EAllusion wrote:We can define any object of explanation as having necessary existence.
No you can't.
EAllusion wrote:We can define the universe qua the aggregate of all things that way...
EA has farted out this response before but claiming that the universe is necessary is a very strong claim that does not appear to fit the data, especially in light of the fact that it is composed of all sorts of contingent things. Oh, and just in case:
Russell correctly notes that arguments of the part-whole type can commit the Fallacy of Composition. For example, the argument that since all the bricks in the wall are small, the wall is small, is fallacious. Yet it is an informal fallacy of content, not a formal fallacy. Sometimes the totality has the same quality as the parts because of the nature of the parts invoked—the wall is brick because it is built of bricks. The universe's contingency, theists argue, resembles the second case. If all the contingent things in the universe, including matter and energy, ceased to exist simultaneously, the universe itself, as the totality of these things, would cease to exist. But if the universe can cease to exist, it is contingent and requires an explanation for its existence (Reichenbach, chap. 5).
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EAllusion wrote:In other words, if it's necessarily true that god exists with the nature he has, then it's also necessarily true that he created the universe as it is, and therefore necessarily true that the universe exists. All this gets us is that there are no contingent truths, which undermines the point of the argument.
I've brought this up to him before, and I don't recall ever seeing a reply.
People are not obliged to respond to bald assertions.