Personhood and Abortion Rights

[_Jersey Girl]

So...far...behind....

Praying for Superbowl Sunday to break this thread up. ;-)

[_Res Ipsa]

I've seen the rights of the person to refuse to be used characterized as bodily property rights (most common), bodily integrity justified on some basis other than self-ownership, or more a more broad right to self-determination that we often call liberty. Privacy? No. I'm not sure how you can rest such a strong claim on such a weak countervailing interest. We normally think privacy is worth violating for far less than protecting someone's life.

Perhaps you and I are using "privacy" differently. I'm referring to a right to be left alone in certain aspects of life -- whether by the government or other individuals. I would describe bodily integrity as being, at least in part, a privacy argument. If you want to think of it as bodily integrity/liberty, knock yourself out. Either way, we're left with the fact that, legally, no person has a legal duty to save or preserve the life of another person using her body or any portion of it. Except pregnancy.

This sounds like a bodily integrity and/or bodily property rights argument, not a privacy one. It doesn't really spell out an argument underneath the revulsion, so we're left to guess. I think there's a lot less distance between taxing someone a substantial portion of their labor to make them pay for someone's health care and making them donate their bone marrow than this judge seems to think. No doubt our society tends to draw some firm lines at bodily intrusions, but I think this is more arbitrary than people suppose. I suspect an emotional disgust factor, what notorious ice cream hater Leon Kass called the wisdom of repugnance, is doing work there.

I see zero reference to the body as property. In fact, the extent of the judge's revulsion indicates he's not thinking about property. Bodily integrity, sure. But, as I said, I see Bodily integrity as being a privacy argument.

And all lines are arbitrary. With laws, we still have to draw them.

[_Res Ipsa]

So...far...behind....

Praying for Superbowl Sunday to break this thread up. ;-)

Why? You've been hitting 'em out of the park.

[_EAllusion]

Perhaps you and I are using "privacy" differently. I'm referring to a right to be left alone in certain aspects of life -- whether by the government or other individuals. I would describe bodily integrity as being, at least in part, a privacy argument. If you want to think of it as bodily integrity/liberty, knock yourself out.

I don't see how you can justify bodily integrity on privacy grounds. Privacy is about personal information being protected from public knowledge. There's a sense in which that means, "the right to be left alone" but if you just mean the right to be left alone in a general sense, then that sounds like begging the question. The government ought to leave you alone because the government ought to leave you alone? Bodily integrity refers to you having control over what happens physically with your body and is usually justified by self-ownership, personal autonomy, or a right unto itself in the way rights get asserted.

I get that there's a bodily integrity argument against criminalizing abortion. I just don't think it does enough work and runs into conflict with things pro-choice people frequently purport to believe.

Either way, we're left with the fact that, legally, no person has a legal duty to save or preserve the life of another person using her body or any portion of it. Except pregnancy.

Sure they do. Rescue laws are an example of that. If the law says that you have to help someone in peril, it's telling you how you may use your body. There are all sorts of ways we expect people to "use their body" to help someone else out. The law frequently makes coercive physical demands of people. Ever have to serve on a jury? Positive rights are mostly obligations about a person having to use their body to help another. Libertarian rights theorists will tell you that the law should only respect negative liberties and refuse to recognize involuntary claim-rights, but we all disagree with them.

And all lines are arbitrary. With laws, we still have to draw them.

Oh, I think some lines are less arbitrary than others and it is a defect in the law when drastically different outcomes are created for arbitrary differences.

[_Chap]

Everyone has views on personhood. Either you do it with some self-awareness and thought put into whether those views make sense or you don't.

Actually, I am not sure I have any view on what you call 'personhood', apart from feeling that talking about whether entities have it or do not have it is about as useless as asking whether those entities are snarks or boojums. The category simply does not seem to be one with any definite content. It seems to be little more than a secular substitute for talking about whether the said entities have 'souls' - a question once very meaningful to many in western cultures, but that is now confined to disputes amongst certain kinds of religious believers.

When you say, "I do not see how it helps to posit the existence of this class of entities, 'persons', membership of which appears next to impossible to agree about, and then make membership of that class the deciding factor in attributing rights. Let's drop the metaphysics, and go straight to the decision about to what entities we, as a society, want to attribute rights. That's the practical; decision, and we might as well face it directly."

All you are saying is let's dispense with understanding and justifying our views on personhood and just go straight to making declarations about it by political will.

Nope. I am saying that arguing about whether an entity has 'personhood' in the present context either gets us nowhere, since either there is no agreement on what the defining features of a person are, or else it is merely equivalent to arguing whether certain entities should have rights ascribed to them. In which case we might as well address that question directly.

If you are going to use what you call 'personhood' to decide whether or not an entity should have rights ascribed to it, you need to explain what, independent of having rights ascribed to it, are the defining characteristics of personhood. Can you do that?

[Guest]

I don't see how you can justify bodily integrity on privacy grounds. Privacy is about personal information being protected from public knowledge. There's a sense in which that means, "the right to be left alone" but if you just mean the right to be left alone in a general sense, then that sounds like begging the question. The government ought to leave you alone because the government ought to leave you alone? Bodily integrity refers to you having control over what happens physically with your body and is usually justified by self-ownership, personal autonomy, or a right unto itself in the way rights get asserted.

I get that there's a bodily integrity argument against criminalizing abortion. I just don't think it does enough work and runs into conflict with things pro-choice people frequently purport to believe.

Well, yes, if you take the narrow definition of privacy that you posited, then of course you won't understand how it could apply bodily integrity or abortion. In the law, the notion of privacy as a right to be left alone has been recognized since the late 1800s. Just as you observed with bodily integrity, it can be recognized as a "right unto itself."

Sure they do. Rescue laws are an example of that. If the law says that you have to help someone in peril, it's telling you how you may use your body. There are all sorts of ways we expect people to "use their body" to help someone else out. The law frequently makes coercive physical demands of people. Ever have to serve on a jury? Positive rights are mostly obligations about a person having to use their body to help another. Libertarian rights theorists will tell you that the law should only respect negative liberties and refuse to recognize involuntary claim-rights, but we all disagree with them.

By "use the body" I did not mean "act." I mean direct use of the body itself, whether in whole or part. Unless I have to give up a finger, Jury Duty isn't relevant. Neither are rescue statutes, which don't apply when there is risk of harm to the rescuer.

What I mean is, if my son needs a bone marrow transplant to live and I'm the only compatible owner, the government can't force me to give him a part of my body. That's true even if all he needs is blood, which involves a pinprick and 20 minutes of my time. And, unless I'm mistaken, a mother can do exactly the same with her newborn infant, even though to abort the infant 30 minutes before would have been a crime. Now, if she takes the infant home and refuses to feed it until it dies, she's a murderer. But if she refuses to give it her blood, it's not.

I think there is a principle or value here that we've recognized everywhere but in the case of pregnancy. That's simply how I think about the issue and I don't expect to persuade you or anyone else to think the way I do.

Oh, I think some lines are less arbitrary than others and it is a defect in the law when drastically different outcomes are created for arbitrary differences.

My point was that simply labeling something as arbitrary doesn't tell us anything important about it.

[_EAllusion]

Actually, I am not sure I have any view on what you call 'personhood'

Do you think mushrooms should/do enjoy the same moral rights as you? Is it morally wrong to eat a mushroom? Should people who eat mushrooms be jailed?

If you are going to use what you call 'personhood' to decide whether or not an entity should have rights ascribed to it, you need to explain what, independent of having rights ascribed to it, are the defining characteristics of personhood. Can you do that?

First, I think you need to clear this up a bit. Personhood is the condition an entity has that entails it having rights. Oughtness is built into the concept. Personhood doesn't tell us if something "should." It is the "should." It describes referents of moral statements by its nature.

That is what the personhood debate is about, yes. Yes, I have opinions on it that I can attempt to justify. So do you, and it is a vice, not a virtue if you think justifying those opinions is pointless.

[_EAllusion]

My point was that simply labeling something as arbitrary doesn't tell us anything important about it.

By calling it arbitrary, I meant that the distinction has no underlying rational basis and is not a useful guide to behavior. I think the distinction likely results in people finding some kinds of physical intrusions to be icky. It is sublimely weird that a person can be coerced physically in all sorts of rather demanding ways, but cannot be made to donate blood. I think these values are in tension and are driven by emotional intuitions that are also in tension.

Regarding privacy, what I don't seem to be getting across is that all the ways in which privacy has a robust, distinct meaning are exceptionally weak as a basis to justify allowing a person to kill someone else, but it's broad meaning is just a restatement of the original position. I can't say the government ought not to interfere with my cock-fighting ring because I have a right to be left alone because my right to be left alone is not some absolute thing. If I then assert my right to privacy prevails for me in that case, I'm just reasserting that I want to be left alone. There are lots of circumstances in which the public as a legitimate interest in not respecting privacy in this sense and engaging in activity that takes away someone else's right to life is typically right at the top. Any "yeah, buts..." you might offer in the case of abortion seem like a different argument altogether. You killing someone else is not some private matter and if you say there a justified basis for you to kill this person, then that sounds like the argument you should be having. That's what I see bodily integrity arguments as. (Of course, I think the better argument is to say this isn't a person at all.)

[_Chap]

Actually, I am not sure I have any view on what you call 'personhood'

Do you think mushrooms should enjoy the same legal and moral rights as you?

Nope. I am open to persuasion on pretty well every issue involving political questions, but I don't feel any motivation for questioning the customary omission of vegetables from such discussion. Do you feel that situation should change?

I suppose you think you can get a slam-dunk by asking me 'How did you decide that without first deciding whether mushrooms are persons'? But your question just asked my opinion on whether I was prepared to advocate rights for mushrooms. And I've answered it, without having used the word 'person' or any equivalent thereto.

If you are going to use what you call 'personhood' to decide whether or not an entity should have rights ascribed to it, you need to explain what, independent of having rights ascribed to it, are the defining characteristics of personhood. Can you do that?

First, I think you need to clear this up a bit. Personhood is the condition an entity has that entails it having rights. Oughtness is built into the concept. Personhood doesn't tell us if something "should." It is the "should." It describes referents of moral statements by it's nature.

But is what the person-hood debate is about, yes. Yes, I have opinions on it that I can attempt to justify. So do you, and it is a vice, not a virtue if you think justifying those opinions is pointless.

I ask whether you can give any content to personhood other that 'having rights' . You reply, in effect that you can't. So the concept of 'personhood' adds nothing useful to a discussion about whether an entity has rights, does it? So why do you feel the need to keep talking about it?

By the way, it is a result of observing such discussions as the endless to and fro on this thread that I have come to think that the concept of personhood is not a useful one.

[_Res Ipsa]

First, I think you need to clear this up a bit. Personhood is the condition an entity has that entails it having rights. Oughtness is built into the concept. Personhood doesn't tell us if something "should." It is the "should." It describes referents of moral statements by its nature.

Okay, you lost me here. I have a living thing. If that living thing has personhood, it has rights (not it should have rights). But there's another step, right? We have to figure out what rights someone with personhood should have.