DiscussMormonism.com

Salutations and welcome, once again, to Cassius University’s Borgesian Archives of Moral Science! I apologize for being late but I have just come from the chapel where the esteemed Reverend Kishkumen was giving the New Year’s sermon. Oh, it was magnificent! He has been preaching his way through Virgil’s ‘Aeneid’ and the campus has been positively buzzing about it for months now.

Today Reverend Kishkumen ministered to us by way of Dido’s death; the chaos and madness that so often accompanies moral blindness was described in a blistering account of the furies raging against Aeneas and Dido. When the ferocity had finally abated, Reverend Kishkumen turned his back to the congregation, with arms outstretched and facing the stained glass mural depicting Cicero and Seneca, he recited in a cracked but just audible voice with perfect elocution:

Reverend Kishkumen wrote:quaesivit caelo lucem ingemuitque reperta

For our friends at The Interpreter and the frequent commentators at Sic et Non, a passable translation of that fragmented line might be, “she sought light in heaven and groaned as she found it.”


The Death of Dido (after Reynolds), by Henry Bone 1804.

It was a poignant sermon, especially since I have just laid eyes upon Daniel Peterson’s latest thinkpiece 'If God Does Not Exist, Is Everything Permitted?'. Here is the abstract:

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:Can people be good without believing in God? Obviously, yes. They can. Is atheistic naturalism capable of supplying a foundation for morality? That is a separate question, to which more than a few theists have answered No. However, a relatively new book by a very prominent student of religion and society suggests otherwise. A rational morality can, it argues, be founded upon atheistic naturalism — but it will necessarily be a modest and quite limited one, lacking universal scope and without a belief in human rights as objective “moral facts.”

That “very prominent student of religion and society” is the sociologist Christian Smith and that “relatively new book” is ‘Atheist Overreach: What Atheism Can't Deliver’. When it comes to The Interpreter, book reviews are usually just book reports with minimal and often tangential engagement. Thankfully, Daniel assures us this is not a review:

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:I won’t be offering a book review of Atheist Overreach here, nor will I be drawing on the entirety of the book. I’m hoping that at least some of you will take a look at it yourselves, because I think that it has much to offer. But I do want to examine what it has to say about whether, “if God doesn’t exist, everything is permitted.”

Now I lack the time to do a full and systematic analysis of Daniel’s latest work in one sitting, but I would like to get the ball rolling and hopefully work my way through all the interesting portions as the week progresses. So let us begin at the first paragraph (bolding mine):

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:The striking statement that, “if God doesn’t exist, everything is permitted,” is often attributed to the great Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881) and, more specifically, to perhaps his greatest novel, The Brothers Karamazov, which was first published in 1880. Theists have used the statement to argue that the alternative to belief in God is moral nihilism.

That is an interesting dichotomy: theism or moral nihilism. I suppose this is intended to put atheists in some kind of dilemma, but I have a hard time not seeing this as a false dichotomy. Given the abundance of accounts for a secular moral realism in the relevant professional literature, it would be quite the feat for someone to demonstrate how all of that somehow collapses back into only choosing theism or moral nihilism.

Given how little Daniel reads in philosophy and his total lack of intellectual discipline, I don’t think such a feat is within his capabilities.

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:Absent a grounding in the divine, so the argument goes, human moral systems are without foundation — and, thus, are likely to crumble in the face of human self-interest, error, and corruption.

Speaking of Daniel’s aliteracy in regards to philosophy, here is yet another example. When someone makes the claim that the divine grounds a moral system, they are not really telling you much. All it amounts to is saying that there is some kind of relationship between the divine and the moral system wherein the moral system obtains normativity by virtue of the divine. One would really have to flesh out the nature of this relationship to make it tenable.

Kit Fine has a paper titled ‘A Guide to Ground’ that is usually used as an introduction to the topic, but it was written more for graduate students and active philosophers. Because of the background requirements, I’ll just use one example of a problem Daniel faces with his thesis and do my best to explain its relevance(p.4):

Kit Fine wrote:For consider the fact that a given act was right or not right (R v ­￢R). This is grounded, we may suppose, in the fact that it is right (R).

Fine sets up what we call a logical disjunction. The variable “R” represents the proposition “the act was right”, the “v” is the disjunctive operator that can be understood as “either/or”, the symbol “￢” represents negation, like saying “not”. The brackets are a convention to help with grouping variables and symbols.

So “(R v ­￢R)” can be translated as “It is the case that the act was right or it is not the case that the acts was right”.

When Fine says we may suppose (R v ­￢R) is grounded in (R), he is making reference to the axioms of First Order Logic where one can start with (R) and logically derive (R v ­￢R). That is to say (R) determinative for (R v ­￢R) by way of logic.

But this is the easiest type of ground to speak of.

Kit Fine wrote:The fact that it is right, we may suppose, is (normatively) explained by the fact that it maximizes happiness (R').

The “ ' ” symbol after “R” indicates a proposition that is of a different kind. So (R) is a question about a specific action being right and (R') is about what it is that makes an action right or wrong. In Fine’s example, what makes something right or wrong is that the action maximizes happiness.

Kit Fine wrote:So the fact that the given act is right or not right is explained in the generic sense by the fact that it maximizes happiness.

Let’s abandon the “maximizes happiness” aspect and assume for our purposes that (R') means an action is right if it is scriptural commandment. At first glance, it looks like (R') explains why an act can be deemed right or not right (i.e. (R v ­￢R))

Kit Fine wrote:But it is a metaphysical necessity that if the act maximizes happiness then the act is right or not right (□R'⊃(R ∨ ­￢R)), since it is a metaphysical necessity that the act is right or not right (□(R ˅ ￢R)).

Now we get to the part where the rubber meets the road. That little box “□” is a modal operator that indicates necessity (in this case, metaphysical necessity) and “'⊃” is a logical entailment.

So “(□R'⊃(R v ­￢R))” translates as “Necessarily, if R' then R or ￢R”, but there is a fly in the ointment. (R v ­￢R) is a disjunction where “R” and “￢R” are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; which amounts to saying it *has* to be the case that if it isn’t “R” then it has to be “￢R”.

So it looks like “(□(R ˅ ￢R))” (which translates into “Necessarily, R or not R”) is what actually grounds “(R v ­￢R)” and not “(□R'⊃(R ∨ ­￢R))”.

Kit Fine wrote:However, the fact that the act maximizes happiness does not metaphysically ground the fact that it is right or not right, contrary to the proposed definition. Nor is it altogether clear how the definition might be modified so as to avoid counter-examples of this sort.

So let me restate what Fine is saying here in a context relevant to Daniel’s thesis.

Let us say there is a fellow by the name of Louis M. who steals tithe money so he can buy a 24 pack of Miller Lite. The action of Louis M. is either morally right or morally wrong, and according to Daniel, this is grounded in the divine commandments recorded in scripture. Daniel then turns to the atheist and says, “You can tell me that what Louis M. did was morally wrong, but you don’t have a grounding for what is morally right and morally wrong.”

But the atheist can reply that what is actually grounding the question of “is this action morally right or morally wrong” is simply the logic used to pose the question. The action is either morally right or morally wrong by necessity because those are the only two options available, it *has* to be one or the other.

Oh my! Look at the time. I have to get going, Dr. Scratch is hosting a little soiree in the faculty lounge at the B.H. Robert’s building. In addition to brandy being served, the hors d'oeuvres are these deconstructed kobe beef sliders that will send you straight to the Celestial plane.

What a wonderful surprise to see our colleague regale us goodly readers with his wisdom once again. I had just set my copy of The Archaeology of Knowledge by Michel Foucault down, and was contemplating my painting-on-loan Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer when I made the fortuitous decision to open this site and peruse its offerings.

… is simply the logic used to pose the question.

That’s … really interesting. “I think, therefore I’m moral/immoral.” It’s the ghost in the machine that creates morality, not some divine puppeteer.

- Dr. Cameron, NC for Me

My intuition says that there is no possible consistent moral, or more generally philosophical, system. They all have to be arbitrary and relative, not absolute.

This is because we have already proven that there is no internally consistent logical system that isn't so limited as to be useless.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems proved that it is impossible to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics. This is a devastating blow to the naïve Platonic/Euclidean worldview of Christianity. God is no longer able to be the author of a complete logically consistent system, because such a system cannot even exist.

DCP is chasing idealism that was disproved systematically over 90 years ago.

Okay, so after Daniel goes down an irrelevant rabbit trail of whether Dostoevsky really believed that if God didn’t exist everything is permitted or that a fictional character named Ivan actually expressed that sentiment, he writes:

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:But the more important question, plainly, is whether it’s really true that “if God doesn’t exist, everything is permitted.” Does atheism actually entail moral nihilism? Please note that the question isn’t whether or not atheists can behave ethically or be morally good. Obviously, they can. Many have been and many continue to be. The question is whether, given an atheistic or naturalistic worldview, the moral principles that guide many highly ethical unbelievers are well-founded.

Daniel Stop!



This is not a strong paragraph, but let's break it down to see why:

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:But the more important question, plainly, is whether it’s really true that “if God doesn’t exist, everything is permitted.” Does atheism actually entail moral nihilism?

So instead of asking about Dostoevsky’s beliefs and what he wrote, we should be looking at the more important question, does atheism entail moral nihilism? Now asserting that atheism entails moral nihilism tells us two things. First, it tells us that atheism is a sufficient condition for moral nihilism and that if atheism is true then moral nihilism has to be true. Second, it tells us that moral nihilism is a necessary condition for atheism and that atheism can’t be true unless moral nihilism is true (though there may be other conditions required besides moral nihilism, like the non-existence of God).

That is an incredibly strong claim. Daniel continues:

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:Please note that the question isn’t whether or not atheists can behave ethically or be morally good. Obviously, they can. Many have been and many continue to be.

The question of atheism entailing moral nihilism isn’t a question about the behavior or moral sentiments of atheists. Got it.

Daniel C. Peterson wrote:The question is whether, given an atheistic or naturalistic worldview, the moral principles that guide many highly ethical unbelievers are well-founded.

Asking if atheistic moral philosophy is well-founded or not is a question of epistemic justification. Asking if atheism entails moral nihilism is about the logical relationships between ideas. These two questions are entirely different, yet the paragraph is written as if they are functionally equivalent. They most certainly are not.

Who is proofreading this for Daniel? This kind of mistake isn’t the kind a mature scholar should be making outside the roughest of rough drafts and it most certainly should not slip through a meaningful editorial review.

I wonder if the things Daniel writes just gets a rubber stamp and included simply because of who Daniel is.

drumdude wrote: ↑

Sun Jan 02, 2022 11:08 pm

My intuition says that there is no possible consistent moral, or more generally philosophical, system. They all have to be arbitrary and relative, not absolute.

This is because we have already proven that there is no internally consistent logical system that isn't so limited as to be useless.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems proved that it is impossible to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics. This is a devastating blow to the naïve Platonic/Euclidean worldview of Christianity. God is no longer able to be the author of a complete logically consistent system, because such a system cannot even exist.

DCP is chasing idealism that was disproved systematically over 90 years ago.

I think that sometimes people have attempted to use a platonic worldview to consider Christianity. On the other hand Christianity is most certainly not a platonic/euclidean worldview. It certainly does not require or suggest that there is a complete logically consistent system. It is in fact not a system.

To look for a link between the existence of God and moral values in scriptural rules I think is the weakest place to look. To look for a systematic set of rules based upon scripture rules or logic is looking in an empty purse.

Thanks for taking time out of your busy travel schedule to post this, Mr. Stak. The Fine argument is interesting, I'll have to think about that one.

I was intrigued by this:

DCP summarized Christian Smith's new book:

but it will necessarily be a modest and quite limited one, lacking universal scope and without a belief in human rights as objective “moral facts.”

DCP throws Christian Smith's new book right out the window after reading it:

Theists have used the statement (WGAIP) to argue that the alternative to belief in God is moral nihilism.

If he's so taken by that one statement, why even bother reading all these other books?

Absent a grounding in the divine, so the argument goes, human moral systems are without foundation — and, thus, are likely to crumble in the face of human self-interest, error, and corruption.

The 'argument' actually has nothing to say on the likelihood a person who believes or doesn't believe will be good or bad.

Finally, I put "argument" in quotes because WGAIP isn't an argument at all, it's a stipulation. A stipulation that DCP will never explain or justify. He'll just say the same thing in different ways and assume it flies for everybody.

I have not read the Dostoevsky book that is referenced here. Long enough ago I will not have details I read Crime and Punishment. The lead character decides he believes that all is permitted. He murders and discovers internal difficulty with this act. He later comes to recognition of God through grace. It is not the recognition which causes him to realize his bad act is bad. One might say that the bad act explains itself to him as bad.

Mr.Stak wrote:There is fundamentally two arguments in play: (i) Naturalism cannot "ground" morality because there is nothing in nature to metaphysically anchor it to and

Good point about WGAIP being ambiguous. I assumed 1 and DCP initially seems to also but it could actually mean 2. 2 may be the more sensible reading for that book. I'd don't like the idea of saying it was intended to mean both or that we should take it to mean both.

Anyway, I'm having a hard time seeing 1 as a real argument. To me, that's like saying that fiat money can't be backed because there's no gold to back it. That's circular. The issue is whether fiat money has value. It could be argued that it has no value without gold to back it. But stipulating over and over that there is no gold to back it up therefore it isn't backed is circular, but stipulating it has no value because it isn't backed is just assuming so.

In metaethics, we're fundamentally investigating the meaning of moral statements. What does it mean "thou shalt not kill"? In DCT, it literally means "God said not to kill". In hedonism, it might mean "Killing destroys all pleasure". "Killing is bad because God said not to kill". "Killing is bad because it destroys all the pleasure the victim could have had." There's no direct way to argue which meaning of goodness is correct: does it mean God's command or the consequence of personal pleasure? A typical way to argue is show why one or the other doesn't work. For instance, the Euthyphro dilemma for God. For hedonism, I could ask why depriving somebody of future pleasure outweighs the intense happiness the killer experienced in killing.

I'm sure Christian Smith has a real argument. However, DCP never has an argument. He just assumes the sale. Nothing can "ground" morality because by his own stipulated definition, God is the ground for morality. Case closed. Anyway, the main point I wanted to make is people should try thinking about metaethics as the meaning of moral statements and break the habit of thinking in terms of "grounding", because the assumption that moral statements need to be "backed up" or "grounded" immediately prime your intuition to assume God or Gold must be there to back up currency, when that is in part what's at issue in the first place.

Why does Fine use "either R or else not-R", as an example for "ground"? It seems like a perverse choice of example because to me statements of the form "either A or else not-A" contain no information. They say nothing at all about anything because they're always true regardless of what A is. Whatever "ground" may be (I've never been clear on that), it sure seems to me as though statements like this one must not need any ground.

I could understand better if Fine had used something like "either A or B (or perhaps both)", where B was not simply "not-A". Then it's true that "either A or B" is implied by A. So if Fine were to tell me that A can be a ground for "either A or B", then I could understand that.

In a strict sense that definition of "is a ground for" as "implies" works just as well regardless of what B is, so it might be okay logically to choose the special case where B is not-A. It's not okay pedagogically, though, because choosing such a perverse special case to illustrate a simple general principle would really seem to invite confusion unnecessarily.

Just a quick and dirty take on this, but it seems that in order for Peterson's point to hold, it must be that moral nihilism is not only included in atheism, but is exactly equal to moral nihilism, and that moral nihilism plus actions based on belief in god have no overlap, and completely encompass all choices. I.e. R and notR = all possible choices.

It seems pretty obvious that Peterson can only reach this conclusion by first assuming the conclusion as a starting condition. This is completely illogical.