incorrigable private evidence

[_Gadianton]

Tarski,

Concerning Chalmers and incorrigibility. I discovered this today, which greatly puts in perspective his thoughts on incorrigibility that I don't remember being fleshed out in his book. (knowing he's conscious is what stimulates him to pursue his arguments, but he doesn't argue from this intuition.)

Warner locates the source of the problem in a different place: the incorrigibility of our knowledge of consciousness. I agree with Warner that there is some sense in which some knowledge of consciousness is incorrigible - I know with certainty that I am conscious right now, for example - but it is remarkably tricky to isolate the relevant sense and the relevant items of knowledge. Warner himself notes that plenty of our beliefs about our experiences are mistaken. He gets around this problem by limiting this to cases where our ability to recognize experiences is "unimpaired", but this seems to come dangerously close to trivializing the incorrigibility claim. After all, it is arguably a tautology that an "unimpaired" belief about an experience will be correct. Warner may have a way to unpack the definition of "impairment" so that the claim is non-circular, but this is clearly a non-trivial project.

That's a pretty low assessment of incorrigibility from the most noteworthy dualist out there.

[_DonBradley]

BEAT ME WITH WET QUALIA for adding this! (Never mind that, Tarski. That was for KA.)

First, Gad, you ask if Dennett needs my advice on being a philosopher. Would you similarly ask if, say, a scholar of Near Eastern antiquities or early Mormon history might need your advice? Have you offered advice to or criticism of such persons? If so, then you apparently don't believe in the very sort of appeal to authority you're making here, however convenient it might be to use it in this case.

Tarski, Gad, et al.,

Next time you are in terrible agony, take comfort in the fact that you aren't really experiencing it. And next time you consider how one of your decisions would affect the emotions of those around you, realize that they won't really experience either suffering or happiness as a result of what you do; they'll merely behave in certain ways they'll verbally describe as suffering or happiness; and, with this assurance, behave as you will.

I don't believe that anyone, at a root level, actually believes that he or she doesn't really experience things. The experience of pleasure and pain, and of other emotions, and the pursuit or avoidance of these because of the nature of the experiences, is as familiar to every human being as anything can be; whether this is openly acknowledged or veiled in sophistry.

Don

[_KimberlyAnn]

Why? do people who spell consciousness correctly have more intense orgasms?

I wouldn't know if their orgasms were more intense. You see, I just assume poor spellers can't possibly know much about philosophy, in the same way you assume those who haven't significantly studied qualia have poor reading comprehension.

Oh, I see that now...

I'm sure you saw that before, Gadiantion, yet you assumed I didn't. Well, I did. As ignorant as I am about qualia, I actually can read.

And as one with significant vested interests in how consciousness is traditionally understood, Dennett's position is a real problem for you - right?

Of course I don't have significant vested interests in how consciousness is traditionally understood. Not many people do, do they? Dennett's position on anything won't change the way I live my life.

I understand you are in disagreement with me on several issues and I also understand I'm no philosopher, or even a student of philosophy. I've readily admitted that on this thread and others, though I'm sure my admissions weren't necessary as my unfamiliarity with philosophy is readily apparent. What I don't understand is your condescending tone. Did you assume my poor reading ability would render me unable to notice it? I shouldn't have jumped on your spelling error, at any rate, and for that I apologize. It's immature to react in such a retaliatory manner.

KA

[_KimberlyAnn]

BEAT ME WITH WET QUALIA for adding this! (Never mind that, Tarski. That was for KA.)

LOL! I thought you might be back, Don...

KA

[_Tarski]

BEAT ME WITH WET QUALIA for adding this! (Never mind that, Tarski. That was for KA.)

First, Gad, you ask if Dennett needs my advice on being a philosopher. Would you similarly ask if, say, a scholar of Near Eastern antiquities or early Mormon history might need your advice? Have you offered advice to or criticism of such persons? If so, then you apparently don't believe in the very sort of appeal to authority you're making here, however convenient it might be to use it in this case.

Tarski, Gad, et al.,

Next time you are in terrible agony, take comfort in the fact that you aren't really experiencing it. And next time you consider how one of your decisions would affect the emotions of those around you, realize that they won't really experience either suffering or happiness as a result of what you do; they'll merely behave in certain ways they'll verbally describe as suffering or happiness; and, with this assurance, behave as you will.
Don

What makes you think we are denying suffering? We are only suggesting that suffering can be unpacked in terms of things understandable in naturalistic terms and in terms that at root connect up to things in the objective world (like frustration of goals and dashing of hopes etc.). No need to appeal to some mysterious quale--"the painfulness of pain itself".
Why is pain bad? Becuase it is "painful"--intrinsically bad in way that cannot be futher decomposed?

[_Tarski]

Here is the way KimberlyAnn and Don picture Tarski


but....(see next post)

[_Tarski]

But how do I see myself?

[_barrelomonkeys]

That is the way I see you too Tarski.

[_Tarski]

That is the way I see you too Tarski.

Which way? (There are two posts above)

[_Doctor Steuss]

I picture you as a Mandelbrot set.