DiscussMormonism.com

moksha wrote:SALT LAKE CITY, January 19, 20013

In a letter addressed to President Obama, the Utah Sheriffs Association has announced that they will resist the feds from taking Utah's guns.

In a related story, hundreds gathered at the Utah State Capitol for "Gun Appreciation Day". So even brought their assault rifles.

It is assumed that this issue will be addressed at the new annual Constitition Day in the Tabernacle.

http://www.kutv.com/

no shock, if any state is going to be strange it is Utah. This is another reason why I am so happy not to be living in Utah.

bcspace wrote: Even top Senate Dem Mitch McConnell is pro Second Amendment

Would you mind unpacking what you think being "pro Second Amendment" means or includes?

As beastie has repeated tried to point out to you Justice Scalia, who sits in a position to authoratively explain the term, has a definition with which you probably disagree.

ETA: and when did Mitch McConnell become a Dem?

bcspace wrote:

Would you mind unpacking what you think being "pro Second Amendment" means or includes?

Right now, opposed to any additional regulations at least.

As beastie has repeated tried to point out to you Justice Scalia, who sits in a position to authoratively explain the term, has a definition with which you probably disagree.

And as I have repeatedly pointed out, Scalia has provided dicta with with she would disagree.

(pg. 22) There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. ___ (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.

(pg 48-49) JUSTICE STEVENS (my add - in the dissenting opinion) places overwhelming reliance upon this Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S.174 (1939).
...
And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment “protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”

Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS’ case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men’s federal convictions for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court’s basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were “bear[ing] arms” not “for . . . military purposes” but for “nonmilitary use,” post, at 2. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection (note, my emphasis added): “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [shortbarreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”

...

(pg. 50) Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

(pg. 52) We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary military equipment” could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment” language must be read in tandem with what comes after: “[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.” The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms “in common use at the time” for lawful purposes like self-defense. “In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.”

(pg. 53) We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.

(pg. 54) Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.

(pg. 54, including those parts previously quoted by beastie) Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and (pg. 56) tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

(pg. 64) Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.

ETA: and when did Mitch McConnell become a Dem?

He's such a push over he seems like a Dem sometimes.

Albion wrote:My observation was that the protest was more about the government taking away people's right to protect themselves. "We need a gun because we need to protect ourselves," seems to be the cry. Protect themselves from what, I wonder. Why people with guns, of course. What an almighty "catch 22".

So, where is your issue with the proposed gun control initiatives in relation to the ruling in DC vs. Heler? Weapons types restrictions (of which assault-type weapons could be classed), registration of weapons, limitations on where a weapon could be carried and on certain elements of society such as felons and the mentally ill are all addressed. With what are you actually taking issue?