Making it harder to sue big corporations.

[_canpakes]

At the behest of their wealthy corporate donors...

let us pause here for a moment because this boogey-man is often whispered in the ears of the DNC faithful right before they drift off into yet another privileged and delusional slumber.

of the top 10 donors among organizations - 7 donate 100% to DNC, 2 to RNC, and 1 splits the difference
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.php
so, "at the behest of their wealthy corporate donors" applies more appropriately to DNC

one of the largest lobby groups (US Chamber of Commerce) represents the interests of companies like Amazon
the number one political donor - Warren Buffet....3 of the top 5 donors are DNC donors...and the only 2 RNC donors are brothers...so arguably, meh.

yep, great point you are making about how the DNC has long used wealthy donors and wealthy companies to fund and influence their policies in spite of whatever the general public may or may not have desired, wanted, or even needed.

subs, this is just a diversion, but nothing more. Let's examine why with the following:

1. lobbyist A donates to someone 100 dollars to buy influence to let them log in an area previously not harvested, with the condition that person A also replants what is taken,

2. lobbyist B donates to someone 100 dollars to buy influence to let them dump mining debris into a field without a requirement to mitigate leaching,

3. lobbyist C donates to someone 100 dollars to buy influence to let them dump industrial waste into a water supply and bypass existing regulations for that river,

4. lobbyist D donates to someone 100 dollars to buy influence to let them run a donation program out of their church without having to adhere to certain 'food safety' guidelines typically required of restaurants or grocery stores.

Each of those involves the same mechanism of influence but the results of each request will differ wildly.

You are only jumping on Gunnar for mentioning the mechanism - and his mention is accurate - but you fail to address the desired outcome.

Do you have an opinion on the legislation that he mentions?

[_EAllusion]

It's also misleading as all get out as it uses anecdotes to distract from the sum total of donations from groups lobbying for corporate interests or wealthy individual donations. Both Democrats and Republicans are recipients, with differences in who benefits most varying by industry, but overall Republicans easily are the larger beneficiaries.

I took this more in the bin of sub as dishonest troll rather than sub the sophomoric snob who lacks self-awareness.

[_subgenius]

so, what is your point here?

I would think the point is that Republicans are sponsoring legislation that would make it harder to sue big corporations.

But is muddied by the opening sentence "at the behest..."
Obviously corporations are in favor of not being sued, regardless of political affiliation.
But the OP lears heavy on the donor influence, not on the actual substance of what "harder" encompasses..

Just a lot of "virtually" hedging

[_Gunnar]

So, Subby, do you have an answer to this question?

Do you have an opinion on the legislation that he mentions?

Do you or do you not think there is anything wrong with that kind of legislation or the legislator succumbing to pressure from wealthy donors who want it purely to further their own selfish interests?

[_cinepro]

This is specifically about class action lawsuits, and this is one of those issues where there is a lot of moral gray area.

Much of the good that can be had from class action lawsuits gets overshadowed by greedy and overreaching plaintiff's attorneys. It may be time for the pendulum to swing back in a more restrictive direction to get things under control.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... s-approves

I don't know if this bill is a good solution to the problem, but the question should at least be honestly framed.

Class actions have been a feature of the American litigation landscape for over seventy-five years. For most of this period, American-style class litigation was either unknown or resisted around the world. Notwithstanding this chilly reception abroad, American class litigation has always been a central feature of American procedural exceptionalism, nurtured on an idealized historical narrative of the class action device. Although this romantic narrative endures, the experience of the past twenty-five years illuminates a very different chronicle about class litigation. Thus, in the twenty-first century American class action litigation has evolved in ways that are significantly removed from its golden age. The transformation of class action litigation raises legitimate questions concerning the fairness and utility of this procedural mechanism, and whether class litigation actually accomplishes its stated goals and rationales. With the embrace of aggregative nonclass settlements as a primary—if not preferred—modality for large-scale dispute resolution, the time has come to question whether the American class action in its twenty first century incarnation has become a disutilitarian artifact of an earlier time. This Article explores the evolving dysfunction of the American class action and proposes a return to a more limited, cabined role for class litigation. In so doing, the Article eschews alternative nonclass aggregate settlement mechanisms that have come to dominate the litigation landscape. The Article ultimately asks readers to envision a world without the twenty-first century American damage class action, limiting class procedure to injunctive remedies. In lieu of the damage class action, the Article encourages more robust public regulatory enforcement for alleged violation of the laws.

http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume ... ction.html