Tarski wrote:But as Feynman points out, metaphysics has a very poor track record telling us what must be and what couldn't be.
I don’t know what Feynman said, I typically don’t go to him with the kind of questions I have.
Tarski wrote:He gives several examples of philosophers claiming that science must work in a certain way only to be slammed down by science itself.
And? Newton was an Alchemist and Godel thought Leibnitz encoded secret formulas into his personal notes. Brilliant people are wrong all the time.
Tarski wrote:How many times have you heard that the same experiment under the same conditions must lead to the same result for science to make sense?
Typically, I only hear that from people who lecture believers on why science makes faith irrelevant.
Tarski wrote:Also, what happened to all the concepts and necessary truths of Artistitolean or medieval metaphysics?
They didn’t go anywhere?
Tarski wrote:Things look quite different to the modern mind and this is largely due to what experience with nature has forced on us.
So necessary and contingent truths are some how different? There is no more talk of universals or just particulars? No more talk of Abstracta and Concreta? No more possible worlds?
Tarski wrote:I mean, it is not as if we are all that sure of ourselves as far as the foundations and limitations of logic and mathematics. Even there, it is in some sense "wait and see' and therefore broadly empirical.
You’ll have to unpack that, I don’t know how “wait and see” becomes “broadly empirical” in any meaningful sense.