EAllusion wrote:MeDotOrg wrote:So the evidence strongly suggests that dropping the bomb ultimately saved millions of lives.
I know this is a popular argument, one I used to use myself, but it urns out the Japanese were on the cusp of essentially unconditional surrender - they had been working toward offering a surrender on terms virtually identical to what actually happened - and that land invasion almost certainly wouldn't have been necessary. We knew this as we had broken their code and were reading their efforts to surrender. High level military officials wanted to use the atomic bombs as a warning to Russia.
Yes, there were elements of the Japanese Power Structure that wanted a negotiated peace, but I think it is not accurate to say that they were on the "cusp of essentially unconditional surrender".
On July 12th, General Togo instructed Ambasador Sato to convey this message to the Soviets:
"His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland."
Preparations for homeland defense were quite active and ongoing.
(Keep in mind that unconditional surrender was part of the Potsdam treaty, to which the Soviets were signatures.)
On July 17th, (one day after the secret Trinity explosion at Alamogordo) Togo elaborated: "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender.
That message was transmitted in the Purple cipher code that was being read by the Americans.
It is highly unlikely that the Soviets wanted a Japanese surrender at this point anyway, as they were poised to invade Manchuria. The Soviets were also aware of America's successful test of the atomic bomb. Joining the war effort became a low-risk calculation for them.
On July 27th, Prime Minister Suzuki met with members of the Japanese press to give a government response to the Potsdam declaration:
I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not attach any important value to it at all. The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war.
Even after the bombing of Nagasaki and the Soviet Declaration of War, a meeting of the Supreme Council (the Big Six) of the Japanese government split 3-3, with 3 unwilling to surrender unless there were no Allied occupation, and the Japanese handled their own war criminal trials and their own disarmament.
Upon hearing of the Emperor's plan to surrender, members of the army staged an aborted coup d'etat in hopes of continuing the fight.
As far as the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. a lot of scientists at Los Alamos were refugees from Europe, and when the Nazis surrendered they assumed it would not be used. The ostensible reason for the Manhattan Project, the defeat of Germany, had gone away.
Did the Generals want to use the bomb as a statement of American Power and a warning to the Soviets? I have no doubt that they did. Did many scientists who worked on the project feel betrayed? Yes.
