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I’ve been interacting with some of the works of a contemporary advocatefor the Moral Argument for Theism, it’s a common argument found in Mopologetic discourse, but less robust than the versions found in Christian apologetic circles.

The argument formulated was this:

(P1) If there are moral facts, then their basis is either natural or supernatural (where these two are construed as mutually exclusive categories)

(P2) The basis of moral facts is not natural

(C1) Therefore if there are moral facts, then their basis is supernatural

(P3) The most plausible way to think of a supernatural basis of moral facts is in terms of a supernatural person who brings moral facts about.

(C2) Therefore, if there are moral facts, the most plausible way to think of their basis is in terms of a supernatural person who brings moral facts about.

In my blog post, I make some observations, but what do you folks think?

MrStakhanovite wrote:I’ve been interacting with some of the works of a contemporary advocatefor the Moral Argument for Theism, it’s a common argument found in Mopologetic discourse, but less robust than the versions found in Christian apologetic circles.

The argument formulated was this:

(P1) If there are moral facts, then their basis is either natural or supernatural (where these two are construed as mutually exclusive categories)

(P2) The basis of moral facts is not natural

(C1) Therefore if there are moral facts, then their basis is supernatural

(P3) The most plausible way to think of a supernatural basis of moral facts is in terms of a supernatural person who brings moral facts about.

(C2) Therefore, if there are moral facts, the most plausible way to think of their basis is in terms of a supernatural person who brings moral facts about.

In my blog post, I make some observations, but what do you folks think?

Just some quick thoughts...

I wouldn't want to make much of stink over (P1); (P2), I suppose, has some intuitive force, but having already studied ethical theory I find my intuition polluted, and I would need some good argument to accept it.

I'm not exactly sure what to think of (P3), but suppose we grant it and everything up to it; I don't see how that leads us to theism - assuming here that 'theism' in this context is meant to refer to a sort of god who continues to engage in the affairs of men.

Edit: I read your blog post after my post and I thin you offer an interesting criticism of (P1).

I never bought (P2), even when I was a believer. There are some big differences between cultures about what is moral. C.S. Lewis in the ABOLITION OF MAN argues that the essentials of morality are consistent between cultures, i.e., all cultures believe that cowardice is a vice, etc. Even that has been proved to be wrong by anthropologists. After reading books like the Moral Animal (http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Animal-Scie ... 0679763996), I don't believe that there are any aspects of morality that cannot be explained by evolution, games theory, etc.

Naturally, all of this presupposes that we can agree on what comprises the set of 'moral facts.' Or that they are somehow immutable.

I haven't read the exchange yet, but I'm particularly not enthused about this variation of the argument. This is because I think the distinction between natural kinds and supernatural kinds is incoherent or such that naturalism trivially wins. (If ghosts exist, that doesn't mean supernaturalists are vindicated. It means ghosts are natural things. If numbers exist as abstracta, they are natural things.) In this case the divide among moral realists is between moral naturalists who think that moral facts are about what we think of as natural facts of the world and those who think they exist as non-physical abstract phenomena. If you think the latter, it just doesn't make sense to me to call that position a supernaturalist one.

But that's a semantic issue. I'd argue the second premise as I am a moral naturalist, but I think the real failure is in premise 3. I haven't seen how it is justified, as I haven't read the exchange yet, but I fail to see how one can successfully justify it. I find it very likely that what happens is the person relies on defining a supernatural person as having the power and desire to obtain that state of affairs and therefore concludes that this is the best explanation for that state of affairs. But that is no explanation at all. It is, in fact, an argument from ignorance that trivially builds into its hypothesis that which it seeks to explain by fiat definition. A lot of attempts at theistic justification hinge on this fundamental flaw. It's always more parsimonious to say the universe qua the aggregate of all things has the properties you are attempting to explain as a brute fact than it is to define a god as creating the universe with those properties and asserting that is a consequence of god's brute fact properties. Both are brute fact assertions, but one has an extra step. And if parsimony isn't a consideration for you, it's unclear why the god hypothesis should be favored over a simple "I don't know" if that is what it boils down to.

This form of the argument is still vulnerable to the Euthyphro dilemma. If our supernatural person we call God is responsible for moral facts, then either those moral facts are contingent on the will/nature of that God or they are necessary truths. If the latter, then they would exist in any case regardless of whether God exists. If they are the the former, then they are arbitrary and, from a theological standpoint, any assertion about God's goodness is empty. (Saying God's commands are good is just saying God's commands are what they are.)

Some people are so concerned about arguing for the existence of their God, they end up distancing themselves from the same God. I say, stop trying to defend His existence. Believe in Him. Bask in His image. Print Him on the palm of your hand. Conclude that He exists, and move on. Enjoy it.

That's what I want to tell them.

If they can't believe wholeheartedly, then find glory in disbelief. Certainly, you can find it there as well.

Very well said, EA.

Morley, that was exactly my thought.

To the layperson (me), this appears to be a dumb argument - isn't (P2) completely arbitrary?

(not your argument, stak, but the argument for the MAT)

H.

I would modify the argument. If we added your suggestion:

(P1’) If there are moral facts, then their basis is either natural or non-natural or supernatural (where these three are construed as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories)

I tend to agree with E about 80%, where I do agree with him is that semantics is taking too prominent of a role whether one is making the moral argument with categories such as 'natural', 'supernatural', or abstract objects. The real issue is regarding an aspect of our lived experience of the real world. I don't care what you call it, i.e. adding another platonic sub-category as you did shouldn't change utilizing that category within the argument and it doesn't.

So with your change in place I would then change as follows:

(P1) If there are moral facts, then their basis is either natural or non-natural or supernatural (where these three are construed as mutually exclusive categories)

(P2) The basis of moral facts is not natural.

(C1) Therefore if there are moral facts, then their basis is supernatural or non-natural. (I would probably change this to simply a real aspect of our experience of the concrete world regardless of what they are).

(P3) The way we apprehend or perceive moral facts is similar to the way that we apprehend or perceive God.

(C2) Therefore, if there are moral facts, we can apprehend or perceive them.

(C3) If the way we apprehend or perceive moral facts is similar to the way that we apprehend or perceive God then we are in fact perceiving God.

This would (at least initially) avoid the Euthyphro dilemma that E also brought up.

my regards, mikwut

mikwut wrote:semantics is taking too prominent of a role

This sums up just about everything that annoys me about the way many modern religious thinkers employ logic and philosophy. It's like they treat it as a game to be won for their team through clever manipulation of language, rather than as a tool for clarifying and analyzing thought. The term "sophistry" comes to mind, but that's not really fair to the sophists.