guy sajer wrote:
but they fail miserably in the empirical realm, unless they have devised some objective method of assessing one's moral capacity (atheists, such as myself, assert moral thoughts, feelings, ideas, behaviors etc. as much as believers,
I never made any claims about an atheist's moral capacity beyond noting that I acknowledge believers and nonbelievers alike have a sense of right and wrong. The argument you are referring to argues that moral understanding, if it is to be made sense of as something with which someone can make objective truth claims about, requires certain philosophical foundations. One of those foundations, according to the argument, is something that is necessarily contradictory to atheism. You might disagree with this, but you and a few others really don't understand what is even being claimed.
One can sit around and debate ad nauseum whether atheists are "moral in a theoretical sense, yet the empirical record (at least by casual observation, and I'm guessing also there's systematic empirical evidence to back it up) overwhelmingly demonstrates that they are.
Doubtless there is empirical evidence that atheists have been able to act in accordance with the dictates of moral ideas. But that was never, ever under dispute. What is under dispute is if it is consistent to not believe in God and also think a moral statement like, "One ought to use ones talents to improve the general happiness of humanity" is an true statement independent of personal preferences. Where's your "empirical evidence" of that? Good luck, as this is the kind of argument suited to other kinds of knowing.
I should add that this tendency noted above is implied by Mormon epistemology. If Mormon epistemology is accurate, this implies, therefore, that all other religious experiences that testify to some "truth," are inherently invalid or less valid than those that affirm Mormonism. Plus, Mormon epistemology is precisely the type of thing Dawkins is criticizing above; reaching firm determinations of truth without factoring a single piece of real world data. Even worse, the paradigm in which the epistemology resides denigrates the attempt to feed in real world data, well, that is as long as the real world data might contradict the "truth" arrived at through entirely ontological means.
Spiritual experiences are "real world data." That point aside, you're veering off in the same ill-fated direction you did when you started dividing moral theory into "formalism" and "utilitarianism." My arguments have not been "ontological," and ontological is not the opposite of empirical. One gets the sense that you think "ontological" means something like "philosophical argument absent empiricism." This is silly, but what am I supposed to do about it?
When you stop to think about it, it's really pretty amazing; an entire system of belief based on the fundamental assertion that real world data is unnecessary, indeed even undesirable, to know "truth."
This bizarre claim is not a view shared by me or implied by LDS doctrine.
And our believing colleagues find it hard to understand that there are those of us for whom this is not a satisfactory method of truth seeking?
But thanks for showing that even people with Ph.D's can have uninformed views, especially when leaving their area of expertise.