Where's Mr. D?

[_wenglund]

It's not quite the same as the discovery that the church is not what it says it is, which again was part of the setup for your scenario. I'm not trying to be nitpicky, but I genuinely don't relate to people like your Case #1 because that experience is nothing like mine.

This is very helpful, and explains to me why you may have been intent on defining Mr. D in such narrow terms, or at least in having me find such a narrow segment of the Mr. D population.

Unfortunately, it misunderstands, in no small way, the purpose I had in mind, generally speaking, for the very simple scenerio, and for Mr. D in particular.

Really, all that was intended was: 1) to posit the general notion that there are viable alternatives to viewing the Church as lying about what it claims to be, including more specifically in terms of those who no longer believe the truth claims of the Church. 2) Given those viable alternitives, then viewing the Church as lying about what it claims to be is not necessary, and thus the signiificant anger and emotion that may result from viewing the Church in that unnecessary way, are themselves unnecessary. 3) Since it is not necessary to view the Church in that way, nor is it necessary to experience significant anger and grief because of that view, then it may be in one's own interest to choose one of the other viable alternatives (so as to avoid unnecessary personal anger and grief), and it may be in the interest of all parties concerned to do likewise (so as to avoid unnecessarily causing others anger and grief that may contribute to the cycle of anger and grief). In short, it was intended to convey the notion that there are more mutually beneficial and workable alternatives to the choice you and other Mr. B's have made.

Once that simple notion was sufficiently established, I had intended, if still necessary, to explore whether it was reasonable or unreasonable to view the Church as lying about what it claimed to be. But, in the thread in question, we weren't able to get beyond step one.

I had, however, made an attempt to address this second issue in a subsequent thread, though likewise without success (we didn't get beyond step two there).

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Of course there are viable alternatives to believing that the church lied about itself.

Great. So we are at least in agreement on point #1 of the intended purpose for the scenerio. What about points #'s 2 & 3?

I thought the thread about whether the church lied about itself got off to a good start, but you seemed to get stuck in not even being able to acknowledge a rather clear-cut lie or consider its relevance to the church's claims about itself.

Actually, it broke down between you and I when you said: "What dismays me is that you want me to prove the unprovable, whereas you steadfastly refuse to address the other side of the equation." And, it ended when you said: "I think I'm going to bow out of this discussion. On the one hand, you tell me that the standard of deciding whether someone lied is whether it's beyond a reasonable doubt. And then on a different thread you tell me that what is true is really not that important in the end. I've been busy getting ready for Christmas, and I guess I don't see the point in discussing this here."

I'd be willing to engage that thread again, but I suspect we'd have more productivity in discussing the foundational claims of Joseph Smith and whether those could be reasonably considered lies.

I think that proposed discussion would be as doomed to failure like the previous discussions unless we can come to an agreement about what is "reasonable" or not, and what methods and stardards should be met in cases such as this. In other words, should "reasonableness" in this case be a function of strong induction or weak induction? Should the definition of "lie" be narrowly or broadly defined? What rules of evidence should be enforced (whether things like hearsay evidence are admissable, and what should be the hierarchy and weighing of evidence--i.e. which type of evidence Trump's other types of evidence, etc.)? Which of the conventions of critical thinking should apply (such as the core principle of charitable interpretation, presumption of innocence, as well as relevance)? What should be the threshold for determining guilt or innocence (perponderance of evidence or beyond reasoanble doubt)?

To me, for the proposed discussion to succeed, answering the questions above must be guided by the principles of charity and fairness and the golden rule, and keep in mind a mutually agreeable end-objective: that, I believe, should entail eliminating or diminishing the cycle of hurt and anger and grief, and doing what is in the best interest of all parties concerned.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[_Runtu]

Great. So we are at least in agreement on point #1 of the intended purpose for the scenerio. What about points #'s 2 & 3?

Actually, it broke down between you and I when you said: "What dismays me is that you want me to prove the unprovable, whereas you steadfastly refuse to address the other side of the equation." And, it ended when you said: "I think I'm going to bow out of this discussion. On the one hand, you tell me that the standard of deciding whether someone lied is whether it's beyond a reasonable doubt. And then on a different thread you tell me that what is true is really not that important in the end. I've been busy getting ready for Christmas, and I guess I don't see the point in discussing this here."[/quote]

That's a different thread from the one I was referring to. You are correct that the original thread broke down because of some statements you made that led me to believe you weren't interested in a serious discussion. If I misread you, I apologize.

I think that proposed discussion would be as doomed to failure like the previous discussions unless we can come to an agreement about what is "reasonable" or not, and what methods and stardards should be met in cases such as this. In other words, should "reasonableness" in this case be a function of strong induction or weak induction? Should the definition of "lie" be narrowly or broadly defined? What rules of evidence should be enforced (whether things like hearsay evidence are admissable, and what should be the hierarchy and weighing of evidence--i.e. which type of evidence Trump's other types of evidence, etc.)? Which of the conventions of critical thinking should apply (such as the core principle of charitable interpretation, presumption of innocence, as well as relevance)? What should be the threshold for determining guilt or innocence (perponderance of evidence or beyond reasoanble doubt)?

Here's what I propose. It seems to me that if we're going to suggest that the determination of "lying" is irrational, then the standard should be whether one can rationally conclude that a lie has been told, based on the evidence. And I know enough about fallacies, such as weak induction, to avoid them.

As for what is a lie, I'd suggest that lies can take many forms, but I like Webster's definition:

1 : to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive
2 : to create a false or misleading impression

Would you agree that such is a reasonable definition of what it means to lie?

As for the standard of evidence, the first item of importance is that the church or its representatives make a claim about the church; and then it must be shown that a reasonable person could conclude, based on the evidence, that the claim was false. I think that the four standard types of evidence should be admitted, with hearsay being rejected. Maybe a little test would be in order before we waste anyone's time.

All four types of evidence were introduced at Mark Hofmann's trial showing that Hugh Pinnock had met repeatedly with Hofmann and arranged for a $185,000 loan for Hofmann to purchase the McLellin collection. Yet, here's what he told the police:

Bell [investigator]: "Do you know anything about the McLellin Collection and this man who was trying to sell it?"

Pinnock: "Well, wait a minute. I think I do. The McLellin Collection? I think I remember something about that. There was a guy who came here. Now, I know nothing about him myself, but I remember that some guy came in and said something about a collection. And I remember having to get up and walk down the hall and go into Elder Oaks's office. And I asked Elder Oaks, 'Are we interested in a 'McLellin Collection' or sorne kind of collection?' And he said, 'No. We're not buying anything. If the guy wants to donate something, that's fine.' And I back and told the guy, 'If you want to donate something that's fine.' "

So, Wade? Does that count as a lie?

To me, for the proposed discussion to succeed, answering the questions above must be guided by the principles of charity and fairness and the golden rule, and keep in mind a mutually agreeable end-objective: that, I believe, should entail eliminating or diminishing the cycle of hurt and anger and grief, and doing what is in the best interest of all parties concerned.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

I'm all for it, Wade.

[_wenglund]

So, Wade? Does that count as a lie?

Assuming that you used "strong induction" and the threashold of "beyond reasonable doubt" in concluding that "All four types of evidence were introduced at Mark Hofmann's trial showing that Hugh Pinnock had met repeatedly with Hofmann and arranged for a $185,000 loan for Hofmann to purchase the McLellin collection", then Pinnock's statement may "reasonably" be viewed as a lie under connotation #2, though perhaps not #1.

However, it entirely misses, in fundamental ways, the point of my previous post.

Did you use a narrow or broad defintion of "lie"? (I view it as conveniently broad)

Is your example relevant to the question whether the Church has lied about what it claimed to be? (I view it as not directly relevant).

Did you presume innocence, and was your interpretation of the events and statement in question "charitable"? (I believe it was conveniently not charitable--particularly in terms of the significance you place on this event and the importance you seem to have give it in relation to the verity of the restored gospel of Christ, not to mention the rather inflexible and one-sided way you previously presented the evidence to me)

Was your choice of examples, and your approach to viewing the example, guided by the principles of charity and fairness and the golden rule, and kept in mind a mutually agreeable end-objective: eliminate or diminish the cycle of hurt and anger and grief, and doing what is in the best interest of all parties concerned? (I certainly don't see it.)

The fact of the matter is, depending upon one's personal objective (be it rationalization, proving oneself right, etc.), and depending upon one's disposition (hyper-critical, negatively focused, mean-spirited, etc.) one may find dictionary definitions that, when loosely and uncharitably and unfairly interpreted and applied, could "reasonably" (at least in one sense of the word--the one you seem to be using) qualify a host of words and actions as lying--such as the use of pseudonyms, not tellings one's spouse about venting against her faith on the internet, mischaracterizing another person's posts, believing something different than someone else or stating something that someone else believes to be false, etc. etc.. But, would such motives and actions be "reasonable" in another sense of the word (the one I am using)? I don't thnk so.

Do you see the critical difference that still exists between us (and I suspect the gap is far greater between me and people like Scratch and Who Knows)? Do you understand that discussions on this matter have little chance of succeeding until we reach common ground on the things I previously suggested?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[_Runtu]

Assuming that you used "strong induction" and the threashold of "beyond reasonable doubt" in concluding that "All four types of evidence were introduced at Mark Hofmann's trial showing that Hugh Pinnock had met repeatedly with Hofmann and arranged for a $185,000 loan for Hofmann to purchase the McLellin collection", then Pinnock's statement may "reasonably" be viewed as a lie under connotation #2, though perhaps not #1.

However, it entirely misses, in fundamental ways, the point of my previous post.

Did you use a narrow or broad defintion of "lie"? (I view it as conveniently broad)

I used the definition I got from Webster's, which happens to be the dictionary I use every day in my job. It wasn't a matter of convenience, Wade, except it's the dictionary on my desk and one whose definitions are generally considered standard in the United States. I agree that Pinnock's statement can reasonably be considered a lie. The problem is always going to be intent. Seems to me that a directly false statement, such as the one I used, implies intent. So, we're probably not going anywhere as long as you consider a reasonable deduction of intent as uncharitable.

Is your example relevant to the question whether the Church has lied about what it claimed to be? (I view it as not directly relevant).

No, I don't consider it directly relevant. I could have chosen any number of false statements from any source. I specifically chose that one to see if using something involving the church would affect your response. Jury's still out on that.

Did you presume innocence, and was your interpretation of the events and statement in question "charitable"? (I believe it was conveniently not charitable--particularly in terms of the significance you place on this event and the importance you seem to have give it in relation to the verity of the restored gospel of Christ, not to mention the rather inflexible and one-sided way you previously presented the evidence to me)

My only interpretation of the event was to ask you if you considered it a lie. I have attached no significance to this event (especially since I've never mentioned this particular incident before today).

Was your choice of examples, and your approach to viewing the example, guided by the principles of charity and fairness and the golden rule, and kept in mind a mutually agreeable end-objective: eliminate or diminish the cycle of hurt and anger and grief, and doing what is in the best interest of all parties concerned? (I certainly don't see it.)

It might surprise you, Wade, that I don't fault Pinnock. I think he panicked. I've made mistakes before, and I'm sure he regretted that one just as I have regretted mine. Again, I chose that example because I wanted to see how you would react to a clear and demonstrable falsehood given by a church leader. You seem to be reading an awful lot into my choice, for some reason.

The fact of the matter is, depending upon one's personal objective (be it rationalization, proving oneself right, etc.), and depending upon one's disposition (hyper-critical, negatively focused, mean-spirited, etc.) one may find dictionary definitions that, when loosely and uncharitably and unfairly interpreted and applied, could "reasonably" (at least in one sense of the word--the one you seem to be using) qualify a host of words and actions as lying--such as the use of pseudonyms, not tellings one's spouse about venting against her faith on the internet, mischaracterizing another person's posts, believing something different than someone else or stating something that someone else believes to be false, etc. etc.. But, would such motives and actions be "reasonable" in another sense of the word (the one I am using)? I don't thnk so.

This is really a strange turn of events, Wade. Again, I chose an event that most dispassionate observers would conclude was a clear lie. It had nothing to do with unfairness, lack of charity, or (heaven forbid) hypercritical and mean-spirited behavior. And it's quite odd that you are using this opportunity to once again remind me of my weaknesses, which I readily admit. I have done much that is wrong in my life, and I have had many moments I am not proud of. Have I ever lied? Sure. Has the church? Yep.

Do you see the critical difference that still exists between us (and I suspect the gap is far greater between me and people like Scratch and Who Knows)? Do you understand that discussions on this matter have little chance of succeeding until we reach common ground on the things I previously suggested?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Yes, I do see the difference. I assigned no motivations, whereas you assigned motivations to my choice of dictionaries and my choice of examples. I had motivations (convenience for the dictionary, curiosity for the Pinnock example), but you speculated wildly about mean-spiritedness, etc. It really is interesting watching so much come of so little.

Part of being charitable is assuming that people have the best of intentions and motivations.

[_wenglund]

Assuming that you used "strong induction" and the threashold of "beyond reasonable doubt" in concluding that "All four types of evidence were introduced at Mark Hofmann's trial showing that Hugh Pinnock had met repeatedly with Hofmann and arranged for a $185,000 loan for Hofmann to purchase the McLellin collection", then Pinnock's statement may "reasonably" be viewed as a lie under connotation #2, though perhaps not #1.

However, it entirely misses, in fundamental ways, the point of my previous post.

Did you use a narrow or broad defintion of "lie"? (I view it as conveniently broad)

I used the definition I got from Webster's, which happens to be the dictionary I use every day in my job. It wasn't a matter of convenience, Wade, except it's the dictionary on my desk and one whose definitions are generally considered standard in the United States. I agree that Pinnock's statement can reasonably be considered a lie. The problem is always going to be intent. Seems to me that a directly false statement, such as the one I used, implies intent. So, we're probably not going anywhere as long as you consider a reasonable deduction of intent as uncharitable.

You misunderstand. My mention of "convinience" was not so much in terms of what dictionary you used, but how broadly you use the definitions in whatever dictionary you may choose. You didn't restrict yourself to the first connotation, but included the second as well (which constitutes a broadening of the definition). Was it legitimate and "reasonable" for you to use that connotation? In one sense of the word "reasonable", yes. However, as previously explained, it may not be "reasonable" in another sense of the word.

Is your example relevant to the question whether the Church has lied about what it claimed to be? (I view it as not directly relevant).

No, I don't consider it directly relevant. I could have chosen any number of false statements from any source. I specifically chose that one to see if using something involving the church would affect your response. Jury's still out on that.

I viewed the example in the context of what I had previously stated, and found it illustrative, in a generic way, and underscored some of what I had said.

Did you presume innocence, and was your interpretation of the events and statement in question "charitable"? (I believe it was conveniently not charitable--particularly in terms of the significance you place on this event and the importance you seem to have give it in relation to the verity of the restored gospel of Christ, not to mention the rather inflexible and one-sided way you previously presented the evidence to me)

My only interpretation of the event was to ask you if you considered it a lie. I have attached no significance to this event (especially since I've never mentioned this particular incident before today).

Actually, you mentioned in a previous thread that Pinnock had lied about not knowing Hoffman. If so, would your statement above constitute a "lie" under connotation #2 in your Webster's dictionary? (I facetiously ask this question so as to see whether something involving you would effect your response, or rather to help you see the point of my previous post in relation to your choice of examples). ;-) No, I am not serious in what I asked.

Was your choice of examples, and your approach to viewing the example, guided by the principles of charity and fairness and the golden rule, and kept in mind a mutually agreeable end-objective: eliminate or diminish the cycle of hurt and anger and grief, and doing what is in the best interest of all parties concerned? (I certainly don't see it.)

It might surprise you, Wade, that I don't fault Pinnock. I think he panicked. I've made mistakes before, and I'm sure he regretted that one just as I have regretted mine. Again, I chose that example because I wanted to see how you would react to a clear and demonstrable falsehood given by a church leader. You seem to be reading an awful lot into my choice, for some reason.

The reason that I may be reading things into what you are saying, is because the example was given in the context of what I had said in my previous post. And, while you may have had your own reasons for choosing the example that you did, I viewed it in the context of my previous post, and found it to evince, in several ways, what I had said.

The fact of the matter is, depending upon one's personal objective (be it rationalization, proving oneself right, etc.), and depending upon one's disposition (hyper-critical, negatively focused, mean-spirited, etc.) one may find dictionary definitions that, when loosely and uncharitably and unfairly interpreted and applied, could "reasonably" (at least in one sense of the word--the one you seem to be using) qualify a host of words and actions as lying--such as the use of pseudonyms, not tellings one's spouse about venting against her faith on the internet, mischaracterizing another person's posts, believing something different than someone else or stating something that someone else believes to be false, etc. etc.. But, would such motives and actions be "reasonable" in another sense of the word (the one I am using)? I don't thnk so.

This is really a strange turn of events, Wade. Again, I chose an event that most dispassionate observers would conclude was a clear lie. It had nothing to do with unfairness, lack of charity, or (heaven forbid) hypercritical and mean-spirited behavior. And it's quite odd that you are using this opportunity to once again remind me of my weaknesses, which I readily admit. I have done much that is wrong in my life, and I have had many moments I am not proud of. Have I ever lied? Sure. Has the church? Yep.

Actually, if viewed in the context of what I previously said, it may, in fact, have to do with unfairness and lack of charity. That is the point I had hoped would be born out through the questions you are now responding to, that you seem again to misunderstand. Regardless of why you may have chosen the example that you did, in the context of what I previously said, your example underscores some of the points that I made--not the least of which is that "reasonableness", as I am using the term, isn't about being dispassionate, but rather about being compassionate.

Do you see the critical difference that still exists between us (and I suspect the gap is far greater between me and people like Scratch and Who Knows)? Do you understand that discussions on this matter have little chance of succeeding until we reach common ground on the things I previously suggested? Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Yes, I do see the difference. I assigned no motivations, whereas you assigned motivations to my choice of dictionaries and my choice of examples. I had motivations (convenience for the dictionary, curiosity for the Pinnock example), but you speculated wildly about mean-spiritedness, etc. It really is interesting watching so much come of so little.

Part of being charitable is assuming that people have the best of intentions and motivations.

You are mistaken. I assigned no motives to your choice of dictionary, and did not specify (assign) a motive for your choice in using a more broad, rather than narrow, definition. Rather, I viewed that choice as illustrative, in a generic way, of the point I had made in the previous post. I also assigned no motive to your choice of examples, but rather found it also illustrative, in a generic way, of the point I had previously made--your own stated motives notwithstanding. And, not for a second had I considered, let along speculated wildly, that you were or are or will be mean-spirited. I mearly presented that as a generic and illustrative example of what may motive some people, and how that motivation may color one's perception of what is "reasonable" or not.

But, I agree whole-heartedly with your last statement. And, as long as that precept is exercised fully on both sides of this discussion, then we may not be all that far apart after all.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[_Runtu]

You misunderstand. My mention of "convinience" was not so much in terms of what dictionary you used, but how broadly you use the definitions in whatever dictionary you may choose. You didn't restrict yourself to the first connotation, but included the second as well (which constitutes a broadening of the definition). Was it legitimate and "reasonable" for you to use that connotation? In one sense of the word "reasonable", yes. However, as previously explained, it may not be "reasonable" in another sense of the word.

I'm sorry, Wade, but I really do see both definitions as applying. I'm not sure why you need to restrict the definition. It doesn't make sense to me. Either way, my giving the dictionary's definition and saying I agree with it does not constitute broadening. I was trying to establish the definition of "lie." I'm sorry we can't agree on a definition.

I viewed the example in the context of what I had previously stated, and found it illustrative, in a generic way, and underscored some of what I had said.

Why would you read it in that context?

Actually, you mentioned in a previous thread that Pinnock had lied about not knowing Hoffman. If so, would your statement above constitute a "lie" under connotation #2 in your Webster's dictionary? (I facetiously ask this question so as to see whether something involving you would effect your response, or rather to help you see the point of my previous post in relation to your choice of examples). ;-) No, I am not serious in what I asked.

I stand corrected. I hadn't remembered that brief mention.

The reason that I may be reading things into what you are saying, is because the example was given in the context of what I had said in my previous post. And, while you may have had your own reasons for choosing the example that you did, I viewed it in the context of my previous post, and found it to evince, in several ways, what I had said.

Again, my question is, Why did you find it necessary to view the example other than in the context in which it was asked?

Actually, if viewed in the context of what I previously said, it may, in fact, have to do with unfairness and lack of charity. That is the point I had hoped would be born out through the questions you are now responding to, that you seem again to misunderstand. Regardless of why you may have chosen the example that you did, in the context of what I previously said, your example underscores some of the points that I made--not the least of which is that "reasonableness", as I am using the term, isn't about being dispassionate, but rather about being compassionate.

I'm still not sure why asking a question indicates unfairness and lack of charity. Can you exlain why?

I believe I have been compassionate where Elder Pinnock is concerned. I genuinely think he made a mistake and should be forgiven it. I've never suggested malice or evil intent with the man. And I'm a little puzzled as to why reasonableness is about being compassionate. I believe in being compassionate, but I also believe in making sure that my compassion does not cloud my judgment. Which is why I believe in being dispassionate when determining facts.

You are mistaken. I assigned no motives to your choice of dictionary, and did not specify (assign) a motive for your choice in using a more broad, rather than narrow, definition. Rather, I viewed that choice as illustrative, in a generic way, of the point I had made in the previous post. I also assigned no motive to your choice of examples, but rather found it also illustrative, in a generic way, of the point I had previously made--your own stated motives notwithstanding. And, not for a second had I considered, let along speculated wildly, that you were or are or will be mean-spirited. I mearly presented that as a generic and illustrative example of what may motive some people, and how that motivation may color one's perception of what is "reasonable" or not.

If you say that your listing of my admitted weaknesses in the context of motivations and choices was not intentional, I'll have to take your word for it.

But, I agree whole-heartedly with your last statement. And, as long as that precept is exercised fully on both sides of this discussion, then we may not be all that far apart after all.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

I would hope so.

[_Mister Scratch]

Assuming that you used "strong induction" and the threashold of "beyond reasonable doubt" in concluding that "All four types of evidence were introduced at Mark Hofmann's trial showing that Hugh Pinnock had met repeatedly with Hofmann and arranged for a $185,000 loan for Hofmann to purchase the McLellin collection", then Pinnock's statement may "reasonably" be viewed as a lie under connotation #2, though perhaps not #1.

However, it entirely misses, in fundamental ways, the point of my previous post.

Did you use a narrow or broad defintion of "lie"? (I view it as conveniently broad)

I used the definition I got from Webster's, which happens to be the dictionary I use every day in my job. It wasn't a matter of convenience, Wade, except it's the dictionary on my desk and one whose definitions are generally considered standard in the United States. I agree that Pinnock's statement can reasonably be considered a lie. The problem is always going to be intent. Seems to me that a directly false statement, such as the one I used, implies intent. So, we're probably not going anywhere as long as you consider a reasonable deduction of intent as uncharitable.

You misunderstand. My mention of "convinience" was not so much in terms of what dictionary you used, but how broadly you use the definitions in whatever dictionary you may choose. You didn't restrict yourself to the first connotation, but included the second as well (which constitutes a broadening of the definition). Was it legitimate and "reasonable" for you to use that connotation? In one sense of the word "reasonable", yes. However, as previously explained, it may not be "reasonable" in another sense of the word.

The only thing "unreasonable" here that I can discern is your refusal to admit that the definition is the definition. There was no "broadening" of the definition, Wade. That *is* the definition. You do not get to alter the dictionary according to your whim, my friend.

Is your example relevant to the question whether the Church has lied about what it claimed to be? (I view it as not directly relevant).

No, I don't consider it directly relevant. I could have chosen any number of false statements from any source. I specifically chose that one to see if using something involving the church would affect your response. Jury's still out on that.

I viewed the example in the context of what I had previously stated, and found it illustrative, in a generic way, and underscored some of what I had said.

Did you presume innocence, and was your interpretation of the events and statement in question "charitable"? (I believe it was conveniently not charitable--particularly in terms of the significance you place on this event and the importance you seem to have give it in relation to the verity of the restored gospel of Christ, not to mention the rather inflexible and one-sided way you previously presented the evidence to me)

My only interpretation of the event was to ask you if you considered it a lie. I have attached no significance to this event (especially since I've never mentioned this particular incident before today).

Actually, you mentioned in a previous thread that Pinnock had lied about not knowing Hoffman. If so, would your statement above constitute a "lie" under connotation #2 in your Webster's dictionary? (I facetiously ask this question so as to see whether something involving you would effect your response, or rather to help you see the point of my previous post in relation to your choice of examples). ;-) No, I am not serious in what I asked.

Wade, do you not see what's happening here? You're saying, "Hey, yeah, sure, the Church may have been dishonest, but you should cut it some slack." You and the Church both need to admit that some dishonesty has occurred. That is the only way that true repentance and contrition can happen.

Was your choice of examples, and your approach to viewing the example, guided by the principles of charity and fairness and the golden rule, and kept in mind a mutually agreeable end-objective: eliminate or diminish the cycle of hurt and anger and grief, and doing what is in the best interest of all parties concerned? (I certainly don't see it.)

It might surprise you, Wade, that I don't fault Pinnock. I think he panicked. I've made mistakes before, and I'm sure he regretted that one just as I have regretted mine. Again, I chose that example because I wanted to see how you would react to a clear and demonstrable falsehood given by a church leader. You seem to be reading an awful lot into my choice, for some reason.

The reason that I may be reading things into what you are saying, is because the example was given in the context of what I had said in my previous post. And, while you may have had your own reasons for choosing the example that you did, I viewed it in the context of my previous post, and found it to evince, in several ways, what I had said.

The fact of the matter is, depending upon one's personal objective (be it rationalization, proving oneself right, etc.), and depending upon one's disposition (hyper-critical, negatively focused, mean-spirited, etc.) one may find dictionary definitions that, when loosely and uncharitably and unfairly interpreted and applied, could "reasonably" (at least in one sense of the word--the one you seem to be using) qualify a host of words and actions as lying--such as the use of pseudonyms, not tellings one's spouse about venting against her faith on the internet, mischaracterizing another person's posts, believing something different than someone else or stating something that someone else believes to be false, etc. etc.. But, would such motives and actions be "reasonable" in another sense of the word (the one I am using)? I don't thnk so.

This is really a strange turn of events, Wade. Again, I chose an event that most dispassionate observers would conclude was a clear lie. It had nothing to do with unfairness, lack of charity, or (heaven forbid) hypercritical and mean-spirited behavior. And it's quite odd that you are using this opportunity to once again remind me of my weaknesses, which I readily admit. I have done much that is wrong in my life, and I have had many moments I am not proud of. Have I ever lied? Sure. Has the church? Yep.

Actually, if viewed in the context of what I previously said, it may, in fact, have to do with unfairness and lack of charity. That is the point I had hoped would be born out through the questions you are now responding to, that you seem again to misunderstand. Regardless of why you may have chosen the example that you did, in the context of what I previously said, your example underscores some of the points that I made--not the least of which is that "reasonableness", as I am using the term, isn't about being dispassionate, but rather about being compassionate.

And are you "compassionate" towards those you see as "antagonizing" your "most precious and dear" Church?

Do you see the critical difference that still exists between us (and I suspect the gap is far greater between me and people like Scratch and Who Knows)? Do you understand that discussions on this matter have little chance of succeeding until we reach common ground on the things I previously suggested? Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Yes, I do see the difference. I assigned no motivations, whereas you assigned motivations to my choice of dictionaries and my choice of examples. I had motivations (convenience for the dictionary, curiosity for the Pinnock example), but you speculated wildly about mean-spiritedness, etc. It really is interesting watching so much come of so little.

Part of being charitable is assuming that people have the best of intentions and motivations.

You are mistaken. I assigned no motives to your choice of dictionary, and did not specify (assign) a motive for your choice in using a more broad, rather than narrow, definition.

That's because you can't. The definition is what it is.

Rather, I viewed that choice as illustrative, in a generic way, of the point I had made in the previous post. I also assigned no motive to your choice of examples, but rather found it also illustrative, in a generic way, of the point I had previously made--your own stated motives notwithstanding. And, not for a second had I considered, let along speculated wildly, that you were or are or will be mean-spirited. I mearly presented that as a generic and illustrative example of what may motive some people, and how that motivation may color one's perception of what is "reasonable" or not.

But, I agree whole-heartedly with your last statement. And, as long as that precept is exercised fully on both sides of this discussion, then we may not be all that far apart after all.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

By the way, Wade, my views on the Church are rather different that those of Who Knows. Just for the record.

[_wenglund]

You misunderstand. My mention of "convinience" was not so much in terms of what dictionary you used, but how broadly you use the definitions in whatever dictionary you may choose. You didn't restrict yourself to the first connotation, but included the second as well (which constitutes a broadening of the definition). Was it legitimate and "reasonable" for you to use that connotation? In one sense of the word "reasonable", yes. However, as previously explained, it may not be "reasonable" in another sense of the word.

I'm sorry, Wade, but I really do see both definitions as applying. I'm not sure why you need to restrict the definition. It doesn't make sense to me. Either way, my giving the dictionary's definition and saying I agree with it does not constitute broadening. I was trying to establish the definition of "lie." I'm sorry we can't agree on a definition.

In a prior thread we had previously agreed on a definition (one very similar to connotation #1 in your Websters dictionary). You have since added a second connotation to the mix (connotation #2). I can't see how that couldn't reasonably be viewed as a broadening of the definition. Connotation #2 clearly provides greater latitude in what constitutes a "lie" than connotation #1, and using both together provides greater latitude still. Granted, it is not as broad as Scratch's use of 5 connotations. But, it is a broadening nevertheless.

Now, is it "reasonable" to broaden the definition in that way? Yes, of course it is--at least in one sense of the word "reasonable". After all, each of the connotations come from authoritative sources. I can (and have done so by way of an object lesson) "reasonably" used the broadened definition in the same way others have, and have thereby deemed not a few things said by participants here as "lies".

But, to what end? The chance to "reasonably" call each other liars, back and forth?

To my own way of thinking, that would be "unreasonable". To me, the point isn't to go around determining what words or actions could possibly or "reasonably" fit the dictionary definitions of "lie", and call them such. Rather, the "reasonable" thing to do is, as you astutely mentioned, be "charitable in assuming that people have the best of intentions and motivations", and reserve the label of "lie" and "liar" for only the most egregious and blattant cases.

I understand, though, that not everyone will see it that way. Certainly, Scratch doesn't. And, so, to the extent that others do not see it the same way as me, the less the chances of success in discussing issues involving "lies".

I viewed the example in the context of what I had previously stated, and found it illustrative, in a generic way, and underscored some of what I had said.

Why would you read it in that context?

I reasonably presumed that you were responding to what I had said, and not just stating something disconnected, and for reasons of your own (not that your stating something disconnected would necessarily be unreasonable). And, knowing now, after the fact, your intents behind proferring the case you did, I can see more clearly how it would work in that way.

Nevertheless, and regardless of your intents, the case you presented, was, in some ways, still useful in illustrating some of the points I had made in my previous post (not the least of which is the one you and I are hammering out above).

Does that help?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[_Runtu]

In a prior thread we had previously agreed on a definition (one very similar to connotation #1 in your Websters dictionary). You have since added a second connotation to the mix (connotation #2). I can't see how that couldn't reasonably be viewed as a broadening of the definition. Connotation #2 clearly provides greater latitude in what constitutes a "lie" than connotation #1, and using both together provides greater latitude still. Granted, it is not as broad as Scratch's use of 5 connotations. But, it is a broadening nevertheless.

I hadn't remembered agreeing on a definition. My definition here was offered in the spirit of setting ground rules. It wasn't an attempt to do anything but establish the terms of the discussion.

Now, is it "reasonable" to broaden the definition in that way? Yes, of course it is--at least in one sense of the word "reasonable". After all, each of the connotations come from authoritative sources. I can (and have done so by way of an object lesson) "reasonably" used the broadened definition in the same way others have, and have thereby deemed not a few things said by participants here as "lies".

While I don't appreciate being used as an "object lesson," point taken.

But, to what end? The chance to "reasonably" call each other liars, back and forth?

That's certainly not my intention, Wade.

To my own way of thinking, that would be "unreasonable".

Not to mention pointless.

To me, the point isn't to go around determining what words or actions could possibly or "reasonably" fit the dictionary definitions of "lie", and call them such. Rather, the "reasonable" thing to do is, as you astutely mentioned, be "charitable in assuming that people have the best of intentions and motivations", and reserve the label of "lie" and "liar" for only the most egregious and blattant cases.

That's not my point, either, Wade.

I understand, though, that not everyone will see it that way. Certainly, Scratch doesn't. And, so, to the extent that others do not see it the same way as me, the less the chances of success in discussing issues involving "lies".

I'm not all that hopeful, Wade, as I believe the Pinnock example I gave is a pretty clear example of definition #1, but you don't. I gave that example because I wanted to see how you dealt with an easily demonstrated lie, in the sense that here is a case that even the most compassionate observer would agree involved someone deliberately gave false information to the police. If you don't see that as a clear lie, then I doubt we'll get very far either. Again, that's why I used that example.

I reasonably presumed that you were responding to what I had said, and not just stating something disconnected, and for reasons of your own (not that your stating something disconnected would necessarily be unreasonable). And, knowing now, after the fact, your intents behind proferring the case you did, I can see more clearly how it would work in that way.

Fair enough.

Nevertheless, and regardless of your intents, the case you presented, was, in some ways, still useful in illustrating some of the points I had made in my previous post (not the least of which is the one you and I are hammering out above).

Does that help?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Yes, it does, Wade. I'm afraid I'm less hopeful for a fruitful discussion, but you never know.

[_Mister Scratch]

You misunderstand. My mention of "convinience" was not so much in terms of what dictionary you used, but how broadly you use the definitions in whatever dictionary you may choose. You didn't restrict yourself to the first connotation, but included the second as well (which constitutes a broadening of the definition). Was it legitimate and "reasonable" for you to use that connotation? In one sense of the word "reasonable", yes. However, as previously explained, it may not be "reasonable" in another sense of the word.

I'm sorry, Wade, but I really do see both definitions as applying. I'm not sure why you need to restrict the definition. It doesn't make sense to me. Either way, my giving the dictionary's definition and saying I agree with it does not constitute broadening. I was trying to establish the definition of "lie." I'm sorry we can't agree on a definition.

In a prior thread we had previously agreed on a definition (one very similar to connotation #1 in your Websters dictionary). You have since added a second connotation to the mix (connotation #2). I can't see how that couldn't reasonably be viewed as a broadening of the definition. Connotation #2 clearly provides greater latitude in what constitutes a "lie" than connotation #1, and using both together provides greater latitude still. Granted, it is not as broad as Scratch's use of 5 connotations. But, it is a broadening nevertheless.

Now, is it "reasonable" to broaden the definition in that way? Yes, of course it is--at least in one sense of the word "reasonable". After all, each of the connotations come from authoritative sources. I can (and have done so by way of an object lesson) "reasonably" used the broadened definition in the same way others have, and have thereby deemed not a few things said by participants here as "lies".

But, to what end? The chance to "reasonably" call each other liars, back and forth?

Such as what? I don't recall you providing any examples or evidence. At the very least, I don't recall you producing evidence that is even remotely on the scale of the deceptions manufactured by the Church.

To my own way of thinking, that would be "unreasonable". To me, the point isn't to go around determining what words or actions could possibly or "reasonably" fit the dictionary definitions of "lie", and call them such. Rather, the "reasonable" thing to do is, as you astutely mentioned, be "charitable in assuming that people have the best of intentions and motivations", and reserve the label of "lie" and "liar" for only the most egregious and blattant cases.

How is something so powerful and sweeping as the Church and its attendant truth claims not an "egregious and blatant case"? Also, is it really proper and correct to treat an organization---such as the LDS Church---as a "person" with motives and intentions?

Let me ask you this: would it be "reasonable" to ignore the deceptions of a company like Enron? Since, after all, the company was mainly just trying to supply energy to people....

I understand, though, that not everyone will see it that way. Certainly, Scratch doesn't. And, so, to the extent that others do not see it the same way as me, the less the chances of success in discussing issues involving "lies".

I viewed the example in the context of what I had previously stated, and found it illustrative, in a generic way, and underscored some of what I had said.

Why would you read it in that context?

I reasonably presumed that you were responding to what I had said, and not just stating something disconnected, and for reasons of your own (not that your stating something disconnected would necessarily be unreasonable). And, knowing now, after the fact, your intents behind proferring the case you did, I can see more clearly how it would work in that way.

Nevertheless, and regardless of your intents, the case you presented, was, in some ways, still useful in illustrating some of the points I had made in my previous post (not the least of which is the one you and I are hammering out above).

Does that help?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

I think the most helpful thing would be for TBMs and the Church itself to admit that deception had gone on. It's much easier to forgive someone who has confessed (and apologized, rather than made excuses).