Best Religious/Nonreligious Debate Ever

[_MrStakhanovite]

Does "A" refer to an argument or a statement about an argument?

Let’s see what I said:

If This is A :If the argument of this chapter is accepted

An argument is not a statement.

A stands for a declarative sentence, in sentential logic, you just choose a variable from one of the key words in the statement. I picked the “A” from the word argument. In what Marg quoted, I was bolding the word argument to show which sentence the variable belongs to.

In modus ponens, the letters refer to statements--statements that can be true or false. Arguments are valid or invalid.

So why not follow my link and see how I defined A? I linked you directly to it.

The acceptance of an argument by a person is not what logically forces the conclusion.

Little confused here, a person accepting an argument is part of a conditional sentence, which entails God almost certainly does not exist. That is what the text establishes, not my variables. Not sure where I said that a persons acceptance of an argument is what forces the conclusion.

What if I simply said that if the reader accepts my argument then they must accept my conclusion. (A needless sentence for sure). Would a reader then be justified in saying my whole argument was a simple modus ponens? Of course not.

You are forgetting this argument takes place in the context of a text that asserts God is a scientific hypothesis, and that if the reader accepts what modern science has to say about the universe, then God almost certainly does not exist. The text also goes into detail as to why.

Here is another silly "reduction" to modus ponens.
If my argument leading to conclusion C is sound then C
My argument leading to conclusion C is sound.
Therefore C.

Why is that silly? It’s a textbook example of MP.

[_Tarski]

Here is another silly "reduction" to modus ponens.
If my argument leading to conclusion C is sound then C
My argument leading to conclusion C is sound.
Therefore C.

Why is that silly? It’s a textbook example of MP.

Because it is useless. It can be put forward no matter what the argument was or who made it and does not contain, encapsulate, summarize, extend, add to, amplify, clarify, or help anything whatever the argument was in any way. It is is unaffected by whether the argument referred to is valid, sound, or even nonsense. If you think this just is the argument A then it is self referential.

It isn't the argument. It is "morally" the same as saying: My argument is that I have a good argument --QED
........

Didn't you say this?

Dawkin's own argument is a simple modus ponens.

A --> -G, A, .:. -G

If the ARGUMENT of this chapter is accepted, the factual premise of religion- the GOD HYPOTHESIS- is untenable (that means NEGATION).

This isn't Dawkins' argument. He is talking about his argument or referring to his argument. He is not actually making his argument in the form of a modus ponens.

A stands for a declarative sentence, in sentential logic, you just choose a variable from one of the key words in the statement. I picked the “A” from the word argument.

This letter choosing policy is a common practice but not part of the statement calculus itself.
But you would have done better to let "A" stand for "accepted" (do you know why?).

But in that case, I also already commented on the resulting modus ponens (if you insist).
The intention of the sentence was obviously other than to make a deduction despite its form. He only wants to remind people that if they agree that his arguments are strong then it would be irrational to not accept (psychologically) the conclusion (G is unlikely).
It is true that he did not actually say that. Instead he said in terse form:

if (argument is ACCEPTED), then (CONCLUSION of argument).
where CONCLUSION is "God is untenable".

This is silly and his actual argument (presumably found elsewhere in the book) would be unchanged if he had left it out.
Don't read like a machine or you will miss intent. In fact, let's hope that the problem here is that I am reading the quote of your words that Marg picked out in an uncharitably machine-like way. Of course, I am still not sure what the point was but I am becoming increasingly sure that there is little profit in going on about it. Because, it isn't his argument.

But you know already this because elsewhere you say his argument is best interpreted as a hypothetical induction, or a demonstrative induction. So lets talk about that instead of this little quote that Marg brought up. She asked what I thought of it and I basically don't think it was so good for reasons I have given.


Let me ask you something. Suppose I come along and try to convince RayA that UFOs are not alien crafts.
Suppose I do this by taking one by one the reasons usually presented and calling them into question in various ways. I show that witnesses are often not credible or self consistent or I bring up the sketchy nature of the photos and videos. I bring up fakes and fabrications. I also argue about alternative plausible explanations etc. I also try to remove various motivations for believing in UFOs and show how much of what is said about UFOs leads to absurdities. I show that physics makes UFOs as described extremely implausible etc.
Suppose after a while Ray is convinced.
What have I done? Was this hammering away at the UFO idea from all these different angles an argument? Was it rational discourse?

Now what did Dawkins do? Something similar?

Did Dawkins bring up anything that would tend to undermine a person's reasons or motivations for believing in God? Not one?

More than one? Many? Exactly the one's he promised to? How do we decide if he effectively brought up enough of these things that a person might change their mind without thereby being irrational??

What if he brought up a whole hell of a lot of points that tend to undermine faith in God in its most common form?


Next, you have said that you are an atheist. I assume you feel that you hold this position rationally. So what is your argument and what precisely is its formal structure? How is the conclusion (even probabilistically) formally entailed on the basis of the formal principles of whatever type of logic you think you are using?

I am not so much interested in your pointing to someone else's famous argument. I would like to know how you personally understand the situation since this seems to have come down to who really knows what they are talking about.

Now I know you want to say that valid inductive reasoning is governed by form also. Well, there certainly must be form, there has to be some form to be even intelligible.
I think Marg was making the distinction that deductive validity was a matter of pure form in the sense of syntax. She felt that in its widest sense, inductive reasoning is not governed by form in the sense that we can and do successfully reason inductively without being able to check for a syntactically specifiable notion of validity as we do in formal deductive systems. You have indeed uncovered the fact that she is unaware of various attempts to mathematize inductive reasoning ("logics" which employ Bayes' theorem one way or another).

But what do you think of this statement from the SEP?

It is now generally held that the core idea of Bayesian logicism is fatally flawed—that syntactic logical structure cannot be the sole determiner of the degree to which premises inductively support conclusions. A crucial facet of the problem faced by Bayesian logicism involves how the logic is supposed to apply to scientific contexts where the conclusion sentence is some hypothesis or theory, and the premises are evidence claims. The difficulty is that in any probabilistic logic that satisfies the usual axioms for probabilities, the inductive support for a hypothesis must depend in part on its prior probability. This prior probability represents how plausible the hypothesis is supposed to be based on considerations other than the observational and experimental evidence (e.g. perhaps due to relevant plausibility arguments).

Well, is inductive reasoning as actually practiced in science something we now know how to formalize in the ambitious way that we see attempted in Bayesian logicism or not?
It may be a hot topic for a certain group of logicians to study since it boils down to math but I think it neither realistically mirrors actual scientific inductive thinking nor do I think that inductive reasoning is exhausted by what can be fully formalized. Rationality is almost certainly not completely formalizable and we have learned this lesson in many ways; the failure of Hilbert's formalist approach to mathematical truth, Godel's theorem, some of the work of Gregory Chaitin, the failure to reach a consensus on the best philosophical foundation for the very notion of probability, Hume's problem of induction, and last but not least the consensus that Bayesian logicism is flawed.

By the way, this whole topic of inductive reasoning and the nature of probabilistic thinking is covered succinctly but nicely in the little book
Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction by Samir Okasha.


Either one finds Dawkins' points convincing or not. It boils down to that. Many people do.
I believe that in the end, there can never be a formula for truth nor a mechanical way of determining what is rational.

By the way, I am puzzled by the fact that you think there is something wrong with the fact that Dawkins references Dennett's book and that Dennett references one of Dawkin's earlier books on evolution? What in the world is wrong with that? Do you think this creates a logical circularity? It doesn't.

Far from being a rabbit hole the books are enlightening and I would describe it more like emerging from the theological rabbit hole. The former is frank and clear while the latter is subject is turgid and mysterious. I never say that I have reached the end of the journey or that I might not be convinced to see things differently, but that is the feeling so far.


I also think unconsciously you have a problem with Dawkins' internet fans more than with Dawkins. But look, the fans of William Lane Craig are just as cultish and this goes for just about any popular thinker who touches on these ideologically charged topics (another example is Dembski and another is PZ Myers). You have to get over that.

[_MrStakhanovite]

This isn't Dawkins' argument. He is talking about his argument or referring to his argument. He is not actually making his argument in the form of a modus ponens.

Show it from the text. That is what this entire thing hinges on, what does the text say? This is about what Dawkins wrote in a book, not tangents of a partial quote.

The intention of the sentence was obviously other than to make a deduction despite its form.

Show it from the text.

But you know already this because elsewhere you say his argument is best interpreted as a hypothetical induction, or a demonstrative induction. So lets talk about that instead of this little quote that Marg brought up. She asked what I thought of it and I basically don't think it was so good for reasons I have given.

I have not seen you address demonstrative induction, could you point out which posts those were?

What have I done? Was this hammering away at the UFO idea from all these different angles an argument? Was it rational discourse?.

Yes and yes! It's a great argument.

[_MrStakhanovite]

By the way, I am puzzled by the fact that you think there is something wrong with the fact that Dawkins references Dennett's book and that Dennett references one of Dawkin's earlier books on evolution? What in the world is wrong with that? Do you think this creates a logical circularity? It doesn't.

He quotes Dennett from 95, as praising the 747 argument, but Dennett is quoting an older version of the argument aimed a kind of designer from the Blind Watchmaker. The arguments are different in form and content, and Dennett wasn't praising the argument in the context of God, but in the context of a Paley-like Designer.

I didn't think it was appropriate.

[_Tarski]

Show it from the text.

Huh?
One of us has no idea what the other one is saying or else something else is even worse is true.

Show what from the text?
That the sentence quoted refers to an argument instead of actually being an argument? You did it for me.
That is the bit of text since it actually does refer to the argument and doubly relevant if you think that sentence just IS the argument. What are you talking about? Is the notion of complexity not playing a role in his argument? It isn't mentioned in your supposed modus ponens.
Have you really been reading my posts completely?
Of course that sentence refers to the argument. After all, what is the word doing in the sentence? If the sentence just IS the argument, then is the sentence referring to itself?
Perhaps we should be discussing the book "Godel, Escher, Bach."
Ummm, Curry Paradox?

Can you show me a useful "simple" modus ponens that contains a direct statement about itself and yet is powerful enough to convince anyone of something nontrivial!
(edit: this sentence has taken me down an old but interesting path that I will have to emerge from before I can tell whether this was good thing to say or not. The point for now simply should have been , do you really think Dawkins' argument is a self referential modus ponens making the rest of the book merely filler?)

I have not seen you address demonstrative induction, could you point out which posts those were?

You brought it up. You said it was the best way to see Dawkins' argument. Yet you also assert that the whole argument is contained in this note that makes references to the argument (refers to itself??)
Which is it? Simple modus ponens or demonstrative induction?



By the way, I will be surprised if Dawkins argument against God isn't at least good as my arguments against alien UFOs.

[_Some Schmo]

I also think unconsciously you have a problem with Dawkins' internet fans more than with Dawkins.

Bingo!

I have long suspected this as well, although I think it may go deeper than that, and I think it does somewhat extend to Dawkins himself. Reading Stak, it just feels like this is an issue of style over substance.

And, it's almost as though independent thought is such a high priority with some atheists that they don't want to get caught up in what other atheists think, and they do this at the expense of rejecting some of their own ideas on the basis that they aren't worded the way they'd like... or something.

That's why I think of Stak as a rebel atheist: taking independent thought to its ultimate logical conclusion...

And I should point out: I don't have any problem at all with independent thought, and I admire what I suspect is going on with Stak for the most part. I just think it may be screwing over his attempt to get at certain realities. I imagine it's similar to a person being too skeptical or too open minded.

It kind of reminds me of Republicans voting against their own economic interests because disagreeing with Obama represents, for them, a higher ideal (although I fully acknowledge that Stak is seemingly far more thoughtful than your average member of the GOP).

[_Tarski]

By the way, I am puzzled by the fact that you think there is something wrong with the fact that Dawkins references Dennett's book and that Dennett references one of Dawkin's earlier books on evolution? What in the world is wrong with that? Do you think this creates a logical circularity? It doesn't.

He quotes Dennett from 95, as praising the 747 argument, but Dennett is quoting an older version of the argument aimed a kind of designer from the Blind Watchmaker. The arguments are different in form and content, and Dennett wasn't praising the argument in the context of God, but in the context of a Paley-like Designer.

I didn't think it was appropriate.

I can't yet see that anything substantial turns on this. Dennett's book stands on its own as far as I can see.

[_MrStakhanovite]

One of us has no idea what the other one is saying or else something else is even worse is true.

We are probably talking past each other. Let me try again…

Dawkins argument is made up of 6 broad points defined by him (Let’s say A1-A6, and the conjunction of all 6 is A*). All 6 points represent dominant scientific thought about cosmology, probability, design, the usual talking points. Then Dawkins will say that A*, if taken as true, is mutually exclusive with the theistic concept of God. At the end of the chapter, he pretty much describes his argument as a MP.

That sentence isn’t the argument, but it sums up the arguments strategy.

Show what from the text?

You were offering your own interpretation of Dawkins argument, what Dawkins meant, I asked to see where from the text you were seeing his intention. That is how I high jacked Schmo’s thread, I don’t think Dawkins Argument is good. We can use whatever tools we need, but at the end of the day, the argument fails it’s intended goal.

You brought it up. You said it was the best way to see Dawkins' argument. Yet you also assert that the whole argument is contained in this note that makes references to the argument (refers to itself??) Which is it? Simple modus ponens or demonstrative induction?

It’s a demonstrative induction that uses MP to achieve it’s goal.

By the way, I will be surprised if Dawkins argument against God isn't at least good as my arguments against alien UFOs.

It probably is, and it probably hits close to home to LDS theology too.

Sorry about the confusion.

[_MrStakhanovite]

I can't yet see that anything substantial turns on this. Dennett's book stands on its own as far as I can see.

I don't think it's substantial, I just don't think Dawkins citation was entirely fair to Dennett's context. Dennett's book is great, and so is the Blind Watchmaker, I'm not critcizing those books, just this specific passage at the end of Chapter 4 in The God Delusion.

[_Tarski]

One of us has no idea what the other one is saying or else something else is even worse is true.

We are probably talking past each other. Let me try again…

Dawkins argument is made up of 6 broad points defined by him (Let’s say A1-A6, and the conjunction of all 6 is A*). All 6 points represent dominant scientific thought about cosmology, probability, design, the usual talking points. Then Dawkins will say that A*, if taken as true, is mutually exclusive with the theistic concept of God.
That sentence isn’t the argument, but it sums up the arguments strategy.

What a relief to hear you say this. I thought I was going insane.

You were offering your own interpretation of Dawkins argument, what Dawkins meant, I asked to see where from the text you were seeing his intention. That is how I high jacked Schmo’s thread, I don’t think Dawkins Argument is good. We can use whatever tools we need, but at the end of the day, the argument fails it’s intended goal.

No I haven't read it remember. I was just imagining what I thought it was based on comments.

I still have to read it.