lulu wrote:No, history, US religion, women and gender. (So my overall knowledge of philosophy is pretty spotty.) In grad school after the '90's there was no escaping it. What we read of history is text, ie, literature. Women and gender studies draw heavily on them too.
Gotcha, you’re more familiar with the Continental side of Philosophy than the Analytical side it seems, and that probably explains the confusion.
lulu wrote:Well, that's who I've read about. Sounds like I should start with Berkeley.
It’s not needed, not that studying Berkeley couldn’t be fruitful, but he is just a historical example of a hardcore empiricist that I think provides a decent counter-example to the OP.
lulu wrote:I'd like to know how any of the three you named (or anyone else) deal more or less convincingly with the "are our senses preceiving reality" issue. Its a tough nut.
Sure, let me give you a quick rundown at what I think is at stake here and see what your interested in.
In the study of epistemology in Anglophone philosophy (sometimes called ‘analytic philosophy’), the standard view of what knowledge is Justified True Belief plus a few other disputed components not needed here. To know a proposition, you actually have to believe it, the proposition has to be true, and you need justification for that belief (otherwise having knowledge is a matter of luck).
If we focus in on just Justification, we ask questions about what kind of reasons, evidence, situations, and conditions need to be met before a belief is justified. When people come out of organized religions, the first thing they often try to do is build an epistemology off of the scientific method and juxtapose that with religion. So people will post about how beliefs needing evidence, go on about falsification, predictions, and all that other good stuff they learn about while reading the “Evolution VS Creationism” literature that is out there.
Now all that stuff is cool, but it gets you in to trouble if you try to build it up into something it is not. So you get into a discussion about epistemology and why there is no God, and the clever theist follows the thread of evidence back to some kind of important foundational belief that is really hard to produce evidence for (e.g. external reality)
At this point, this is when the ex-mormons around here flip their crap, because they mistake the intent of this exercise. What they see is someone using radical skepticism to attack something that seems to be common sense (there is an external reality) which holds up the natural sciences (which produce excellent results) so they can believe some bat crap crazy idea*.
The real intent is, to show that really important beliefs can’t always have good evidence for them, so we have to add some kind of other principle into the mix of Justification to get around this.
One way to get around this is to do what Chris Smith suggested earlier when he mentioned first principles. Axioms, brute facts, Moorean facts, basic beliefs, or what ever you want to call them, if you can trace evidence for a belief back to basic belief, it is considered justified
So the next stage of the conversation is going to be, what makes a basic belief or first principle self justifying? Or if we simply assume it so we can get on with other things, why can’t the theist simply assume God? Why does external reality get to be a brute fact that doesn’t need strong evidence, but God carries a bigger evidential burden?
I’ll stop there so this wall of text post doesn’t grow, but I hope this makes things clearer.
* Plenty of people out there do this, and Mormon apologists have made ample use of that strategy. Simon Belmont is a legendary but now defunct poster here who played this card to it’s absurd and borderline intellectually dishonest extremes.