There can be no evidence that Mormonism is false

[DrStakhanovite]

I just wanted to quickly comment that I’m starting a new job at a different institution and it has been making demands on my writing time. So I wanted to get Part 1 out there before too much time elapsed. Part 2 will cover the “why” and “how” someone would want to claim a belief in God is non-inferential and what is the strategic advantage of doing so in apologetics.

[Kishkumen]

I just wanted to quickly comment that I’m starting a new job at a different institution and it has been making demands on my writing time. So I wanted to get Part 1 out there before too much time elapsed. Part 2 will cover the “why” and “how” someone would want to claim a belief in God is non-inferential and what is the strategic advantage of doing so in apologetics.

Thanks, DrStak! I appreciate you taking the time to set out WLC’s method in brief. Congrats on the new job!

[Philo Sofee]

I just wanted to quickly comment that I’m starting a new job at a different institution and it has been making demands on my writing time. So I wanted to get Part 1 out there before too much time elapsed. Part 2 will cover the “why” and “how” someone would want to claim a belief in God is non-inferential and what is the strategic advantage of doing so in apologetics.

How exciting! I hope things got very well for you. Thank you for your stellar post, I shall have to read it carefully. I appreciate your efforts and knowledge.

[dastardly stem]

DrStak, I'm trying to see it, but I don't see much in these quotations that takes Craig any distance from the views expressed by Dr Peterson. What am I missing?

You and I were not comparing DCP to WLC, we were comparing Paulogia’s comments about evidence to what WLC believes about the nature evidence.

Why did you shift the topic?

Hah...Sorry. I guess I got confused. I may have to go back to Paulogia's video to listen to catch exactly what it was that was the problem here. It appears to me WLC expresses himself much like DCP--that's why I initially linked the video trying to contribute to the thread's topic. I guess I'm not feeling too concerned if Paulogia said something wrong, but I will say I can't recall anything in his video that said much about what WLC believes about evidence. I thought you took issue with what Paulogia believes about evidence--that he was expressing an empiricists type of view, and perhaps expected WLC to think evidence was important? I feel like whatever it was that got us going in this conversation is losing steam. Again, my apologies for any confusion. I'm still feeling like WLC doesn't have much in terms of argument for his position. While much of his argumentation is logical and valid, I find too much remains unsound and thus too reliant on assumptions that can easily be questioned or rejected.

Ultimately I'm interested in getting a better feel why empiricism is a problem. That seems to be an issue to you. I've recently read David Deutsch's The Beginning of Infinity and have enjoyed it. He suggests empiricism is a problem because it inherently would rely on individual's senses, impressions, biases and such. I really like his explanation of fallibilism and think he's on to plenty there. But, fallibilism entails, while knowledge isn't really attained, empiricism likely gets us closest to truth hopefully most often pointing us in the direction of truth.

I don't know how to take Craig's, or DCP's position too seriously. They seem to come from the same line of thinking to me.

I just wanted to quickly comment that I’m starting a new job at a different institution and it has been making demands on my writing time. So I wanted to get Part 1 out there before too much time elapsed. Part 2 will cover the “why” and “how” someone would want to claim a belief in God is non-inferential and what is the strategic advantage of doing so in apologetics.

Awesome. and Congrats. I wish you well. And no worries. I'm very grateful for any insight you're able to offer. Certainly no rush and if you run out of time, just know, happy to consider whatever references you may wish to forward on, at the very least.

[dastardly stem]

Yes, this Mr. Stak selection of W.L.C. shows there is no difference than with Dan Peterson's approach...

I have to disagree, I think both approaches are as different as night and day.

PART 1

From my perspective, the field of Mormon Studies labors under the illusion that apologetics and scholarship function on the same level, but the stark reality is that both activities are guided by different principles and require different skill sets. Best case scenario, scholarship informs apologetics, but usually the inverse is practiced and apologetics informs scholarship and you get stuff like ‘The Interpreter’.

Good apologists soft-knuckle counter-apologists and bait them into taking dialectical ground that they are not ready to defend. What WLC is presenting in those quotations are conclusions from a laborious research program that he has been engaged in for over thirty years; they are simply and confidently stated because he wants to communicate that confidence to Christian readers (the primary audience) while simultaneously guiding counter-apologists (the secondary audience) into a false sense of confidence.

During interviews, WLC often remarks that his weakest arguments are his arguments for the existence of God. Why? I’m going to explain in detail, but first let me present a hastily drawn graphic that I can reference:



When it comes to epistemology and the structure of knowledge, WLC is a moderate Foundationalist that believes there is a certain set of beliefs that people have that are “non-inferential” which is to say they are beliefs that are not inferred from other beliefs, such as a belief that you are currently experiencing pain. Many of these non-inferential beliefs are critical for any worldview to function and some of these non-inferential beliefs are also incredibly hard to justify in the face of skepticism (e.g. the belief that other people have minds like you do). While there are some attempted justifications for these beliefs, they cannot be demonstrated through the usual means of philosophical analysis and require creative measures that often cannot escape being personally unsatisfying. On my hastily drawn graphic, these kinds of beliefs are in blue and represent 1st Order analysis.

(You’ll notice that with the classic examples of “Other Minds” and “External Reality” you’ll see “God” included. This is important and we’ll return to discuss its inclusion in Part 2.)

In the green you’ll see the 2nd order of analysis, which covers a broad area of what philosophy is traditionally known for: What is the ultimate nature of reality? What does it mean to exist and what sorts of things exist?What are the features of the human condition? Can humans acquire knowledge? Do humans have free will? Etc, etc. The examples given in my hastily drawn graphic are examples of philosophical positions that propose an answer to such questions. Nominalism is a position that denies the existence of universals, mathematical objects, and other abstracta like Platonic Forms. Incompatibilism is the position that denies that the concepts of determinism and free will are compatible; that humans can possess and exercise some kind of free will despite living in a deterministic universe.

The brown writing is the 3rd order of analysis and includes philosophical analysis on topics that typically lie outside the domain of philosophy and in the domain of another discipline like the natural sciences, religion, or history. The examples I’ve chosen is the apologetic friendly moral argument for the existence of God and the counter-apologetic friendly argument known as the evidential problem of evil (see Tarik LaCour’s recent FAIR presentation).

The different orders of analysis follow a logical priority; 3rd order analysis always involves at least one assumption from 2nd order analysis and 2nd order analysis always involves at least one assumption from 1st order analysis. This hierarchy of dependency can be dialectically exploited by a clever apologist.

Let’s take the moral argument for the existence of God for example, here is how WLC presented the argument in his written debate with Walter Sinnot-Armstrong (p.19):

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

The above syllogism is valid, the conclusion (3) is logically derived from the preceding assumptions (1 and 2) by means of denying the consequent. The argument lacks jargon and isn't complicated by a lengthy chain derivations. To many people, the argument strikes them as nearly being absurd in presentation, excessively ambitious, and obviously wrong. I can sympathize with that reaction, but to see what is really going on requires a change in perspective. One shouldn’t look at the moral argument for the existence of God as a static artifact that we just examine and then evaluate; rather one ought to see a shifting field of possibilities.

Presenting a valid argument is the easy part, defending that argument from challenges is where real ground is gained. Because WLC is the one presenting the argument, he gets a tactical advantage that he can exploit. Given how the above syllogism is arrayed, the two obvious avenues of attack are either to deny the truth of (1) or to deny the truth of (2). What that means is WLC can prepare for whatever path his opponent decides to take.

If I myself were to debate WLC on this argument, I would attack (1) vigorously, so let’s consider the comments WLC makes about the prospect of denying (1) in the same publication (p.19 italics in original):

Atheistic moral realists affirm that moral values and duties exist in reality and are not dependent upon evolution or human opinion, but they insist that they are not grounded in God. Indeed, moral values have no further foundation. They just exist.

I must confess that this alternative strikes me as incomprehensible, an example of trying to have your cake and eat it, too. What does it mean to say, for example, that the moral value Justice simply exists? I don’t know what this means. I understand what it is for a person to be just; but I draw a complete blank when it is said that, in the absence of any people, Justice itself exists. Moral values seem to exist as properties of persons, not as abstractions—or at any rate, I don’t know what it is for a moral value to exist as an abstraction. Atheistic moral realists seem to lack any adequate foundation in reality for moral values, but just leave them floating in an unintelligible way.

WLC correctly identifies the real philosophical issue at stake in the denial (1) and makes his position clear: Nominalism. If you glance back hastily drawn graphic, you’ll see that Nominalism belongs to 2nd order analysis, which means that if you want to win the war going on in the 3rd order of analysis (vis-à-vis the moral argument for the existence of God) then you can’t lose the battle he is drawing you into at the 2nd order of analysis (vis-à-vis Nominalism).

To make it even more difficult for me, WLC takes the opportunity to characterize my position as “incomprehensible” to him and remarks that he doesn’t understand how an abstract moral value can exist. This saddles me with the further duty to try and offer up my own account that isn’t laced with jargon and obscure references in addition to being short and robust or risk the clarity of my position.

This isn’t even the worst of it, because WLC has published a 500+ page book on the very topic of Nominalism that directly relates to the moral argument for the existence of God. The man didn’t just copy and paste his “research notes” into some blogging software and post it, he got it published by a properly refereed academic press and the title was subsequently reviewed in well respected journals.

I’m not saying the aforementioned book is some kind of landmark piece of philosophical thought that revolutionizes the field, but it cleared enough bars to actually merit publication and communicates clearly that WLC has read everything I’ve bothered to read on the subject and has spent time thinking about it. He’s considered his position and knows how to defend it.

DCP doesn’t do .001 of the work WLC does. I understand that WLC comes off as glib, but when it comes to apologetics he is limited by the amount of time he has to communicate and the space given to do so. You have to make choices, you can’t go on 150 page digression into the ontology of abstract objects in a debate, so instead you craft a short paragraph where you articulate your objections as “This seems weird to me, I don’t understand what you mean when you say these abstract things exist. You don’t just get to claim they exist and not provide an account.”

WLC sees the bigger picture and he benefits from atheists not taking him seriously, it is why he absolutely destroyed Sam Harris in their debate at Notre Dame. Yet, if you watch the cross examination periods in WLC’s debate with Shelly Kagan on the moral argument for the existence of God, you can watch in real time as Shelly catches WLC making 2nd order assumptions and calling him out on it: [paraphrasing]“But wait a second Bill, that is assuming incompatibilism and I’m a compatibilist, so that isn’t going to fly”. Now Shelly can do that without exhaustively reading WLC because he already knows so much about metaphysics and moral philosophy that he can catch these things at first hearing. Counter-Apologists who don’t have such a background need to resort to actually reading Craig closely and outside the apologetic context.

This is great, and with all my confusion this is the type of stuff I was after. I know this is meant as a response to Philo, but I I'm going to take the opportunity to eat it up. My initial impression to WLC would be a question why? He says it's incomprehensible for someone without a foundation to think, or assume, objective moral values exist, yet he thinks objective moral values exist. Should we ever say someone's assumption is incomprehensible because it lacks an assumed foundation? Why can't someone who assumes objective moral values assume a foundation that we simply can not know?

Also, as dense as I am, I don't know why a foundation is required in the first place. If one assumes objective moral values exist then that is the foundation.

The larger problem here is WLC's God, as defined in tradition and scripture, doesn't behave at all like there are objective moral values. To say it is objectively true rape or murder is wrong, is to implicate his God. And yet he argues his god is the source of objective moral values. When he argues these things it feels like he's playing a game, putting on a bit of a sideshow to distract everyone from his ultimate position. I don't know how his motte and baily fallacies get us anywhere near his position. He tends to treat these as if they take someone in the direction of his position, as if doing so will somehow convince them that his real position isn't a gigantic gulf away from what he's arguing for.

[Res Ipsa]

I just wanted to quickly comment that I’m starting a new job at a different institution and it has been making demands on my writing time. So I wanted to get Part 1 out there before too much time elapsed. Part 2 will cover the “why” and “how” someone would want to claim a belief in God is non-inferential and what is the strategic advantage of doing so in apologetics.

Good luck with the new job and thanks for the explanation. Lots to chew on there.

[huckelberry]

........


This isn’t even the worst of it, because WLC has published a 500+ page book on the very topic of Nominalism that directly relates to the moral argument for the existence of God. The man didn’t just copy and paste his “research notes” into some blogging software and post it, he got it published by a properly refereed academic press and the title was subsequently reviewed in well respected journals.

I’m not saying the aforementioned book is some kind of landmark piece of philosophical thought that revolutionizes the field, but it cleared enough bars to actually merit publication and communicates clearly that WLC has read everything I’ve bothered to read on the subject and has spent time thinking about it. He’s considered his position and knows how to defend it...........

This is great, and with all my confusion this is the type of stuff I was after. I know this is meant as a response to Philo, but I I'm going to take the opportunity to eat it up. My initial impression to WLC would be a question why? He says it's incomprehensible for someone without a foundation to think, or assume, objective moral values exist, yet he thinks objective moral values exist. Should we ever say someone's assumption is incomprehensible because it lacks an assumed foundation? Why can't someone who assumes objective moral values assume a foundation that we simply can not know?

Also, as dense as I am, I don't know why a foundation is required in the first place. If one assumes objective moral values exist then that is the foundation.

The larger problem here is WLC's God, as defined in tradition and scripture, doesn't behave at all like there are objective moral values. To say it is objectively true rape or murder is wrong, is to implicate his God. And yet he argues his god is the source of objective moral values. When he argues these things it feels like he's playing a game, putting on a bit of a sideshow to distract everyone from his ultimate position. I don't know how his motte and baily fallacies get us anywhere near his position. He tends to treat these as if they take someone in the direction of his position, as if doing so will somehow convince them that his real position isn't a gigantic gulf away from what he's arguing for............

I find I share some of Stems thought here. I actually do not see what it can possible mean to say there are objective moral values. I do not see such existing outside of the judgement of conscious creatures . Judgements would be based upon desirability and understanding how objective reality works. Well this is objective in the clear sense that hand on hot stove can be judged as undesirable. In a legal sense a group of people make judgements about what actions are harmful to the group and decide on sanctions to help stop such actions.

I do not see how adding or subtracting a god in the matter changes the fundamental. One can say God has wisdom and judicial power beyond humans. (hopefully)

So what does WLC mean by objective values? I realize a substantial book probably gives the real answer to this question. I am put off enough by WLC that I would need encouragement to cause me to read the thing. (well I have not erased all curiosity on the matter)

So does WLC have an alternative version of moral values beyond what evolution developed with the development of human communities?

Some folks say moral is god says so. Stem has raised a question about that. I did not wish to try to answer that but see that the question itself is valid. Is not moral something existing within creation and the real world not just a figment of gods imagination?

[dastardly stem]

I find I share some of Stems thought here. I actually do not see what it can possible mean to say there are objective moral values. I do not see such existing outside of the judgement of conscious creatures . Judgements would be based upon disirability and understanding how objective reality works. Well this is objective in the clear sense that hand on hot stove can be judged as undesirable. In a legal sense a group of people make judgements about what actions are harmful to the group and decide on sanctions to help stop such actions.

I do not see how adding or subtracting a god in the matter changes the fundamental. One can say God has wisdom and judicial power beyond humans. (hopefully)

So what does WLC mean by objective values? I realize a substantial book probably gives the real answer to this question. I am put off enough by WLC that I would need encouragement to cause me to read the thing. (well I have not erased all curiosity on the matter)

So does WLC have an alternative version of moral values beyond what evolution developed with the development of human communities?

Some folks say moral is god says so. Stem has raised a question about that. I did not wish to try to answer that but see that the question itself is valid. Is not moral something existing within creation and the real world not just a figment of gods imagination?

Good points, huckelberry. What would it mean to have objective morality?

[Rivendale]

I find I share some of Stems thought here. I actually do not see what it can possible mean to say there are objective moral values. I do not see such existing outside of the judgement of conscious creatures . Judgements would be based upon disirability and understanding how objective reality works. Well this is objective in the clear sense that hand on hot stove can be judged as undesirable. In a legal sense a group of people make judgements about what actions are harmful to the group and decide on sanctions to help stop such actions.

I do not see how adding or subtracting a god in the matter changes the fundamental. One can say God has wisdom and judicial power beyond humans. (hopefully)

So what does WLC mean by objective values? I realize a substantial book probably gives the real answer to this question. I am put off enough by WLC that I would need encouragement to cause me to read the thing. (well I have not erased all curiosity on the matter)

So does WLC have an alternative version of moral values beyond what evolution developed with the development of human communities?

Some folks say moral is god says so. Stem has raised a question about that. I did not wish to try to answer that but see that the question itself is valid. Is not moral something existing within creation and the real world not just a figment of gods imagination?

Good points, huckelberry. What would it mean to have objective morality?

Right. What would that mean? It is the Euthyphro dilemma all over again. WLC uses the same process in determining his morality as an atheist does. When he mentions grounding he had to select that grounding from a set of axioms that he found compelling. Moral frameworks are society/contract driven based on the consensus of the group.

[huckelberry]

Perhaps this fits. I do not see anyway to understand 2 plus 2 equals 4 to be an objective reality with existence beyond peoples minds. It is to my understanding a language which has been developed to be able to describe all sorts of relationships some quite complicated and difficult. To connect math with the real world requires observation and clear decision on what you wish to mean with the number one.