It's Official - Stand and Shout the Gays are Out (link)

[_Buffalo]

I thought simon WAS the bottom of the rung. ldsfaqs and subgenius have convinced be that the rungs keep going down infinitely.

note to self:
when Buffalot runs out of argument, or even faux-argument, Buffalot resorts to strategy of insult and ridicule.
interesting low-road strategy, lets see how Buffalot plays it out

You don't think it's a little ironic that your prime argument here has been to compare gays to rapists and murderers, and now you accuse me of taking the low road?

[_Chap]

...

as for the perceived "angry" and/or "abusive" quality in my posts, its rather ironic ain't it?.....
...usually its the critics and apostates who litter this board with bitter, crass, inflammatory, and degrading condemnations of the Church and insist that one degrade the intellect and personal character of any TBM.
But dare to challenge these critics' homogenized and sterilized utopias of self-righteousness or cloud the mirror that reflects their narcissistic statures and watch them clamor about, pointing fingers of accusation, collecting rope and lighting torches for lynching, all the while adding yet another disgust filled brick to their walls of "self" protection.

...

Those of us who thought we might feel the lack of Droopy in this forum can, I think, feel reassured.

I am happy to leave it to others to judge whether subgenius's post was a reasonable response to mine.

[_Quasimodo]

...

as for the perceived "angry" and/or "abusive" quality in my posts, its rather ironic ain't it?.....
...usually its the critics and apostates who litter this board with bitter, crass, inflammatory, and degrading condemnations of the Church and insist that one degrade the intellect and personal character of any TBM.
But dare to challenge these critics' homogenized and sterilized utopias of self-righteousness or cloud the mirror that reflects their narcissistic statures and watch them clamor about, pointing fingers of accusation, collecting rope and lighting torches for lynching, all the while adding yet another disgust filled brick to their walls of "self" protection.

...

Those of us who thought we might feel the lack of Droopy in this forum can, I think, feel reassured.

I am happy to leave it to others to judge whether subgenius's post was a reasonable response to mine.

Well, it certainly was a mouthful. Filled with metaphor and similes. A tad over dramatic and a mischaracterization of everyone he doesn't like. I think you do quite well by comparison, Chap.

[_Yoda]

...

as for the perceived "angry" and/or "abusive" quality in my posts, its rather ironic ain't it?.....
...usually its the critics and apostates who litter this board with bitter, crass, inflammatory, and degrading condemnations of the Church and insist that one degrade the intellect and personal character of any TBM.
But dare to challenge these critics' homogenized and sterilized utopias of self-righteousness or cloud the mirror that reflects their narcissistic statures and watch them clamor about, pointing fingers of accusation, collecting rope and lighting torches for lynching, all the while adding yet another disgust filled brick to their walls of "self" protection.

...

Those of us who thought we might feel the lack of Droopy in this forum can, I think, feel reassured.

I am happy to leave it to others to judge whether subgenius's post was a reasonable response to mine.

I have a soft spot for Droopy. ;-)

[Guest]

I am glad to know that the law is on your side. I look forward to the presentation of your rational basis argument.

as you should...allow me to give you a primer.

Subgenius, you would have to know what you are talking about in order to give someone a primer. You demonstrably do not. You do not know how to read case law, you do not know how to distinguish holding from dicta, and you are blissfully unaware of the general rule of jurisprudence that a case will not be decided on a higher standard of review when a lower standard will suffice.

Romer v. Evans, sexual orientation is not subject to strict scrutiny, but only to a rational basis test.

That is not even close to what the Supreme Court held in Romer v. Evans. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado state constitutional amendment as applied was subject to review under strict scrutiny because it affected a fundamental right (voting). The U.S. Supreme Court was reviewing the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court. There is absolutely nowhere in the majority opinion of Romer that says whether sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. The majority held that even under the least deferential standard of review---the rational basis test---the Colorado amendment was fatally defective under the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Because the amendment could not even pass the rational basis test, there was no need to apply a higher standard of review. And the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, which based its ruling on strict scrutiny, was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must co-exist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 - 272 (1979); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). We have attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 6).

Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.

Taking the first point, even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained. The search for the link between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limits of our own authority. In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (tourism benefits justified classification favoring pushcart vendors of certain longevity); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (assumed health concerns justified law favoring optometrists over opticians); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (potential traffic hazards justified exemption of vehicles advertising the owner's products from general advertising ban); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'Relief Society for Port of New Orleans, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (licensing scheme that disfavored persons unrelated to current river boat pilots justified by possible efficiency and safety benefits of a closely knit pilotage system). The laws challenged in the cases just cited were narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for us to ascertain that there existed some relation between the classification and the purpose it served. By requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. See United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.").

Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The absence of precedent for Amendment 2 is itself instructive; "[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision." Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928).

It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. "`Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.'" Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). Respect for this principle explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare. A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense. "The guaranty of `equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.'" Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), not cited by the parties but relied upon by the dissent, is not evidence that Amendment 2 is within our constitutional tradition, and any reliance upon it as authority for sustaining the amendment is misplaced. In Davis, the Court approved an Idaho territorial statute denying Mormons, polygamists, and advocates of polygamy the right to vote and to hold office because, as the Court construed the statute, it "simply excludes from the privilege of voting, or of holding any office of honor, trust or profit, those who have been convicted of certain offences, and those who advocate a practical resistance to the laws of the Territory and justify and approve the commission of crimes forbidden by it." Id., at 347. To the extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no longer good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). To the extent it held that the groups designated in the statute may be deprived of the right to vote because of their status, its ruling could not stand without surviving strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). To the extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote, its holding is not implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).

A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. "f the constitutional conception of `equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes often can be explained by reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons. Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it. We conclude that, in addition to the far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2 that we have noted, the principles it offends, in another sense, are conventional and venerable; a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988), and Amendment 2 does not.

The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups. The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. "[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S., at 24.

We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed.

And by the way, Subgenius, every single time I have argued on this board that prohibiting same-sex marriage violates equal protection, it has been on a rational basis standard. So not only is your assertion about what [i]Romer held not even within shouting distance of being accurate, it is also irrelevant.

Lawrence v. Texas, the striking down of sodomy laws does not pave the way for same-sex marriage, because it was ruled on the grounds of substantive due process instead of equal protection, which kinda hurts legal arguments for same-sex marriage.

Seriously, just stop. The above sentence is one of the stupidest things I have ever read on this board, and that is saying something.

First, as far as Lawrence being inapplicable to the issue of same-sex marriage, whom should we believe understands constitutional law better: you, or Antonin Scalia? From his dissenting opinion in Lawrence:

The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of action, so that that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada (in a decision that the Canadian Government has chosen not to appeal). See Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 WL 34950 (Ontario Ct. App.); Cohen, Dozens in Canada Follow Gay Couple’s Lead, Washington Post, June 12, 2003, p. A25. At the end of its opinion–after having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence–the Court says that the present case “does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” Ante, at 17. Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage in the Court’s opinion, which notes the constitutional protections afforded to “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education,” and then declares that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.” Ante, at 13 (emphasis added). Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” for purposes of proscribing that conduct, ante, at 18; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,” ante, at 6; what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution,” ibid.? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry. This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so.

Second, if homosexuals have a fundamental substantive right to engage in same-sex relationships, that doesn't "kinda hurt legal arguments for same-sex marriage." That is the strongest possible argument for same-sex marriage.

Loving v. Virginia found bans on interracial marriage are not constitutional on equal protection grounds, including using language like "fundamental right to marry." Fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, same-sex marriage is not - simply because marriage is legally defined, in most places, the legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife This means that as a person, you have the right to marry anyone of the opposite sex. (the absence of this definition is where same-sex marriages have been allowed because of this type of legal scrutiny - that is why you often here this definition debated).

The above is as stupid as your statement about Lawrence v. Texas. Circular reasoning ("fundamental rights are not subject to strict scrutiny if it's same-sex marriage because state constitutional provisions only allow marriage between a man and a woman") does not pass the rational basis test, let alone questions involving fundamental rights. You are bringing new levels of vapidity to the internet with observations that amount to, "Same-sex marriage bans are not subject to strict scrutiny except when they have been overturned because marriage is a fundamental substantive right." Yeah, thanks for that insightful legal analysis, Clarence Darrow. Also, English is not spoken anywhere in the world, except in countries where English is spoken.

Baker v. Nelson, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson ruled not long after Loving v. Virginia, stated, "In commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex - Race is immutable, but a relationship (ie. sexual orientation) is not" - this is once again echoed in the ruling by the Washington state supreme court.

Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas have resolved the issue of whether there is a substantial federal question involved in classifications based on sexual orientation. I am aware that uninformed anti-same-sex marriage zealots think that a 40+ year old denial of certiorari (when prevailing societal views about sexual orientation were different) is binding precedent notwithstanding further developments in the law, but that's not how stare decisis works.

The fundamental association of marriage being between a man and a woman has an incredible amount of legal precedence which runs the concept of marriage and procreation through such cases listed above and even Skinner v. Oklahoma, Griswald v. Connecticut, and even Roe v. Wade. Not to mention DOMA and even the UN declaration on human rights.

The Defense of Marriage Act has already been held unconstitutional by federal courts, because the Tenth Amendment does not allow congress to define marriage for the states. And I am glad to know that you are in favor of the United Nations defining the parameters of the U.S. Constitution for us.

You've already made this irrelevant allusion to Skinner v. Oklahoma, and I already addressed it. viewtopic.php?f=3&t=20238&st=0&sk=t&sd=a&start=42 Forced sterilization as a criminal penalty has nothing to do with whether marriage is a fundamental right simply because of procreation, since neither procreating nor having the ability to procreate is an element of the legal definition of marriage anywhere in the United States.

Griswold v. Connecticut has nothing to do with marriage being only about procreation, either, especially since the Supreme Court extended that same right to privacy to unmarried couples. Eisenstadt v. Baird held that equal protection required the same right of privacy for both married and unmarried persons.

And since Norma McCorvey was not married when she got pregnant, no, Roe v. Wade does not have anything to do with marriage being about procreation.

What's particularly dumb about what you're implying is that the U.S. Supreme Court gets to define marriage, and they don't. And despite the talking points to the contrary, arguing that a ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional does not equate to judges defining marriage. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the state that defines marriage, but the state has to do so in a way that does not deprive its citizens of equal protection of the law. If you don't want same sex marriage, then pass a statute that says married couples have to procreate. So far, not one jurisdiction in the United States has done so.

To run the gauntlet of legal arguments on this cause is an incredible, if not futile, effort...which is quickly being realized by the LGBT. This realization is being manifest by the LGBT massive Public Relations campaign to win "hearts and minds", because quite literally, that is their only hope. No one can deny that the LGBT has enjoyed an recent increase in political power due to such a massive financial outpouring of propaganda for their cause....but that is a different discussion....er, a different "presentation".

Yes, I'm sure that people who think that banning same-sex marriage is unconstitutional are just reeling after that crushing defeat in Perry v. Schwarzenegger. But since you have conclusively proven that you do not understand "the gauntlet of legal arguments," maybe you should find a different topic to offer your uninformed opinions on.

EDIT: Damn typos.

[_subgenius]

Subgenius, you would have to know what you are talking about in order to give someone a primer. You demonstrably do not. You do not know how to read case law, you do not know how to distinguish holding from dicta, and you are blissfully unaware of the general rule of jurisprudence that a case will not be decided on a higher standard of review when a lower standard will suffice.

you are correct, i assumed you had at least a basic knowledge of law, and even a fundamental working idea of what the issue(s) is.
but, wow, the pretty-blue-cut-and-paste that you posted, just plain embarrasses you.

Romer v. Evans, sexual orientation is not subject to strict scrutiny, but only to a rational basis test.

such an incredible wealth of information available to you, but it fails to address my point.
Let us, once again, see the error of your ways...and then we can sit back and watch you try to "cut-n-paste" your way around the actual law (which, as i said before, is overwhelmingly on my side)

"Equal Protection" is divided into 3 levels of scrutiny.
same-sex marriage falls into the rational-basis level.
reference United States v. Carolene Products Co.
the court has ruled that any any law that falls into the rational-basis category is constitutional as long as the law in question is in question is reasonably related to governmental issues. DOMA makes it a state government issue to decide whether to recognize same sex marriage, any law which would ban same sex marriage is therefore not an infraction on the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
You concede this point below at Baker v Nelson, as does the Supreme Court which states that the law does not merit there consideration "for want of a substantial federal question."

Seriously, just stop. The above sentence is one of the stupidest things I have ever read on this board, and that is saying something.

you should read more of your own posts

First, as far as Lawrence being inapplicable to the issue of same-sex marriage, whom should we believe understands constitutional law better: you, or Antonin Scalia? From his dissenting opinion in Lawrence:

errr..."dissenting opinion" ? what a convenient omission on your part....care to convey the "other" opinion?, you know, the one that counts.

Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas have resolved the issue of whether there is a substantial federal question involved in classifications based on sexual orientation. I am aware that uninformed anti-same-sex marriage zealots think that a 40+ year old denial of certiorari (when prevailing societal views about sexual orientation were different) is binding precedent notwithstanding further developments in the law, but that's not how stare decisis works.

ok, you concede Baker v Nelson, check.

The Defense of Marriage Act has already been held unconstitutional by federal courts, because the Tenth Amendment does not allow congress to define marriage for the states. And I am glad to know that you are in favor of the United Nations defining the parameters of the U.S. Constitution for us.

i read this over and over.....where did you cite that DOMA was repealed?
and did you forget to comment about Congress and BLAG?

You've already made this irrelevant allusion to Skinner v. Oklahoma, and I already addressed it. viewtopic.php?f=3&t=20238&st=0&sk=t&sd=a&start=42 Forced sterilization as a criminal penalty has nothing to do with whether marriage is a fundamental right simply because of procreation, since neither procreating nor having the ability to procreate is an element of the legal definition of marriage anywhere in the United States.

but the citation that "marriage and procreation are fundamental" has been used in the decisions that followed. That little gem is what you seem to be intentionally looking over.

Griswold v. Connecticut has nothing to do with marriage being only about procreation, either, especially since the Supreme Court extended that same right to privacy to unmarried couples. Eisenstadt v. Baird held that equal protection required the same right of privacy for both married and unmarried persons.

and, like others, took precedent from Skinner, but i see why you ignore that.

maybe you should find a different topic to offer your uninformed opinions on.

wow, its like you are saying things that i am thinking....eerie it is

You should enjoy such Supreme Court gems as seen in Murphy v. Ramsey where we read:
"the union for life of one man and one woman," .... "the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization."
or how about (speaking of dissenting opinions)
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co.:
"one of the cornerstones of our civilized society."
i particularly like California Supreme Court Justice Carol Corrigan (allegedly LGBT):
"The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment."
the "legitimate purpose" of the law....hmmm....what have we seen over and over and over and over with that....hmmmm

It is no denigration of one class or the other to acknowledge the biological truth that same-sex and opposite-sex couples are not similarly situated with respect to at least one of the purposes of marriage, namely, procreation. As was noted by Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and author of that Court's 2003 decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health mandating same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, the capacity for unassisted procreation is "the one unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples." Although Chief Judge Marshall, like Judge Vaughn Walker in the Proposition 8 litigation in California, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), responded to this indisputable truth with the rather extraordinary claim that procreation has never really been a purpose of marriage, denying the obvious does not make the point any the less obvious. And yet, with that "unbridgeable difference," a classification that recognizes the biological differences and thereby treats differently situated persons differently, is no violation of equal protection

Bottom line
my original assertion is correct...i still need not "defend" anything, because i am not the one in want.

[Guest]

Subgenius, you would have to know what you are talking about in order to give someone a primer. You demonstrably do not. You do not know how to read case law, you do not know how to distinguish holding from dicta, and you are blissfully unaware of the general rule of jurisprudence that a case will not be decided on a higher standard of review when a lower standard will suffice.

you are correct, i assumed you had at least a basic knowledge of law, and even a fundamental working idea of what the issue(s) is.
but, wow, the pretty-blue-cut-and-paste that you posted, just plain embarrasses you.

No, Subgenius, it does not embarrass me to quote the language from Romer where the U.S. Supreme Court reaches a holding that is completely different from what you asserted.

Romer v. Evans, sexual orientation is not subject to strict scrutiny, but only to a rational basis test.

such an incredible wealth of information available to you, but it fails to address my point.
Let us, once again, see the error of your ways...and then we can sit back and watch you try to "cut-n-paste" your way around the actual law (which, as i said before, is overwhelmingly on my side)

Cutting and pasting from case law IS LAW. That's why you see those string citations in judicial opinions.

"Equal Protection" is divided into 3 levels of scrutiny.
same-sex marriage falls into the rational-basis level.
reference United States v. Carolene Products Co.
the court has ruled that any any law that falls into the rational-basis category is constitutional as long as the law in question is in question is reasonably related to governmental issues.

Whoa....you mean like you just figured out what I have been saying this whole time? That is some deep thinking there, dude.

DOMA makes it a state government issue to decide whether to recognize same sex marriage, any law which would ban same sex marriage is therefore not an infraction on the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

Right, because congress can supersede the full faith and credit clause by legislative fiat. Yes, you are certainly showing me the error of my ways. Thank you for clarifying that if the legislature passes a law, that means the law is constitutional.

You concede this point below at Baker v Nelson, as does the Supreme Court which states that the law does not merit there consideration "for want of a substantial federal question."

No, I must not concede that point, because it is not a valid point. If it were, the Supreme Court would never have granted certiorari in Romer or Lawrence.

Seriously, just stop. The above sentence is one of the stupidest things I have ever read on this board, and that is saying something.

you should read more of your own posts

"I know you are, but what am I?" Truly, a stunning refutation.

First, as far as Lawrence being inapplicable to the issue of same-sex marriage, whom should we believe understands constitutional law better: you, or Antonin Scalia? From his dissenting opinion in Lawrence:

errr..."dissenting opinion" ? what a convenient omission on your part....care to convey the "other" opinion?, you know, the one that counts.

It's a dazzling display of idiocy when you simultaneously continue to show that you have no idea what you are talking about, and keeping saying to someone who has done this as his profession that he does not.

Dissenting and concurring opinions are frequently cited by judges to clarify points of law. What exactly was I "omitting" when I specified that this was a dissent? You also are completely missing the point, which is that Scalia dissented because he understood the ramifications of deciding Lawrence under a substantive due process analysis.

Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas have resolved the issue of whether there is a substantial federal question involved in classifications based on sexual orientation. I am aware that uninformed anti-same-sex marriage zealots think that a 40+ year old denial of certiorari (when prevailing societal views about sexual orientation were different) is binding precedent notwithstanding further developments in the law, but that's not how stare decisis works.

ok, you concede Baker v Nelson, check.

No, I just did the opposite, and your "I-read-a-Wikipedia-entry-about-stare-decisis" level of understanding is not impressive. If there is no substantial federal question presented in classifying people according to sexual orientation, then the Supreme Court would not have had subject matter jurisdiction over Romer or Lawrence. And Perry v. Schwarzenegger also would have been summarily dismissed if Baker means what you mistakenly believe it means. It also already would have been dismissed by the 9th Circuit, since questions of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.

The Defense of Marriage Act has already been held unconstitutional by federal courts, because the Tenth Amendment does not allow congress to define marriage for the states. And I am glad to know that you are in favor of the United Nations defining the parameters of the U.S. Constitution for us.

i read this over and over.....where did you cite that DOMA was repealed?

This is another one of your tells that you don't know what you are talking about. When a federal court rules that an act of congress is unconstitutional, that doesn't mean the act has been "repealed."

Here is one of the cases where a federal judge ruled that certain provisions of DOMA---the provisions that pertain to your mistaken assertions---were unconstitutional: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/dis ... 123233/58/

Glad to know, though, that you are unaware of current developments in the law, but you think that a 40 year-old denial of certiorari (which has limited stare decisis effect) is binding precedent, even though it has been superseded by other cases addressing classification by sexual orientation as presenting a substantial federal question.

and did you forget to comment about Congress and BLAG?

No.

You've already made this irrelevant allusion to Skinner v. Oklahoma, and I already addressed it. viewtopic.php?f=3&t=20238&st=0&sk=t&sd=a&start=42 Forced sterilization as a criminal penalty has nothing to do with whether marriage is a fundamental right simply because of procreation, since neither procreating nor having the ability to procreate is an element of the legal definition of marriage anywhere in the United States.

but the citation that "marriage and procreation are fundamental" has been used in the decisions that followed. That little gem is what you seem to be intentionally looking over.

I specifically referred to it, and yet I am "intentionally overlooking it." Oh, okay.

For the love of God, stop digging yourself in deeper. The U.S. Supreme Court has no authority under federalism to define marriage under state law (and the equal protection argument for same-sex marriage does not imply otherwise). That statement does not define what marriage is. You are making it clear, as I already said, that you don't know how to tell what the holding of a court is. The criminal statute at issue did not enact forced castration only for criminals who are married. A convicted criminal who is not married still has a fundamental right to procreate. Defining marriage as necessarily including procreation was not the holding in Skinner because that question was not before the court. That statement has absolutely zero legal significance for defining what marriage means. It only means that both marriage and procreation are protected by substantive due process.

And by the way, since you are selectively deciding when you are a strict constructionist (which you do not appear to realize): there is nowhere in the text of the U.S. Constitution that grants a right to procreation. A long-term trend of extending substantive rights is not exactly the death knell for extending equal protection to gay people.

Griswold v. Connecticut has nothing to do with marriage being only about procreation, either, especially since the Supreme Court extended that same right to privacy to unmarried couples. Eisenstadt v. Baird held that equal protection required the same right of privacy for both married and unmarried persons.

and, like others, took precedent from Skinner, but i see why you ignore that.

No, you can't, because I did not ignore it, and you don't understand how case law works. There is nothing anywhere in any of these cases that says that procreation is a necessary element of marriage, and the U.S. Supreme Court does not have the authority to define that, anyway, because defining marriage is a question of state law. Deciding whether the state definition of marriage violates equal protection, however, is a question of federal constitutional law.

maybe you should find a different topic to offer your uninformed opinions on.

wow, its like you are saying things that i am thinking....eerie it is

The difference would be that I have shown that I know what I am talking about, and you continue to prove that you don't. You're not even informed enough to know how uninformed you are.

You should enjoy such Supreme Court gems as seen in Murphy v. Ramsey where we read:
"the union for life of one man and one woman," .... "the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization."

Oh, Jesus Christ......you are such a moron.

Case law does not mean you pick out-of-context dicta and say, "See?!? That's what the law is!!!"

At the time Murphy was decided, Utah was not a state. There was no sovereign state law to raise a 10th Amendment issue. The only significance to equal protection for homosexuals that an 1885 case about polygamists having voting rights is that the language you are referring to was cited unfavorably by the dissent in Romer v. Evans.

"[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement." [Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)]. I would not myself indulge in such official praise for heterosexual monogamy, because I think it no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

That is it. It means nothing. Your cherry-picked dicta from Murphy has absolutely no legal significance regarding the definition of marriage. Not even the three justices dissenting from Romer relied on it as precedent---in fact, they joined in criticizing the editorializing by the Supreme Court.

or how about (speaking of dissenting opinions)
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co.:
"one of the cornerstones of our civilized society."

Yep, that's case law. You just randomly pick phrases, and it's the law!!!

Meltzer was a case denying certiorari by petitioners claiming their right to due process was denied because they could not afford court fees. This is the full context of your Magic 8-Ball approach to law:

The other distinction between divorce and different kinds of controversies suggested in the Boddie opinion is the degree to which the disputes are regarded as "fundamental." The extent to which this requirement limits the holding of Boddie is found in the very facts of that decision -- the right to seek a divorce is simply not very " fundamental" in the hierarchy of disputes. Marriage is one of the cornerstones of our civilized society. Society generally places a high value on marriage and a low value on the right to divorce. And since Boddie held that the right to a divorce was "fundamental," I can only conclude that almost every other kind of legally enforceable right is also fundamental to our society.

This has no precedential value, and it is also irrelevant. People are who are arguing that same-sex people have a right to marry do not dispute that marriage is a fundamental right. That is why they think gays should be able to get married, too.

i particularly like California Supreme Court Justice Carol Corrigan (allegedly LGBT):
"The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment."
the "legitimate purpose" of the law....hmmm....what have we seen over and over and over and over with that....hmmmm

What we have seen is that there is no legitimate purpose to denying same-sex marriage, because there is nowhere in the United States where people are required to have children in order to be married.

It is no denigration of one class or the other to acknowledge the biological truth that same-sex and opposite-sex couples are not similarly situated with respect to at least one of the purposes of marriage, namely, procreation. As was noted by Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and author of that Court's 2003 decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health mandating same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, the capacity for unassisted procreation is "the one unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples." Although Chief Judge Marshall, like Judge Vaughn Walker in the Proposition 8 litigation in California, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), responded to this indisputable truth with the rather extraordinary claim that procreation has never really been a purpose of marriage, denying the obvious does not make the point any the less obvious. And yet, with that "unbridgeable difference," a classification that recognizes the biological differences and thereby treats differently situated persons differently, is no violation of equal protection

See the part that I underlined? How many kids has Dallin H. Oaks had with his current wife? How many kids do you think they will have before he dies?

Bottom line
my original assertion is correct...i still need not "defend" anything, because i am not the one in want.

Now I know how Simon Southerton feels when Mormon hobby apologists tell him he doesn't know anything about genetics.

Note to readers: I make the above post for your benefit so you will not be confused by pseudolaw. It is not a futile attempt to convince Subgenius of his ignorance. If an orangutan could be trained to type, it would offer more intelligent legal commentary than what Subgenius provides. Therefore, I do not expect to reason with the latter.

EDIT: Another typo. Spell check doesn't seem to work any better than seer stones.

[_EAllusion]

This is like like watching the older kid go to town on a pinata after the smaller kids took turns whacking at it. It equal parts hilarious and impressive.

[_Darth J]

Bump for subgenius.

[_Shulem]

Gay marriage will become legal in the United States of America. The Mormon church can't stop it. Shame on the Mormon church for trying to force their value system on everyone else!



Paul O