DiscussMormonism.com

MrStakhanovite wrote:Blixa is a predator

Now THAT would be a GREAT siggy! ;-)

"Well, did you or did you not say that???"

mfbukowski wrote:I have an uncle from Maine who is the quintessential Yankee- flannel shirt, straw hat and overalls, and he'll look you in the eye, spit, and give you a piece of his mind that will be exactly right on the money every time.

THAT is Pragmatism.

Mfbukowski,

Thanks for your time and effort. I look forward to our next discussion.

So Dr. Mark Mostert has done the best metaanalysis work on facilitated communication post 1994. He's the best person to cite for recent research on the subject indicating its failures as an augmentative communication tool. But he's also a completely certifiable nutjob on numerous political topics, 'causing him to write atrocious scientific opinions. His Terry Shaivo stuff is in particular quite embarrassing. That always makes me a bit sweaty when I cite him, as I'm worried that someone is going to point out how ideologically compromised he is on other topics.

Facilitated Communciation. Amirightguys?

That always makes me a bit sweaty when I cite him, as I'm worried that someone is going to point out how ideologically compromised he is on other topics.

All you need to do is call "ad hominem." Should shut up the critics.

You can support a person in one area of work, while criticizing that person in another area. Fair game.

If I were to be critical of everyone who disagreed with me in any respect, I would be holding myself up as a goddess. That I am not. I am imperfect.

MCB wrote:

That always makes me a bit sweaty when I cite him, as I'm worried that someone is going to point out how ideologically compromised he is on other topics.

All you need to do is call "ad hominem." Should shut up the critics.

It's not really ad hominem. This is an area that is sometimes tricky for people. To argue that an argument someone makes is wrong because of who they are is ad hominem. But that's not the issue at hand here. When you cite someone for their expertise, you are asking people to take a measure of what they say based on the authority they have. You expect their citations reliable rather than quotemined, for instance. There are numerous factors that go into judging whether a source is credible so that authority should be trusted. If you can point out how a person has obviously misguided views because they are so ideologically biased in one area of research, this can rightly harm their crediblity in another. You'd be foolish not to be more skeptical.

In the case of Dr. Mostert, I've read much of what he cites in his writings, so I know his FC papers check out. But if I'm citing him, I'm not expecting everyone to do the same legwork.

Here is a hypothetical dialogue that I imagine with mfbukowski:

Me: Stop playing that piss ass annoying game that philosophers play of "semantics" or I am going to shove my foot so far up your nose that . . .

mfbukowski: But, what does it really mean "foot" and what is the real meaning of "nose"? Does your "boot" actually exist, or is it a construct of our minds and our experience?

Me: Well, let me see. *shove. Did you feel that?

mfbukowski: Well, it depends on what you mean by "feel". Is this meant to be an materialist view of the world or a constructionist view?

Me: Well, let me shove it up there again and see if you feel it this time *shove. Did you feel it that time?

mfbukowski: Again, it depends on how you define "nose". I can quote the works of Frued and Plato to show that . . .

Me: Let me demonstrate again *shove

Somebody really needs to play this game with this guy so that he learns the difference between philisophical B.S. and the real world. :-|

Of course I'm kidding!!!! :)

But if I'm citing him, I'm not expecting everyone to do the same legwork.

I understand the ad hominem point. I think it behooves any intelligent person to take a critical look at research, whether it fits the individual's preconceived notions or not. If there are other views the scholar presents in a flawed manner, then perhaps one would look for the same type of flaws in the work under discussion. Or, perhaps one might look at how the strengths of the work under discussion are applied to the subject with which one disagrees.

mfbukowski wrote:I have an uncle from Maine who is the quintessential Yankee- flannel shirt, straw hat and overalls, and he'll look you in the eye, spit, and give you a piece of his mind that will be exactly right on the money every time.

THAT is Pragmatism.

I know a couple of brothers from Payson named Ron and Dan who will give you a piece of their minds that will be right on the money every time, at least for them. Of course, you'll have to visit them at the Point of the Mountain.

Cheap shot? Not really. If "what works for me" is "true," then no one can argue with what they did. It was "true" for them, right?

Runtu wrote:

mfbukowski wrote:I have an uncle from Maine who is the quintessential Yankee- flannel shirt, straw hat and overalls, and he'll look you in the eye, spit, and give you a piece of his mind that will be exactly right on the money every time.

THAT is Pragmatism.

I know a couple of brothers from Payson named Ron and Dan who will give you a piece of their minds that will be right on the money every time, at least for them. Of course, you'll have to visit them at the Point of the Mountain.

Cheap shot? Not really. If "what works for me" is "true," then no one can argue with what they did. It was "true" for them, right?

Tolerance for ambiguity is evidence of a mature intellect

Google the phrase and see what you get. I didn't study psych for nothin'.

The world is a complex place without easy answers.

I think your buddies have low tolerance for ambiguity. You see a lot of that around here.

keithb wrote:Here is a hypothetical dialogue that I imagine with mfbukowski:

Me: Stop playing that piss ass annoying game that philosophers play of "semantics" or I am going to shove my foot so far up your nose that . . .

mfbukowski: But, what does it really mean "foot" and what is the real meaning of "nose"? Does your "boot" actually exist, or is it a construct of our minds and our experience?

Me: Well, let me see. *shove. Did you feel that?

mfbukowski: Well, it depends on what you mean by "feel". Is this meant to be an materialist view of the world or a constructionist view?

Me: Well, let me shove it up there again and see if you feel it this time *shove. Did you feel it that time?

mfbukowski: Again, it depends on how you define "nose". I can quote the works of Frued and Plato to show that . . .

Me: Let me demonstrate again *shove

Somebody really needs to play this game with this guy so that he learns the difference between philisophical B.S. and the real world. :-|

Of course I'm kidding!!!! :)

Of course, I'm kidding.

The converse, ambiguity intolerance,[4][5] which was introduced in The Authoritarian Personality in 1950,[6] was defined in 1975 as a “tendency to perceive or interpret information marked by vague, incomplete, fragmented, multiple, probable, unstructured, uncertain, inconsistent, contrary, contradictory, or unclear meanings as actual or potential sources of psychological discomfort or threat.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguity_tolerance

Hi Stak,

I really appreciated your post and the time you took in responding to my questions.

I was wondering if you could clarify something further for me. I didn't really see MFB respond directly to your question about induction, instead appealing to the Duhem-Quine Thesis. I personally wasn’t satisfied with his answer to your follow up question as well, but I thought it may help me if I tried to think through the problem "out loud" as it were, and tried to answer your questions directly myself so I could see where you are going with the above?

His notes following your first post seem to show he did not agree with induction being the best method for deriving inferences from data, and thus your explanation for his form of Pragmatism, as described below –

“First let's look at P1

"P1: A generalization is confirmed by any of it’s instances."

So if I see a pink elephant, the generalization "Pink elephants exist" is now confirmed?

Or if there is one albino white raven, the generalization that ravens are white is confirmed?

Now P2

"P2: If two hypotheses can be known a priori to be equivalent, then any data that confirms one confirms the other."

What does that even mean? How do we know that two hypotheses can be known a priori to be equivalent? Does that mean deductively? Logically equivalent?

Attitude:
A pragmatist would never state that anything is always anything else. What good does it do to state that all ravens are black? What is the purpose of that statement? All it would take is one albino raven to destroy the hypothesis. What does it get us? It's just a game!”

You noted above that by abandoning P1 or P2 it would cripple his ability to draw good inferences; a conclusion he seems to also agree with when he questions even being able to infer that P2 can be inferred a priori to be true if P1 is known to be true based on one’s personal experience. While I almost think MFB is onto something in his “Attitude” response above (all it DOES take is one example that contradicts P2 to invalidate it, and as a result why wouldn’t one also call P1 into question?), I think a different example might help MFB clarify his thoughts on this matter for us.

I’d like to replace the hypothetical questions of ravens and blixa-the-cat examples with one that is more closely related to Mormonism, and thus is more likely to be defended or questioned.

M1: A person who applies Moroni’s promise will know that the Book of Mormon is true scripture from God.

A natural, a priori hypothesis that follows from the above could be-

M2: All people who do not know that the Book of Mormon is true scripture from God have not applied Moroni’s promise.

I suspect that MFB would actually agree with M1. Past experience has me believe that MFB would not agree with M2, but rather than jump to this conclusion, I think it may be informative to work towards a modified conclusion step-by-step.

We can suppose that Runtu continues in his role in the description you gave and comes along claiming that he has applied the Moroni promise but does not know that the Book of Mormon is in fact true scripture from God.

A few Mormons are inclined to preserve both M1 and M2 in this case, relying instead on questioning that Runtu did, in fact apply Moroni’s promise. Or even questioning that Runtu might actually comply with M1 but is lying, either to himself or outwardly to others.

A person who is willing to accept Runtu’s view, but not willing to reconsider M1, might redefine the matter as follows:

M1b - A person who correctly applies Moroni’s promise will know that the Book of Mormon is true scripture from God.

M2b: All people who do not know that the Book of Mormon is true scripture from God have not correctly applied Moroni’s promise.

I think that the above could describe many people’s views when faced with similarly conflicting evidence. I may have misread it, but you seem to get into this where you discuss Quine.

Now, some people may even be willing to further modify M1b to something such as, “A person who correctly applies Moroni’s promise - who God knows is ready to handle the additional responsibilities that come from having this revealed to them - will know that the Book of Mormon is true scripture from God” and modify M1b accordingly as well.

At this point, it seems that we have arrived at the conclusion you provided regarding the Durhim-Quine thesis,

MrStak wrote:“So, the only distinction that we could make (and the only one that we need to make) is between sentences that we are reluctant to give up in the face of recalcitrant experience, and sentences which can be jettisoned without compunction.”

I was wondering how does the above get around the issue of falsifiability? If a person can simply continue to modify their hypothesizes to continually account for conflicting data, what does this say about the value of this philosophical worldview? If no individual hypothesis can be falsified, can the underlying experientially gained "truth" be said to be falsifiable even if early versions of the M1/M2 are contradicted by experience?

Or does falsifiability matters?