canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:I've given this discussion a lot of thought. I've been asserting that it's certainly possible that God simply cannot communicate with sound to as many people simultaneously as God can communicate with via the spirit. I've been asking myself, is this really the direction I want to take the discussion? I'm still not convinced that God's ability to create the universe (by some natural process) and God's ability to communicate by the spirit with large numbers of people simultaneously necessarily imply that God has the ability to communicate via audio with the same large numbers of people. But even if God did have the ability to communicate via audio with large numbers of people, I'm not convinced that God would choose to. Canpakes, you have described communication by feelings as inferior to communication by audio, but I don't see why God would not see it as perfectly adequate for God's purposes. If God has a complicated message to convey, then obviously there's something to be said for sending an angel to communicate that message with a prophet/spokesman. But once God has established an organization to take that message to the world, all God really needs to do is tell people yes or no, either God established some given organization as that message conveyor or God did not.
OK, so God can tell people
yes or no. God can do this by using, 'Yes', or 'No'. Otherwise, a feeling or sensation is not conclusive to anything other than the recipient's need to affirm what they may subconsciously desire.
What if they subconsciously desire nothing? What you have said about subconsciously desiring one answer over the other is a
perfect description of how I asked God over and over again whether or not the Book of Mormon was true. Every time I would get a good feeling, but every time I would realize I couldn't count on God having answered my question for the simple reason that I
had wanted a yes answer, and hadn't been prepared for a no answer. Anyone who really thinks about the principle of asking God for a kernel of truth, would understand why I couldn't base my life on the many mini yeses I got when I prayed about the Book of Mormon. It wasn't until I was fully prepared for
either a yes or a no answer that I got an answer I knew I could use as the kernel of truth at the foundation of my theology, and it was a humdinger in comparison to all the mini yeses.
canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:I don't see that trying to rationalize a sensation "as the definitive answer from God" opens me up to any guesswork at all. If God exists, God is certainly capable of giving a sensation that is clearly positive or one that is clearly negative. And how is anything "self-fulfilling" here? You keep trying to convince me that I'm using a circular argument, but you have not yet demonstrated where the circle is. Why should anyone believe I'm using a circular argument?
Please explain what would make a feeling determinable as 'clearly positive' or 'clearly negative'.
When you experience a clearly positive feeling you feel great; when you experience a clearly negative feeling you feel terrible. What's so hard to understand about that?
canpakes wrote:Any more circular? Are you sure that you want to put it that way? ; )
Yes I am; since it's pretty clear to mathematicians the world over that Euclid's rigorous proofs of his theorems were most definitely
not circular, I have no problem whatsoever asserting that my argument is not any more circular than Euclid's arguments.
canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:I never said that my arguments and Euclid's are "equally valid"; I said that my arguments are no more circular (underline added) than Euclid's were, and that's completely true.
OK, so be it. But
you introduced the Euclidean gambit.
My statement was that your argument was circular. You are admitting that it is circular with your statement above.
Canpakes, how do you go from my "statement above" to the conclusion that I am "admitting that it is circular"?
canpakes wrote:However, it is noted that an argument can be 'logically valid' even if circular.
Why is that?
canpakes wrote:As it is, your premise needs just as much proof as your conclusion; in short, it delivers nothing, which is what I am asserting about it and which makes it very different than Euclidean proofs.
Wow, Canpakes, you really haven't been listening to me, have you? One of Euclid's
premises, his axioms, was the parallel-point axiom. If me not proving my premises is in fact what "makes it very different than Euclidean proofs," then that would imply that Euclid
actually proved the parallel-point axiom. He did not. So when it comes to one's premises (in this case one's axioms) needing "just as much proof as" one's conclusion, Euclid's arguments are just as flawed as mine are. However, I think it's safe to say that Euclid's arguments are
not flawed in this regard, and therefore my arguments are
also not flawed in this regard.
canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:Once again, you talk about "the circular nature of" my core argument, without ever explaining where the circle is.
Here you go:
God exists + (unprovable assertions which have no actual bearing on the initial assumption or conclusion) = God exists.
Are you saying that my arguments are circular because I have started with the assumption that God exists, and then concluded that {God exists + (unprovable assertions which have no actual bearing ...)}? When have I ever concluded that God exists based on a line of conclusions that began with my assumption of the existence of God?
Granted that I started by assuming that God exists, and then moved on to say I'd asked God a question, and got an answer. But I've made it clear in subsequent posts that what I meant was that God had answered me
if in fact my assumption that God exists was true. I've never said, "And therefore God exists." I have admitted a number of times that I
don't strictly know whether or not God exists. All I've said is that
if God exists, and if God wants me to know Her/His will, and if God can answer prayer, then I can conclude that the answer I got to my question did in fact come from God. Where's the circle in that?
canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:I will say it again; all you have ever said is that I assumed God existed at the beginning of my argument, and I assumed God existed at the end of my argument. Euclid and the non-Euclideans both did precisely the same thing...
Waitaminute... Euclid wrote proofs about God's existence? ; )
Ho ho ho.
canpakes wrote:Silliness aside, Euclid has a much better track record of creating a useful or provable argument than you, even if you want to call some of his proofs 'circular'.
I
don't want "to call some of his proofs 'circular'"! I never called Euclid's proofs circular! All I've done was demonstrate that my arguments were
no more circular than Euclid's arguments; Euclid's arguments were clearly not circular, so
my arguments are clearly not circular.
canpakes wrote:KevinSim wrote:True, a superficial resemblance to the structure of a Euclidean proof doesn't make the argument a proof, or make it valid, or keep it from being circular, but when the only attempt the critic has ever used to explain why the argument is circular applies just as well to Euclidean and non-Euclidean proofs as it does to the argument in question, then the accusation that the argument in question is circular falls kind of flat.
Oh, all right,
fine, then - it's
circular, ineffective and fails to deliver your conclusion provably.
Canpakes, how many times do I have to keep saying this? All you have ever done, in your efforts to convince people that my arguments are circular, is say that I assumed God existed at the beginning of my arguments, and I also assumed God existed at the end of my arguments. Euclid did exactly the same thing with his parallel-point axiom; he assumed it was true at the beginning of his proofs, and he also assumed it was true at the end of his proofs. It would greatly surprise the mathematical community to discover that Euclid's proofs used circular logic; I think we can safely conclude that Euclid's proofs
did not use circular logic; I have therefore showed that your attempts to show that my arguments are circular
do not in fact show that they are circular; in short, your logic is flawed.