Theodicy

[_Lamanite]

Lamanite,

Thank you for sharing your essay with us and asking for feedback. I wish I had the answer, but no one does, despite the pretentious claims of some. It's issues like this that, in my opinion, triggered one of my favorite quotes:

It is an insult to God to believe in God. For on the one hand it is to suppose that he has perpetrated acts of incalculable cruelty. On the other hand, it is to suppose that he has perversely given his human creatures an instrument -- their intellect -- which must inevitably lead them, if they are dispassionate and honest, to deny his existence. It is tempting to conclude that if he exists, it is the atheists and agnostics that he loves best, among those with any pretensions to education. For they are the ones who have taken him most seriously. ~Galen Strawson

I'm not saying that your struggles must inevitably lead to atheism. They do not. But I think that honestly grappling with this issue may give you some insight into why decent, moral, and sincere people become atheists.

Thank you for the quote and words of encouragement.

Big UP!

Lamanite

[_Droopy]

Uh, Droopy. There is no problem of evil for the atheist. It's not some great mystery that people do bad things to one another. A godless universe doesn't imply anything else should be the case. It only becomes a mystery when you propose the existence of a God who is all-good, knows about it, and has the power to stop it.

But it only becomes a problem because God's core attributes of being all-good, loving, and omnipotent are approached in isolation. Once we begin asking why God created a universe in which evil could be manifest, and created spirit children and mortal beings subject to evil inclinations and free to follow them, and we then look at the plan of salvation and see that the universe exists as much for us as for God, we then begin to see that God's omnipotence is not the central focus of the problem of evil. The central focus is the plan and the requirements of the plan for God's children.

Look up desire consequentialism and you'll see pretty quickly where the metaethical views are that get you to that.

But they don't E. Utilitarian ethics leaves us pretty much where it began: looking for the ultimate ground within the confines of culture and social milieu. Ultimately, this is yet another relativistic exercise that must ground morality, at the end of the day, in cultural time and place, from which confines it must make its case.

For instance, I think we can abstract moral properties like good and bad as referent of natural properties like, "tends to fulfill or thwart aggregate desire fulfillment."

The problem, however, begins when we begin to try to define "desire" and the content of those desires.

My view doesn't ground morality in personal views or social norms.

What other choice do you have? In a strictly naturalistic context, are not all social norms and value judgements culture bound, and constructed within culture in a way that reflects is core assumptions?

Of course, this doesn't have much to do with anything. You appear to be renaming the problem of evil as the problem of explaining what evil actually is.

No. I'm saying that the "problem" of evil is only a problem when God's attributes are looked at in isolation outside the plan of salvation, which goes toward some degree of explanation of just why God's power to stop or prevent evil or suffering cannot be used arbitrarily just because God might desire to stop some instance of evil.

He will not, in other words, corrupt or short circuit our purpose in being here by the arbitrary wielding of his power simply because he feels so inclined (and I'm sure he much of the time does).

That's a human characteristic, not a divine one.

[_MrStakhanovite]

No. I'm saying that the "problem" of evil is only a problem when God's attributes are looked at in isolation outside the plan of salvation, which goes toward some degree of explanation of just why God's power to stop or prevent evil or suffering cannot be used arbitrarily just because God might desire to stop some instance of evil.

He will not, in other words, corrupt or short circuit our purpose in being here by the arbitrary wielding of his power simply because he feels so inclined (and I'm sure he much of the time does).

That's a human characteristic, not a divine one.

Droopy, that doesn't explain natural evils, uneccesary suffering, nor Divine Hiddenness.

[_Droopy]

Droopy, that doesn't explain natural evils, uneccesary suffering, nor Divine Hiddenness.

Earthquakes are caused by plate tectonics, Stak. It is not good or evil, but tragic.

"Unnecessary" suffering is a concept that has yet to be defined and argument presented showing how you could know it from suffering of the necessary sort.

The "divine hiddeness" argument is broken backed for the reason that God remains hidden only to the spiritually dead. The atheist skeptic has no means of knowing who around him, walking the streets, serving him food, taking his money at the cash register, know God and know of his existence in a direct, unambiguous way.

The divine hiddeness argument, in other words, is an argument from his own subjective perceptual world, not an argument about the world.

[_MrStakhanovite]

Yeah, you haven't read, reviewed, and probably are not even aware of the current literature on this topic.

I asked you before, to show me your chops on this thread, where I presented a formal argument and defended it, quoting from top of the line Theistic Philosophers.

To go ahead and dealwith some of your comments, here is a sneak peak:

I suggest that (2) is false if and only if there is a state of affairs in the actual world which it would be logically impossible for God to bring about without permitting the occurrence of at least one instance of reasonable nonbelief. That is to say, it must be a state of affairs whose existence logically necessitates the permission of reasonable nonbelief, otherwise an omnipotent and perfectly loving God would bring it about without permitting the occurrence of reasonable nonbelief.

Anyone who claims that God's love is Agape, they are stuck to the argument. As the great Robert Adams puts it in his The Virtue of Faith, " There cannot be Agape at all without benevolence." Moroni's promise/challenge is the connection between this Divine love and the seeking of a personal relationship. Would Mormons deny they have a personal relationship with God?

I am claiming that God, if loving, seeks explicit reciprocal relationship with us, not only involving such things as Divine guidance, support, and forgiveness, but also human trust, obedience, and worship. So understood, this proposition seems obviously required. A personal relationship with God would immeasurably enhance our well-being, and so God as powerful as he is, must seek it for us.

What is Reasonable Doubt?

A careful and nuanced discussion of belief and epistemic rationality which includes a discussion of culpability and inculpability in believing can be found in Richard Swineburne's Faith and Reason.

Swinburne lays out five kinds of rationality, and the first one we will call R1 obtains if and only if S's "belief that p is probable, given his inductive standards and given his evidence...A failure in respect of [ R1 ] is a failure of internal coherence in a subject's system of beliefs, a failure of which the subject is unaware." Coherence may be there, but other things may be lacking, so Swinburne moves on to R2.

R2 obtains if and only if S's belief that p is properly grounded in experience or reason and arrived at by the application of correct inductive standards. As he goes on to say, "[R2] is a matter of conformity to objective standards which the believer may not recognize and may indeed explicitly deny"

...

So going from that:

R3: S has a rational belief that p if and only if his evidence, inductive standards, and belief as to p's probability on the evidence have been, in his own view at the time, adequately investigated.

R4: S has a rational belief that p if and only if his investigation was adequate by his normal standards.

R5: S has a rational belief that p if and only if his investigation satisfied correct standards.

...

S is inculpably in doubt about the truth of G if (i) S believes that epistemic parity obtains between G and ~G, and (ii) S has not knowingly (self-deceptively or otherwise) neglected to submit this belief to adequate investigation.

Here is the deal, I'm more than willing to discuss this with you, but we are going to do Philosophy, not rants, no bald assertions, and no inflammatory remarks.

[_Droopy]

Here is the deal, I'm more than willing to discuss this with you, but we are going to do Philosophy, not rants, no bald assertions, and no inflammatory remarks.

And where did I engage in any of these?

[_MrStakhanovite]

And where did I engage in any of these?

]An intellectually cowardly shrugging off of the great questions of existence. Indeed, if there is no God, everything is permitted in theory, so its also a very convenient position to take.

I really don't want to Wade (lol- sorry, couldn't resist) through things like that. I've noticed you started a Celestial thread, want me to take it there?

[_Droopy]

(1) If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.

(2) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.

(3) Reasonable nonbelief occurs.

--(3) and (2) gets us:

(4) No perfectly loving God exists.

--(4) and (1) it follows that:

(5) There is no God.


This argument is valid and commits no error of logic, given (1), (2), and (3), we may validly conclude (5).

So, putting this as near to standard form as possible, we have:


If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.

If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.

Reasonable nonbelief occurs.

Therefore, there is no God.

Now, this would appear to be, far from a valid deductive argument, a situation in which the conclusion of the argument doesn't follow necessarily from the premises at all. There is no apparent logical connection between the existence of "reasonable" non-belief (a mental state and body of belief about God), and the non-existence of God qua non-existence, which would be an existential reality that could only be known by direct apprehension of that non-existence (one would have to know God did not exist the way one knows unicorns do not exist, and unicorns are "hidden" and non-existent in a very different manner than God is considered "hidden, and within a vastly different context). To move from reasonable unbelief (arguments, premises, evidence thought to count as being against God's existence etc.) to a "therefore" claim about God's existence, one would require a clear logical connection between premises and conclusion here that has not been provided.

Part of the problem clearly inheres in the second premise, that "If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur." The reason this premise should be assumed to be true such that it can function as a legitimate premise from which the conclusion could be derived is not at all clear. In the first instance, it is not at all clear what God's perfect lovingness has to do with the manner or means by which he reveals himself to human beings, or if he does so, and upon what conditions.

A hidden assumption also appears to be present in that, if God existed, and if he was all-loving, then it is thought for some reason to follow that he would in some sense be empirically present or the created world would make his existence logically self evident in an obvious way, among humans on earth (otherwise, how could it be the case that, if God is all loving, non-belief is impossible?) The reason for this assumption is also not at all clear.

If reasonable non-belief occurs, then it must be because there is no all-loving God since his hiddeness has been made contingent on his attribute of being all-loving. His all-lovingness, in other words, would appear to condition his conduct toward humans such that, were he all-loving, he would by necessity be non-hidden - unambiguously present.

The basis for the second premise is deeply hazy, at this point, and needs to be made explicit.

The only thing left for the Mormon to do is try to deny one of those three premises, but where do they begin?

I think (1) and (3) can be strongly supported, so the weakest point open for attack would be (2). What would it take for a Mormon to show that the denial of (2) is plausible?

I see you were already aware of its problems and what the first line of attack would be.

I suggest that (2) is false if and only if there is a state of affairs in the actual world which it would be logically impossible for God to bring about without permitting the occurrence of at least one instance of reasonable nonbelief. That is to say, it must be a state of affairs whose existence logically necessitates the permission of reasonable nonbelief, otherwise an omnipotent and perfectly loving God would bring it about without permitting the occurrence of reasonable nonbelief.

If one were to take this as definitive, then literally everything that exists in the natural world, as they can be explained at various levels of analysis without referring directly to God, is evidence for non-belief, and premise (2) must be correct. The problem - and a severe one - lies in the implicit assumption (again) that if God existed, he would make his existence conspicuously obvious by creating a world in which nothing that existed could be thought of as evidence against his existence.

Given what LDS theology teaches regarding the "plan of salvation" and the character and attributes of God, there is no reason to believe that God would "operate" in this manner regarding the question of how human beings are to be made aware, or if specific persons are to be made aware, of his existence, regardless of his attribute of all-lovingness (which, for LDS, could not utterly dominate and overwhelm his other attributes, such as his absolute respect of human free agency, and his perfect knowledge of the requirements of the plan of salvation relative to the capacities and needs of his children).

A further problem lies in another implicit assumption that would place upon God the sole responsibility for making his existence known. The fundamental basis of gospel teaching, however, is that only as we "knock" is the door opened, and only as we ask, is it given. A relationship between man and God regarding the manner, conditions, and timing of the revelation of God's existence to a particular human being is present in the actual teaching of the gospel (and Christianity generally) that is completely washed out of stak's argument.

God's existence is made known to individuals, individual by individual, predicated upon the conditions and requirements governing the reception of that kind of knowledge, and not in a general empirical way or logically required way, because, again, of the requirements of the plan of salvation relative to us and our needs as mortals undergoing a "probation." in the "telestial" world. His personal attributes do not exist in isolation from eternal law and his relationship to us as, not just God, but as our Father in Heaven following the necessities of the plan through which we can return to him and become like him (deification).

Part of that plan, indeed, a requirement of it, as understood in LDS theology, is the existence of a world that can be interpreted in a variety of ways, even though the same phenomena are at issue.

Does the LDS Faith have an answer to this? I would say that it does not and therefore can be rejected.

You are far from making that case, and I don't think a strict adherence to formalistic deductive logic is going to get you very far along the way unless it is combined with other means of critical reasoning.

[_Droopy]

And where did I engage in any of these?

]An intellectually cowardly shrugging off of the great questions of existence. Indeed, if there is no God, everything is permitted in theory, so its also a very convenient position to take.

I really don't want to Wade (lol- sorry, couldn't resist) through things like that. I've noticed you started a Celestial thread, want me to take it there?

That was aimed at another poster for whom it was specifically crafted, and that poster is not one to "do philosophy," so don't worry about it. The Celestial thread is intended to explore this subject at length.

[_MrStakhanovite]

Hi Droopy,

Given the length of your response, I’m just going to tackle the first chunk of it to avoid massively long posts. Once we’ve resolved or have gotten as far as we can, I’ll progress to the next chunk of your response.

Now, this would appear to be, far from a valid deductive argument, a situation in which the conclusion of the argument doesn't follow necessarily from the premises at all.

Here is the proof:

(1) If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.

G ~> L

(2) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.

L ~> -R

(3) Reasonable nonbelief occurs.

R

(4) No perfectly loving God exists.

R allows us to use Modus Tollens and negate L, so using that inference, we can derive:

-L

--(4) and (1) it follows that:

Using -L, we make use of Modus Tollens again and negate G

(5) There is no God.

-G

QED

I think the validity of the argument is beyond dispute, I think you might have had “soundness” in mind, where the argument has the correct logical form, but there are disputes about the premises. We need to resolve this first because there is no point is discussing an invalid argument, the horse would already be dead before I hit it with my bat.