Following their line of argument, though: the Gods of these hypothetical other worlds would not be immoral in those worlds; only the God of our world would be.EAllusion wrote:JohnStuartMill wrote:
I don't think this second defense of Divine Command theory is so unsalvageable, at least from the arguments you've given. Most mainstream Christians (I'm guessing) would stop you at "If God were to have a different nature..." and say "If He did, He wouldn't be God, and your rebuttal to DCT breaks down". Which makes kind of a weird sort of sense because, after all, Christians usually hold deity to be perfect, and because they belong to a monotheistic religion, think that there's only one way for it to be so. If one defines "God" as the literal Creator of the entire universe and its properties (which most Christians do), then Divine Command Theory starts to look an awful lot like Natural Religion, and converges with the "morality through reasoning" that you or I would recognize as ideal. Both theories would say that there are moral truths that are discoverable by reason and observation; the only difference between the two that I can see is that require there to be a supernatural agent at the end of the discovery process, while morality by reasoning would not. (I'd add that DCT would be shown to be inferior to its alternative on Occam's Razor grounds, in that case.)
The problem is that if God would cease to be moral if his commands/nature were different, that means that the truth of moral statements exists logically prior to the nature of God. Divine Command Theory is the view that the truth of moral statements is contingent on the wil/nature of God. Ergo, if God would be immoral in another world with a different nature, DCT is by definition false. In short, "both" is not an option. At least not this way.
Yeah, I don't think this is properly thought of as DCT. Good on the Mormons for this point.At this point, you might be arguing for a practical DCT, where knowing what is morally true or not is dependent on knowing the will of God. One might argue this because while the truth of moral statements isn't contingent on the will of God, God is the only sort of being able to figure out the truth of moral statements, and we all must rely on it to know those truths when it tells us them. Mormon theology is extremely unfriendly to DCT, despite many average Mormons either explicitly believing it or implicitly believing it through their arguments (especially against atheists), but this type of DCT is more available to them. The problem with thinking that is Euthyphro rears its ugly head again with its emptiness and arbitrariness problems. This time, it's just epistemic. If you don't have some independent ability to evaluate the moral goodness of God's commands, you still are faced with anything going and there being no basis to judge God perfectly good over anything else.
As far as Kevin being derivative of Behe goes, I don't buy that. Sure, Kevin is quoting intelligent design websites and endorsing ID arguments. Kevin is making classic creationist arguments. Heck, skepticism on on the capacity of evolutionary theory to account for the origin of flight (because afterall what good is half a wing?) leading one to conclude a designer must be involved is probably the most famous creationist argument of all. It dates back over a century. So much for his disavowal of intelligent design. But in order for me to think Kevin is being derivative of Behe, I'd need to see him making an argument that is uniquely dependent on how Behe relayed it. If Kevin started talking about irreducible complexity or something, then we could call derivative of Behe. (I realize he's referencing that type of argument, but that type of argument predates Behe in creationist literature by decades.)
You're right -- it's probably not fair to say that Kevin is being derivative of Behe. (I'm not familiar enough with the exact design arguments that Behe makes to say that Kevin definitely isn't being derivative.) It is fair to say that he is throwing out the same kind of awful arguments that Behe does, though.