incorrigable private evidence

[_DonBradley]

When I ask you to flesh it out you seem to gravitate toward stuff I don't deny (stuff that brains and subtle machines could do).

Good, since I believe brains do do these things, including producing subjectivity.

Can you just say what is left out without just repeating a few isolated words like "consciousness", or "subjective quality", "what its like inside" etc?

Can I say "consciousness" in words that don't denote consciousness, or without invoking the concept of consciousnes? No, I cannot.

Can you describe time in words that don't assume. an understanding of the concept of time--i.e., without words like "sequence," "chronological order," "before," "after," "temporal succession," etc.?

The fact that these things cannot be described in other terms is not an argument for their reducibility to some other phenomenon. Quite the contrary. It is if these phenomena could be described in the terminology of other phenomena that we would suspect them to be reducible to those other phenomena.

Now, please, nonexistent immaterial consciousnesses of the divine realm, release me from my addiction to responding to ideas that merit no response.

Don

[_CaliforniaKid]

Now, please, nonexistent immaterial consciousnesses of the divine realm, release me from my addiction to responding to ideas that merit no response.

Silly Don,

Nobody in their right mind thinks that the nonexistent consciousnesses of the divine realm are immaterial. They are in fact quite anthropomorphic. Just ask Kerry Shirts.

-CK

(I can already hear the voices telling you to respond to my meritless idea... bwahahaha!)

[_Tarski]

When I ask you to flesh it out you seem to gravitate toward stuff I don't deny (stuff that brains and subtle machines could do).

Good, since I believe brains do do these things, including producing subjectivity.

Can you just say what is left out without just repeating a few isolated words like "consciousness", or "subjective quality", "what its like inside" etc?

Can I say "consciousness" in words that don't denote consciousness, or without invoking the concept of consciousnes? No, I cannot.

Can you describe time in words that don't assume. an understanding of the concept of time--I.e., without words like "sequence," "chronological order," "before," "after," "temporal succession," etc.?

The fact that these things cannot be described in other terms is not an argument for their reducibility to some other phenomenon. Quite the contrary. It is if these phenomena could be described in the terminology of other phenomena that we would suspect them to be reducible to those other phenomena.

Now, please, nonexistent immaterial consciousnesses of the divine realm, release me from my addiction to responding to ideas that merit no response.

Don

OK, then why would anyone ever doubt for even a second that a robot could be conscious in principle?
Since we are at least biological machines the robot conscious consideration is a good catalyst to clarification.
So why have you not repsonded to any of my questions about machine consciousness?

In a world that contains nothing but physical entities in motion how is subjectivity even possible?
Is that an interesting question?
Why would what is considered one of the biggest problems facing philosophy ("the ontology of consciousness") be not worthy of a response?

It's huge (as is Dennett's reputation):
http://www.philowiki.com/wiki/index.php ... bate_Guide


who dignifies the question of the ontology of subjectivity?

Fredric Bartlett Jerome Bruner John Carroll David Chalmers
Noam Chomsky Patricia Churchland William Clancey Michael Cole
Daniel Dennett John Dewey Hubert Dreyfus Gerald Edelman
Heinz von Foerster Howard Gardner Jack Goody Stevan Harnad
Douglas Hofstadter David Hume John Josephson Karl Lashley
George Lakoff Brenda Laurel John McCarthy Warren McCulloch
Drew McDermott George Miller Marvin Minsky Allen Newell
Donald Norman Ulric Neisser Seymore Papert Jean Piaget
Roger Schank John Searle Herbert Simon Paul Thagard
Sherry Turkle Alan Turing Mark Turner Francisco Varela
Valentin Voloshinov Lev Vygotsky Terry Winograd Ludwig Wittgenstein
Wilhelm Wundt Mark Johnson

http://realityconditions.blogspot.com/2 ... mbies.html

[_cksalmon]

When I ask you to flesh it out you seem to gravitate toward stuff I don't deny (stuff that brains and subtle machines could do).

Good, since I believe brains do do these things, including producing subjectivity.

Can you just say what is left out without just repeating a few isolated words like "consciousness", or "subjective quality", "what its like inside" etc?

Can I say "consciousness" in words that don't denote consciousness, or without invoking the concept of consciousnes? No, I cannot.

Can you describe time in words that don't assume. an understanding of the concept of time--I.e., without words like "sequence," "chronological order," "before," "after," "temporal succession," etc.?

The fact that these things cannot be described in other terms is not an argument for their reducibility to some other phenomenon. Quite the contrary. It is if these phenomena could be described in the terminology of other phenomena that we would suspect them to be reducible to those other phenomena.

Now, please, nonexistent immaterial consciousnesses of the divine realm, release me from my addiction to responding to ideas that merit no response.

Don

Hi Don--

Riddle me this: I think it fairly intuitive (at least "intuitive" after considerable reflection) to believe that "time" ultimately is reducible to other phenomena (viz., at least, the observation of movement--I almost typed "movement over time!" Talk about shooting oneself in the foot...). Okay: sequential movement. And right there "sequence" raises its beastly chronological head.

I'm fairly convinced that without physical movement, there is no "time." How would this idea, supposing you'd countenance it, be transposed into your thoughts on subjective consciousness? Without "____," there would be no subjective consciousness? My hunch is that these two concepts (time and consciousness) are indelibly intertwined (at least in one fundamental way--viz., with regard to "sequence.").

It also seems fairly intuitive that even assuming physical movement (let's say in a material universe utterly devoid of any sort of observing being)--in the absence of any mind to project the notion of "sequence" onto "sequential" movements, there could be no time. The notion of "time" might, in that case, have a logically-proper referent, but it would have no subjective referee, so to speak, to impart the concept of "sequence."

I guess I'm asking: can a materialist (general question about which I'm hoping for your lucid insight: I don't assume you are a materialist, though I suspect you may be) posit subjective consciousness as something in excess of neuro-biological processes? I don't know the answer to that.

In my less bibliocentric moments, I tend to lean toward a monistic framework of humanity: i.e., that a purely material description of the human being is a sufficient one. Further, that such a material description (invoking, as it irrevocably does, a purely mechanical understanding of consciousness) does not necessarily sound the death knell for supra-material visions of the universe.

But, then, I'm a theological determinist who believes that any thoroughgoing genre of determinism (be it psychological, biochemical, behavioral, etc.) is at least possibly consistent with Christian belief, properly conceived. (I don't believe in libertarian freewill.)

I'm rambling, obviously.

Fundamentally, I'm wondering whether or not and why you feel justified in positing a supra-material conception (using that term in a purely descriptive, non-theistic manner) of subjective consciousness?

Maybe you can make sense of my questions and pull together some coherent words in response to them...

You ain't got much to work with, bro, but I ask sincerely.

Best to you.

CKS

PS. I'm enjoying immensely the H. G. Collingwood book you recommended.

[_Gadianton]

for what it's worth, I don't know what it is that causes conscious states--subjective states. You seem to know that it is information processing that constitutes consciousness. I believe that consciousness arises from, or is perhaps identical to, certain brain states, but unlike you I don't know how this occurs.

While identity theory is still very popular, there are good reasons for alternative views. Among the most important, Putnam's multiple realizability thesis which can be taken in the direction of computational models:

1.2 Arguments Against “Reductive” Mind-Brain Identity Theories
In a series of papers published throughout the 1960s, Hilary Putnam introduced multiple realizability into the philosophy of mind. Against the "brain state theorists," who held that every mental kind is identical to some as-yet-undiscovered neural kind, Putnam (1967) notes the wide variety of terrestrial creatures seemingly capable of experiencing pain. Humans, other primates, other mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and even mollusks (e.g., octopi) seem reasonable candidates. But then for the “brain state theory” to be true, there must be some physical-chemical kind common to this wide variety of pain-bearing species, and correlated exactly with each occurrence of the mental kind. (This is a necessary condition of the hypothesized type-identity.) But comparative neuroanatomy and physiology, facts about convergent evolution, and the corticalization of function (especially sensory function) as cortical mass increases across species all speak against this requirement.

In addition, early mind-brain identity theorists insisted that these identities, while contingent, hold by virtue of natural (scientific) law. But then any physically possible cognizer (e.g., pain-bearer) must also be capable of possessing that physical-chemical kind. Here the well-known philosophers' fantasies enter the discussion. Silicon-based androids, artificially intelligent electronic robots, and Martians with green slime pulsating within their skulls all seem to be possible pain realizers. But they lack “brain states” comparable to ours at any level of physical description. Further still, these mind-brain identity theories were supposed to be completely general. Every mental kind was held to be identical to some neural kind. So the critic needs to find only one mental kind, shared across species yet realized differently at the physical-chemical level. Putnam acknowledges that the early identity theories were empirical hypotheses. But one of their consequences was "certainly ambitious" and very probably false.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multi ... izability/