incorrigable private evidence

[_Tarski]

I tend to reject the notion of subjective/interior private evidence. However, many skeptics and critics seem to hold to the common idea that at least one's own consciousness cannot be doubted. For me, consciousness in the sense that most people intuit and that is defended by Chalmers and challenged by Dennett can indeed be doubted. We can't just "look and see".
This is the kind of consciousness that we think that robots can't have since they are just machines or if they do it is becuase something extra appears as an epiphenomemon. I certainly do not think that I can just check inside myself and see that I possess this mysterious thing called consciousness. I do intuit it and it does seem "obvious" most of the time but that isn't enough and, in principle, no better than a Mormon testimony resting as it does on a sheer ineffable feeling of obviousness or intuition.

Are those think that the existence of ones own mind as a nonmaterial separate ontological category ( a la Descartes) is indubitable really hypocrits if they say that nevertheless spiritual witness cannot provide certainty?

[_Polygamy Porter]

Look at the jokers on the Farm sites and their research articles that they foist upon their rabid posse of wannabees.

They end most, if not all of their "research" with what? A TESTIMONY.

Read my sig line... is it any wonder?

[_Some Schmo]

Are those think that the existence of ones own mind as a nonmaterial separate ontological category ( a la Descartes) is indubitable really hypocrits if they say that nevertheless spiritual witness cannot provide certainty?

Hey bud, you were likely typing fast, so no worries... but could you check the grammar on this and correct it so I really know what you're asking, because I believe I'm intrigued by what you're getting at.

[_asbestosman]

I tend to reject the notion of subjective/interior private evidence. However, many skeptics and critics seem to hold to the common idea that at least one's own consciousness cannot be doubted.

[. . . ]

Are those think that the existence of ones own mind as a nonmaterial separate ontological category ( a la Descartes) is indubitable really hypocrits if they say that nevertheless spiritual witness cannot provide certainty?

Perhaps those critics hold that consciousness cannot be doubted, but do not define it as a separate ontological category (a la Descartes). If by consciousness they merely mean the phenomena whereby one perceives the world or "thinks" while yet holding that perhaps robots could have this too, then perhaps there is no contradiction (I prefer contradiction to hypocrisy as I doubt there is blame to be laid here, but ahhhh semantics which I hate arguing over) in also maintaining that spiritual witnesses cannot provide certainty.

Qualia may be an illusion of sorts or even a non-issue. Still I think it perfectly justifiable to believe that one's own experience of existing is an undeniable fact. The questions remain as to how faithful that experience is or what precisely existence means (do numbers exist). Still, one could hold the existence of some experience as an undeniable fact while reectnig the spiritual witnesses as being reliable.

Indeed the proper comparison would be whether our qualia / conscious experience are reasonably reliable representations of the universe vs whether spiritual experiences are reasonably reliable representations of the universe. Likewise it would be whether the experiences of consciousness exist and whether the expereiences of spirutual witnesses exist. I think few deny this last comparison however I think we all agree that it is not their existence which is called into question but their veracity.

[_moksha]

Are those think that the existence of ones own mind as a nonmaterial separate ontological category ( a la Descartes) is indubitable really hypocrits if they say that nevertheless spiritual witness cannot provide certainty?

Is there a Babelfish translation for this? ;-)

[Guest]

Hi Tarski,

I understand your comparison of our "intuition" of consciousness with the intuitive knowledge claimed by religionists, and perhaps I'll comment specifically on that later.

In the meantime, I'm curious about the notions that consciousness can be doubted and that we know we're conscious because we have a kind of intuition or apprehension of consciousness itself.

We are conscious merely by virtue of having experiences. To have mental experience is to be conscious. Consciousness isn't the object of awareness, it is the awareness.

Does Dennett really argue that we aren't conscious, or that this is uncertain? And if so, should we believe arguments in this vein, or accept the existence of the very apparatus by which we apprehend the arguments? Of course we're conscious. What sort of misguided hyperskepticism would lead us to question that?

I've long been interested in philosophy, but with time that interest fades. If the best academic philosophy can do is lead us to question the very notions on which our functioning depends--such as truth, external reality, causation, and consciousness, what's the point? And what advantage would a philosopher have over a Sophist?

Don

[_Gadianton]

Chalmers's motivation to make his conceivability argument comes from some kind of incorrigable introspection. But the details are unclear to me.

I think there is a way that the belief in phenomenal consciousness is similar to the idea of a testimony and a way it is different.

Different:

Qualia are "one dimensional". They don't need to represent anything. So if I "see red" there need not be any red objects. That property is in fact why they are incorrigable. A testimony though, is suppose to represent the church being true, and junk like that. So testimonies try to buy more than folks who "take consciousness seriously".

Similar:

Now it is interesting you bring this up because a while ago I had a similar thought. Damn, it appears somehow I can't copy and paste from my own blog:

http://worldlyliving.wordpress.com/2007 ... d-seeming/

Paragraphs 3,4,5 are the important ones. This fleshes out why I said earlier that I'm not clear on his position of introspection. It's one thing for Chalmers to believe he has conscious life, it's another thing to give a detailed account of that life. And to me that's a big problem. It's one thing for him to say that qualia are by definition unmistakable, and another to accurately recount when he had an experience. Bringing to mind experiments in cognitive science which show that we often can't possibly experience what we think we experience. And that leaves open the possibility for (not again!) radical skepticism where it's hard to see how any consciousness can be incorrigable.

So now the link to a testimony. A testimony is ineffable and incorrigable. If someone says they've got one, then, by golly, they've got one. And there is no point in trying to match up mine to yours (think inverted spectrum here). So I can see your point for inconsistency. Because a testimony is in fact an experience (as TBMs will tell you) and experience is incorrigable. Given my sentiments above, it's hard to see how someone in Chalmers's position can draw the line and say a testimony, which TBMS report as experiential, cannot or might very well not be something they really experienced. If we can draw the line there, why can't we question some of the things Chalmers claims he experience? What makes him more of an expert on his experience than a TBM is on theirs? But if we can question anything in Chalmers's experience, then why can't we question everything? Ultimately, seeing red wouldn't be off limits I don't think, and if you go that far, then we're cutting deep into his generalized set of "conscious experience" which Chalmers draws on and ultimately, one starts wondering if maybe he himself could be the phenomenal zombie twin.

Now Tarski, stay with me, I know this is a long post. This has been an important issue for me long before I ever read Dennett. Many skeptics are content with believing that a Mormon testimony, a burning in the bosom, or whatever, is something like seeing a mirage or duping ourselves into a hallucination. The experience happens, but it doesn't refer to anything significant. But that's not good enough for me. When I was missionary, I not only had a hard time believing that Elder Green's experience while reading and praying about the Book of Mormon tells us anything about his knowledge, but I couldn't believe in 98 percent of the cases that anyone was having testimony experiences at all. I think something "Orwellian" was going on as soon as those guys manned the pulpit, or possibly even during those times where they were supposidly feeling spiritual. Most of the time, I don't think it's a case that by stressing over their testimony, Elders would trigger the hallucination, but rather, given enough time doing what BKP tells us to do, and bear what we don't have, our psychological consciousness constructs a narrative that we might thoroughly believe yet it never had anything to do with actual experience! I'm not sure if I'm thoroughly convinced by Dennett, there are other strong positions in phil mind worth considering, but one thing is for sure, you can call me a "testimony experience eliminativist". I don't just doubt the testimony's legitimacy, I doubt that warm fuzzies of any significance even happen most of the time or even make any sense.

[_barrelomonkeys]

Are those think that the existence of ones own mind as a nonmaterial separate ontological category ( a la Descartes) is indubitable really hypocrits if they say that nevertheless spiritual witness cannot provide certainty?

Hey bud, you were likely typing fast, so no worries... but could you check the grammar on this and correct it so I really know what you're asking, because I believe I'm intrigued by what you're getting at.

Are those that think that minds (thoughts) are proof that one thinks (a la Descartes and I exist because I think) is beyond doubt actually hypocrites if they say that spiritual witness can't provide certainty?

[_Tarski]

Are those think that the existence of ones own mind as a nonmaterial separate ontological category ( a la Descartes) is indubitable really hypocrits if they say that nevertheless spiritual witness cannot provide certainty?

Hey bud, you were likely typing fast, so no worries... but could you check the grammar on this and correct it so I really know what you're asking, because I believe I'm intrigued by what you're getting at.

I left off an apostrophe. Here is the fixed version:
Are those think that the existence of one's own mind as a nonmaterial separate ontological category ( a la Descartes) is indubitable really hypocrits if they say that nevertheless spiritual witness cannot provide certainty
:)

Here is the very sloppy but comprehensible version:

You are not conscious. You simply behave and react like a very subtle machine. Prove otherwise! How do you know? Intuition? Isn't that like a spiritual witness?

What do I mean by consciousness? Lets narrow it down to the existence of qualia. If a congenitally blind scientist (usually named Mary) knew everything that was to know about neurology and brain function would she learn something new if she was suddenly able to see and looked a a red apple? (Will she say "Oh wow, that's what red is!!").
What if I say no.

[_Tarski]

Hi Tarski,


We are conscious merely by virtue of having experiences. To have mental experience is to be conscious. Consciousness isn't the object of awareness, it is the awareness.
Don

Fine but then a photelectric cell is aware of light.
What does your intuition tell you about building ever more sophisticated robots? Is there a point beyond which it is aware but not before? What is added?