Mormonism Live on Free Will

[Philo Sofee]

Soooooooo, tonight's episode on Mormonism Live was on Free Will, and why we don't have it. So I freely chose, badly though I wanted to stay, to leave as an illustration that I certainly do have free will, and can use it at anytime even if it is disadvantageous to me (I really WANTED to see the discussion!). We shall see, eh? For myself, I simply don't believe at all that we don't have free will. I can choose and do from within my own self, regardless of the limited choices I have. I DO have choices. And I made mine tonight freely to illustrate it. They can talk about it not being real, I show it is. I give the evidence.

[Rivendale]

Soooooooo, tonight's episode on Mormonism Live was on Free Will, and why we don't have it. So I freely chose, badly though I wanted to stay, to leave as an illustration that I certainly do have free will, and can use it at anytime even if it is disadvantageous to me (I really WANTED to see the discussion!). We shall see, eh? For myself, I simply don't believe at all that we don't have free will. I can choose and do from within my own self, regardless of the limited choices I have. I DO have choices. And I made mine tonight freely to illustrate it. They can talk about it not being real, I show it is. I give the evidence.

Free will is not denying choices. The choice you pick is not free. For example. If you are asked to name your favorite movie there will be a parade of choices placed in front of you. Who arranged the parade? And why did it skip your real favorite?

[Bond]

In another dimension the Mormonism Live podcast episodes are 5, 10, 15+ hours long and Mormon Stories ends abruptly at 2 hours.

[drumdude]

I find Sam Harris’ argument on this compelling.


Think of a movie. Any movie. What movie did you think of? What intentional choice did you make to pick that specific movie to pop up in your brain? You didn’t. It arose without any intentionality from you.


Similarly, you didn’t choose to think of the idea to stop watching to demonstrate your point about free will. That idea popped into your head the same way the movie did, as a result of the specific neural configuration in your brain.


That’s probably easy to see, what is harder to grasp is that the decision to act on this idea was also not intentional. Your brain, if you meditate and examine closely to what is going on, makes choices in exactly the same way.

[Philo Sofee]

I find Sam Harris’ argument on this compelling.


Think of a movie. Any movie. What movie did you think of? What intentional choice did you make to pick that specific movie to pop up in your brain? You didn’t. It arose without any intentionality from you.


Similarly, you didn’t choose to think of the idea to stop watching to demonstrate your point about free will. That idea popped into your head the same way the movie did, as a result of the specific neural configuration in your brain.


That’s probably easy to see, what is harder to grasp is that the decision to act on this idea was also not intentional. Your brain, if you meditate and examine closely to what is going on, makes choices in exactly the same way.

I choose not to believe this.

[drumdude]

I find Sam Harris’ argument on this compelling.


Think of a movie. Any movie. What movie did you think of? What intentional choice did you make to pick that specific movie to pop up in your brain? You didn’t. It arose without any intentionality from you.


Similarly, you didn’t choose to think of the idea to stop watching to demonstrate your point about free will. That idea popped into your head the same way the movie did, as a result of the specific neural configuration in your brain.


That’s probably easy to see, what is harder to grasp is that the decision to act on this idea was also not intentional. Your brain, if you meditate and examine closely to what is going on, makes choices in exactly the same way.

I choose not to believe this.

Can you choose to believe the opposite of what you currently believe?

[Physics Guy]

It's not clear to me what free will even means. It sounds nice to say, "I could have done anything," but I don't want my choices to be random and arbitrary. That's not freedom; it's being a slave to chance, and I find chance a worse master than fate because fate might have a purpose.

I actually want my choices to be determined, without any real possibility that they could have been otherwise: I just want them to be determined by me, rather than by things that aren't me. To me that is freedom. And it's perfectly compatible with physicalism. My choices are determined by (some subset of) the state of my neurons: that's fine, because that subset of the state of my neurons is me.

Are who I am and what I want themselves determined by something? If so it might have to be something other than me, by definition; but I'm not completely sure about that, actually. It sounds as though it might be one of these self-referential questions that requires a new axiom, or something, to decide. Between the alternatives of having my own essential nature determined by some reason outside me, on the one hand, and having it be determined by a random selection from uncountable possibilities, on the other, I'd really rather be predestined according to some kind of plan than be randomly generated.

[Moksha]

Mormonism LIVE: 067: Nuancehoe Carah Burrell

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-EiGE_c2bY

[Philo Sofee]

I choose not to believe this.

Can you choose to believe the opposite of what you currently believe?

Not without evidence and good reasons, no.

[Philo Sofee]

It's not clear to me what free will even means. It sounds nice to say, "I could have done anything," but I don't want my choices to be random and arbitrary. That's not freedom; it's being a slave to chance, and I find chance a worse master than fate because fate might have a purpose.

I actually want my choices to be determined, without any real possibility that they could have been otherwise: I just want them to be determined by me, rather than by things that aren't me. To me that is freedom. And it's perfectly compatible with physicalism. My choices are determined by (some subset of) the state of my neurons: that's fine, because that subset of the state of my neurons is me.

Are who I am and what I want themselves determined by something? If so it might have to be something other than me, by definition; but I'm not completely sure about that, actually. It sounds as though it might be one of these self-referential questions that requires a new axiom, or something, to decide. Between the alternatives of having my own essential nature determined by some reason outside me, on the one hand, and having it be determined by a random selection from uncountable possibilities, on the other, I'd really rather be predestined according to some kind of plan than be randomly generated.

Well said, yes, I like this approach quite a lot.