
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
A Brief Orientation
PART ONE
10-1 & 10-2 (Addendum)
10-3 & 10-4
10-5 & 10-6 (digression into cause)
10-7 & 10-8 & 10-9
10-10 & Endnote 22
10-11 & 10-12
Endnote 23 & 10-3
Hume was the clear leader, even beating Aristotle himself! Even during his own day Hume had quite the reputation in literary circles, enjoying friendships with the likes of Benjamin Franklin, Edward Gibbon, James Boswell, and had a very close relationship with the economist Adam Smith. Hume even had a very dramatic and public falling out with the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau that was the subject of a lot of TMZ style of speculation in his day.Bourget and Chalmers wrote:Hume 139, Aristotle 118, Kant 113, Wittgenstein 73, Frege 70, Lewis 69, Russell 61, Quine 61, Davidson 49, Carnap 45, Mill 42, Rawls 42, Plato 37, Locke 35, Moore 27, Spinoza 22, Nietzsche 21, Descartes 19, Leibniz 18, Hegel 16.
David was just 11 years old when he left to study law at the University of Edinburgh and he returned home at the age of 15 without a degree and without his Christian faith. He shut himself up in the family library and spent a few years gorging himself on philosophy, poetry, and literature. Apparently he lived a kind of monastic existence, which eventually caused him to have some kind of mental health breakdown that he refers to as “the disease of the learned” in an unsent letter to a medical doctor.Hume wrote:I passed through the ordinary course of education with success, and was seized very early with a passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion of my life, and the great source of my enjoyments. My studious disposition, my sobriety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that the law was a proper profession for me; but I found an insurmountable aversion to every thing but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring.
This was not entirely true, the work attracted the ire of many a Calvinist reader who scoffed at the entire project. In fact, after the publication of ‘Treatise’ David would often find himself at the center of controversy every time he applied for positions at the University of Edinburgh or University of Glasgow. When there was talk about David seeking such positions, there was the inevitable letter writing campaign that would always put an end to David being considered.Hume wrote:Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the zealots.
And so in 1748 ‘An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding’ (hereafter: ‘Enquiry’) was published with David’s name attached. The book goes through ten editions, with the final edition being published a year after David died in 1777. That final edition is what I will be utilizing in this thread. The whole of ‘Enquiry’ will not be under consideration here, only section X ‘Of Miracles’.Hume wrote:I had always entertained a notion, that my want of success in publishing the Treatise of Human Nature had proceeded more from the manner than the matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too early. I, therefore, cast the first part of that work anew in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, which was published while I was at Turin.
As was briefly discussed in a previous post, the ‘Enquiry’ is a major revision of Hume’s previous work ‘Treatise’; in an interesting footnote at the beginning of this section Eric Steinhart (hereafter: ESF) mentions that this section could be a response to some Christian apologetic works that were popular during Hume’s day:Hume wrote:THERE is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the real presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.
If ‘Of Miracles’ is aimed at Christian apologetics works contemporary with Hume, his choice of beginning with a work by John Tillotson is an interesting strategy.ESF wrote:A draft of this section was extant as early as 1737; although Hume had apparently entertained the idea of including it in the ‘Treaties’, evidence suggests that he withheld it for fear of displeasing Joseph Butler, whose approval of the work he sought. The essay was first published as part of the ‘Enquiry’ and is thought by some to be a direct reply to two influential works, one by Thomas Sherlock (1678-1761), Bishop of London, ‘Tryal of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus’ (1729); the other was Zachary Pearce’s (1690-1774) ‘Miracles of Jesus Vindicated’ (1729). (Footnote #37)
No Archbishop of Canterbury has ever been a confessing Presbyterian, as Presbyterians do not recognize the office of Archbishop in their church polity. The good Dr. Tillotson was an Anglican (i.e. Church of England). You can read Tillotson’s ‘A Doctrine Against Transubstantiation’ online if one feels the desire to do so.ESF wrote:John Tillotson (1630-1694), a Presbyterian theologian who became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1691, argued in ‘Rule of Faith’ (1676) and ‘A Doctrine Against Transubstantiation’ (1684) that transubstantiation could never be established as part of Christian doctrine. (Footnote #38)
Thanks for this post, PG. What I understand of the role of Greek philosophy in Christian theology is too little, but it accords with what you have written here. Looking at discussions of that thought world and how Hume is participating impresses me with how little we generally comprehend of those arguments.What this implies for Hume's Treatise, I'm not sure. Perhaps it means his beginning is not as close to mere mocking of medieval absurdities as modern readers might think. He was talking about things that had in his day received tons of air time, some of which was rabbit-holishly subtle. Still perhaps he was just mocking superstition, and any connection to the arcane Scholastic categories of substance and accident was a mere red herring that one should ignore in following Hume.
If for nothing else diminishing over time is a good rule to go with since over time, we lose reliability of whether what is claimed was actually witnessed or not. For instance, it seems pretty clear any writer of the New Testament was not witness to any particular miracle that gets described there. There is no witness recording of the events.DrStakhanovite wrote: ↑Wed Jul 07, 2021 12:56 am
Notice though that Hume mentions that the evidentiary value of apostolic witness diminishes over time. We are being told that the temporal distance between us and ancient witnesses makes those witnesses less reliable in some sense, but I’m not sure how I feel about that.
Not sure I'm following. Tradition and scripture hardly seem to be evidence of the claimed miracles at all.Combined with his strong assertion of a hierarchy of evidence with human senses at the top and scripture and tradition below it, there seems to be a lot to be objected to.
Yes. Good points.I’m also not sure how to take that sentence concerning the Holy Spirit operating on the hearts of people. Is he being sarcastic here? Or is this some last minute qualification to help ensure his Christian audience doesn’t throw down his book in disgust when he states that human experience Trump's scripture and tradition.
What is refreshing so far is that Hume doesn’t have that evangelistic zeal about the primacy of reason over revelation or experience over scripture and makes no predictions about a day when everyone values what he does and ignores everything else.
I'm trying to figure out what he could mean if he's not being sarcastic. Scripture and tradition aren't brought home to everyone's breast like "sense", like the Holy Spirit does to make people feel like the change to real body and blood took place.when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
Hume writes as he does because in his day tradition and scripture were taken by large groups of people to be evidence that certain things, including miracles had actually occurred in the past.dastardly stem wrote: ↑Wed Jul 07, 2021 5:08 pmTradition and scripture hardly seem to be evidence of the claimed miracles at all.
Here Hume is sketching out a rough framework on how people reason. What is interesting here is that he isn’t being proscriptive in the sense that he is saying “this is how we ought to proceed when reasoning from our experiences” but instead he is talking as if this is how reasoning from experience is simply done and that we all recognize it.Hume wrote: Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.