At the bottom of

[_subgenius]

1.Was the "object", that most people would term a "baby", 6 days old at the time of death?
2. Does being out of the uterus and alive for 6 days qualify a baby as a person?

1. Yes
2. Yes.

Ok.
NY penal code (from your reference above) states:
" § 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Person," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human
being who has been born and is alive.
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PE ... 25.05.html
§ 125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree.
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:
1. He recklessly causes the death of another person"
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PE ... 25.15.html

1. Do you think there was any reckless cause of death for the 6 day old person from the OP?

[_Res Ipsa]

Ok.
NY penal code (from your reference above) states:
" § 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Person," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human
being who has been born and is alive.
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PE ... 25.05.html
§ 125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree.
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:
1. He recklessly causes the death of another person"
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PE ... 25.15.html

1. Do you think there was any reckless cause of death for the 6 day old person from the OP?

Your question is compound, so I'm going to break it into parts. Hopefully, that will allow us to discard some issues as not relevant to your OP.

1. Was the mother in the OP reckless? The jury heard all the evidence, as well of the legal definition, and decided that she was. If I just had the facts as summarized in the appellate opinion, I'd agree with the jury.

2. Did the mother's recklessness injure the child before it was born? Yes.

3. Was the child a person when it was injured? No.

4. Did the injuries result in death after the child was born? Yes.

5. Was the child a person when he or she died? Yes.

6. Did the mother recklessly cause the death of another person? I'm actually torn between "no" and "the question is not answerable because it is ambiguous."

If I take the following context into account...

1. Violation of the manslaughter statute is a felony.

2. If the child had died before it was delivered by C-section, the mother would not have been guilty of any crime.

3. If the mother had intentionally killed the child before it was born, she would have been guilty of a misdemeanor.

Then the answer is "no."

[_subgenius]

Ok.
NY penal code (from your reference above) states:
" § 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Person," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human
being who has been born and is alive.
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PE ... 25.05.html
§ 125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree.
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:
1. He recklessly causes the death of another person"
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PE ... 25.15.html

1. Do you think there was any reckless cause of death for the 6 day old person from the OP?

Your question is compound, so I'm going to break it into parts. Hopefully, that will allow us to discard some issues as not relevant to your OP.

Honestly, the question is straightforward, without ambiguity, and simple - not compound. But I understand your strategy and desire to consider it as "compound".

but i agree, let's cut to it.

6. Did the mother recklessly cause the death of another person? I'm actually torn between "no" and "the question is not answerable because it is ambiguous."

Where exactly is the ambiguity? The laws you cited do not speak to any limitations for "cause" with regards to how or when that cause is executed, do they?
No, there is simply a "cause" and a result. In this case the cause exists and the result is death.
Your hypothetical are simply hypothetical and cannot be considered against the facts, or rather, the reality. One cannot determine guilt or innocence by measuring what did not occur.

If I take the following context into account...

1. Violation of the manslaughter statute is a felony.

2. If the child had died before it was delivered by C-section, the mother would not have been guilty of any crime.

#2 is not context in this case because the child lived after it was delivered. Is it also context to state that if the mother had been abducted by aliens the mother would not have been guilty. You are creating ambiguity that is not otherwise there.

3. If the mother had intentionally killed the child before it was born, she would have been guilty of a misdemeanor.

agreed, but the child was born...again, ambiguity that is not there.

Then the answer is "no."

So, you would answer no based upon theoretical-did-not-happen circumstances rather than basing your answer on the actual facts?

So, while a court may have found otherwise, the question was "do you think...?"
In other words, you have already determined that the 6 day old baby was a person - so - it only remains for you to answer if the mother "recklessly caused" that person's death....or more specific to the original question...was the cause of the person's death reckless?

[_Res Ipsa]

I can understand why you want to ignore context -- paying attention to context weakens your argument and you want to win. But you cannot dismiss context by just refusing to call it context. So let's talk for a minute about why context is important here.

The people whose legal decision we are discussion are not just a couple of guys trying to win an argument on the internet. They are appellate judges. And while you have the luxury of closing your eyes, plugging your ears, and chanting "la la la la la" to avoid grappling with context, they can't. The words you and I type here have no consequences for anyone else. The words the appellate judges write in an opinion have real life consequences for our fellow citizens. They will determine when the coercive power of the state will forcibly deprive fellow citizens of their liberty. I shouldn't have to explain to someone who distrusts government how important it is that we force the government to clearly state the conditions under which citizens will be forcibly deprived of their liberty.

That is the ultimate context in which the legal decision we are discussing was made. Another critical context is that these judges are given the job of applying the intent of the legislature. Whether you like that description or not, that is what they are charged with doing. If they interpret a statute contrary to the intent of the legislature, then they are just legislating themselves.

Finally, when interpreting a statute, they are providing trial courts with the rules of decision in future cases. Trial judges are bound to follow the interpretations of a statue given by an appellate court. That means the judges have to consider the impact of how they interpret the statutes on future, hypothetical cases.

That's the context I'm talking about. If we are going to critique a legal opinion in a fair manner, we must take into consideration the context in which the authors wrote the opinion.

Black letter law on ambiguity is something like: a writing is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. A writing can be ambiguous on its face, or it can be ambiguous when applied to a specific fact pattern.

My argument is: (1) "causes the death of another person" under these facts can be reasonably interpreted to require that the cause occur to a person as well as the resulting death. This would lead me to answer your question above as "the statute is ambiguous in this situation and should not be used to forcibly deprive the mother of her liberty."

(2) Interpreting the statute as applied to these facts to require only that the death occur to a person would be unreasonable. This would lead me to answer "no" to the question above.

The legislature did not address this issue at all, leaving it unclear. That's not unusual. These are general criminal statutes and cannot anticipate every issue that might arise when attempting to apply them to specific facts. That's the nature of language. So, the judges are faced with choosing an interpretation that is most consistent with the intent of the legislature. I'm assuming there is no legislative history on point, or that would have been provided to the court. So how does a court implement the intent of the legislature when the legislature hasn't made its intent explicit. One thing the court should avoid doing is giving the law an unreasonable interpretation -- one that produces absurd or nonsensical results. Another is the recognition that the law at issue is one part of an entire legislative scheme, and the court should not interpret this law in a manner inconsistent with other relevant parts of the criminal code.

Here, the judges are presented with an anomalous fact pattern: an injury occurs to a "not person" which then becomes a "person" and then dies from the injuries. The statute does not say whether "causing the death of a person" requires that the victim be a person when the death was caused or when the death occurred. Your interpretation is that a person is guilty if the victim is a person at the time of death and that the victim's status at the time of the cause is irrelevant. I don't think that interpretation is reasonable for several reasons.

First, the time of death is arbitrary relative to the conduct being punished. Under your interpretation, had the child been stillborn the woman would have gone free. But if it had died one second after delivery, she goes to prison. At the time she commits the reckless conduct, there is no way to predict which it will be. I think this is an arbitrary result, and the court should not assume the intent of the legislature was to be arbitrary.

Second, there are a number of other consequences to this interpretation that I think render it unreasonable. Suppose the accident had damaged the infant's heart, the docs were able to repair it, but the prognosis was that the damage would likely result in a fatal heart attack in the future. Do we throw the mother in prison if the child dies at age 3? Age 18? Suppose the child dies at age 70? Do we throw the 95 year old mother in prison? Again, the court should not assume that the legislature intended to adopt a law that results in absurdity.

Third, the statutes enacted by the legislature to address the specific issue of a mother's legal duties to an unborn child demonstrates the intent to limit criminal conduct to cases involving intent to harm the unborn child and making the consequence of that intentional conduct a misdemeanor. Given those limitations intended by the legislature when it addressed the specific issue of duties of mothers to unborn children, it would be absurd to interpret the general manslaughter statute to (1) criminalize reckless conduct of mothers with respect to unborn children and (2) punish reckless conduct more severely than intentional harm. The court should not assume the legislature intended this result unless that intent is expressed clearly.

Finally, interpreting the statute in this manner creates a perverse incentive for a woman who may have recklessly injured an unborn child to avoid seeking medical care. I think it's fair to say that the overall statutory scheme in New York, as in most states, reflects a public policy of wanting pregnant women to get medical care that is needed to preserve the life and health of the unborn child. If something happens to a mother that may have injured an unborn child, I think it's fair to say that it would be public policy that she goes and sees a doctor. If medical procedures like a C-Section are needed to save the life of the unborn child, we want her to take those steps. We don't want the threat of prison to ever discourage a pregnant woman from seeking medical care.

For all of these reasons, my argument is that the interpretation you favor is unreasonable. It assumes that the legislature intended consequences that are absurd, inconsistent with the intent expressed in other relevant portions of the criminal code, and produces incentives that are inconsistent with the public policy reflected in the statutory scheme as a whole.

Contrast that with my proposed interpretation. Most importantly, it ties the criminal consequences directly to the conduct. A mother knows that, during pregnancy, her legal duty is to not intentionally harm the child. After pregnancy, her legal duty is not to engage in reckless conduct that causes the death of the child. The standard to which she is held is not affected by the arbitrary timing of the death. The mother is also not subject to an indefinite threat of criminal prosecution for conduct that happened during her pregnancy. The interpretation is completely consistent with the criminal statutes that specifically address duties of a mother to an unborn child. And they do not give an incentive to a mother who may have recklessly injured her unborn child to avoid medical care.

After going through the exercise of writing the analysis up, I'm much more inclined to say "no." Because your proposed interpretation is unreasonable, it cannot be used as the basis to forcibly deprive fellow citizens of their liberty. The only reasonable interpretation is to require the victim to be a person at the time of injury as well as the time of death.

And one last bit of context: this discussion occurred because you said my logic required me to excuse the intentional strangling of a six day old baby. I've laid out my logic in excruciating detail. Nothing in what I've said requires such a result. Like I said, all you did was come up with crappy "logic" of your own and then attributed it to me.

[_subgenius]

I can understand why you want to ignore context -- paying attention to context weakens your argument and you want to win. But you cannot dismiss context by just refusing to call it context. So let's talk for a minute about why context is important here.

I agree that context is important - BUT - hypothetical circumstances are not context no matter how hard you wish them to be.

The people whose legal decision we are discussion are not just a couple of guys trying to win an argument on the internet. They are appellate judges. And while you have the luxury of closing your eyes, plugging your ears, and chanting "la la la la la" to avoid grappling with context, they can't. The words you and I type here have no consequences for anyone else. The words the appellate judges write in an opinion have real life consequences for our fellow citizens. They will determine when the coercive power of the state will forcibly deprive fellow citizens of their liberty. I shouldn't have to explain to someone who distrusts government how important it is that we force the government to clearly state the conditions under which citizens will be forcibly deprived of their liberty.

That is the ultimate context in which the legal decision we are discussing was made. Another critical context is that these judges are given the job of applying the intent of the legislature. Whether you like that description or not, that is what they are charged with doing. If they interpret a statute contrary to the intent of the legislature, then they are just legislating themselves.

Finally, when interpreting a statute, they are providing trial courts with the rules of decision in future cases. Trial judges are bound to follow the interpretations of a statue given by an appellate court. That means the judges have to consider the impact of how they interpret the statutes on future, hypothetical cases.

That's the context I'm talking about. If we are going to critique a legal opinion in a fair manner, we must take into consideration the context in which the authors wrote the opinion.

Black letter law on ambiguity is something like: a writing is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. A writing can be ambiguous on its face, or it can be ambiguous when applied to a specific fact pattern.

Clearly the question asked what you think, specifically, it was not a request for an echo of the court decision, which was already posted in the OP via link. But i appreciate your above apologetic writing for the majority opinion of the court decision.

My argument is: (1) "causes the death of another person" under these facts can be reasonably interpreted to require that the cause occur to a person as well as the resulting death. This would lead me to answer your question above as "the statute is ambiguous in this situation and should not be used to forcibly deprive the mother of her liberty."

Not sure how you can reasonably extrapolate "cause" in a such a manner as to include a loophole, unless you are simply providing a loophole under the guise of "interpretation". Either an action causes death or it does not. The cited code can not be reasonably interpreted to require anything further.

(2) Interpreting the statute as applied to these facts to require only that the death occur to a person would be unreasonable. This would lead me to answer "no" to the question above.

Saying that it is unreasonable is not enough, provide your argument because the requirement is NOT that only a death occurs, but that a reckless act causes the death.

...(snip)...Your interpretation is that a person is guilty if the victim is a person at the time of death and that the victim's status at the time of the cause is irrelevant. I don't think that interpretation is reasonable for several reasons.

Yet your position that the "person" suffered no cause of death at all - infinitely more unreasonable. Either you believe the person died from a "cause" or you do not...currently your argument assumes there was no cause of death...or, if there was a cause of death then that cause was not a reckless act....or, that the reckless act was committed by someone other than the mother.

First, the time of death is arbitrary relative to the conduct being punished. Under your interpretation, had the child been stillborn the woman would have gone free. But if it had died one second after delivery, she goes to prison. At the time she commits the reckless conduct, there is no way to predict which it will be. I think this is an arbitrary result, and the court should not assume the intent of the legislature was to be arbitrary.

see, this is the flaw in your hypothetical contexts...you neglect to see the difference between attempted murder and actual murder, looking to excuse the occurrence of the latter because the former may well have happened in theory.

Second, there are a number of other consequences to this interpretation that I think render it unreasonable. Suppose the accident had damaged the infant's heart, the docs were able to repair it, but the prognosis was that the damage would likely result in a fatal heart attack in the future. Do we throw the mother in prison if the child dies at age 3? Age 18? Suppose the child dies at age 70? Do we throw the 95 year old mother in prison? Again, the court should not assume that the legislature intended to adopt a law that results in absurdity.

Suing cigarette companies works that way.
I do not see any ambiguity in the NY law that puts a statute of limitations on manslaughter. Are you saying that poisoning you slowly is less of a crime that poisoning you quickly?

Third, the statutes enacted by the legislature to address the specific issue of a mother's legal duties to an unborn child demonstrates the intent to limit criminal conduct to cases involving intent to harm the unborn child and making the consequence of that intentional conduct a misdemeanor. Given those limitations intended by the legislature when it addressed the specific issue of duties of mothers to unborn children, it would be absurd to interpret the general manslaughter statute to (1) criminalize reckless conduct of mothers with respect to unborn children and (2) punish reckless conduct more severely than intentional harm. The court should not assume the legislature intended this result unless that intent is expressed clearly.

Again, as I said before, we all know what the court found...and obviously I "think" the law is clear and unambiguous. You seem to agree with the court, but have yet to actually state what you think on the most simple of questions. If you think what they think, then so be it....just say that.

Finally, interpreting the statute in this manner creates a perverse incentive for a woman who may have recklessly injured an unborn child to avoid seeking medical care.

People do this all the time...like driving home with a dead person on the hood of their car. I cannot believe you are actually trying to argue that fear of being punished is a bad thing to impose upon a criminal. Likewise if we punish drunk drivers they will flee the scene of a crime until they sober up....good policy!

I think it's fair to say that the overall statutory scheme in New York, as in most states, reflects a public policy of wanting pregnant women to get medical care that is needed to preserve the life and health of the unborn child. If something happens to a mother that may have injured an unborn child, I think it's fair to say that it would be public policy that she goes and sees a doctor. If medical procedures like a C-Section are needed to save the life of the unborn child, we want her to take those steps. We don't want the threat of prison to ever discourage a pregnant woman from seeking medical care.

So, this case can just be filed under a mother drinking ,doing drugs, and smoking while pregnant - because you would like to perpetuate the myth that a baby magically transforms into a person upon clearing the labia.

For all of these reasons, my argument is that the interpretation you favor is unreasonable. It assumes that the legislature intended consequences that are absurd, inconsistent with the intent expressed in other relevant portions of the criminal code, and produces incentives that are inconsistent with the public policy reflected in the statutory scheme as a whole.

wait...what other relevant portions of the code? And what public policy? You provided no references for your imaginary public policies, instead you just put forth speculation as "probably" what is public policy.

Contrast that with my proposed interpretation. Most importantly, it ties the criminal consequences directly to the conduct. A mother knows that, during pregnancy, her legal duty is to not intentionally harm the child. After pregnancy, her legal duty is not to engage in reckless conduct that causes the death of the child. The standard to which she is held is not affected by the arbitrary timing of the death. The mother is also not subject to an indefinite threat of criminal prosecution for conduct that happened during her pregnancy. The interpretation is completely consistent with the criminal statutes that specifically address duties of a mother to an unborn child. And they do not give an incentive to a mother who may have recklessly injured her unborn child to avoid medical care.

The most absurd thing here is this imaginary concept of an "arbitrary time of death". That is utter nonsense except when speaking about natural causes, at which case the reckless party would be God or a bowl of spaghetti - whichever you prefer.

After going through the exercise of writing the analysis up, I'm much more inclined to say "no." Because your proposed interpretation is unreasonable, it cannot be used as the basis to forcibly deprive fellow citizens of their liberty. The only reasonable interpretation is to require the victim to be a person at the time of injury as well as the time of death.

Why is that the only reasonable interpretation? In countless other jurisdictions it is criminal to be responsible for the death of an unborn person. The only reasoning in support of your interpretation is that preserves the notion that a person is not a person, nor entitled to any rights, until the magic of labia passing has occurred.

And one last bit of context: this discussion occurred because you said my logic required me to excuse the intentional strangling of a six day old baby. I've laid out my logic in excruciating detail. Nothing in what I've said requires such a result. Like I said, all you did was come up with s****y "logic" of your own and then attributed it to me.

No, what I noted was the inevitable consequence of what you claimed was "context", which is wholly different than your argument here. Granted i still disagree with your goosestep support of the majority opinion but at least we have almost been able to read something that you might actually "think".

[_Res Ipsa]

I can understand why you want to ignore context -- paying attention to context weakens your argument and you want to win. But you cannot dismiss context by just refusing to call it context. So let's talk for a minute about why context is important here.

I agree that context is important - BUT - hypothetical circumstances are not context no matter how hard you wish them to be.

They are when what we are talking about is deciding on a rule that will determine whether people in the future will have their liberty forcibly taken from them by government. If you want to avoid considering context by simply denying it exists, then you're just engaging in public mental masturbation.

The people whose legal decision we are discussion are not just a couple of guys trying to win an argument on the internet. They are appellate judges. And while you have the luxury of closing your eyes, plugging your ears, and chanting "la la la la la" to avoid grappling with context, they can't. The words you and I type here have no consequences for anyone else. The words the appellate judges write in an opinion have real life consequences for our fellow citizens. They will determine when the coercive power of the state will forcibly deprive fellow citizens of their liberty. I shouldn't have to explain to someone who distrusts government how important it is that we force the government to clearly state the conditions under which citizens will be forcibly deprived of their liberty.

That is the ultimate context in which the legal decision we are discussing was made. Another critical context is that these judges are given the job of applying the intent of the legislature. Whether you like that description or not, that is what they are charged with doing. If they interpret a statute contrary to the intent of the legislature, then they are just legislating themselves.

Finally, when interpreting a statute, they are providing trial courts with the rules of decision in future cases. Trial judges are bound to follow the interpretations of a statue given by an appellate court. That means the judges have to consider the impact of how they interpret the statutes on future, hypothetical cases.

That's the context I'm talking about. If we are going to critique a legal opinion in a fair manner, we must take into consideration the context in which the authors wrote the opinion.

Black letter law on ambiguity is something like: a writing is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. A writing can be ambiguous on its face, or it can be ambiguous when applied to a specific fact pattern.

Clearly the question asked what you think, specifically, it was not a request for an echo of the court decision, which was already posted in the OP via link. But i appreciate your above apologetic writing for the majority opinion of the court decision.

Clearly it didn't. I posted about the decision. You said the logic of my post required that I excuse the intentional strangulation of a six day old baby. I said that was your "logic," not mine. In response, you asked your questions. Context, subby, context. What I've explained in detail is my logic. Your statement about the consequences of my logic is your usual, illogical BS.

My argument is: (1) "causes the death of another person" under these facts can be reasonably interpreted to require that the cause occur to a person as well as the resulting death. This would lead me to answer your question above as "the statute is ambiguous in this situation and should not be used to forcibly deprive the mother of her liberty."

Not sure how you can reasonably extrapolate "cause" in a such a manner as to include a loophole, unless you are simply providing a loophole under the guise of "interpretation". Either an action causes death or it does not. The cited code can not be reasonably interpreted to require anything further.

I'm not extrapolating loopholes. I'm saying that, under the facts of this case, what it means to cause death to a person is ambiguous. It could possibly mean "cause death to an entity that is a "person" at the time of the death" or "cause death to an entity who is a person at the time of the cause" or it could mean both.

(2) Interpreting the statute as applied to these facts to require only that the death occur to a person would be unreasonable. This would lead me to answer "no" to the question above.

Saying that it is unreasonable is not enough, provide your argument because the requirement is NOT that only a death occurs, but that a reckless act causes the death.

Keep reading... Obviously, my reasons for saying so are what follows.

...(snip)...Your interpretation is that a person is guilty if the victim is a person at the time of death and that the victim's status at the time of the cause is irrelevant. I don't think that interpretation is reasonable for several reasons.

Yet your position that the "person" suffered no cause of death at all - infinitely more unreasonable. Either you believe the person died from a "cause" or you do not...currently your argument assumes there was no cause of death...or, if there was a cause of death then that cause was not a reckless act....or, that the reckless act was committed by someone other than the mother.

There you go again! Making up some crappy logic and saying it is my position. None of those are my position. If you want to understand my position, read what I write.

First, the time of death is arbitrary relative to the conduct being punished. Under your interpretation, had the child been stillborn the woman would have gone free. But if it had died one second after delivery, she goes to prison. At the time she commits the reckless conduct, there is no way to predict which it will be. I think this is an arbitrary result, and the court should not assume the intent of the legislature was to be arbitrary.

see, this is the flaw in your hypothetical contexts...you neglect to see the difference between attempted murder and actual murder, looking to excuse the occurrence of the latter because the former may well have happened in theory.

Complete non sequitur. Nothing about my position fails to distinguish between attempted murder and actual murder. You are not making any sense at all.

Second, there are a number of other consequences to this interpretation that I think render it unreasonable. Suppose the accident had damaged the infant's heart, the docs were able to repair it, but the prognosis was that the damage would likely result in a fatal heart attack in the future. Do we throw the mother in prison if the child dies at age 3? Age 18? Suppose the child dies at age 70? Do we throw the 95 year old mother in prison? Again, the court should not assume that the legislature intended to adopt a law that results in absurdity.

Suing cigarette companies works that way.
I do not see any ambiguity in the NY law that puts a statute of limitations on manslaughter. Are you saying that poisoning you slowly is less of a crime that poisoning you quickly?

Suing cigarette companies has nothing to do with putting mothers in jail for reckless injury to their unborn children. The question is whether to forcibly deprive someone of their liberty, not the circumstances under which monetary compensation for damages should be awarded. And why do you think the statute of limitations is relevant? Under your interpretation of the statute, no crime has been committed until the child dies -- even if it takes decades. And, yes, poisoning me is a crime. It's a crime regardless of how long it takes me to die. If you want to make an analogy to the case we are discussing, your position would be like saying it's legal to poison someone up until they die. Then it's a crime. My legal duty is to not poison you. That's clear, and is not contingent on when, if ever, that results in death.

Third, the statutes enacted by the legislature to address the specific issue of a mother's legal duties to an unborn child demonstrates the intent to limit criminal conduct to cases involving intent to harm the unborn child and making the consequence of that intentional conduct a misdemeanor. Given those limitations intended by the legislature when it addressed the specific issue of duties of mothers to unborn children, it would be absurd to interpret the general manslaughter statute to (1) criminalize reckless conduct of mothers with respect to unborn children and (2) punish reckless conduct more severely than intentional harm. The court should not assume the legislature intended this result unless that intent is expressed clearly.

Again, as I said before, we all know what the court found...and obviously I "think" the law is clear and unambiguous. You seem to agree with the court, but have yet to actually state what you think on the most simple of questions. If you think what they think, then so be it....just say that.

If you think the law is clear and unambiguous, then we disagree. If what you want to discuss is the meaning of the law out of context, then I think that's a silly exercise.

Finally, interpreting the statute in this manner creates a perverse incentive for a woman who may have recklessly injured an unborn child to avoid seeking medical care.

People do this all the time...like driving home with a dead person on the hood of their car. I cannot believe you are actually trying to argue that fear of being punished is a bad thing to impose upon a criminal. Likewise if we punish drunk drivers they will flee the scene of a crime until they sober up....good policy!

There you go again! Again, the context is in how to interpret what the legislature intended. Given a choice between two alternative readings -- one that gives pregnant women incentive to get an injured unborn child medical treatment and one that does not, the latter reading should be preferred. Or, put another way, all things being equal, punishing a woman for getting medical treatment should be something we try to avoid. The question is not "should we punish criminal behavior?" The question is "which behavior did the legislature intend to punish?"

I think it's fair to say that the overall statutory scheme in New York, as in most states, reflects a public policy of wanting pregnant women to get medical care that is needed to preserve the life and health of the unborn child. If something happens to a mother that may have injured an unborn child, I think it's fair to say that it would be public policy that she goes and sees a doctor. If medical procedures like a C-Section are needed to save the life of the unborn child, we want her to take those steps. We don't want the threat of prison to ever discourage a pregnant woman from seeking medical care.

So, this case can just be filed under a mother drinking ,doing drugs, and smoking while pregnant - because you would like to perpetuate the myth that a baby magically transforms into a person upon clearing the labia.

Not at all. The line was drawn by the New York legislature. The Court of Appeals cannot redraw that line. If that's your beef, then your problem lies with the legislature, not with me or with the Court of Appeals. If you think we should throw pregnant women in jail who smoke, drink or do drugs, then get a law passed that clearly says so. Figuring out the set of laws that should apply during pregnancy is a complex and difficult issue.

For all of these reasons, my argument is that the interpretation you favor is unreasonable. It assumes that the legislature intended consequences that are absurd, inconsistent with the intent expressed in other relevant portions of the criminal code, and produces incentives that are inconsistent with the public policy reflected in the statutory scheme as a whole.

wait...what other relevant portions of the code? And what public policy? You provided no references for your imaginary public policies, instead you just put forth speculation as "probably" what is public policy.

The portions of the code specifically enacted to address the legal duties owed by a mother to her unborn child. The legislature looked specifically at this issue and limited criminal liability to (1) intentional harm to the unborn child after a certain number of weeks and (2) made the conduct a misdemeanor. The public policy I think is shown in the fact that the legislature has extended some protections to the life of an unborn child, namely restrictions on abortion and the passing of the law making intentional killing of the unborn child by the mother a misdemeanor. Are you taking the position that the state has no public policy in favor of the birth of healthy babies?

Contrast that with my proposed interpretation. Most importantly, it ties the criminal consequences directly to the conduct. A mother knows that, during pregnancy, her legal duty is to not intentionally harm the child. After pregnancy, her legal duty is not to engage in reckless conduct that causes the death of the child. The standard to which she is held is not affected by the arbitrary timing of the death. The mother is also not subject to an indefinite threat of criminal prosecution for conduct that happened during her pregnancy. The interpretation is completely consistent with the criminal statutes that specifically address duties of a mother to an unborn child. And they do not give an incentive to a mother who may have recklessly injured her unborn child to avoid medical care.

The most absurd thing here is this imaginary concept of an "arbitrary time of death". That is utter nonsense except when speaking about natural causes, at which case the reckless party would be God or a bowl of spaghetti - whichever you prefer.

Just because you don't understand something doesn't make it imaginary. I'll explain it again. Assume a mother injures an unborn child through reckless conduct. If the child dies five seconds before delivery, there is no crime. If it dies five seconds after delivery, the mother goes to prison. Making the existence of the crime depend on what time the child dies is absolutely arbitrary.

What you have completely and utterly failed to do here is show that your interpretation of the law is reasonable at all or to show there is anything unreasonable about my interpretation. You've just thrown out a bunch of BS characterizations of my argument.

After going through the exercise of writing the analysis up, I'm much more inclined to say "no." Because your proposed interpretation is unreasonable, it cannot be used as the basis to forcibly deprive fellow citizens of their liberty. The only reasonable interpretation is to require the victim to be a person at the time of injury as well as the time of death.

Why is that the only reasonable interpretation? In countless other jurisdictions it is criminal to be responsible for the death of an unborn person. The only reasoning in support of your interpretation is that preserves the notion that a person is not a person, nor entitled to any rights, until the magic of labia passing has occurred.

Because the New York legislature has chosen to define "personhood" for purposes of this set of criminal laws to begin at birth. If you can reasonably interpret the definition of "person" in the law we are discussing to mean "before birth" when it requires being born, be my guest. Even if you did, at best that would make the law ambiguous.

And one last bit of context: this discussion occurred because you said my logic required me to excuse the intentional strangling of a six day old baby. I've laid out my logic in excruciating detail. Nothing in what I've said requires such a result. Like I said, all you did was come up with s****y "logic" of your own and then attributed it to me.

No, what I noted was the inevitable consequence of what you claimed was "context", which is wholly different than your argument here. Granted i still disagree with your goosestep support of the majority opinion but at least we have almost been able to read something that you might actually "think".

Don't rewrite history, sub. What you've utterly failed to do is show how anything I've said logically requires me to find a mother who intentionally strangles a six-year old baby innocent.

Here is what I said upthread:

Here is the problem the court confronted: the legislature had enacted specific statutes that criminalized certain conduct of mother's toward their unborn children. Those crimes required intent and made violation only a misdemeanor. The general manslaughter statute, on the other hand, was not enacted with consideration of how it would apply to mothers who injure their unborn children resulting in death after birth. The court felt it would be anomalous to use the general manslaughter statute to convict this woman of a felony based on non-intentional conduct, when a more specific statute governing intentionally killing of her unborn child would have been just a misdemeanor. The court, in effect, said: legislature, if this is what you wanted "death of a person" to mean under these types of facts, you need to clearly tell us.

Frankly, if not sending this woman to prison because she recklessly caused an accident that injured her unborn child who ended up dying after birth is the bottom of the slippery slope, I'm perfectly happy with it.

Contrary to the misleading headline, the court did NOT hold that six-day-old babies aren't persons. It didn't even hold that six-day-old babies are not persons under the manslaughter statute. It simply held that the application of the statute to this particular set of facts was ambiguous, given the entire statutory scheme. If the legislature wants to throw mothers in the same situation in jail, all it has to do is clarify in the statute that the death of a person includes injury a child before birth that dies after the birth.

Please explain exactly how what I first argued is "wholly different" from my long post. And show how either post logically compels the conclusion that a woman who intentionally strangles a six-day old baby must be found innocent.

[_Res Ipsa]

I've now had a chance to read the appellate briefs submitted by the parties, the transcript of the oral argument before the Court of Appeals (which is the highest appellate court in New York), and the closing arguments from the trial court. Learning more about the history of the case and the actual evidence presented at trial has caused me to change my mind on a few issues, none of which affect my opinion on how the court handled the legal interpretation of the second-degree manslaughter statute. At this point, I'm inclined to disagree with the court's holding. I think the proper thing for the court to have done would have been to remand for a new trial on the single count of second degree manslaughter based on prosecutorial misconduct. One of the judges mentioned this at the oral argument, and asked why the mother's lawyer was not arguing that instead of arguing they should interpret an unclear statute. He answered something like "where would that leave us on retrial? The case had been tried once before, resulting in a hung jury. I think it likely the judges thought that sending the case back for a third trial without resolving the statutory interpretation issue would simply mean they'd have to decide the issue again in another couple of years. However, if the court could have avoided deciding the case by interpreting an unclear statute, it should have done so.

I also have serious reservations about whether the prosecution actually proved recklessness and causation beyond reasonable doubt. The jury found the mother not guilty of driving while impaired to any extent by drugs and/or alcohol. The only reckless act that applies to the unborn child but not the mother is failure to wear the seatbelt. I'm not sure the failure to wear the seatbelt rises to the level of criminal recklessness. Everyone agreed that the was an abruption of the placenta that resulted in the child's death. However, even the plaintiff's medical experts could not tell whether the crash had caused the abruption or the abruption had occurred just before the crash (resulting in severe abdominal pain to the mother). There was evidence in recent blood work consistent with preeclampsia, which can result in an abruption. She was in the process of moving to her father-in-laws house, and the car was packed with boxes. She'd had an episode of abdominal pain about a month before, for which she saw her GYN. All that sounds like reasonable doubt to me, but I wouldn't stake out a firm position without reading the entire trial transcript.

I was surprised at the way the prosecutor tried to demonize the mother, at one point suggesting in closing argument that if the accident had not occurred, the mother would have been driving around blitzed on booze and benzoes and not putting the baby in a car seat. (In fact, there was a child seat in the car). She made a big deal out of the fact that the mother didn't ask about the child at the accident scene and during transport. The mother had been knocked unconscious and suffered a subdural hematoma.

I do think there was pretty good evidence that the mother was addicted to Xanax and Clonazepam during the pregnancy and at times obtained duplicate prescriptions from different doctors. The prosecution did not put on any evidence that taking the anti-anxiety meds caused the child's death. But, in closing, she did make a statement that sounded like the jury could consider the meds as a cause of death. That may explain the jury's verdict. It would be interesting to interview the jurors and find out why they returned a not-guilty verdict on the other drivers but a guilty verdict on the child.

You can find all this online here, if you are interested. https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/courtpa ... earch.aspx