CypressChristian wrote:EA
You and I are on the same page regarding the uniformity of nature and induction, and yes, I'm using the transcendental argument for God's existence.
"Assuming God is law-like, then saying nature is law-like as a result of this has failed to explain anything. It simply takes the brute fact of "law-likeness" and assumes it of God thus failing to explain why existence has a law-like quality to it."
An all-powerful God absolutely allows us to give a reason for why we believe nature to be uniform. A chance universe does not.
You assert this, but it does not make sense. By "chance" here you just mean not created by an intelligent entity. For all we know that "chance" universe could be a necessity (much in the same way you likely believe that God is uncreated and exists.) There's absolutely no reason that kind of universe cannot be regular. That doesn't answer the question why it is regular, sure, but you haven't exactly accounted for that in your created universe either.
Presuppositionalists have a habit of getting caught up in the voodoo of their argument with repetitions that cannot be penetrated by simple reason. Think about this for a second. You keep faulting an secular explanation of uniformity that goes, "It is because it is. Uniformity just is an unaccounted for brute fact of the world." You fault it for not explaining anything. That's true enough. You have to realize that as we explain our explanations, eventually the problem of infinite regress leaves us with unaccounted for brute facts like this. The problem that I'm pointing out here is that proposing your God doesn't change this situation. When we ask why the universe - meaning everything that exists, including God - is uniform, you still haven't accounted for it. It's not explaining the uniformity of nature; it's hiding the mystery of the uniformity of the rest of nature in the inexplicable fact of God's nature. This is worse than the secular response above, because it is doing the same thing, only attaching it unecessarily to other claims.
If God grounds the uniformity of nature, that must either be contingent on God or a necessary trait of his nature. If it is contingent, then God could simply change his willingness to make nature uniform at any moment, thus contradicting the uniformity of nature. If it is necessary, that means it could not be otherwise and therefore there is something about the ultimate nature of reality that makes law-likeness of God necessary. If that is the case, it can just as easily be the case for a godless reality that leads to the existence of 1 or more physical universes like ours. So the brute fact of law-likeness can't be used to preference God over no-God.
So far, we agree that we're both assuming that the entirety of nature is uniform based on our very limited experience.
I'm not doing that. I could be, but I'm not. I'm saying that we must act as though nature is uniform because rationality itself necessitates it. It's a pragmatic argument that is distinct from that.
You are objecting to my assumption that God is inherently law-like. Fine, but how is this different from your assumption that MATTER is inherently law-like?
It's not different with one serious exception. That's my entire point. The serious exception is that assuming the universe is law-like is more parsimonious than assuming God is law-like and created a law-like universe. If Christians like yourself are permitted to assume the existence of God having the brute-fact property of securing epistemic foundations, we are permitted to assume the existence of the epistemic foundations themselves, sans any kind of singular intelligence. Parismony favors that position. But even if parsimony wasn't on the side of either position and they were exactly equal, you coudn't use our desire to ground knoweldge to preference God-belief, so one would not be justified in believing in God on those grounds.
What you are offering is a God of the Gaps argument (i.e. argument from ignorance), but instead of offering for something more typical like eyeballs, lightning, or the existence of life, you are offering it for a fundamental problem of epistemology. Instead of saying, "You can't account for lightning, but I can. Zeus did it," you instead use the foundations of knowledge.