Questions I'd like to see Peterson "actually answer (and not

[Tator]

Your analogy breaks down if you cannot demonstrate, to any appreciable degree, that (placing the question explicitly within the context of the present discussion) John Clark and/or Richard Hansen have ever done precisely what you suggest: disregard experiments that contradict his belief.

Of course, since we’re talking about archaeology, we’ll have to change “experiments” to “data”. I’ll happily provide just one example from Dr. Clark. I’m not familiar with any apologia written by Dr. Hansen.

Dr. Clark made the following assertion in his famous devotional:

The Book of Mormon mentions bows and arrows, swords, slings, scimitars, clubs, spears, shields, breastplates, helmets, and cotton armor–all items documented from Mesoamerica.

I’ll focus on just one thing Dr. Clark ignored – there is no evidence of the bow and arrow in ancient Mesoamerica until the last postclassic period. That is well outside the Book of Mormon time frame.

by the way, I'm not suggesting that Clark or Hansen's bias affects their professional work in Mesoamerican archaeology. (nice sleight of hand there, though) I am suggesting that their bias affects their use of Mesoamerica in Book of Mormon apologia.

[_Morrissey]

Thanks, Will. It gets too tiresome for me.

Are the biases Mormons hold regarding their truth claims (e.g., about the truthfulness of the Book of Mormon) in any way, or inherently, more valid than the biases held by others in terms of their beliefs?

Obviously, all biases that are consistent with my biases are superior to all biases that are not.

Did you really have to ask?

The only human frailty atheists are more exempt from than others is the human tendency to believe in religious superstitious nonsense.

See above.

Good reply. Seriously, though, how would you answer the first question?

[_Ray A]

You never once mention, nor would you even consider, the possibility that perhaps he has good scientific reasons to suppose the real plausibility of Nephites.

If this is true, then can you give one example of a non-Mormon scholar/scientist who takes this plausibility seriously?

I already know the standard answer, by the way. None have studied it enough. But why?

[_Daniel Peterson]

Seriously, though, how would you answer the first question?

Obviously, I really do believe that there were Nephites, etc., and, accordingly, I think that Drs. Hansen and Clark are correct in their view on that subject, and that their views on the subject are both better grounded than conflicting biases and more accurate. But I don't think that their views regarding Book of Mormon historicity are fundamentally different, in terms of real-life function in their scholarship, than other such extraneous views that are brought to this or that subject by scholars, and I see nothing to suggest that their scholarship has been adversely affected by their belief in the Book of Mormon.

I think scholarship is a wonderful thing, and I'm delighted that Catholics and Marxists and Mormons and Freudians and feminists and structuralists and poststructuralists make their contributions. The more, the merrier. I really don't mind that they have preconceptions, as long as they operate openly, on the basis of evidence and analysis. In fact, I think the variety of viewpoints enriches the overall discussion.

[_Ray A]

I reiterate what Michael Coe said about Mormon archaeologists in his PBS interview:

I think that being a Mormon archaeologist, you have to be two people. You have to be, one, an archaeologist that happens to be a Mormon, and also, you have to believe in the Mormon religion. Mormon archaeology can be the Book of Mormon archaeology, where you're actually going right from the beginning, trying to find the evidence that the Book of Mormon is correct.

Doing archaeology as a scientist who happens to be a Mormon is another dish of tea completely, and this is what most of my friends who are archaeologists are doing right now. They're extremely good archaeologists, and they have made wonderful discoveries in what we call the Formative Period in southern Mexico and Guatemala and amazing stuff that's being discovered right now. But they are quick to tell me that they are archaeologists who are also Mormon, like you can be an archaeologist and you can be a Catholic or a Muslim or Buddhist or nothing, as I am. You can do this.

But again, still it must bother them, because there are many people in the Mormon Church who want them to be doing Book of Mormon archaeology, and this they don't want to do. And the people who do Book of Mormon archaeology are no longer in the ascendancy. In major educational places like Brigham Young University, which has an absolutely marvelous anthropology/archaeology department, most people are archaeologists and anthropologists who are also Mormons, and that's a different thing. ...

Why. Because clearly, to Mormon archaeologists (described by Coe) there is no case for a "Book of Mormon archaeology". It's not even on first base. That's also why Hansen and Clark wouldn't be caught dead trying to convince their peers (through peer-reviewed literature). They do real archaeology, then "Book of Mormon archaeology" is a hobby.

[_beastie]

Obviously, I really do believe that there were Nephites, etc., and, accordingly, I think that Drs. Hansen and Clark are correct in their view on that subject, and that their views on the subject are both better grounded than conflicting biases and more accurate. But I don't think that their views regarding Book of Mormon historicity are fundamentally different, in terms of real-life function in their scholarship, than other such extraneous views that are brought to this or that subject by scholars, and I see nothing to suggest that their scholarship has been adversely affected by their belief in the Book of Mormon.

I think scholarship is a wonderful thing, and I'm delighted that Catholics and Marxists and Mormons and Freudians and feminists and structuralists and poststructuralists make their contributions. The more, the merrier. I really don't mind that they have preconceptions, as long as they operate openly, on the basis of evidence and analysis. In fact, I think the variety of viewpoints enriches the overall discussion.

I want to be clear on this point, since Will already tried this sleight of hand in his post.

I do not believe that Drs. Clark and Hansen allow their firm conviction that the Book of Mormon is Mesoamerican history affect their professional work in Mesoamerican studies.

I do believe that their firm conviction does affect the apologia they may produce (I haven't seen any by Hansen).

Dr. Clark knows, better than I do, that bows and arrows were not used in Mesoamerica until the late post-classic period. Yet that did not stop him from making the assertion I just cited in my response to Will.

[_Daniel Peterson]

So criticize their evidence and/or their logic, if you can. Don't whine or lament about their preconceptions.

[_Doctor Scratch]

Scratch, I appreciate your willingness to show up here as an illustration of the old, naïve notion of objectivity that, as I was just pointing out, has been rendered problematic over the past several decades. I don't know whether it's really your position, or simply a pose that you've assumed in order to make my point visible. But thanks.

No, no---I'm not advocating a "universal objectivity." But, unless I'm misunderstanding you, you seem to be saying that an LDS testimony is the same kind of "bias" as, say, feminism or Marxism. Obviously, people come by these biases in different ways, no?

And let's not forget that this thread has been dealing mainly with Mopologetic meso-American "scholarship." You seem to be saying, in effect, that praying and gaining a testimony of the Book of Mormon is academically and intellectually equivalent to approaching archaeology from, say, a post-structuralist or feminist standpoint. Pardon me for saying so, but that seems a bit of a stretch. I have a hard time seeing how or why it is possible---on any level---to treat the two things as being equivalent. Then again: maybe there are instances of people getting down on their knees and praying to receive an answer as to whether or not post-structuralism is the one, true viewpoint?

What you seem to be attempting to do here is a sort of colossal "leveling of the playing field." With one wave of the hand, everyone is all of the sudden saddled with all these biases, and all the biases are equivalent in terms of the way they affect scholarly work. If the critics are going to attack Clark et al. for "bias," just turn around and remind everyone that *all* scholars are "biased"! This reminds me of the time when I suggested there were bias-related problems with the peer review process at FARMS, and you proceeded to attack the *entire* peer review process.

[_Daniel Peterson]

I don't think it matters much, functionally speaking, whence a scholar's lens or preconception comes.

What matters is the strength of the preconception, how it affects (for good or ill; both are possible) the scholarship, and so forth.

Thus, for example, the following is a ridiculously biased (and hence lethally partisan and distorted) summary of my position:

This reminds me of the time when I suggested there were bias-related problems with the peer review process at FARMS, and you proceeded to attack the *entire* peer review process.

[_beastie]

So criticize their evidence and/or their logic, if you can. Don't whine or lament about their preconceptions.

This entire subtopic arose because Will made a clear appeal to authority, using Clark and Hansen. Appeals to authority can rightly be analyzed on the basis of problematic bias.

In other words, I wasn’t the one who opened the Pandora’s box.

http://www.fallacyfiles.org/authorit.html

An appeal to authority may be inappropriate in a couple of ways:

The authority is an expert, but is not disinterested. That is, the expert is biased towards one side of the issue, and his opinion is thereby untrustworthy.

For example, suppose that a medical scientist testifies that ambient cigarette smoke does not pose a hazard to the health of non-smokers exposed to it. Suppose, further, that it turns out that the scientist is an employee of a cigarette company. Clearly, the scientist has a powerful bias in favor of the position that he is taking which calls into question his objectivity.

There is an old saying: "A doctor who treats himself has a fool for a patient," and a similar version for attorneys: "A lawyer who defends himself has a fool for a client." Why should these be true if the doctor or lawyer is an expert on medicine or the law? The answer is that we are all biased in our own causes. A physician who tries to diagnose his own illness is more likely to make a mistake out of wishful thinking, or out of fear, than another physician would be.

While the authority is an expert, his opinion is unrepresentative of expert opinion on the subject.

The fact is that if one looks hard enough, it is possible to find an expert who supports virtually any position that one wishes to take. "Such is human perversity", to quote Lewis Carroll. This is a great boon for debaters, who can easily find expert opinion on their side of a question, whatever that side is, but it is confusing for those of us listening to debates and trying to form an opinion.

Experts are human beings, after all, and human beings err, even in their area of expertise. This is one reason why it is a good idea to get a second opinion about major medical matters, and even a third if the first two disagree. While most people understand the sense behind seeking a second opinion when their life or health is at stake, they are frequently willing to accept a single, unrepresentative opinion on other matters, especially when that opinion agrees with their own bias.

Bias (problem 3) is one source of unrepresentativeness. For instance, the opinions of cigarette company scientists tend to be unrepresentative of expert opinion on the health consequences of smoking because they are biased to minimize such consequences. For the general problem of judging the opinion of a population based upon a sample, see the Fallacy of Unrepresentative Sample.

To sum up these points in a positive manner, before relying upon expert opinion, go through the following checklist:
• Is this a matter which I can decide without appeal to expert opinion? If the answer is "yes", then do so. If "no", go to the next question:
• Is this a matter upon which expert opinion is available? If not, then your opinion will be as good as anyone else's. If so, proceed to the next question:
• Is the authority an expert on the matter? If not, then why listen? If so, go on:
• Is the authority biased towards one side? If so, the authority may be untrustworthy. At the very least, before accepting the authority's word seek a second, unbiased opinion. That is, go to the last question:
• Is the authority's opinion representative of expert opinion? If not, then find out what the expert consensus is and rely on that. If so, then you may rationally rely upon the authority's opinion.
If an argument to authority cannot pass these five tests, then it commits the fallacy of appeal to misleading authority.