Cassius Circle: David Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’

[DrStakhanovite]

Paragraphs 10-7 & 10-8 & 10-9

This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from human testimony.

Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive à priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato; was a proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority.

10-7 is largely dedicated to the factors that impact the veracity given to testimony that is probably shared universally by most people. 10-8 however establishes a principle that underlies the rest of Hume’s argument, so I think it merits close attention. The bolding, italics, and underlining, in the following quote is mine:

The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive à priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them.

What the italicized “à priori” means here is a distinction between two types of knowledge. Knowledge that is a priori means that it is knowledge that is obtained without experience. Traditionally what has constituted a paradigmatic examples of a priori knowledge has been mathematics and geometry; we know Pythagoras's theorem is true not because we’ve gone out and confirmed it by measuring a bunch of right triangles, but because it can be proven by referencing just the principle relations involved in the theorem itself. By contrast, “a posteriori” knowledge comes after experience and if mathematics and geometry are paradigmatic examples of a priori knowledge then physics and chemistry would be paradigmatic examples of a posteriori knowledge. If you are forming hypotheses and then conducting experiments to confirm or disconfirm that hypothesis, then modifying your hypothesis in light of your experimentation, you are dealing in a posteriori knowledge.

Take a second look at the bolded section of the above quote, what is Hume saying? I would submit that when Hume writes “any connexion, which we perceive à priori” he is referencing an idea that philosophers today call the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” (hereafter: PSR). Now there is a lot to be said about this principle and it was much discussed between the so-called “Rationalist” philosophers like Spinoza and Leibniz who preceded Hume. We don’t need to cover much of it other than the core element at the center of the principle which I would roughly characterize for this thread as “every event has a cause”.

You might recognize the PSR as constituting one of the premises that make up William Lane Craig’s kalam cosmological argument. Hume disputes that we can know the PSR is true a priori and he disputes that we could learn the truth of the PSR a posteriori. The SEP has a succinct paragraph that quickly captures the spirit of Hume’s objection:

Hume’s critique of causation presents an important challenge to the PSR. In his Treatise of Human Nature (I, 3, 3) Hume considers several arguments which attempt to prove the “general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause” and finds all of them wanting. Hume argues that since the ideas of cause and its effect are evidently distinct, we can clearly conceive or imagine an object without its cause. He takes the separability of the two ideas to show that there is no necessary conceptual relation between the ideas of cause and effect insofar as conceiving the one without the other does not imply any contradiction or absurdity.

Going back to the underlined portion we read that it isn’t a metaphysical connection witnesses have to supposed events that makes their testimony believable, but their conformity with our experiences. This is the fundamental principle that allows Hume’s arguments against miracles to operate. In practice it gives witness testimony a secondary role in evidential assessment similar to how secondary sources are given less credence than primary sources are in historical studies.

Reading the rest of the paragraph gives us a clearer picture of this operation. When witness testimony is given and it conforms with what we already know by experience, a sort of equilibrium is struck between the testimony and our experience:



When the testimony of witnesses contradicts what we know from experience, the evidentiary weight given to the testimony is reduced and what is known to us already is given more credence.



The last paragraph is Hume providing an example of this principle from classical antiquity, where even the most respected of persons giving a testimony could not override something that was considered obviously known.

[DrStakhanovite]

Paragraph 10-10 and Endnote 22

The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it. [see endnote]

Concerning the story of the Indian prince, Eric Steinberg provides the following:

A variation of this story appears in Locke’s ‘Essays Concerning Human Understanding’ (IV. 15) as a story about the King of Siam and a Dutch ambassador. An account closer to Hume’s is mentioned by Butler in the introduction to his ‘Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of nature’ (1736).

Here is Hume’s endnote:

NO INDIAN, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell à priori what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that, in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence.

In the previous section Hume established the principle that when witness testimony conforms to what we have already experienced, the testimony is granted a certain amount of evidentiary value and if said testimony is not in accord with what has been experienced then the evidentiary value is lessened to such a degree that the testimony alone is not enough to disregard experience. Now obviously this principle is vulnerable to counterexamples and needs a few qualifications to make it suitable for actual practice.

The immediate issue at hand that Hume is dealing with straight away is the notion that just because some witness testimony falls outside what I know to be true from experience doesn’t mean that it should always be disregarded. Hume’s choice of this story about an Indian prince is interesting to me, because it seems as if Hume is acknowledging that what and how people experience things is often conditioned by our context. Those from climates where ice and snow never really get a chance to form cannot be experienced by the inhabitants (save through modern technology) and thus those inhabitants have good initial reasons for not accepting the testimony of people who claim water changes its properties when introduced to sufficiently cold temperatures.

The last sentence in the paragraph should receive some extra attention:

Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it.

Hume is drawing a distinction between witness testimony that is contrary to experience and witness testimony that is not conformable to experience. The story about the Indian prince is an example of testimony not being conformable and is used as an example of how testimony can be reinforced to the point that it outweighs “uniform experience”. In a rare lengthy endnote from Hume, we see a hint at how he views miracles (bolding mine):

But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same.

I view Hume’s comment about circumstances to be something similar to trying to minimize or otherwise control variables between experiences of different people. It is more or less a setup for the notion that experiments allow for the reproduction of like effects, thus adding to the totality of experiences we can reason from. Miracles seem to be in a much different category and are not something that can be subject to experimentation.

[DrStakhanovite]

10-11 & 10-12

But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed, in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.

Paragraph 10-11 is picking up where the discussion about how witness testimony can actually override uniform experience. Hume now wants us to consider a hypothetical; instead of the Indian prince being presented with something that is not conformable to experience, what if he were presented with something that was contrary to experience? What if the testimony that was contrary to experience was an alleged miracle? How is this resolved?

Now we get into Hume’s definition of a miracle as a violation of a law of nature. How does Hume define a law of nature? That is actually an open and contemporary debate about how readers ought to interpret Hume on these matters and any sort of meaningful survey of that debate would take me very far afield from the confines of this thread. Thankfully though we can leave that question unresolved for the time being and simply focus on the immediate context of this passage to atleast get a minimal idea of what Hume intends (bolding mine):

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.

It appears to me that Hume is telling us that these Laws represent the highest pinnacle of uniformity of experience. For a miracle to overcome the weight of this evidence seems to be the highest demand one could ask, because these laws appear fundamental to how humanity goes on to manipulate nature for our collective benefit. Because nature is in some meaningful sense predictable, it has allowed humans to accomplish the myriad of feats necessary for the rise of civilization.

There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation.

Interestingly, Hume says for something to be miraculous it must contradict a law of nature. This makes a certain amount of sense to me, because if something transpires that is deemed possible, if highly improbable, then the claim of the miraculous can be disputed with ease. Winning a high stakes lottery with an abysmal chance of success can be just as easily explained as an occurrence of luck as the claim that God influenced the result so a person would win. The way Hume is framing this, a miracle has to be a violation of the laws of nature because only a supernatural being like God could bring about such a scenario.

And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.

Hume is setting a high bar for miracles, because the laws of nature represent the fullest form of a “proof” that experience can provide and for a miracle to be established it must be a “proof” that is superior to it.

It makes me wonder if the Book of Mormon and its Witnesses would actually qualify as a miracle according to Hume’s definition.

[DrStakhanovite]

Endnote 23 & 10-13

[Endnote 23] SOMETIMES an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.

The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish: And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior. When any one tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

Endnote 23 expands on the idea of a miracle discussed in paragraph 10-12; events that are non-miraculous in nature can be considered miraculous if the events are brought about by a person commanding nature to obey their will. Hume also mentions that miracles must involve some kind of supernatural agency, but it isn’t necessary for the miracle to be observed by humans to be properly categorized as a miracle.

The final paragraph that concludes Part I ‘Of Miracles’ includes a clear standard of when witness testimony of a miracle has a higher evidentiary value than that of the most universal and uniform experiences (i.e. Hume’s conception of the laws of nature): witness testimony can establish a miracle if the nature of the testimony is so dynamic that the prospect of the testimony being false is a greater miracle than the miracle the witness speaks of.

Next installment will be reflection of Part I that will speak to the relevancy of Hume to the modern day context and then I'll dig in to Part II.