form of suffering, in this view, could lack usefullness to any eternal spirit being.

From a gospel standpoint, it is not the pain and suffering itself that is of importance, but our perspective and interpretation of it, that matters.

And/Or those situations that aren't necessary since the abuse of free will creates enough evil to try and test every human being on earth ad infinitum.

Again, upon what cosmic, gnostic basis have you determined what is and is not "necessary" for any given individual in mortality?

The problem is that if God is complicit in causing/allowing innocent suffering then I HAVE A HUGE PROBLEM because that would implicate and/or indict God as evil. Whoa! I'm scared to even write that.

If God exists, then he is complicit in organized, coherent existence itself, so it would appear that you have dug yourself a hole from which there is no escape. The alternative would appear to be either for human beings not to exist, or for nothing to exist at all.

If nothing exists, there is no environment within which suffering and the experience of it can take place. God's primary crime, it would appear, was creation.

[_Droopy]

Followed by the extension of both a spirit body, and hence personality and individuated self awareness, and free will to his children, which introduces the prospect of both happiness and suffering and the feature of interpretation of experience into both suffering and happiness.

[_mikwut]

A couple of things,

I have recently had the fortune or misfortune through my practice to encounter what I consider and perceived as 'evil' in a case I handled, it was a separate category of experience than bad mistake, bad intentions, folly, etc.. it was manifest evil. Whenever I have visited the holocaust museum I perceive an existential reality that our english speaking minds can only convey by calling it 'evil'. But how do we know that Nazi acts were 'evil'? Maybe it is ethnocentric as harmony writes suggesting the possibility, maybe it is mistaking this category with resolute distastefulness, but my intuition, my sense tells me it is in fact evil. Evil exists. To me. My experience deeply resonates with Eleanore Stump's wonderful essay, "The Mirror of Evil", from God and the Philosophers. You can read it here (if you scroll to the bottom of the page under 'other') if its your cup of tea:

http://sites.google.com/site/stumpep/onlinepapers

Because of this, what I consider a veridical perception or veridical intuition my reasoning doesn't allow for the nihilistic non-existence of meaning, purpose, value, morals etc... it begins with the real existence of objective evil. It is a basic. It is the necessary background to further exploring of the Problem of Suffering. This means when I begin pondering the Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering the secular possibilities are wrought with as many problems as my theistic conclusions. Or, I have to simply pretend away an actual concrete existential experience of intuiting the existence of evil that is simply too manifest to my mind to be able to do. Because it doesn't exist in secular view. Gordon Graham's Evil and Christian Ethics concludes with some ideas I don't find completely satisfactory (Satan, demonic possession etc..) but his overall criticism that evil should be taken seriously, and that secular accounts of evil are inadequate and not satisfying intellectually, evidentially, or experientially in explaining it are convincing. When one reads Jonathon Glover's "Humanity" one glimpes Gordan Graham's criticism's in practice as Glover brings the reader to existential angst and emotional tears with the depth of suffering in just the 20th century and then offers his inadequate response to it from a secular perspective. I would sincerely be interested in how EAllusion accounts for 'evil' from his perspective it would be illuminating I am sure. This isn't to be read in anyway that the theist shouldn't remain in a state of complete humility towards this grand question, he must, always. It is just to say a possible arrogance masks the secularist going in.

This is why I don't think stem's (although woefully still inadequate) ideas are to be simply reduced to mere ad hoc musings. No matter what side of the philosophical divide one lands on regarding this tremendous and grand question some type of ad hoc is necessary for ultimately concluding on this issue because the ultimate unknown regarding the issues of evil, meaning, purpose, design, etc... are unknown to all, mystery is a word none should shun or smirk at here. If constructed properly the ad hocs are possibilities based on the already accepted corroborating evidence accepted by theist, but not the secularist. They amount to no greater 'evil' (pun intended) then the secularists unsatisfactory explanations of evil.

The Problem of Evil from a hopeful and theistic perspective must also be worked and struggled with in parts and not a whole. If the whole is struggled with no one explanation will be even plausibly satisfactory and EAllusion's masterfully adept ability with the opposing view will be the perfect example of bringing a knife to a gunfight. But if the popular defenses, free will, soul-making etc.. are combined with the existence of evil and the even playing field and the overall case for God in a broad and in depth way I believe cogent answers, with some satisfactory mystery remaining (although not compelling) at the very least must be taken very seriously by secular critics and provide depthful and satisfying resolutions to the problem for those that accept certain basics and fundamentals that the secular critic simply does not.

my best, mikwut

[_EAllusion]

Mikwut -

I have no problem accounting for the existence of evil. We exist in a universe that does not care about us. Some of the properties the world has just so happens to cause suffering. This is pretty simple. I think there is no denying that the existence of suffering takes more mental effort in a theistic universe.

If you are asking why we think of these things as evil in the first place, it depends on which "evils" you are talking about. But, broadly speaking, I think we have an evolved sense of fairness projected onto everything and negative attitude towards undesirable experiences, which is why the random pain caused by an earthquake sometimes feels evil. When it comes to moral evils, I think you are asking me for a metaethical theory. I'm a desire consequentialist. Saying more is a long essay at a minimum.

[_EAllusion]

Stem -

I think you didn't get whey I said "special rules." If you propose there is heretofore unknown rules writ into the fabric of reality that prevent God from creating planet less susceptible to natural disasters, pestilence, etc. what I'm saying this this is a queer, ad hoc proposal. I don't see this as substantially different than just asserting that God has heretofore unknown reasons why having a planet as susceptible to evils as it is is in fact a good thing. Those approaches have the same faults and are variations on what the unknown purposes defense tries to do. Think about it this way. God - even the omnipotent creator of everything else God - is part of reality. You're saying that God is restricted by the rules of the physical universe in ways we don't appreciate. What the classical theist is saying is that God is restricted by the rules of reality in ways we don't appreciate. The main difference here is just that your God is weaker, which is unpalatable to your average monotheist.

[_mikwut]

Hi E,

Thanks, you have already answered for me in the past the way you did and I appreciate it, I am familiar with desire consequentialism and the varieties of utilitarianism, in fact I think you pointed it out to me quite a while ago, I could be wrong. As always I commend you for corresponding to at least what I consider to be the most sophisticated secular position.

But, I wasn't clear, I was more interested in the psychology of evil. Say a patient who has experienced a commonly understood experience with 'evils' - for example the patient's parents were slaughtered by a serial killer who shows no remorse contrasted with a scenario you gave me years ago, a three year old little girl is accidently dragged unaware to the driver to her death by a vehicle when her coat is shut inadvertently in the door. One is intentional evil, the other is unnecessary evil. Does the secular psychologist approach these from a utilitarian perspective? is there a dissatisfaction to you in how either of those patients could ever resolve those evils satisfactorily without any resort to religious possibilities or compromises. I sincerely ask.

my regards, mikwut

[_EAllusion]

Mikwut -

I think natural evils sometimes implicate our moral sense because our moral sense is promiscuous. I have no problem thinking about how unfair life can be, for instance, even though I don't think where lightning strikes is a moral issue. So I think there is a difference between an earthquake and a serial killer. The killer is a moral agent that we can assign blame to. The earthquake is not, even if we might anthropomorphize it in dealing with our grief.

Concerning resolving evils, I believe in a world where not every evil will be punished or undone. Not every good will go recognized. I think this is sad, but I don't find it irrational that I live in a morally imperfect universe. I think we need to resolve to make the world a better place by being better ourselves and using our tools of behavior modification (reward, praise, condemnation, shame, etc.) to encourage others to do so as well. As I've said before, we do what we can.

[_Droopy]

I have no problem accounting for the existence of evil. We exist in a universe that does not care about us. Some of the properties the world has just so happens to cause suffering. This is pretty simple.

That, however, does not take care of the problem of evil, but only of accidents, such as volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, and rabid dogs.

When it comes to moral evils, I think you are asking me for a metaethical theory. I'm a desire consequentialist. Saying more is a long essay at a minimum.

But none of the forms of consequentialism answer the question of the ultimate ground of moral determinations. All utilitarian philosophy, including its slight sub-varieties - does, is kick the philosophical can down the road by reducing everything to consequences and then playing with the meaning of that term while the real crux of the matter - how do we (in this culture, in this social context) know what is right and wrong (not legally, but morally, in its full sense)?

All such conceptualizations still return us again to the same question of what is moral and what is immoral by grounding morality in personal or social norms, as understood within any given culture, that themselves cannot give an ultimate epistemic account of themselves without reference to a transcendent standard.

[_beastie]

Lamanite,

Thank you for sharing your essay with us and asking for feedback. I wish I had the answer, but no one does, despite the pretentious claims of some. It's issues like this that, in my opinion, triggered one of my favorite quotes:

It is an insult to God to believe in God. For on the one hand it is to suppose that he has perpetrated acts of incalculable cruelty. On the other hand, it is to suppose that he has perversely given his human creatures an instrument -- their intellect -- which must inevitably lead them, if they are dispassionate and honest, to deny his existence. It is tempting to conclude that if he exists, it is the atheists and agnostics that he loves best, among those with any pretensions to education. For they are the ones who have taken him most seriously. ~Galen Strawson

I'm not saying that your struggles must inevitably lead to atheism. They do not. But I think that honestly grappling with this issue may give you some insight into why decent, moral, and sincere people become atheists.

[_EAllusion]

That, however, does not take care of the problem of evil, but only of accidents, such as volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, and rabid dogs.

Uh, Droopy. There is no problem of evil for the atheist. It's not some great mystery that people do bad things to one another. A godless universe doesn't imply anything else should be the case. It only becomes a mystery when you propose the existence of a God who is all-good, knows about it, and has the power to stop it.

But none of the forms of consequentialism answer the question of the ultimate ground of moral determinations.

Look up desire consequentialism and you'll see pretty quickly where the metaethical views are that get you to that. Referencing that normative theory tends to carry with it particular metaethical views. Mikwut understood this.

For instance, I think we can abstract moral properties like good and bad as referent of natural properties like, "tends to fulfill or thwart aggregate desire fulfillment."

All such conceptualizations still return us again to the same question of what is moral and what is immoral by grounding morality in personal or social norms, as understood within any given culture, that themselves cannot give an ultimate epistemic account of themselves without reference to a transcendent standard.

[/quote]

My view doesn't ground morality in personal views or social norms. Taking my example above, what actually is or isn't apt to produce aggregate desire fulfillment is not something that can be determined by personal views or social norms. People individually or collectively can just have wrong opinions about that. I don't want to short shrift other views here, though. One can be an antirealist and not think this or adopt any number of other realist moral theories. I think Stak thinks moral properties are brute fact abstracta, for instance. Or one could be a nihilist.

Of course, this doesn't have much to do with anything. You appear to be renaming the problem of evil as the problem of explaining what evil actually is. That's completely unhelpful. And, for what it is worth, the existence of a God doesn't help solve that problem at all.