canpakes wrote:Do you see why I state that a more direct communication is not any more improbable than a 'sensation'? And why trying to rationalize a 'sensation' as the definitive answer from God just opens you up to an even greater level of guesswork and 'self-fulfilling' reasoning (circular argument)?
I've given this discussion a lot of thought. I've been assering that it's certainly possible that God simply cannot communicate with sound to as many people simultaneously as God can communicate with via the spirit. I've been asking myself, is this really the direction I want to take the discussion? I'm still not convinced that God's ability to create the universe (by some natural process) and God's ability to communicate by the spirit with large numbers of people simultaneously necessarily imply that God has the ability to communicate via audio with the same large numbers of people. But even if God did have the ability to communicate via audio with large numbers of people, I'm not convinced that God would choose to. Canpakes, you have described communication by feelings as inferior to communication by audio, but I don't see why God would not see it as perfectly adequate for God's purposes. If God has a complicated message to convey, then obviously there's something to be said for sending an angel to communicate that message with a prophet/spokesman. But once God has established an organization to take that message to the world, all God really needs to do is tell people yes or no, either God established some given organization as that message conveyor or God did not.
I don't see that trying to rationalize a sensation "as the definitive answer from God" opens me up to any guesswork at all. If God exists, God is certainly capable of giving a sensation that is clearly positive or one that is clearly negative. And how is anything "self-fulfilling" here? You keep trying to convince me that I'm using a circular argument, but you have not yet demonstrated where the circle is. Why should anyone believe I'm using a circular argument?
canpakes wrote:Well, notwithstanding other theories this introduces the LDS concept of the Holy Spirit being God's messenger and only being able to be in one person at one time. Refer to the mathematical problem of this above... and that's even before we get to the problem of how this definition of the Holy Spirit was derived.
How did you come to the conclusion that an LDS concept consists "of the Holy Spirit ... only being able to be in one person at one time"? I have been going to LDS Sunday School for fifty years, and I've never heard that concept brought up.
canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:Presumably my "version of God could not"? I don't think that necessarily follows.
Then please present rationalization or reasoning as to why one is attainable and the other is not, per your interpretation of both options vis-à-vis God's abilities.
Then please? Are you saying that I have said, "I don't think that necessarily follows," and therefore I should be able to "present rationalization or reasoning as to why one is attainable and the other is not"? I have no idea how I would rationalize or reason "as to why one is attainable and the other is not"; what does that prove? If it doesn't necessarily follow, it doesn't necessarily follow, regardless of my ability to provide an argument for its opposite.
canpakes wrote:Do you disagree with my conclusion here about why I believe that you have stated these things? If so, why?
Because I've made it clear from very early on that I know God exists in the same sense that Euclid knew the truth of his famous parallel postulate. I based everything I said on my axiom just as Euclid based his geometry on his axioms.
canpakes wrote:This is an assumption, then, correct? The existence of God?
Yes, yes! How many times do I have to say it? It's an assumption. I take the existence of God on faith.
canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:You have never explained how my reasoning is any more circular than Euclid's. All you have ever said, in an attempt to convince me that my reasoning is circular, is that I assumed God existed at the beginning of my reasoning, and I assumed God existed at the end of my reasoning. Similarly, Euclid assumed the truth of his axioms at the beginning of his reasoning, and he also assumed the truth of his axioms at the end of his reasoning. So why should I believe that my reasoning is any more circular than Euclid's was?
Not so. Euclid did not waste effort randomly assuming the existence of any characteristic or condition that he was 'proving' in any of his proofs. His assumptions were typically axioms (self-evident), and the structure of the proof relies on known and mutually-agreed-upon definitions. Euclid observed that a thing was true or that a relationship existed, then set about to map out (the 'proof' process) a set of steps or instructions that could be replicated by anyone with exactly the same results.
Except that his axioms didn't turn out to be as self-evident as he thought they were, did they? There's a reason I focused in on the parallel-point axiom, and not the other axioms Euclid relied on. Have you heard of non-Euclidean geometries, Canpakes? Scholars have put a lot of work into them. Can an axiom really be self-evident in one geometry while an axiom that contradicts it is self-evident in another geometry? That's what we have with Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. If the parallel-point axiom is really all that self-evident, why is so much scholarly work put into investigating both what would happen if it was true, and what would happen if it was false?
I'll tell you one thing; the people who study non-Euclidean geometries would strongly object to you claiming they were using circular arguments, even if you could convince them that their axioms aren't self-evident.
canpakes wrote:You, by comparison, are assuming that God exists, and offer no verifiable or repeatable set of steps to determine either your initial assumption or your conclusion.
Nor do I suspect that you can come up with any "verifiable or repeatable set of steps to determine" whether the parallel-point axiom is true or false. All the geometrists have done is made an assumption, whether it's true or false, and have seen where the logic takes them. I've done the same thing with the question of the existence of God. Some people assume God doesn't exist, and I'd be interested to find out where a conscientious exploration of the consequences leads them. And I've assumed that God does exist. As far as circular reasoning goes, I'm doing nothing more than the geometrists have done. So I ask you once again, how have you come to the conclusion that my reasoning is any more circular than the reasoning of the geometrists, either Euclidean or non-Euclidean?
canpakes wrote:Your initial assumption has no concrete definition. Nor is the conclusion, or any step, or any result of a step definitively repeatable or verifiable by any other person. This is not a 'proof' and the claim that both use 'assumptions' therefore makes both your arguments and Euclid's equally valid is, in and of itself, an invalid argument that cannot overcome the circular nature of your core argument.
I never said that my arguments and Euclid's are "equally valid"; I said that my arguments are no more circular than Euclid's were, and that's completely true. Once again, you talk about "the circular nature of" my core argument, without ever explaining where the circle is. I will say it again; all you have ever said is that I assumed God existed at the beginning of my argument, and I assumed God existed at the end of my argument. Euclid and the non-Euclideans both did precisely the same thing; they assumed the parallel-point axiom (or, respectively, an axiom negating the parallel-point axiom) at the beginning of their arguments, and then they assumed the same respective axiom at the end of their arguments. So how do you arrive at the conclusion that my reasoning is any more circular than Euclid's (or the non-Euclideans')?
canpakes wrote:Anyone can construct an argument that superficially resembles the structure of a Euclidian proof, but doing so does not make the argument the same as a proof, or make it valid, or keep it from being circular.
True, a superficial resemblance to the structure of a Euclidean proof doesn't make the argument a proof, or make it valid, or keep it from being circular, but when the only attempt the critic has ever used to explain why the argument is circular applies just as well to Euclidean and non-Euclidean proofs as it does to the argument in question, then the accusation that the argument in question is circular falls kind of flat.
