“Belief Perseverance”

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I Have Questions
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“Belief Perseverance”

Post by I Have Questions »

I hadn’t heard this concept before. It’s interesting. It explains why people such as Blake Ostler (and maybe Dan Mclellan) and others can maintain a belief in the Book of Mormon despite acknowledging the evidence shows it is not what it claims to be. It also explains why members discount evidence and double down on things they believe in that are show to be factually incorrect.
The first study of belief perseverance was carried out by Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter.[11] These psychiatrists spent time with members of a doomsday cult who believed the world would end on December 21, 1954.[11] Despite the failure of the forecast, most believers continued to adhere to their faith.[11][12][13] In When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World (1956) and A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957), Festinger proposed that human beings strive for internal psychological consistency to function mentally in the real world.[11] A person who experiences internal inconsistency tends to become psychologically uncomfortable and is motivated to reduce the cognitive dissonance.[11][12][14] They tend to make changes to justify the stressful behavior, either by adding new parts to the cognition causing the psychological dissonance (rationalization) or by avoiding circumstances and contradictory information likely to increase the magnitude of the cognitive dissonance (confirmation bias).[11][12][14]

When asked to reappraise probability estimates in light of new information, subjects displayed a marked tendency to give insufficient weight to the new evidence. They refused to acknowledge the inaccurate prediction as a reflection of the overall validity of their faith. In some cases, subjects reported having a stronger faith in their religion than before.[15]
I’ve always struggled with understanding the illogical nature of maintaining a belief about something that has been shown to be incorrect. We see it in Mormonism, we see it in Trump supporters, it’s been studied in Wall Street traders. It’s linked to sunk costs, the avoidance of crystalising a loss, and cognitive dissonance. I had not heard the term “Belief Perseverance” before and I think it’s an interesting topic.

In terms of religions, I think the more you claim, the more detailed those claims, the more likely that there will be evidence that shows some of those claims to be demonstrably untrue. And religious organisations always claim more, always add detailed claims to justify and make their religion more unique and therefore “more true”. Mormonism is a good example of a religion that has from its inception gone down the rabbit hole of trying to have an answer for everything. More answers than anyone else. More details. Which of course sets itself up to be refuted further down the line.
Premise 1. Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable.
Premise 2. The best evidence for the Book of Mormon is eyewitness testimony.
Conclusion. Therefore, the best evidence for the Book of Mormon is notoriously unreliable.
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Re: “Belief Perseverance”

Post by Doctor CamNC4Me »

It should be called: Retard Resilience: noun

1. A maladaptive form of psychological persistence characterized by the continued adherence to ineffective, irrational, or counterproductive beliefs, behaviors, or courses of action despite repeated evidence of their failure.

2. An excessive tolerance for dysfunction, often mistaken for strength, perseverance, or commitment.

See also: Evangelical Christians, MAGA, Mopologists
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Re: “Belief Perseverance”

Post by Physics Guy »

I have a hypothesis that big changes of belief, that may get called conversion or deconversion, can be described by saying that the graph of belief versus (perception of) evidence is a sort of S-shaped curve: a zig-zag that curves in reverse in the middle. What this implies is that people are pretty rational in the lower-left and upper-right corners of the graph, where evidence and belief are either both low or both high, but that what happens in the middle is not so straightforwardly rational.

The shape of curve I have in mind is not a perfect S. In the lower left corner, it's a gentle slope upward from zero: when the evidence is overwhelmingly negative, belief is nil. If evidence becomes more positive, belief rises, just as it logically should. And in the upper right corner, likewise, the curve is a gentle slope up towards total belief when the evidence is overwhelmingly positive. If the evidence weakens a bit, belief becomes less sure, as it logically should.

In the middle, the curve becomes steeper. There's a sort of tipping-point effect, where even a small change of perceived evidence can induce a large shift in degree of belief. This might be seen as a kind of over-correction for belief perseverance (or disbelief perseverance): the upper-right and lower-left parts of the curve are actually flatter than unbiased reason would make them, but there comes a point where people suddenly realize that their beliefs are badly out of step with the way the evidence looks, and they kind of rush to catch up.

An evidence-belief curve that gets steep in this middle range would not really be rational, either, any more than the flatness of the curve at both ends. If evidence shifts across the middle range from 40 to 60, a rational being's belief would also rise from 40 to 60, but a human's belief may well rise from 20 to 80.

My idea is that this is actually rational behavior for humans, though, if we consider that the problem that humans are trying to solve rationally is not just the problem of deciding what's probably true. Most people aren't actually deciding what's true, even when we ourselves think that we're doing that. I think what we're usually doing instead is deciding what we should think about most of the time, what we should say, and how we should act. An addicted gambler who technically does know the odds, but who constantly dreams about winning, only talks about winning, and keeps on making bets, is someone whom I would say actually believes they're much more likely to win than the odds would imply, even if they can tell you the odds. So when I think about belief in this way, as a life strategy more than as a detached judgement, then it seems likely that more definite beliefs—close to zero or close to 100%—are inherently more useful as strategies, either way, than wishy-washy positions closer to 50%. So people don't want to hang around in the middle zone. They're attracted to the extremes, where nearly certain belief or disbelief offer easy decision making and other practical benefits.

But here's the weird part of my hypothesis. I'm proposing that the evidence-belief curve does more than just get steep in the middle to make up for being gentle at the ends. I'm thinking that it actually curves backwards in the middle, really like the letter S. So someone could start out seeing the evidence as overwhelmingly positive, and believing with total confidence, and then if their view of the evidence slipped down to only about 20% positive, their belief would only fall to about 80%, as they slid along the top of the S. But then what if the very same person, with the same way of deciding beliefs, instead started out seeing the evidence as overwhelmingly negative (0% positive) and had complete disbelief, before gradually changing their view of the evidence to see it as 80% positive? They might well only rise to 20% belief, sliding along the bottom of the S, because of disbelief perseverance. So there could be two people who actually think and feel in the exactly the same ways, and one believes strongly (80%) with only weak evidence (20%) while the other disbelieves strongly (20% belief) despite seeing evidence that a rational decider would consider as strong (80%). The difference between the two people is the history of their beliefs over time, and their personal history of encountering evidence, rather than any difference in the basic ways they decide to believe.

In between that upper-left 20-evidence-but-80-belief point, and the corresponding lower-right 80-evidence-but-20-belief point, is the back-curving middle part of the S. This back-curving part is flatly non-rational: somebody moving along this back-curving part of the curve is actually believing more strongly because they see the evidence weakening, or conversely doubting more just because the evidence strengthens. As the evidence changes, they're doubling down instead of reconsidering. They're living in a fantasy world in which mounting evidence against their ideas is only proving how good the conspiracy is, or whatever.

Letting adverse evidence actually strengthen belief (or unbelief) is an unstable way to think and act in the world, because beliefs are practical tools that are going to shape your decisions in life. If you're unwarrantedly confident about something (one way or the other), then you'll probably try to act on that unwarranted confidence; since the confidence is unwarranted, the consequences will likely be more adverse evidence. So if this only makes you more confident, you're going to keep getting more and more confident in your disbelief or belief. On the other hand if you're less sure about something, you won't stake much upon it, so you won't get much negative feedback, so you'll perversely become even less sure than you were, when you're on this irrational back-curving part of the S. This built-in reinforcement of confidence or downplaying will tend to fragment your beliefs, as you become more and more sure about some things and more and more non-committal about others. You become a fanatic with a few pet theories and no interest in anything else.

In practice most people can't actually stay very long on the irrational part of the curve. Their increasingly incoherent obsessions bring them to a crisis and they either jump from the S's back-curving middle to its top, or else jump down to its bottom. Someone with a low tolerance for incoherent fantasy might even jump immediately from bottom to top, or from top to bottom, without going through the back-curving middle at all, as soon as they reach the point at which the back-curving starts. This would be my theory of what ex-Mormons call the breaking of the shelf—or of a conversion experience.

This theory of the partly irrational back-curving S curve of belief as a function of evidence is of course based on decades of careful psychological and sociological research on my part ... not at all. It's nothing but a speculative analogy from something in physics (the equation of state of the van der Waals gas) which explains something that is kind of like religious conversion, namely the boiling of liquid into gas, or condensing of gas into liquid. And it has something kind of like belief perseverance, namely superheating or supercooling.

Whatever human brains do in deciding what to believe, it's obviously a lot more complicated than boiling. A pattern of behavior which is simple enough to show up in gases and liquids, however, might be a pattern that is basic enough to show up in other places as well. A liquid can remain liquid even if it is heated to well above its boiling point, as long as the heating is very gradual, the liquid is pure, and the container is clean. At that point, however, even a tiny disturbance can make the superheated liquid explosively flash into gas. This really happens with water and it can be dangerous; with other fluids, on the other hand, the sensitivity of the effect can make it the basis of a detector for subatomic particles (a "bubble chamber").

It's a complicated behavior that is in some ways perverse and surprising, but it all makes sense when you understand how the particles in the fluid are interacting. And maybe in the same way a hypothesis like this could at least serve as a metaphor for human belief perseverance, and suggest ways of understanding how and why people behave as they do. Behavior that would be badly irrational as a procedure for drawing abstract conclusions might be a viable way of selecting life strategies, taking other factors besides likelihood into account.
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Re: “Belief Perseverance”

Post by MG 2.0 »

Doctor CamNC4Me wrote: ↑
Mon Nov 02, 2026 10:36 am
It should be called: Retard Resilience: noun

1. A maladaptive form of psychological persistence characterized by the continued adherence to ineffective, irrational, or counterproductive beliefs, behaviors, or courses of action despite repeated evidence of their failure.

2. An excessive tolerance for dysfunction, often mistaken for strength, perseverance, or commitment.

See also: Evangelical Christians, MAGA, Mopologists
This can apply to human beings in general, right? Not just members of the LDS Church. I’m fairly positive that this is not what you are suggesting? When it comes to members of the LDS Church I think there is a fairly wide range of psychological strengths and weaknesses just as there would be in the general population.

I wouldn’t, however, place a psychologically negative descriptive label on someone who has religious beliefs…simply because they may believe in the supernatural. Many stable and very intelligent people have believed in the supernatural throughout history.

I would include Latter-day Saints within that group of stable individuals even though, just like in the general population, there are going to be those with maladaptive disorders.

They are human beings too!

Regards,
MG
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Re: “Belief Perseverance”

Post by I Have Questions »

Physics Guy wrote: ↑
Wed Nov 04, 2026 4:06 pm
It's a complicated behavior that is in some ways perverse and surprising, but it all makes sense when you understand how the particles in the fluid are interacting. And maybe in the same way a hypothesis like this could at least serve as a metaphor for human belief perseverance, and suggest ways of understanding how and why people behave as they do. Behavior that would be badly irrational as a procedure for drawing abstract conclusions might be a viable way of selecting life strategies, taking other factors besides likelihood into account.
Thanks for this PG. I find ongoing belief in something long after the objective evidence has disproven it, somewhat mind boggling. I read a case of a doomsday cult. Their prophet prophesied the end of the world on a certain date. Followers resigned jobs, sold properties and relocated to the designated place at the designated place and waited for the day to come when the world would end and they would be saved because they were with the right prophet in the right place at the right time and a spaceship would be sent. The day came and… no end of the world. Nothing happened. No end of world. No spaceship. Life went on around them as normal. The surprising thing to me was not that the end of the world didn’t happen as prophesied, it was that their belief in their Prophet persevered long after he was shown to be a fraud. They were able to reframe the event as the end of the world was prevented by their faithfulness in selling up and being obedient. They’d lost everything, moved their kids to the middle of nowhere, gave up jobs. Mind boggling.

I see the same willingness to swallow obvious nonsense within Mormonism. I know members that would sell houses, leave jobs, and move to the middle of the desert if Oaks told them to because the end of the world was going to happen on <insert date> and only those in <insert location> would be saved. I know people that would emigrate to be there if they were told to.
Premise 1. Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable.
Premise 2. The best evidence for the Book of Mormon is eyewitness testimony.
Conclusion. Therefore, the best evidence for the Book of Mormon is notoriously unreliable.
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Re: “Belief Perseverance”

Post by MG 2.0 »

I Have Questions wrote: ↑
Fri Nov 06, 2026 8:21 am

I see the same willingness to swallow obvious nonsense within Mormonism. I know members that would sell houses, leave jobs, and move to the middle of the desert if Oaks told them to because the end of the world was going to happen on <insert date> and only those in <insert location> would be saved. I know people that would emigrate to be there if they were told to.
I think there is a danger in hypotheticals which may very well have no basis on reality. The danger is that reasonable people would see a comparison between a doomsday cult and a church (LDS and others) that will progress and adapt to the world they find themselves in...and then make an erroneous judgement that one sort is like the other sort in every which way.

That's obviously not true.

Sure, in the case of many religious systems there is to be an end times of sorts and a judgement of sorts...but we don't run around hairy scary to the deserts waiting for something to happen.

President Oaks is not going to send people out to the desert...even though Brigham Young did in his time. Conditions change along with the realities of living in an evolving world with wide and varying cultural landscapes.

Regards,
MG
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Re: “Belief Perseverance”

Post by Marcus »

Physics Guy wrote: ↑
Wed Nov 04, 2026 4:06 pm
I have a hypothesis that big changes of belief, that may get called conversion or deconversion, can be described by saying that the graph of belief versus (perception of) evidence is a sort of S-shaped curve: a zig-zag that curves in reverse in the middle. What this implies is that people are pretty rational in the lower-left and upper-right corners of the graph, where evidence and belief are either both low or both high, but that what happens in the middle is not so straightforwardly rational.

The shape of curve I have in mind is not a perfect S. In the lower left corner, it's a gentle slope upward from zero: when the evidence is overwhelmingly negative, belief is nil. If evidence becomes more positive, belief rises, just as it logically should. And in the upper right corner, likewise, the curve is a gentle slope up towards total belief when the evidence is overwhelmingly positive. If the evidence weakens a bit, belief becomes less sure, as it logically should.

In the middle, the curve becomes steeper. There's a sort of tipping-point effect, where even a small change of perceived evidence can induce a large shift in degree of belief. This might be seen as a kind of over-correction for belief perseverance (or disbelief perseverance): the upper-right and lower-left parts of the curve are actually flatter than unbiased reason would make them, but there comes a point where people suddenly realize that their beliefs are badly out of step with the way the evidence looks, and they kind of rush to catch up.

An evidence-belief curve that gets steep in this middle range would not really be rational, either, any more than the flatness of the curve at both ends. If evidence shifts across the middle range from 40 to 60, a rational being's belief would also rise from 40 to 60, but a human's belief may well rise from 20 to 80.

My idea is that this is actually rational behavior for humans, though, if we consider that the problem that humans are trying to solve rationally is not just the problem of deciding what's probably true. Most people aren't actually deciding what's true, even when we ourselves think that we're doing that. I think what we're usually doing instead is deciding what we should think about most of the time, what we should say, and how we should act. An addicted gambler who technically does know the odds, but who constantly dreams about winning, only talks about winning, and keeps on making bets, is someone whom I would say actually believes they're much more likely to win than the odds would imply, even if they can tell you the odds. So when I think about belief in this way, as a life strategy more than as a detached judgement, then it seems likely that more definite beliefs—close to zero or close to 100%—are inherently more useful as strategies, either way, than wishy-washy positions closer to 50%. So people don't want to hang around in the middle zone. They're attracted to the extremes, where nearly certain belief or disbelief offer easy decision making and other practical benefits.

But here's the weird part of my hypothesis. I'm proposing that the evidence-belief curve does more than just get steep in the middle to make up for being gentle at the ends. I'm thinking that it actually curves backwards in the middle, really like the letter S. So someone could start out seeing the evidence as overwhelmingly positive, and believing with total confidence, and then if their view of the evidence slipped down to only about 20% positive, their belief would only fall to about 80%, as they slid along the top of the S. But then what if the very same person, with the same way of deciding beliefs, instead started out seeing the evidence as overwhelmingly negative (0% positive) and had complete disbelief, before gradually changing their view of the evidence to see it as 80% positive? They might well only rise to 20% belief, sliding along the bottom of the S, because of disbelief perseverance. So there could be two people who actually think and feel in the exactly the same ways, and one believes strongly (80%) with only weak evidence (20%) while the other disbelieves strongly (20% belief) despite seeing evidence that a rational decider would consider as strong (80%). The difference between the two people is the history of their beliefs over time, and their personal history of encountering evidence, rather than any difference in the basic ways they decide to believe.

In between that upper-left 20-evidence-but-80-belief point, and the corresponding lower-right 80-evidence-but-20-belief point, is the back-curving middle part of the S. This back-curving part is flatly non-rational: somebody moving along this back-curving part of the curve is actually believing more strongly because they see the evidence weakening, or conversely doubting more just because the evidence strengthens. As the evidence changes, they're doubling down instead of reconsidering. They're living in a fantasy world in which mounting evidence against their ideas is only proving how good the conspiracy is, or whatever.

Letting adverse evidence actually strengthen belief (or unbelief) is an unstable way to think and act in the world, because beliefs are practical tools that are going to shape your decisions in life. If you're unwarrantedly confident about something (one way or the other), then you'll probably try to act on that unwarranted confidence; since the confidence is unwarranted, the consequences will likely be more adverse evidence. So if this only makes you more confident, you're going to keep getting more and more confident in your disbelief or belief. On the other hand if you're less sure about something, you won't stake much upon it, so you won't get much negative feedback, so you'll perversely become even less sure than you were, when you're on this irrational back-curving part of the S. This built-in reinforcement of confidence or downplaying will tend to fragment your beliefs, as you become more and more sure about some things and more and more non-committal about others. You become a fanatic with a few pet theories and no interest in anything else.

In practice most people can't actually stay very long on the irrational part of the curve. Their increasingly incoherent obsessions bring them to a crisis and they either jump from the S's back-curving middle to its top, or else jump down to its bottom. Someone with a low tolerance for incoherent fantasy might even jump immediately from bottom to top, or from top to bottom, without going through the back-curving middle at all, as soon as they reach the point at which the back-curving starts. This would be my theory of what ex-Mormons call the breaking of the shelf—or of a conversion experience.

This theory of the partly irrational back-curving S curve of belief as a function of evidence is of course based on decades of careful psychological and sociological research on my part ... not at all. It's nothing but a speculative analogy from something in physics (the equation of state of the van der Waals gas) which explains something that is kind of like religious conversion, namely the boiling of liquid into gas, or condensing of gas into liquid. And it has something kind of like belief perseverance, namely superheating or supercooling.

Whatever human brains do in deciding what to believe, it's obviously a lot more complicated than boiling. A pattern of behavior which is simple enough to show up in gases and liquids, however, might be a pattern that is basic enough to show up in other places as well. A liquid can remain liquid even if it is heated to well above its boiling point, as long as the heating is very gradual, the liquid is pure, and the container is clean. At that point, however, even a tiny disturbance can make the superheated liquid explosively flash into gas. This really happens with water and it can be dangerous; with other fluids, on the other hand, the sensitivity of the effect can make it the basis of a detector for subatomic particles (a "bubble chamber").

It's a complicated behavior that is in some ways perverse and surprising, but it all makes sense when you understand how the particles in the fluid are interacting. And maybe in the same way a hypothesis like this could at least serve as a metaphor for human belief perseverance, and suggest ways of understanding how and why people behave as they do. Behavior that would be badly irrational as a procedure for drawing abstract conclusions might be a viable way of selecting life strategies, taking other factors besides likelihood into account.
PG, very interesting! Could you clarify the axes-- you defined them as
"...belief versus (perception of) evidence..."

Would that include inaccurate perceptions of evidence or are you assuming, within reason and normal human limits, accurate perception?

Further along you seem to be describing reasonable accuracy of perception and assigning the belief axis with possible inaccuracies, but both ways have interesting implications, as well as the idea that moving to the right could be interpreted as either 1) more accurate perception of evidence already known (like philo's point, If I recall correctly, that he realized aready known very low probabilities don't help one's likelihood arguments) or 2) learning that results in the increase of specific evidence in one's knowledge base, or 3) a combination of the two.
...My idea is that this is actually rational behavior for humans, though, if we consider that the problem that humans are trying to solve rationally is not just the problem of deciding what's probably true. Most people aren't actually deciding what's true, even when we ourselves think that we're doing that. I think what we're usually doing instead is deciding what we should think about most of the time, what we should say, and how we should act...
This is a hugely significant point, in my opinion. A single individual should attempt to be rational by improving their own situation, and given the typical individual's time, money, and space constraints, this most likely leads to heuristic rules for themselves.

(On a side note, thanks to your earlier post on the Navier-Stokes equations, I had a fascinating discussion on the use of AI with my adult son who is a computer science engineer, so thank you!!)
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