Derail: Can you disprove a negative?

[_MrStakhanovite]

I'm not sure how Nimrod disproved the Screed example. The way I understood Nimrod is that you could never get a Mormon to neatly lay out their beliefs to the point where you could show a contradiction. I guess Nimrod might have to clear up the confusion.

No confusion.

This is a derail.

It is at once more complex and more simple than you apparently know. I don't need a primer in philosophy, thank you.

Nimrod understood correctly that the issue is all about definitions and nothing else. You can prove or disprove anything with symbolic logic if you define the terms the way you want.

I am really not interested in discussing this topic now, but thanks for your response.

Edit: For example, your definition of "entity" is itself question-begging. Look that up if you don't know what it means. The definition of entity you listed is:

1 a : being, existence; especially : independent, separate, or self-contained existence b : the existence of a thing as contrasted with its attributes
2 : something that has separate and distinct existence and objective or conceptual reality
3 : an organization (as a business or governmental unit) that has an identity separate from those of its members

What you are proving is that existing things exist. The whole problem is in the definitions- in this case the one for "entity"

But this is a derail and is not appropriate for the thread

Orginal thread from Derail is here: http://mormondiscussions.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=12727&start=21

[_MrStakhanovite]

This is a derail.

I've changed the venue.

I am really not interested in discussing this topic now, but thanks for your response.

Well, I hope you change your mind :)

Nimrod understood correctly that the issue is all about definitions and nothing else. You can prove or disprove anything with symbolic logic if you define the terms the way you want.

I'm not sure the entire issue of disproving a negative is based solely on definitions to the exclusion of everything else.

I do agree with you that if the two parties involved can't agree to definitions before hand, most of the discussion would be unproductive. But what if I presented you with the Screed argument, and you used the definitions I provided to show the contradiction, would this clearly not be a case of disproving a negative?

It is at once more complex and more simple than you apparently know.

It must be, because I genuinely don't understand my error here.

I don't need a primer in philosophy, thank you.

I'm sorry if I came off as condescending or arrogant, I just wanted to fully explain myself and show how I was coming to my conclusions. If I'm wrong, then I'm clearly misunderstanding a great deal, and I would appreciate it if you or anyone who's been following this, could take the time to correct me.

Edit: For example, your definition of "entity" is itself question-begging. Look that up if you don't know what it means.

Okay, so if I went with 1a..

1 a : being, existence; especially : independent, separate, or self-contained existence

Do you think love or redness meets that criteria?

[_MrStakhanovite]

I went over to AskPhilosopher.org and poked around and I came across this topic. it only had two answers, but I thought they might interest some:

http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2714

I'm reminded of the exasperated Bertrand Russell faced with the young Wittgenstein: "He thinks that nothing empirical is knowable. I asked him to admit that there was not a rhinoceros in the room, but he wouldn't. I looked under all the desks without finding one but Wittgenstein remained unconvinced." It is Wittgenstein here who is being obtuse and in the grip of a silly theory. Of course we can establish empirical propositions both positive and negative – for example, that there are five desks in the room and no rhinoceroses.

By any sane standard, it is just plain false that you can't prove a negative, and that supposed "discussion-killer" should itself be promptly killed off.

This is Mr.Smith's bio..

Peter Smith is a lecturer in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. Previously he taught at Aberystwyth and Sheffield, and for twelve years he was editor of the journal Analysis. He has written books in the past on the philosophy of mind and on chaos theory; now he mostly works on logic-related matters, and his last book was on Gödel's theorems. He blogs at http://logicmatters.blogspot.com/