Russian Collusion After All

[_Doctor CamNC4Me]

Subjenius,

The fact that you just posted that yet again affirms that you don’t read. We’ve posted extensively on Manafort.

That said, I hope your grindr date went well. Answer my inquiries and I’ll get to work because I need to tailor my response to your brain. Also, I’ll remind any casual readers that, “I don’t know what else to say on the matter except the report is ‘right there’ and easily accessible. When McConnell says the report exonerates Trump and team he’s either totally ignorant of what’s contained in the report or he’s banking on the fact Trumpers won’t read it, don’t care to know the truth contained in it, and just need to be told a lie so they can repeat it.”

- Doc

[_Icarus]

Cool story how this report echoes the Mueller report and yet (a.k.a. in reality) PROVES nothing except:
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found no evidence that the Trump campaign colluded with Russia to influence the 2016 presidential election.
But keep your faith based drivel moving forward. Your reliance on the cited language of "suggested..may have been" is PROOF of how weak minded your post is.

Actually it proves plenty to those who don't have their heads in Brietbart's ass.

https://www.lawfareblog.com/collusion-r ... ittee-find

A Collusion Reading Diary: What Did the Senate Intelligence Committee Find?

It is a bit of a mug’s game at this point to fight over whether what either Mueller or the Intelligence Committee found constitutes collusion and, if so, in what sense. The question turns almost entirely on what one means by the term “collusion”—a word without any precise meaning in the context of campaign engagement with foreign actors interfering with an election.

So rather than engaging over whether the Intelligence Committee found collusion, we decided to read the document with a focus on identifying precisely what the committee found about the engagement over a long period of time between Trump and his campaign and Russian government or intelligence actors and their cut-outs.

Whether one describes this activity as collusion or not, there’s a lot of it: The report describes hundreds of actions by Trump, his campaign, and his associates in the run-up to the 2016 election that involve some degree of participation by Trump or his associates in Russian activity. In this post—which we are generating serially as we read through the document—we attempt to summarize, precisely and comprehensively, what the eight Republicans on the committee, along with their seven Democratic colleagues, report that the president, members of his campaign and his associates actually did.

One overarching note: There is a fair amount of overlap between this document and the Mueller report. But the Senate report covers a fair bit more ground for a few reasons. For one thing, it was not limited to information it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt in court, as Mueller was. Just as important, the committee included counterintelligence questions in its investigative remit—whereas Mueller limited himself to a review of criminal activity. So the document reads less like a prosecution memo and more like an investigative report addressing risk assessment questions. This volume is an attempt to describe comprehensively the counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities associated with Russia’s interference in the 2016 election. So it’s inherently a little more free-wheeling and speculative.

The first section of the report concerns Paul Manafort, Trump’s one-time campaign chairman who resigned from the campaign in August 2016 following news reports of his previous work for a pro-Russian Ukrainian political party. Manafort was indicted in October 2017 in the course of the Mueller investigation and was eventually convicted of, and pleaded guilty to, charges including bank and tax fraud. Manafort’s business associate Rick Gates, who served on the Trump transition team, also pleaded guilty to fraud charges. Much of the Senate report’s information on Manafort echoes the Mueller report’s conclusions, but the Intelligence Committee is far more aggressive in its description of the counterintelligence threats posed by Manafort’s involvement with the campaign.

“Manafort had direct access to Trump and his Campaign’s senior officials, strategies, and information,” the committee notes, as did Gates—and “Manafort, often with the assistance of Gates, engaged with individuals inside Russia and Ukraine on matters pertaining both to his personal business prospects and the 2016 U.S. election.”

The report provides a brief overview of Manafort’s “connections to Russia and Ukraine,” which date to “approximately 2004.” In brief, Manafort began work then for the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine, which eventually led to his role in engineering the 2010 election to the Ukrainian presidency of pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. While the Mueller report described Deripaska as “closely aligned with Vladimir Putin,” the committee’s report is much more direct: “The Russian government,” the committee writes, “coordinates with and directs Deripaska” in conducting influence operations, with which Manafort also assisted. At another point, the committee states that “Manafort’s influence work for Deripaska was, in effect, influence work for the Russian government and its interests.”

In other words, as a baseline matter, the Trump campaign was—for a time—run by a man who himself had carried out influence operations on behalf of Russian interests.

It gets worse, however.

Manafort’s work in Ukraine and with Deripaska also led him to have a long-term business relationship with a man named Konstantin Kilimnik, the report states, who “became an integral part” of Manafort’s business. Kilimnik is no stranger to those who have followed L’Affaire Russe. The Mueller report had reported that “[t]he FBI assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.”

But here again, the Senate report goes much further, bluntly stating that “Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer.” What’s more, Manafort was likely aware of this fact, the committee states: In a footnote, the committee states that “Manafort … at some point harbored suspicions that Kilimnik had ties to intelligence services. Manafort was undeniably aware—often from first-hand experience—of suspicious aspects of Kilimnik’s behavior and network. Nevertheless, Manafort later asserted to [Mueller’s team] that Kilimnik was not a spy.”

As the Senate writes, Manafort’s work for the Trump campaign took place in the wake of a business dispute between Manafort and Deripaska involving money owed to Deripaska by Manafort, as well as a separate dispute involving money Manafort felt he was owed by other clients, pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs. The report states that Manafort “was actively seeking a position on the Trump campaign” in January 2016 on the grounds that it would help iron out his financial disputes with Deripaska and the Ukrainian oligarchs. Trump associate Roger Stone reached out directly to Trump and helped Manafort lobby for that role, the committee writes. According to Trump associate Tom Barrack, Manafort’s willingness to work for free was central to his getting the job of chairman—and, the Senate writes, Manafort was hired without the campaign conducting any vetting, “including of his financial situation or vulnerability to foreign influence."

The report states that Manafort “likely made Kilimnik aware of the possibility [that] he would join the Trump Campaign prior to its public announcement” in March 2016. After the public announcement, “Manafort used Kilimnik to send private messages to three Ukrainian oligarchs—at least one of whom Manafort believed owed him money—and to Deripaska.” The report contains several heavily redacted pages following a description of Manafort’s communications with Kilimnik during this time, which, from unredacted footnotes, seem to involve Kilimnik’s outreach to various oligarchs.

During his time on the Trump campaign, the committee writes, Manafort also worked with Kilimnik on developing a peace plan to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia. And, the committee states, “On numerous occasions over the course of his time on the Trump campaign, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik.” Most notably, Gates told investigators that Manafort had instructed him to share internal campaign polling data with Kilimnik. Gates “understood” that the data would be shared with Deripaska as well. Notably, the committee writes that “Kilimnik was capable of comprehending the complex polling data,” given his “significant knowledge of, and experience with” such material. On the basis of testimony by Kilimnik’s business partner Samuel Patten, it appears that the data involved information about the public’s negative views of Hillary Clinton, which Manafort felt could give Trump a chance to win the election.

In other words, throughout his work on the Trump campaign, Manafort maintained an ongoing business relationship with a Russian intelligence officer, to whom he passed nonpublic campaign material and analysis.

So what did Kilimnik do with the data—and why did Manafort share it? This was one of the great mysteries left unsolved by the Mueller report, and the Senate was also unable to come up with an answer. Gates, apparently, did not know: “Gates ultimately claimed that he did not trust Kilimnik, that he did not know why Manafort was sharing internal polling data with him, and that Kilimnik could have given the data to anyone.” The report states that “the Committee did … obtain a single piece of information that could plausibly be a reflection of Kilimnik’s actions” after receiving the data—but the next paragraph is entirely redacted.

Perhaps the most tantalizing suggestion in this section involves the redacted pages following the committee’s assertion that “some evidence suggests Kilimnik may be connected to the GRU hack-and-leak operation related to the 2016 election”—that is, the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and Clinton campaign chair John Podesta. The suggestion that Kilimnik may have had some link to the hack-and-leak operation is new; it was not included in the Mueller report. Sections of unredacted text discuss the “Cyber Berkut” hacker group—which the report identifies as a “GRU influence operation”—and the 2014 leak of a conversation between State Department official Victoria Nuland and the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, which the White House at the time accused Russia of releasing.

The committee goes further, stating that there is a “possibility” that Manafort himself was somehow connected to the hacking and leaking. Much of the text that follows is redacted, though the unredacted text includes information about Manafort’s one-time son-in-law Jeffrey Yohai, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The possible connection between Yohai and the GRU operation is unclear.

In other words, according to the committee, not only was the chairman of the Trump campaign engaged in a business relationship with a Russian intelligence officer during the campaign and feeding him confidential information, but one or both of them might have played some kind of role in the hacking and dumping operation at the heart of the Russian electoral interference.

The engagement did not end when Manafort resigned from the campaign in August 2016. Manafort remained in contact both with members of the Trump campaign and with Kilimnik after his resignation, the report states—and “Kilimnik was aware that Manafort remained in contact with Trump and the Campaign generally and took an interest in making use of the connection.” Manafort’s contacts included providing advice to Trump and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and sending the campaign a memo days before Election Day predicting Trump’s victory. Among the advice Manafort gave Kushner, emails show, was the suggestion to use “WikiLeaks information” for the campaign.

Manafort’s work along these lines, and his relationship with Kilimnik, continued even after the election. Kilimnik, the report states, “began considering how to leverage his relationship with Manafort for influence” under the new Trump administration. And “Kilimnik specifically sought to leverage Manafort’s contacts with the incoming Trump administration to advance” Kilimnik’s preferred policies in Ukraine. The report quotes an email shared with Manafort by Kilmnik advocating the deployment of the peace plan discussed by the two men in August 2016. As part of this effort, Manafort met with a representative of Deripaska in Madrid, the committee states—and “provided false and misleading information” about that meeting to the committee and the special counsel’s office—and later met with Kilimnik in Madrid as well. Additionally, Kilimnik traveled to the United States for Trump’s inauguration and met with Manafort while he was there, though he did not attend the inauguration itself. Through 2018, Manafort helped Kilimnik with polling on the possible peace plan, the committee states.

Finally, the report writes that “Manafort, Kilimnik, Deripaska, and others associated with Deripaska participated in … influence operations” spread by the Russian government after the election that were designed to “discredit investigations into Russian interference … and spread false information about the events of 2016.” Notably, the committee states that “Kilimnik almost certainly helped arrange some of the first public messaging that Ukraine had interfered in the U.S. election”—the same false idea that led to Trump’s animosity toward Ukraine and precipitated the scandal at the center of the president’s impeachment. Some of the material in this section is redacted, but the unredacted text sketches how Manafort and Kilimnik sought to discredit Ukrainian investigations of Manafort and seed the idea that the real 2016 election interference was by Ukraine in support of Clinton, including contacts between Kilimnik and the Ukrainian prosecutor whose false allegations against U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch became a central component of the impeachment scandal.

It is particularly striking that the committee’s Republicans signed onto this portion of the report, given the insistence by Trump and many Senate Republicans that Ukraine interfered in the 2015 election. Yet here are Republican senators, some of whom have even endorsed that theory, admitting that its origins lie in Russian disinformation.

Notably, the committee states that its investigation into Manafort was limited by the committee’s inability to interview Manafort and Gates to the extent desired; by Manafort, Gates and Kilimnik’s use of encrypted communications and other means of avoiding documentation; and by Manafort’s lies to the special counsel’s office about his relationship with Kilimnik. “Manafort's obfuscation of the truth surrounding Kilimnik was particularly damaging to the Committee's investigation,” the report writes, “because it effectively foreclosed direct insight into a series of interactions and communications which represent the single most direct tie between senior Trump Campaign officials and the Russian intelligence services.”

The section entitled “Hack and Leak” contains perhaps the frankest statements describing efforts by the Trump campaign institutionally—and Trump personally—to take advantage of Russia’s efforts, through Wikileaks, to damage Hillary Clinton’s candidacy:

While the GRU and WikiLeaks were releasing hacked documents, the Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those materials to aid Trump's electoral prospects. To do so, the Trump Campaign took actions to obtain advance notice about WikiLeaks releases of Clinton emails; took steps to obtain inside information about the content of releases once WikiLeaks began to publish stolen information; created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release; and encouraged further theft of information and continued leaks.

The report summarizes the key role of Roger Stone in these efforts:

Trump and senior Campaign officials sought to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks through Roger Stone. In spring 2016, prior to Assange's public announcements, Stone advised the Campaign that WikiLeaks would be releasing materials harmful to Clinton. Following the July 22 DNC release, Trump and the Campaign believed that Roger Stone had known of the release and had inside access to WikiLeaks, and repeatedly communicated with Stone about WikiLeaks throughout the summer and fall of 2016. Trump and other senior Campaign officials specifically directed Stone to obtain information about upcoming document releases relating to Clinton and report back. At their direction, Stone took action to gain inside knowledge for the Campaign and shared his purported knowledge directly with Trump and senior Campaign officials on multiple occasions. Trump and the Campaign believed that Stone had inside information and expressed satisfaction that Stone's information suggested more releases would be forthcoming.

These summaries are supported by detailed factual accounts that specify the roles different members of the campaign and other Trump associates played in the efforts. The report shows, in detail, that Roger Stone did not act in a vacuum or without the knowledge of the campaign or Donald Trump himself. In August 2016, following a tasking from the campaign, Stone obtained information indicating that John Podesta would be a target of an upcoming release, prior to WikiLeaks releasing Podesta's emails. Stone communicated this information to Trump and other senior campaign officials and affiliates, including Manafort and Gates.

Indeed, the report specifies that “[w]hile it was seeking advance information about potential WikiLeaks releases, the Campaign created a messaging strategy to promote the stolen materials.”

And crucially, the report makes clear that both Trump and the campaign continued these efforts even after it was well understood that Russia was behind them:

Trump and the Campaign continued to promote and disseminate the hacked WikiLeaks documents, even after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security released a joint statement officially attributing the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia as part of its interference in the U.S. presidential election. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia, and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort.

By Todd Carney, Samantha Fry, Quinta Jurecic, Jacob Schulz, Tia Sewell, Margaret Taylor, Benjamin Wittes Friday, August 21, 2020, 4:41 PM
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Central Hearing Facility in the Hart Senate Office Building, where the Senate Intelligence Committee is located. (Architect of the U.S. Capitol)
The fifth and final volume of the Select Intelligence Committee’s bipartisan report on Russian interference in the 2016 election is an incredibly long and detailed document. At a whopping 966 pages, volume 5 alone is more than twice the length of the Mueller report, and it covers a great deal more ground.

It is important for another reason: Along with the shorter volumes 1-4, the Senate’s report is the only credible account of the events of 2016 to which Republican elected officials have signed their names. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell in a press release praised the report on the investigation he set in motion way back in December 2016, saying, “I commend my colleagues on both sides for keeping their work out of the partisan spotlight and focused on the facts.” McConnell, in the same press release, echoes the statements of Acting Committee Chairman Marco Rubio, stating that “[t]heir report reaffirms Special Counsel Mueller’s finding that President Trump did not collude with Russia.”

It is a bit of a mug’s game at this point to fight over whether what either Mueller or the Intelligence Committee found constitutes collusion and, if so, in what sense. The question turns almost entirely on what one means by the term “collusion”—a word without any precise meaning in the context of campaign engagement with foreign actors interfering with an election.

So rather than engaging over whether the Intelligence Committee found collusion, we decided to read the document with a focus on identifying precisely what the committee found about the engagement over a long period of time between Trump and his campaign and Russian government or intelligence actors and their cut-outs.

Whether one describes this activity as collusion or not, there’s a lot of it: The report describes hundreds of actions by Trump, his campaign, and his associates in the run-up to the 2016 election that involve some degree of participation by Trump or his associates in Russian activity. In this post—which we are generating serially as we read through the document—we attempt to summarize, precisely and comprehensively, what the eight Republicans on the committee, along with their seven Democratic colleagues, report that the president, members of his campaign and his associates actually did.

One overarching note: There is a fair amount of overlap between this document and the Mueller report. But the Senate report covers a fair bit more ground for a few reasons. For one thing, it was not limited to information it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt in court, as Mueller was. Just as important, the committee included counterintelligence questions in its investigative remit—whereas Mueller limited himself to a review of criminal activity. So the document reads less like a prosecution memo and more like an investigative report addressing risk assessment questions. This volume is an attempt to describe comprehensively the counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities associated with Russia’s interference in the 2016 election. So it’s inherently a little more free-wheeling and speculative.

We summarize each section of the report in the order in which it appears. We’ll be updating and adding summaries of new sections as we read.

A. Paul Manafort

B. Hack and Leak

A. Paul Manafort (pp. 27-169)

The first section of the report concerns Paul Manafort, Trump’s one-time campaign chairman who resigned from the campaign in August 2016 following news reports of his previous work for a pro-Russian Ukrainian political party. Manafort was indicted in October 2017 in the course of the Mueller investigation and was eventually convicted of, and pleaded guilty to, charges including bank and tax fraud. Manafort’s business associate Rick Gates, who served on the Trump transition team, also pleaded guilty to fraud charges. Much of the Senate report’s information on Manafort echoes the Mueller report’s conclusions, but the Intelligence Committee is far more aggressive in its description of the counterintelligence threats posed by Manafort’s involvement with the campaign.

“Manafort had direct access to Trump and his Campaign’s senior officials, strategies, and information,” the committee notes, as did Gates—and “Manafort, often with the assistance of Gates, engaged with individuals inside Russia and Ukraine on matters pertaining both to his personal business prospects and the 2016 U.S. election.”

The report provides a brief overview of Manafort’s “connections to Russia and Ukraine,” which date to “approximately 2004.” In brief, Manafort began work then for the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine, which eventually led to his role in engineering the 2010 election to the Ukrainian presidency of pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. While the Mueller report described Deripaska as “closely aligned with Vladimir Putin,” the committee’s report is much more direct: “The Russian government,” the committee writes, “coordinates with and directs Deripaska” in conducting influence operations, with which Manafort also assisted. At another point, the committee states that “Manafort’s influence work for Deripaska was, in effect, influence work for the Russian government and its interests.”

In other words, as a baseline matter, the Trump campaign was—for a time—run by a man who himself had carried out influence operations on behalf of Russian interests.

It gets worse, however.

Manafort’s work in Ukraine and with Deripaska also led him to have a long-term business relationship with a man named Konstantin Kilimnik, the report states, who “became an integral part” of Manafort’s business. Kilimnik is no stranger to those who have followed L’Affaire Russe. The Mueller report had reported that “[t]he FBI assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.”

But here again, the Senate report goes much further, bluntly stating that “Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer.” What’s more, Manafort was likely aware of this fact, the committee states: In a footnote, the committee states that “Manafort … at some point harbored suspicions that Kilimnik had ties to intelligence services. Manafort was undeniably aware—often from first-hand experience—of suspicious aspects of Kilimnik’s behavior and network. Nevertheless, Manafort later asserted to [Mueller’s team] that Kilimnik was not a spy.”

As the Senate writes, Manafort’s work for the Trump campaign took place in the wake of a business dispute between Manafort and Deripaska involving money owed to Deripaska by Manafort, as well as a separate dispute involving money Manafort felt he was owed by other clients, pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs. The report states that Manafort “was actively seeking a position on the Trump campaign” in January 2016 on the grounds that it would help iron out his financial disputes with Deripaska and the Ukrainian oligarchs. Trump associate Roger Stone reached out directly to Trump and helped Manafort lobby for that role, the committee writes. According to Trump associate Tom Barrack, Manafort’s willingness to work for free was central to his getting the job of chairman—and, the Senate writes, Manafort was hired without the campaign conducting any vetting, “including of his financial situation or vulnerability to foreign influence."

The report states that Manafort “likely made Kilimnik aware of the possibility [that] he would join the Trump Campaign prior to its public announcement” in March 2016. After the public announcement, “Manafort used Kilimnik to send private messages to three Ukrainian oligarchs—at least one of whom Manafort believed owed him money—and to Deripaska.” The report contains several heavily redacted pages following a description of Manafort’s communications with Kilimnik during this time, which, from unredacted footnotes, seem to involve Kilimnik’s outreach to various oligarchs.

During his time on the Trump campaign, the committee writes, Manafort also worked with Kilimnik on developing a peace plan to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia. And, the committee states, “On numerous occasions over the course of his time on the Trump campaign, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik.” Most notably, Gates told investigators that Manafort had instructed him to share internal campaign polling data with Kilimnik. Gates “understood” that the data would be shared with Deripaska as well. Notably, the committee writes that “Kilimnik was capable of comprehending the complex polling data,” given his “significant knowledge of, and experience with” such material. On the basis of testimony by Kilimnik’s business partner Samuel Patten, it appears that the data involved information about the public’s negative views of Hillary Clinton, which Manafort felt could give Trump a chance to win the election.

In other words, throughout his work on the Trump campaign, Manafort maintained an ongoing business relationship with a Russian intelligence officer, to whom he passed nonpublic campaign material and analysis.

So what did Kilimnik do with the data—and why did Manafort share it? This was one of the great mysteries left unsolved by the Mueller report, and the Senate was also unable to come up with an answer. Gates, apparently, did not know: “Gates ultimately claimed that he did not trust Kilimnik, that he did not know why Manafort was sharing internal polling data with him, and that Kilimnik could have given the data to anyone.” The report states that “the Committee did … obtain a single piece of information that could plausibly be a reflection of Kilimnik’s actions” after receiving the data—but the next paragraph is entirely redacted.

Perhaps the most tantalizing suggestion in this section involves the redacted pages following the committee’s assertion that “some evidence suggests Kilimnik may be connected to the GRU hack-and-leak operation related to the 2016 election”—that is, the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and Clinton campaign chair John Podesta. The suggestion that Kilimnik may have had some link to the hack-and-leak operation is new; it was not included in the Mueller report. Sections of unredacted text discuss the “Cyber Berkut” hacker group—which the report identifies as a “GRU influence operation”—and the 2014 leak of a conversation between State Department official Victoria Nuland and the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, which the White House at the time accused Russia of releasing.

The committee goes further, stating that there is a “possibility” that Manafort himself was somehow connected to the hacking and leaking. Much of the text that follows is redacted, though the unredacted text includes information about Manafort’s one-time son-in-law Jeffrey Yohai, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The possible connection between Yohai and the GRU operation is unclear.

In other words, according to the committee, not only was the chairman of the Trump campaign engaged in a business relationship with a Russian intelligence officer during the campaign and feeding him confidential information, but one or both of them might have played some kind of role in the hacking and dumping operation at the heart of the Russian electoral interference.

The engagement did not end when Manafort resigned from the campaign in August 2016. Manafort remained in contact both with members of the Trump campaign and with Kilimnik after his resignation, the report states—and “Kilimnik was aware that Manafort remained in contact with Trump and the Campaign generally and took an interest in making use of the connection.” Manafort’s contacts included providing advice to Trump and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and sending the campaign a memo days before Election Day predicting Trump’s victory. Among the advice Manafort gave Kushner, emails show, was the suggestion to use “WikiLeaks information” for the campaign.

Manafort’s work along these lines, and his relationship with Kilimnik, continued even after the election. Kilimnik, the report states, “began considering how to leverage his relationship with Manafort for influence” under the new Trump administration. And “Kilimnik specifically sought to leverage Manafort’s contacts with the incoming Trump administration to advance” Kilimnik’s preferred policies in Ukraine. The report quotes an email shared with Manafort by Kilmnik advocating the deployment of the peace plan discussed by the two men in August 2016. As part of this effort, Manafort met with a representative of Deripaska in Madrid, the committee states—and “provided false and misleading information” about that meeting to the committee and the special counsel’s office—and later met with Kilimnik in Madrid as well. Additionally, Kilimnik traveled to the United States for Trump’s inauguration and met with Manafort while he was there, though he did not attend the inauguration itself. Through 2018, Manafort helped Kilimnik with polling on the possible peace plan, the committee states.

Finally, the report writes that “Manafort, Kilimnik, Deripaska, and others associated with Deripaska participated in … influence operations” spread by the Russian government after the election that were designed to “discredit investigations into Russian interference … and spread false information about the events of 2016.” Notably, the committee states that “Kilimnik almost certainly helped arrange some of the first public messaging that Ukraine had interfered in the U.S. election”—the same false idea that led to Trump’s animosity toward Ukraine and precipitated the scandal at the center of the president’s impeachment. Some of the material in this section is redacted, but the unredacted text sketches how Manafort and Kilimnik sought to discredit Ukrainian investigations of Manafort and seed the idea that the real 2016 election interference was by Ukraine in support of Clinton, including contacts between Kilimnik and the Ukrainian prosecutor whose false allegations against U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch became a central component of the impeachment scandal.

It is particularly striking that the committee’s Republicans signed onto this portion of the report, given the insistence by Trump and many Senate Republicans that Ukraine interfered in the 2015 election. Yet here are Republican senators, some of whom have even endorsed that theory, admitting that its origins lie in Russian disinformation.

Notably, the committee states that its investigation into Manafort was limited by the committee’s inability to interview Manafort and Gates to the extent desired; by Manafort, Gates and Kilimnik’s use of encrypted communications and other means of avoiding documentation; and by Manafort’s lies to the special counsel’s office about his relationship with Kilimnik. “Manafort's obfuscation of the truth surrounding Kilimnik was particularly damaging to the Committee's investigation,” the report writes, “because it effectively foreclosed direct insight into a series of interactions and communications which represent the single most direct tie between senior Trump Campaign officials and the Russian intelligence services.”

B. Hack and Leak, pp. 170-256

The section entitled “Hack and Leak” contains perhaps the frankest statements describing efforts by the Trump campaign institutionally—and Trump personally—to take advantage of Russia’s efforts, through Wikileaks, to damage Hillary Clinton’s candidacy:

While the GRU and WikiLeaks were releasing hacked documents, the Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those materials to aid Trump's electoral prospects. To do so, the Trump Campaign took actions to obtain advance notice about WikiLeaks releases of Clinton emails; took steps to obtain inside information about the content of releases once WikiLeaks began to publish stolen information; created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release; and encouraged further theft of information and continued leaks.

The report summarizes the key role of Roger Stone in these efforts:

Trump and senior Campaign officials sought to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks through Roger Stone. In spring 2016, prior to Assange's public announcements, Stone advised the Campaign that WikiLeaks would be releasing materials harmful to Clinton. Following the July 22 DNC release, Trump and the Campaign believed that Roger Stone had known of the release and had inside access to WikiLeaks, and repeatedly communicated with Stone about WikiLeaks throughout the summer and fall of 2016. Trump and other senior Campaign officials specifically directed Stone to obtain information about upcoming document releases relating to Clinton and report back. At their direction, Stone took action to gain inside knowledge for the Campaign and shared his purported knowledge directly with Trump and senior Campaign officials on multiple occasions. Trump and the Campaign believed that Stone had inside information and expressed satisfaction that Stone's information suggested more releases would be forthcoming.

These summaries are supported by detailed factual accounts that specify the roles different members of the campaign and other Trump associates played in the efforts. The report shows, in detail, that Roger Stone did not act in a vacuum or without the knowledge of the campaign or Donald Trump himself. In August 2016, following a tasking from the campaign, Stone obtained information indicating that John Podesta would be a target of an upcoming release, prior to WikiLeaks releasing Podesta's emails. Stone communicated this information to Trump and other senior campaign officials and affiliates, including Manafort and Gates.

Indeed, the report specifies that “[w]hile it was seeking advance information about potential WikiLeaks releases, the Campaign created a messaging strategy to promote the stolen materials.”

And crucially, the report makes clear that both Trump and the campaign continued these efforts even after it was well understood that Russia was behind them:

Trump and the Campaign continued to promote and disseminate the hacked WikiLeaks documents, even after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security released a joint statement officially attributing the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia as part of its interference in the U.S. presidential election. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia, and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort.

Specifically, the report states that “[t]he Campaign tried to cast doubt on the October 7 joint DHS/ODNI assessment formally attributing the activity to Russia, and was indifferent to the significance of acquiring, promoting, or disseminating materials from a Russian intelligence services hack-and-leak campaign.” It reiterates again that “[t]he Trump Campaign strategically monitored and promoted the WikiLeaks releases of John Podesta's emails from October 7 until the election.”

The report also tracks a second, related effort to obtain emails: Trump’s obsession with the "missing" emails from Hillary Clinton's server. It repeats what was already revealed in the Mueller report and widely reported in the press: that Trump publicly requested (“Russia, if you’re listening…”) that Russia find and release those emails and, hours later, that GRU hackers spearphished non-public email accounts of Clinton's personal office for the first time and targeted seventy-six email accounts hosted by the Clinton campaign's domain.

But the report goes into many more specifics about the effort, the broad range of campaign officials and associates that were involved, and the willingness of campaign officials to engage with foreign actors to obtain them. According to Rick Gates, the report states, Donald Trump Jr. would ask where the Clinton emails were during "family meetings." Other senior advisors—including campaign advisor Michael Flynn, Kushner, Manafort, campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, then-Sen. Jeff Sessions and campaign policy advisor Sam Clovis—also expressed interest in obtaining the emails:

Manafort also recalled hearing from Stone sometime in June 2016 that "a source close to WikiLeaks confirmed that WikiLeaks had the emails from Clinton's server." Like Gates, Manafort recalled Stone telling him that the emails would be released "soon," but Stone "did not know when." Manafort, who was not convinced that the documents were coming out, directed Gates to check in with Stone "from time to time" to see if his WikiLeaks information remained "real and viable."

The report takes pains to corroborate telephonic and in-person conversations discussing the topic, including with phone logs, calendars of members of the campaign and other detailed sources.

It shows that key members of the campaign—including Trump himself—knew of Wikileaks’s potential Russia connection long before the intelligence community’s assessment of the issue in October 2016. On June 12, Julian Assange gave an interview in which he said that WikiLeaks was planning to release information on Hillary Clinton. The report finds that the “Trump Campaign was elated by the news about WikiLeaks's plans, which it considered an unexpected ‘gift.’” When, two days later, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) announced it had been compromised by Russian government hackers, the report documents a flurry of phone calls between Trump and Stone:

That evening, at 9:03 p.m., Stone called Trump at Trump's home number. Trump returned Stone’s call from his cell phone two times, at 9:53 p.m. and 9:56 p.m.: the calls lasted about two-and-a-half minutes and two minutes, respectively. The Committee does not know the substance of these conversations, but the pattern and timing of Stone’s calls with Trump and others during this period suggest that they could have discussed the DNC hack and WikiLeaks.

And then there’s this:

Campaign leadership reacted positively to the news that the DNC had been hacked by the Russians. Gates described the reaction in part as "disbelief," but also given "what we were told that information might be about," the Campaign "felt it would give [them] a leg up" if released.

And campaign officials made sure they were well-positioned to take full advantage of the fruits of the Russian hacking: the campaign planned a "press strategy, a communications campaign, and messaging based on the possibility the emails existed" and conversations were held "about what the campaign could plan for in the way of emails." Members of the campaign communicated frequently with each other and with Stone. Hours after the GRU released stolen DNC documents through its Guccifer 2.0 persona in June, Stone and Gates discussed the DNC hack by phone. Stone told Gates that "more information would be coming out of the DNC hack."

The report found that witness testimony and documentary evidence “support that Stone spoke to Trump about the WikiLeaks information prior to its release.” Although Manafort claimed that he was reluctant to tell Trump and cautioned Stone against doing so, “Stone could-and did-contact Trump directly, as Stone did on June 14.” And everyone knew Trump would be pleased: “Manafort believed Stone would have told Trump anyway because he ‘wanted the credit for knowing in advance.’” Trump’s frequent communications with Stone were no secret: “Gates was aware that Stone called Trump during the campaign. Cohen similarly noted that ‘Stone called Trump all the time,’ and ‘could call Trump's cell phone, especially if at night.’ Trump himself acknowledged that he ‘spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign.’” The report makes this assessment about Stone’s and Trump’s communications:

Any of these calls would have provided Stone with an opportunity to share additional information about WikiLeaks directly with Trump, and given the content of his conversations with Manafort and Gates combined with Trump's known interest in the issue, the Committee assesses he likely did.

In one telling tidbit that speaks to the regard the campaign had for the hacking of the DNC, a campaign staffer posed a question in an email about whether, in connection with downloading and distributing the newest batch of Guccifer 2.0 emails, "Senate or campaign rules preclude us from possessing data that's been hacked from a third party and distributed via the internet." Tellingly, John Mashburn, the policy director for the Trump campaign, replied: "I don't see a problem. Just like WikiLeaks material."

The report recounts in detail the actions by the committee in the run-up to the July 22, 2016, release by WikiLeaks of 20,000 emails the GRU had stolen from the DNC. The report states that “a possible WikiLeaks release appeared central to the Campaign's strategic focus.” Indeed, the hack-and-dump brought the Trump campaign and the Republican National Committee (RNC) in a more trusting relationship: “Trump and Kushner were reportedly willing to ‘cooperate’ with the RNC's efforts on this front, overcoming their earlier skepticism of working with the RNC, and demonstrating that both were focused on the possibility of WikiLeaks releasing Clinton documents.”

It recounts in-person conversations in which Donald Trump encouraged Stone’s contact with Julian Assange, and also potential efforts to mask such conversations. It finds that witness testimony indicates that Stone may have raised WikiLeaks again to Trump in late July, shortly before the DNC release occurred. Manafort assumed such a conversation took place, and Michael Cohen recalled overhearing a phone call from Stone in Trump's office in which Stone reported that he had talked to Assange and that there would be a “massive dump” of emails in July. Trump encouraged him, though Cohen was somewhat skeptical about whether Stone was telling the truth. The report suggests that such conversations may have taken place on the phone of Trump’s bodyguard, Keith Schiller, rather than Trump’s own phone: “[w]itnesses said that Trump often used Schiller's phone to hide his communications.”

The campaign staff, including Gates, Stephen Miller, and Jason Miller, worked on a “messaging strategy” and had “brainstorming sessions” in the run-up to the July 22 release. After the release, the report recounts, “Trump and his Campaign immediately pivoted to leveraging the WikiLeaks documents. Gates recalled that Manafort "express[ ed] excitement" about the release,” and Manafort and Trump discussed how they could use the DNC emails relating to Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Michael Cohen and Trump discussed "the usefulness of the released emails," including in relation to Bernie Sanders, Donna Brazile, and Wasserman Shultz. Gates recalled that following the email release, the takeoff of Trump’s plane was delayed 30 minutes so that Trump “could work the emails into his next speech.”

The campaign’s weaponization of the Wikileaks release to attack and divide the Democratic party “mirrored the discussion between WikiLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 about using the emails to create conflict within the Democratic Party by splitting Clinton and Sanders supporters” and “echoed social media efforts by Russia to drive a wedge between supporters of Clinton and Sanders” as described in the second volume of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report.

The July 22 Wikileaks release energized the Trump campaign and it “began to more actively pursue leads on WikiLeaks activities.” Manafort reminded Trump that Stone had predicted the release and, in response, Trump “directed Manafort to stay in touch with Stone to see if there were more emails coming out.” Manafort spoke with Stone during the week of the 2016 Democratic National Convention, and he agreed to follow up. Manafort also instructed Gates to follow up with Stone on occasion to find out when additional information might be released. He told Gates that he would be "updating other people on the Campaign, including the candidate." But Manafort was cautious to use Stone, rather than official campaign staffers, advising Gates and others “throughout the Campaign” that no one should "touch’" Assange, even though there was a "growing belief that Assange was, in fact, assisting their effort."

Having received Trump’s direction through Manafort, Stone channeled his outreach efforts to Assange through right-wing author Jerome Corsi—but kept in close contact with the campaign. The report details multiple communications and machinations between Stone, Corsi, Ted Malloch, and others in an effort to get to Assange. Stone stayed in contact with Trump and the campaign throughout this time period, including a “68-minute call” between Stone and Manafort on July 30. Stone indicated to Manafort that “additional information would be coming out down the road” and Manafort "thought that would be great."

Next came the “October surprise”: the release of Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta’s emails. In August, Stone asked Corsi for information about the “timing and content of the Podesta email release,” and Stone told Corsi he was talking to Trump. Stone was also talking to the campaign staff: He had “at least 25 phone calls with Manafort, 20 phone calls with Gates, two calls with Bannon and two calls with Trump in the month of August 2016 alone.”

Enter Steve Bannon, who recalled discussing WikiLeaks and Assange with Stone “both before and after taking over as the chief executive officer of the Trump Campaign on August 13, 2016.” Bannon recalled that, before he joined the campaign, "Stone told him that he had a connection to Assange" and "implied that he had inside information about WikiLeaks." After Bannon became the campaign’s CEO, Stone repeated to him that he "had a relationship with Assange and said that WikiLeaks was going to dump additional materials that would be bad for the Clinton Campaign."

Notably, Trump, in written responses to questions from Mueller's office, stated that, "I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with [Stone], nor do I recall being aware of Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks. with individuals associated with my campaign." Trump further claimed that he had "no recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1, 2016 and November 8, 2016."

The Senate report report does not directly conclude that Trump was lying, but it gets pretty close. It draws this conclusion: “Despite Trump's recollection, the Committee assesses that Trump did, in fact, speak with Stone about WikiLeaks and with members of his Campaign about Stone's access to WikiLeaks on multiple occasions.”

The wording is careful. It does not say that Trump did, contrary to his testimony, recall the specifics of any of these conversations. It merely says that he had repeated conversations with Stone and describes them in fashions that would be memorable to any reasonable person. It thus shows the ridiculousness of Trump’s representations to the Department of Justice about Stone and Wikileaks, though it stops short of accusing him of lying under oath.

The report also describes the sheer volume of communications among members of the campaign, and with Breitbart employees, regarding the hoped-for “October surprise” dump of new Wikileaks documents. Although members of the campaign had grown more hesitant about communicating directly with Stone, the campaign staff tracked Stone’s commentary and the news about Wikileaks and communicated copiously with each other about it. Andrew Surabian, who ran the campaign's war room, emailed Stone's Twitter prediction about a Wednesday release to Bannon, campaign pollster Kellyanne Conway and the Trump campaign press team. The next day, campaign staffer Dan Scavino emailed the Oct. 3 WikiLeaks Twitter announcement to Bannon. Bannon reached out to two editors at Breitbart, where he held a leadership role, to ask if they would be awake "to get what he [Assange] has live."

Bannon also received an email from another Breitbart editor, forwarding Boyle's correspondence from earlier that day with Stone. But Bannon, for one, seemed less eager. Boyle had asked Stone, "Assange-what's he got? Hope it's good." Stone responded, "It is. I'd tell Bannon but he doesn't call me back." Stone also emailed Trump supporter and associate Erik Prince on Oct. 3, telling him: "Spoke to my friend in London last night. The payload is still coming."

When no “leak” was forthcoming, Trump got frustrated and his advisers immediately reached out to Stone to see what went wrong. “Trump was frustrated with the absence of a WikiLeaks release on October 4,” Gates said, recalling that Trump asked: "When is the other stuff coming out?" Other key Trump advisers were likewise disappointed. Bannon reached out directly to Stone by email about the lack of any new releases, asking "what was that this morning???" On October 4, Prince also asked Stone whether Assange had "chicken[ed] out." Prince texted Stone, again to ask whether he had "hear[d] anymore from London." Stone wrote, "Yes-want to talk on a secure line-got Whatsapp?" and previewed that it was "good.” Prince spoke with Stone, who told him that “WikiLeaks would release more materials harmful to the Clinton Campaign.” Prince also described Stone having the equivalent of "insider stock trading" information about Assange.

On Oct. 6, Stone tweeted: "Julian Assange will deliver a devastating expose on Hillary at a time of his choosing. I stand by my prediction. #handcuffs4hillary." On the afternoon of Oct. 6, Stone received a call from Keith Schiller's number. The report states,

Stone returned the call about 20 minutes later, and spoke—almost certainly to Trump—for six minutes. The substance of that conversation is not known to the Committee. However, at the time, Stone was focused on the potential for a WikiLeaks release, the Campaign was following WikiLeaks's announcements, and Trump's prior call with Stone on September 29, also using Schiller's phone, related to a WikiLeaks release. Given these facts, it appears quite likely that Stone and Trump spoke about WikiLeaks.

It seems a new opportunity was brewing for the use of the Podesta release of emails. After it became clear to Trump associates that the famous Access Hollywood tape would be coming out, Stone sought to time the much-sought-after release of Podesta emails by Wikileaks to divert attention from the tape. Corsi recalled that Stone "[w]anted the Podesta stuff to balance the news cycle" either "right then or at least coincident."

And Stone got his wish: “At approximately 4:32 p.m. on October 7, approximately 32 minutes after the release of the Access Hollywood tape, WikiLeaks released 2,050 emails that the GRU had stolen from John Podesta, repeatedly announcing the leak on Twitter and linking to a searchable archive of the documents.”

You get the picture. All of the key figures in the Trump campaign—including Trump himself—knew about, and anticipated, the Podesta Wikileaks dump. Stone helped engineer the timing of it with Wikileaks through Corsi. Afterward, Stone, Manafort and Gates all communicated with one another.

So what about Corsi? Was he really in communication with Assange directly or through another interlocutor, or was it something he fabricated? Or was it bluster on Stone’s part? The report provides ample detail regarding communications between Corsi and Stone that are very specific about both the release, timing and nature of the emails, and leaves the reader with the unmistakable impression that Corsi actually was in contact with Assange either himself or through Ted Malloch. But the report also states:

The Committee is uncertain how Corsi determined that Assange had John Podesta's emails. Corsi initially explained in an interview with the SCO that during his trip to Italy, someone told him Assange had the Podesta emails. Corsi also recalled learning that Assange was going to "release the emails seriatim and not all at once." However, Corsi claimed not to remember who provided him with this information, saying he could only recall that "it feels like a man" who told him.

...

However, during a later interview with the SCO, Corsi revised how he had learned that Assange would be releasing Podesta's emails. Corsi claimed that, rather than being told this information by a source, he had deduced it from Assange's public statements.

And then there’s this: "The Committee did not interview Corsi, who asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in response to a Committee subpoena, and could not determine if either of the two versions of these events was accurate."

The report also states, based on an FBI interview report form, that

Corsi recalled that, at the end of August, Stone grew concerned about having made a statement about the release of Podesta materials before WikiLeaks had released any documents. On August 30, Stone and Corsi agreed to fabricate a story that Stone's knowledge and his August 21 Podesta tweet were both based on a public article and subsequent memorandum from Corsi. However, Corsi understood that he was Stone's actual source of information and admitted that this "cover story" was "BS."

The reality is that the information Stone got from Corsi ended up being both specific and accurate. On Aug. 21, a month-and-a-half before WikiLeaks ultimately released its first batch of stolen John Podesta emails, Roger Stone tweeted, “Trust me, it will soon the Podesta’s time in the barrel.” The volume and connectedness of the details in this part of report leave the reader with the impression that Corsi really did have some kind of channel to Assange and that Corsi passed that information back to Roger Stone—though the report never says this explicitly.

That same day that the Podesta emails were released, Oct. 7, the Department Of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued their now-famous public release finding that “The U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations. The recent disclosures of alleged hacked e-mails on sites like DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks and by the Guccifer 2.0 online persona are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts.”

It seems Stone met with Trump on Oct. 8, the next day. Stone messaged Corsi: "Lunch postponed - have to go see T," referring to Trump. And Stone grew concerned that his contacts with Wikileaks through Corsi be hidden: “Corsi said that Stone was concerned about having advance information about the Podesta release, and that Stone recruited Corsi to make sure no one knew Stone had advance knowledge of that information.” Corsi claimed that Stone directed him to delete emails relating to the Podesta information. Stone’s later testimony to the House Intelligence Committee about his actions formed the basis for his indictment and trial on charges of making misleading and false statements about his communications with the Trump campaign and individuals associated with the campaign. In addition, Stone directed Corsi to "stick to the plan"; threatened radio host Randy Credico, who had also served as a link between Stone and Assange, to prevent Credico from testifying to House Intelligence Committee and contradicting Stone's story.

Recall that on July 10, 2020, Trump commuted Stone’s sentence on seven felony crimes for which he had been convicted, sparing Stone from a 40-month prison term.

The report confirms that following the Oct. 7 release, WikiLeaks released 33 more sets of stolen materials before Election Day—over 50,000 documents—advertising the materials on Twitter each time. And the campaign once again eagerly integrated WikiLeaks materials into the campaign’s efforts, including Trump’s tweets, speeches, and press releases. The campaign even “tracked WikiLeaks releases in order to populate a fake Clinton Campaign website, clintonkaine.com.” In short, as summarized in the report:

Despite the contemporaneous statement by the U.S. Government warning of Russian responsibility for the hacking and leaking of the DNC, DCCC, and Clinton Campaign documents and emails, the Trump Campaign considered the release of these materials to be its "October surprise."

And they took full advantage—DHS and ODNI findings be damned. They even endeavored to undermine the attribution of the theft to Russia: “While the Campaign was using the WikiLeaks documents, Trump cast doubt on the assessment that Russian government hackers were responsible for the hack-and-leak campaign.” Everyone who saw the second presidential debate on October 9 saw Trump assert "maybe there is no hacking." Other times he suggested it was an "absurd claim" to say that the Kremlin was promoting the Trump campaign; that "the DNC did the 'hacking"' as a distraction; that the Democrats were "putting [it] out" that the Russians were responsible; and that it was "unlikely" that the Russians did it; that nobody knew it was Russia, and it "could also be China" or "lots of other people."

Gates described a "growing belief” within the campaign that Assange was, in fact, assisting their effort. But it seems that any moral sense that it was wrong for the campaign to accept Russian involvement in assisting Trump’s campaign was non-existent. The campaign “treated the releases as just another form of opposition research.” Bannon's view was that "anything negative that comes out [against an opponent] is clearly helpful to a campaign." Campaign aide Stephen Miller felt "t would have been political malpractice not to use the WikiLeaks material once it became public." Trump “praised and promoted WikiLeaks repeatedly in the closing month of the campaign”—a “deliberate strategy employed by the Campaign” in his remarks and on social media:

In mid-October, Ivanka Trump tasked the Campaign's senior officials (including Bannon, Scavino, Stephen Miller and Jason Miller) with preparing two Trump tweets every day linking to WikiLeaks content, which, she said, would help "refocus the narrative." Trump tweeted direct references to WikiLeaks throughout October and November 2016, including on October 11, 12, 16, 17, 21 (twice), 22, 24, 27 and November 1.

And then there’s Donald Trump Jr., who had his own special connection with Wikileaks.

It seems Trump Jr. did not get the message about obscuring contact with Wikileaks. Instead, he responded directly when WikiLeaks reached out to him. As previously outlined in the Mueller report, the Senate report recounts how, on Sept. 21, WikiLeaks used a direct message on Twitter to reach out to Trump Jr. for a comment about a website, "putintrump.org," and provided Trump Jr. a password to access the website before it launched. Trump, Jr. responded, "Off the record I don't know who that is, but I'll ask around." He then forwarded the message to the campaign team with this note:

Guys I got a weird Twitter DM.from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it.

The report also describes how, prior to the October Podesta dump, WikiLeaks reached out directly to Trump Jr. and asked him to "comment on/push" a report about Clinton asking whether Assange could be droned. Trump Jr. responded that he had already done so, and then two minutes later, Trump Jr. wrote to WikiLeaks: "What's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?" (He did not receive a response.)

This section of the report concludes with a description of how WikiLeaks sought to coordinate its distribution of stolen documents through Don Jr. After Trump proclaimed at an Oct. 10 rally, "I love WikiLeaks" and then posted about it on Twitter, WikiLeaks resumed messaging with Trump Jr.: "Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us ... there's many great stories the press are missing and we're sure some of your follows [sic] will find it. by the way we just released Podesta Emails Part 4." Shortly afterward, Trump tweeted: "Very little pick-up by the dishonest media of incredible information provided by WikiLeaks. So dishonest! Rigged System!" In case that didn’t make the point strongly enough, two days later, Donald Trump Jr. tweeted the link himself: "For those who have the time to read about all the corruption and hypocrisy all the @wikileaks emails are right here: wlsearch.tk." According to the report, Trump Jr. admitted that this may have been in response to the request from WikiLeaks, but also suggested that it could have been part of a general practice of retweeting the WikiLeaks releases when they came out. Trump Jr. retweeted WikiLeaks content numerous times in October and November 2016, frequently encouraging others to go to WikiLeaks or· elsewhere to review the hacked emails.

But he wasn’t alone. This section of the report concludes:

The Campaign's preoccupation with WikiLeaks continued until the general election. As the general election approached, Scavino, a member of the communications team who also had a role in administering Trump's Twitter account during the campaign, increasingly forwarded updates relating to WikiLeaks to other Campaign officials, using subject lines like · "WIKI ABOUT TO DROP SOME BOMBS ... 4 pmE" and "The WikiLeaks BOMB!" and linking to the latest WikiLeaks Twitter post or its website. To one, Donald Trump Jr. responded: "Blow it out."

At least there was no collusio.

[_Some Schmo]

I don't know whom I despise more: Trump or the obscenely treasonous Senate Republicans.

Holy sh-it, I can relate. They're feckless quislings with Trump's sh-it all over their faces from continuous ass-kissing.

[_Some Schmo]

When McConnell says the report exonerates Trump and team he’s either totally ignorant of what’s contained in the report or he’s banking on the fact Trumpers won’t read it, don’t care to know the truth contained in it, and just need to be told a lie so they can repeat it.

There was a time when Trump supporters were wearing T-shirts saying "Read the Transcript." It was the moment we knew three things:

- Trump was leading a cult
- His followers are inexcusably fu-cking stupid
- Trump and the senate have no respect for the GOP base, knowing they don't deserve it, and treat them like the idiots they know them to be

Of course Trump's cult doesn't read. Willful ignorance is their calling card. To know Trump is to despise him (at least, if you have any decency in your character).

[_Doctor CamNC4Me]

Maybe this will work for subjenius. Here's the literal title of Volume 5:

REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION

VOLUME 5: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES

Now. I'll take a moment and let that title sink in for our drive-by poster. What does that title literally mean, subjenius?

- Doc

[Guest]

[quote="Some Schmo"]Of course Trump's cult doesn't read. Willful ignorance is their calling card. To know Trump is to despise him (at least, if you have any decency in your character).[/quote]

This is why I'm attempting to get subjenius to tell me what's acceptable as far as sentences go. I'm forcing him into a discussion where the rules he sets is the rules he'll have to abide by. Now. I get that even if he says, "Set the sentence limit at two sentences.", he'll most likely gloss over what's being posted, but I want HIM to set the bar.

This is also why is [edited upon, uh, Icarus' request] copypasting the lawfare blog's entry is pointless. I'd bet my life savings that neither Xanax nor subjenius would read that entire entry. What's the point? They're not interested in truth, reason, or nuance. They're going to vote Trump anyway so any sort of extended mental effort is a waste of time for them. Hence why I'm trying to get subjenius to pare responses down to an acceptable bite-sized chunk for him to actually read.

- Doc

[_ajax18]

They're going to vote Trump anyway so any sort of extended mental effort is a waste of time for them.

Doc I don't think many people change their minds in a general election. Party primaries is a time when people can be influenced and swayed by issues.

[_Doctor CamNC4Me]

Subjenius. I’ll post the evidences from the evidence known as the report as soon as you set out how many sentences you want me to pare the evidence down to so that you’ll actually read it. I’m just waiting on you to set the standard so we can move forward.

- Doc

[_Jersey Girl]

Icarus modify your FU-CKING POST and quit doing that underhanded dirty sh-it here, goddamnit.

[_Icarus]

Icarus modify your FU-CKING POST and quit doing that underhanded dirty sh-it here, goddamnit.

This stupid idiot has been doxxing this whole time and now suddenly you give a crap?

He brought this on himself. There was no need for it, but he's been doing it all week.