MrStakhanovite wrote:Over at ironically named MD&D board, my good friend Loran Blood (hereafter: Droopy or Droops) has started a thread about an LDS Themed Theodicy, where he requested:
Droopy wrote:Pursuant to this, I'd like to continue the exploration of the subject, from an LDS standpoint, and engage the default positions of the broad secular culture (moral value relativism/situational ethics/nihilism) from that perspective. A civil, reasoned, rigorous philosophical discussion would be appreciated.
SAUCEIf it’s rigor my friend wants, then allow me to help him out! Since I’m apparently not a part of the broad secular culture (I’m not a moral relativist, situational ethicist, nor nihilist), I can’t defend that, but I can help Droops tighten up his game. See here:
Droopy wrote:From a gospel perspective, this is much clearer. Evil and good are core ontological categories of existence and are conceptually and definitionally linked by necessity. If one exists, the other must, by definition, also exist as the basis upon which the other is conceived.
First, congrats to Droops for making up a new word (definitionally). Second, Droops is correct that what he describes is a gospel perspective:
2Nephi2:11 wrote:For it must needs be, that there is an opposition in all things. If not so, my first-born in the wilderness, righteousness could not be brought to pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead, having no life neither death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility.
I have to say that I’m impressed with Droop’s use of the phrase “ontological categories”, now if he has any idea what that really is cannot be answered by me, but I’ll assume he knows how such terminology works.
To Droops, good and evil are ‘core ontological categories of existence’ which I take to mean existence(hereafter: M) is a primary ontological category, and good(hereafter: G) and evil(hereafter: E) are secondary categories. To me, these categories are modally robust (e.g.. not subjective, like the ontology used in biology to divide kingdoms and such, nor prone to change) and so it follows that M, G, and E are natural classes (I hope Droops isn’t a good Lockean, because this flies in the face of Locke), with G and E being natural subclasses of M.
Sadly, Droops doesn’t explicitly explain how G and E are linked by necessity, but I understand the sentence, “If one exists, the other must, by definition, also exist as the basis upon which the other is conceived” to mean that E is the absence of G and vice versa, that is to say, when you posit the existence of G, you also posit it’s negation, not good( ~G). If you have ~G then you have E.
So let us lay out the 4 premises of Droopy’s thought:
(P1): G -> ~G
If Good, then not Good, on the surface, (P1) looks like a contradiction, but you should understand it just to mean that if something Good is taking place at location X, then something not Good is taking place at location Y. In Droopy‘s post, you need the not Good to be able to understand the Good.(P2) ~G -> E
If not Good then Evil. Recall that Droopy made it explicit that Good and Evil are linked by definition(P3) E -> ~E
If something Evil happens at X, something not Evil happens at Y(P4) ~E -> G
If not Evil, then Good(P1) through (P4) seem viciously circular, but really, we should look at this as some kind of tautology, such as saying all bachelors are unmarried (again, this fits Droop’s thesis that good and evil are linked by definition).
All This seems appropriate for Droops, how often have we heard the trite and quite false idea expressed in terms like, “You wouldn’t know joy unless you knew misery”. This idea is, quite fittingly, espoused by the Book of Mormon passage above.
But what if you had a proposition like this?
(P5) Darth J sat on the chair.
(P5) seems to defy classification as either good or evil (more precisely; G v E), but by Droops’ own espoused ontology, (P5) must fit into some natural subclass of M. In the question of G or E, it seems we must posit a third subclass of M to deal with things like (P5), let us call it N (for neutral).
Now the problem becomes clear, since something can neither be both E and N (they are mutually exclusive, same for G and N, G and E), wherever one finds ~G, you may or may not find E:
(P2*)~G à E v N
( If not Good then Evil or Neutral)
So it follows when (P5) obtains, and Darth J sits on a chair, we are seeing something that is not good (~G), but this instance of ~G is also ~E, in the very least ~G and ~E are necessary for N, so:
(P6) N -> ~G & ~E
(If Neutral then not Good and not Evil)
So, let’s look at this little argument:
(P4*) ~E ->G v N
(P7) N
(P8) N -> ~G & ~E
(C1) ~G & ~E
So (P7) and (P8), shows us (by way of modus ponens) that something neutral is both not good and not evil , and since we know these concepts to be linked by their very definition (recall Droopy’s own words, “If one exists, the other must, by definition, also exist as the basis upon which the other is conceived.“), it reasonable to state:
(P9) ~G & ~E -> G & E
Now what follows is a simple chain argument:
(P7) N
(P8) N -> ~G & ~E
(P9) ~G & ~E -> G & E
(C2) G & E
(C3) N -> G & E
Droopy’s ontology and attempted LDS themed theodicy will inevitably lead to the contradiction that a neutral act is both good and evil, or if N is not allowed for some reason, then (P1) through (P4) is at best, an unconvincing tautology and at worst, a vicious circle.