For antishock: Demonstrate the truth of this proposition...

[_antishock8]

However reasonable your position might be, this is a circular argument. You assume (1) without demonstrating it and then conclude from your assumed, undemonstrated premise that Book of Mormon is not a true history.

At this point, sans demonstration, one would be perfectly justified in rejecting (1) and, thus, the argument fails.

Even assuming that (1) is true, it is also undemonstrated; thus, the argument is not cogent or constraining.

This points toward the reason that I would speak of these things a bit differently than Beastie, for example. While she suggests, "...using languages as we normally do, it is reasonable and logical to state that the Book of Mormon has been proven to be 'not true' in terms of being a factual history," I would approach the issue from a different point of view. I would suggest rather that, all things considered, the probability of Book of Mormon being a true history is so small that one can reasonably exclude that probability from active consideration. I wouldn't say, however, that it has been proven to be "not true."

Chris

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_inference

A→B
A
∴B

Please don't take my lack of verbosity as snarkiness. I don't think I'm using circular logic. I don't have a supercomputer available to me in order to run enough simulations to satisfy an apologist in this instance. However, as an anecdote, my former father-in-law used to run nuclear tests from his computer at Los Alamos. His expertise was in variability equations. He was instrumental in helping the government move from live testing to simulated testing of nuclear devices. My point? Only a handful of people would be educated enough to understand the mathematics behind his programming. In addition, the complex data gathered from the testing again could most likely be understood by very few. What you're asking me to is take us into the realm of that level of expertise. That's impossible.

However, what's not impossible is for us to understand that inference, as a rule, is admissable when establishing truth. Reliable. Verifiable. Truth.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admissible_rule

In a very basic way, I'm simply providing the model, thanks to the Book of Ether, and then sans the arithmetic (since it's beyond my ability to produce it, get it, or for most of us to understand it) making an inference that is sound. What thinking person could say that releasing 8 bottles, or 8 barges, or 8 anything at one point and then having them travel across seas/oceans for 344 days would land at the same spot, at the same time? We know enough, from a lay person's point of view, about weather and ocean patterns, statistics, probability, etc.. that my inference is sound, logically based, and based in rational principles which follow scientific rules.

[_cksalmon]

However reasonable your position might be, this is a circular argument. You assume (1) without demonstrating it and then conclude from your assumed, undemonstrated premise that Book of Mormon is not a true history.

At this point, sans demonstration, one would be perfectly justified in rejecting (1) and, thus, the argument fails.

Even assuming that (1) is true, it is also undemonstrated; thus, the argument is not cogent or constraining.

This points toward the reason that I would speak of these things a bit differently than Beastie, for example. While she suggests, "...using languages as we normally do, it is reasonable and logical to state that the Book of Mormon has been proven to be 'not true' in terms of being a factual history," I would approach the issue from a different point of view. I would suggest rather that, all things considered, the probability of Book of Mormon being a true history is so small that one can reasonably exclude that probability from active consideration. I wouldn't say, however, that it has been proven to be "not true."

Chris

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_inference

A→B
A
∴B

Please don't take my lack of verbosity as snarkiness. I don't think I'm using circular logic. I don't have a supercomputer available to me in order to run enough simulations to satisfy an apologist in this instance. However, as an anecdote, my former father-in-law used to run nuclear tests from his computer at Los Alamos. His expertise was in variability equations. He was instrumental in helping the government move from live testing to simulated testing of nuclear devices. My point? Only a handful of people would be educated enough to understand the mathematics behind his programming. In addition, the complex data gathered from the testing again could most likely be understood by very few. What you're asking me to is take us into the realm of that level of expertise. That's impossible.

However, what's not impossible is for us to understand that inference, as a rule, is admissable when establishing truth. Reliable. Verifiable. Truth.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admissible_rule

In a very basic way, I'm simply providing the model, thanks to the Book of Ether, and then sans the arithmetic (since it's beyond my ability to produce it, get it, or for most of us to understand it) making an inference that is sound. What thinking person could say that releasing 8 bottles, or 8 barges, or 8 anything at one point and then having them travel across seas/oceans for 344 days would land at the same spot, at the same time? We know enough, from a lay person's point of view, about weather and ocean patterns, statistics, probability, etc.. that my inference is sound, logically based, and based in rational principles which follow scientific rules.

A→B
A
∴B

From the article you referenced:

This expression states, that whenever in the course of some logical derivation the given premises have been obtained, the specified conclusion can be taken for granted as well.

In order for this argument to be successful, it would need to have the following form (which you've provided) and an important Caveat (my [2'] below, which you haven't):

(1) A→B
(2') A has been demonstrated
(3) ∴B

The conclusion (B) is a valid application of the rule of inference just so long as (A) has been demonstrated to be true. Otherwise, no dice.

What you're asking me to is take us into the realm of that level of expertise. That's impossible.

Strictly speaking, it's not "impossible" (mere "possibility" being an incredibly low bar in discussions such as this one), it's just incredibly, monumentally, mind-shatteringly unlikely. But, I think you've highlighted my point.

You seem to be arguing that it is impossible to demonstrate the truth of A, but, despite (A)'s undemonstrated nature, you would assume the truth of (A) in your argument (and, by implication of [A]'s veracity) that (B) is, in fact, the case.

There can be no logical entailment in one's conclusion if one's initial premise remains undemonstrated.

To put it another way, it would be like saying:
"I cannot show that (A) is in fact true, nevertheless, (A) is in fact true; therefore, (B) is true." Inference depends for its veracity upon prior demonstrated premises.

Otherwise, we have a circular argument.

Again, I agree with your conclusion on probabilistic grounds, but what you've provided does not entail ~(A), which must be the case in order for (B) to be said to be necessarily true or entailed.

With regard to the Admissible Rule, one's set of premises need be closed within the argument itself in order for the Admissible Rule to obtain. In other words, one's admissible inferences need be entailed within the argument itself. Extra-systemic premises (or inferences from extra-systemic premises) do not follow the Admissible Rule (which governs admissibility within a [logically-speaking] hermetically-sealed system of argumentation).

Or, that is my understanding. But, here, we're importing a schema from formal logic that is, to my mind, simply at odds with understanding and assessing propositions of history. Which is a tension that this thread has been plucking since the OP.

Chris

[_beastie]

This points toward the reason that I would speak of these things a bit differently than Beastie, for example. While she suggests, "...using languages as we normally do, it is reasonable and logical to state that the Book of Mormon has been proven to be 'not true' in terms of being a factual history," I would approach the issue from a different point of view. I would suggest rather that, all things considered, the probability of Book of Mormon being a true history is so small that one can reasonably exclude that probability from active consideration. I wouldn't say, however, that it has been proven to be "not true."

Your statement may be technically more accurate (and safer in regards to conversations with apologists, who tend to pick at nits), but my point is that some things are simply understood in our language. There is no practical difference between saying something has been proven "not true", and saying the probability can be excluded from active consideration. The end game is the same. The only reason this is even an issue is because it's one of the tools of desperate apologia. Does anyone imagine that apologists would use this as a tool if there were actually adequate evidence of the Book of Mormon in the first place? Of course not. Resorting to "you can't prove a negative" is a tool of the desperate.

[_antishock8]

Again, I agree with your conclusion on probabilistic grounds, but what you've provided does not entail ~(A), which must be the case in order for (B) to be said to be necessarily true or entailed.

With regard to the Admissible Rule, one's set of premises need be closed within the argument itself in order for the Admissible Rule to obtain. In other words, one's admissible inferences need be entailed within the argument itself. Extra-systemic premises (or inferences from extra-systemic premises) do not follow the Admissible Rule (which governs admissibility within a [logically-speaking] hermetically-sealed system of argumentation).

Or, that is my understanding. But, here, we're importing a schema from formal logic that is, to my mind, simply at odds with understanding and assessing propositions of history. Which is a tension that this thread has been plucking since the OP.

Chris

Modus ponens?

[_cksalmon]

This points toward the reason that I would speak of these things a bit differently than Beastie, for example. While she suggests, "...using languages as we normally do, it is reasonable and logical to state that the Book of Mormon has been proven to be 'not true' in terms of being a factual history," I would approach the issue from a different point of view. I would suggest rather that, all things considered, the probability of Book of Mormon being a true history is so small that one can reasonably exclude that probability from active consideration. I wouldn't say, however, that it has been proven to be "not true."

Your statement may be technically more accurate (and safer in regards to conversations with apologists, who tend to pick at nits), but my point is that some things are simply understood in our language. There is no practical difference between saying something has been proven "not true", and saying the probability can be excluded from active consideration. The end game is the same. The only reason this is even an issue is because it's one of the tools of desperate apologia. Does anyone imagine that apologists would use this as a tool if there were actually adequate evidence of the Book of Mormon in the first place? Of course not. Resorting to "you can't prove a negative" is a tool of the desperate.

However true that might be, Beastie, I would just state that I, personally, find there to be a significant logical difference between, say, 0.99999997% and 100%. I use the word "prove" and "proof" and "entailment" and "necessary" in very precise ways. I don't use them glibly (and I'm not suggesting that you do, either). Whether or not my view of entailment overlaps with that of the LDS apologist in ways convenient for him or her is really not something by which I'm particularly troubled. It is enough for me that the chances of Book of Mormon being a true history are quite, quite small.

I don't think I'm being obtuse, either, though that's debatable.

I currently believe a global flood is even less likely than the Jaredite voyage, if only because the claim is so much broader and amenable to investigation. What evidence I've read and digested against a global flood seems to be pretty solid. (And, check this, one of the most compelling summaries of said evidence was presented by two LDS publishing in Dialogue, of all things.)

Still, I wouldn't say that a global flood has been proven to be "not true."

I do think there is a significant difference (albeit, perhaps not a "practical one") between saying "something has been proven 'not true,' and saying the probability can be excluded from active consideration." In the first instance, the conclusion is utterly constraining--that is, "the Book of Mormon is not a true history" is a necessary truth. It cannot be denied without entailing logical incoherence.

In the second, the issue becomes, "Is this proposition 'the Book of Mormon is not a true history' necessarily true, thus making my belief to the contrary incoherent, or is its obverse just so utterly unlikely as to save me the trouble of entertaining it as a live option on probabilistic grounds?"

That's my point.

Chris

[_cksalmon]

Again, I agree with your conclusion on probabilistic grounds, but what you've provided does not entail ~(A), which must be the case in order for (B) to be said to be necessarily true or entailed.

With regard to the Admissible Rule, one's set of premises need be closed within the argument itself in order for the Admissible Rule to obtain. In other words, one's admissible inferences need be entailed within the argument itself. Extra-systemic premises (or inferences from extra-systemic premises) do not follow the Admissible Rule (which governs admissibility within a [logically-speaking] hermetically-sealed system of argumentation).

Or, that is my understanding. But, here, we're importing a schema from formal logic that is, to my mind, simply at odds with understanding and assessing propositions of history. Which is a tension that this thread has been plucking since the OP.

Chris

Modus ponens?

Sure.

If A, then B.

If ~A, B is left dangling. Modus ponens (implication) depends upon the demonstrated veracity of A.

Chris

[_beastie]

I do think there is a significant difference (albeit, perhaps not a "practical one") between saying "something has been proven 'not true,' and saying the probability can be excluded from active consideration." In the first instance, the conclusion is utterly constraining--that is, "the Book of Mormon is not a true history" is a necessary truth. It cannot be denied without entailing logical incoherence.

In the second, the issue becomes, "Is this proposition 'the Book of Mormon is not a true history' necessarily true, thus making my belief to the contrary incoherent, or is its obverse just so utterly unlikely as to save me the trouble of entertaining it as a live option on probabilistic grounds?"

I don't disagree with what you're saying. You do get my point - which is that, while your philosophical point may be more technically correct, in practice there really is no difference between the two. If you're excluding the probability of something from active consideration, you're really saying, for all practical purposes, that it's not true.

Like I said, I do understand your point, and agree with you, on philosophical terms. I just get tired of seeing this used as a tactic by believers (of all stripes), as if it makes a real practical difference.

[_cksalmon]

I don't disagree with what you're saying. You do get my point - which is that, while your philosophical point may be more technically correct, in practice there really is no difference between the two. If you're excluding the probability of something from active consideration, you're really saying, for all practical purposes, that it's not true.

Like I said, I do understand your point, and agree with you, on philosophical terms. I just get tired of seeing this used as a tactic by believers (of all stripes), as if it makes a real practical difference.

I generally agree with you, as well. The problem that defenders (of all stripes) can run into is the fallacy of negative proof: X is true because ~X has not been proven to be true. That's an obvious fallacy.

Chris

[_antishock8]

So, for you is the problem with my assertion vis a vis the Jaredite-8-barges-arriving-at-the-same-place is because it hasn't been demonstrated through a sophisticated simulation, mathematical equation, or through x number of tests? In other words, it's not a cogent argument because of the aforementioned examples?

Personally, the simplicity of the assertion, and self-evident nature of the impossibility of the task at hand seem, to me, very persuasive. Maybe I'm biased.. ;) Maybe I'll have to think of another example...

[_cksalmon]

So, for you is the problem with my assertion vis a vis the Jaredite-8-barges-arriving-at-the-same-place is because it hasn't been demonstrated through a sophisticated simulation, mathematical equation, or through x number of tests? In other words, it's not a cogent argument because of the aforementioned examples?

In short, the problem is that it hasn't been demonstrated to be true, by whatever means available. It has only been assumed to be true.

Personally, the simplicity of the assertion, and self-evident nature of the impossibility of the task at hand seem, to me, very persuasive. Maybe I'm biased.. ;) Maybe I'll have to think of another example...

While I find your initial premise likely, it is not self-evident (that is, it is not necessarily true given prior system-enclosed inferences). I find your conclusion probabilistically much more likely than its obverse, but I can't say that it is necessarily true. It is not "impossible."

by the way, I think Chap, on another thread, has presented some evidence from the Wentworth letter that is potentially more conclusive than the Jaredite voyage.

He has presented evidence that Joseph Smith received knowledge via revelation that the Jaredites first settled the New World. This does not at all appear to be true. More importantly, it is acknowledged by many Book of Mormon defenders to be not true. Because Joseph Smith presented this history (in the Wentworth letter) to be a spiritual and true revelation, and it is granted to be false by LGT adherents, it seems that Joseph Smith's revelations re: the Jaredites as the first settlers is false. Or, at least, both LDS apologists and non-LDS scholars believe it to be false.

I think this is a more productive arena of inquiry vis-a-vis the proposition "the Book of Mormon is not a true history."

Chris