The lack of logic that encompasses this joint

[_MrStakhanovite]

I reject belief in extraterrestrials, but absolutely refuse to affirm that extraterrestrials don't exist. I just haven't seen any compelling reason to think they do. You can deny assent to some proposition without asserting its negation.

+1

It's frustrating how often that distinction gets lost in these sorts of discussions.

I’m not so sure; I’m not satisfied with EA’s example. The claim God exists and its negation, God doesn’t exist, seem to me to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. God exists or God doesn’t exist. EA refusing to agree to a proposition that God exists surely points to some reasons why he doesn’t think the proposition is true. While EA may not express his full confidence in the proposition God doesn’t exist, he clearly favors it over the proposition God does exist for some reason.

[_sock puppet]

I reject belief in extraterrestrials, but absolutely refuse to affirm that extraterrestrials don't exist. I just haven't seen any compelling reason to think they do. You can deny assent to some proposition without asserting its negation.

+1

It's frustrating how often that distinction gets lost in these sorts of discussions.

I’m not so sure; I’m not satisfied with EA’s example. The claim God exists and its negation, God doesn’t exist, seem to me to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. God exists or God doesn’t exist. EA refusing to agree to a proposition that God exists surely points to some reasons why he doesn’t think the proposition is true. While EA may not express his full confidence in the proposition God doesn’t exist, he clearly favors it over the proposition God does exist for some reason.

Stak,

I do not believe in god. There is, in my opinion, no credible evidence for the notion of god's existence. In my estimation, god was conceived by man to explain that for which mankind did not have any other explanation, i.e. natural phenomena. As science has come to explain so much about our existence and environments, there is less and less of an explanatory need for god. Scientific thought as a process has become so much better and reliable at explaining the 'mysterious' than god ever was.

Humans are emotional beings, and the god myth continues to serve emotional needs and longings, even if god is no longer good at explaining what we do not understand. I have found making decisions based on feelings (Moroni promise or otherwise) not reliable. I have made much better and more consistently better decisions when I can articulate the pro's and con's, as well as my processes in sorting and sifting them to the point of a decision, than when acting on feelings that I cannot defend verbally.

As with most anything for which I do not have credible evidence now, I might later. There could exist this god of the notions of man. If I become aware of credible evidence of it, I would become a theist. In the lack of credible evidence for the god proposition or that rules the possibility out logically, it is an issue that is not ascertainable. So, I don't give it much thought. I do not believe, but I do not disbelieve either.

Perhaps I lean more towards disbelief because of the lack of evidence. I do not hold a belief that Rodney Dangerfield was a Martian. But, if there were credible evidence that could best (most rationally and probably) be explained as Rodney Dangerfield is a Martian. Then I would believe it until more evidence is adduced, and a better theory explaining that evidence debunks the notion that Rodney Dangerfield is a Martian.

If you might label that positive atheistic belief, I would respectfully disagree.

[_canpakes]

With all the clever quibbling that's gone on in this post over the definition of "atheist" (and Equality has done a yeoman's job of introducing several subtle linguistic distinctions with very little difference into the discussion in an attempt to create - subtle linguistic distinctions with very little difference), the upshot of the matter, at the end of the day, is this: Much of the atheist argument is dependent upon just what counts as evidence for or against the existence of God, and upon what criteria that is to be decided.

When an atheist says, "I don't believe in God because I do not see sufficient evidence to believe in God." what is really being claimed here is that, from within the intellectual template, constraints, expectations, perceptual range, and accepted methodological rules of the intellectually conditioning sphere of the philosophical naturalism that is the perceptual filter through which the atheist perceives the universe, what counts as "evidence" for the existence of God may be very different from what counts as evidence to someone working outside the naturalistic/materialist/positivst "box."

Yes, this sounds like you are referring to the 'scientific method'.

Atheists assume that what they take to be "evidence" for or against the existence of God is somehow uniquely privileged above other forms of perception, thought, and methodology, and that what counts as evidence in a biology lab or an astronomer's observatory in the search for some truth relating to the physical universe, is simply transferable wholesale into other realms in which other kinds of phenomena are in question.

Atheists likely draw their conclusion by using a method that encompasses two important components: (1) verifiable observations that are consistent amongst multiple observers regardless of religious beliefs, and (2) contrasts between contradictory claims on the nature of God (that nature being ultimately untestable).

In other words, it comes down to a conclusion based either on what can be verified by others, or by what someone merely claims 'is' (the particular attributes of God as s/he sees fit to define them) without verifiable corroboration from others. In essence, then, your statement is the reverse of what the actual case is - the atheist works within 'the rules' applicable to all and everything, and the believer holds the 'privileged' opinion, by excusing him/herself from a corroborative method of study that would lend credence to the believer's religious claims.

[_EAllusion]

I’m not so sure; I’m not satisfied with EA’s example. The claim God exists and its negation, God doesn’t exist, seem to me to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. God exists or God doesn’t exist. EA refusing to agree to a proposition that God exists surely points to some reasons why he doesn’t think the proposition is true. While EA may not express his full confidence in the proposition God doesn’t exist, he clearly favors it over the proposition God does exist for some reason.

I think the alien analogy holds because aliens, like deities, can comfortably exist without our knowledge without us expecting to have that knowledge of them even if they existed. This is different than Nessie or Bigfoot where lack of evidence is strong evidence against. A diety, on the other hand, could exist without there being any reason for us to think we'd know if it did. People clearly believe in the existence of aliens, like deities, but their case(s) have not met my satisfaction. But, failing to provide justification for their belief does not necessarily preclude the existence of its object. Beliefs can be true without being justified.

I don't think one has to have Cartesian certainty to conclude God doesn't exist. Further, I am willing to argue that plenty of conceptions of God - what the vast majority of believers believe - either probably do not exist or are so incoherent that it doesn't make sense to even speak about them. I'm not just convinced of the strong atheist project. That said, I think those who glibly dismiss strong atheism almost always don't have a clue about how people go about trying to justify it.

As far as your reasoning goes here, I am confused by it. Either aliens exist or they don't. Failing to agree that they do is not the same as asserting they don't. Same is true of God. The main case for strong atheism argues that you can reasonably go ahead and assume something does not exist if 1) there is no reason to think it does and 2) it's prior probability is naturally low. You need not be agnostic about the proverbial teacup in space. It doesn't exist. If you are assuming that in what you are saying, I'm not persuaded that this is necessarily the case.

[_EAllusion]

When an atheist says, "I don't believe in God because I do not see sufficient evidence to believe in God." what is really being claimed here is that, from within the intellectual template, constraints, expectations, perceptual range, and accepted methodological rules of the intellectually conditioning sphere of the philosophical naturalism that is the perceptual filter through which the atheist perceives the universe, what counts as "evidence" for the existence of God may be very different from what counts as evidence to someone working outside the naturalistic/materialist/positivst "box."

This is quite possibly the most horribly written sentence I've ever read.

[_Some Schmo]

When an atheist says, "I don't believe in God because I do not see sufficient evidence to believe in God." what is really being claimed here is that, from within the intellectual template, constraints, expectations, perceptual range, and accepted methodological rules of the intellectually conditioning sphere of the philosophical naturalism that is the perceptual filter through which the atheist perceives the universe, what counts as "evidence" for the existence of God may be very different from what counts as evidence to someone working outside the naturalistic/materialist/positivst "box."

This is quite possibly the most horribly written sentence I've ever read.

Thanks a lot, EA. I had comfortably missed that until you quoted it. Now I have to go wash my eyes out with soap.

Let me guess... Droopy?

[_Chap]

When an atheist says, "I don't believe in God because I do not see sufficient evidence to believe in God." what is really being claimed here is that, from within the intellectual template, constraints, expectations, perceptual range, and accepted methodological rules of the intellectually conditioning sphere of the philosophical naturalism that is the perceptual filter through which the atheist perceives the universe, what counts as "evidence" for the existence of God may be very different from what counts as evidence to someone working outside the naturalistic/materialist/positivst "box."

This is quite possibly the most horribly written sentence I've ever read.

Yes, and he could have said it so much more simply:

"If the kind of evidence you are willing to admit does not seem sufficient to justify a belief in my preferred deity. then you need to change the kind of evidence you are willing to admit."

To which one can only say ... why?

In the past our normal senses were considered quite sufficient to perceive evidence of divine activity.

Glancing through the Bible at the kind of evidence for his existence that Droopy's deity used to produce reveals some really impressively obvious physical phenomena: we might, for instance, see the Red Sea parting to let us walk dryshod to the other shore, or food for a whole nation miraculously appearing on the ground every morning in the desert, or death of all our enemy's firstborn, or big pots of water turning into wine, or lunch for 5,000 people produced from a few scraps, or a dead man becoming alive and walking around again. That's quite a lot of really easy to detect evidence that Something Is Going On.

How come the entity we are supposed to be believing in suddenly got so much harder to detect in action?

[_EAllusion]

Droopy's argument is that atheists do not see evidence of God because they unjustifiably dismiss sensus divintus out of hand. He's really accusing atheists of engaging in grand metaphysical question-begging. Speaking for myself, I don't reject sensus divintus out of hand. I reject it because there is good reason to think it isn't legitimate. What's cute about this approach is Droopy is instantly wiping off the table almost all arguments for the existence of God. He's granting almost all of the atheists' arguments right off the bat.

[_Droopy]

This is quite possibly the most horribly written sentence I've ever read.

At a seventh or eighth grade reading comprehension level (the MDB standard), this is, at all events, a difficult sentence. It is, however, the kind of sentence I grew used to fielding many years ago reading philosophy texts and other similar materials. Trust me, I'm nothing compared to Foucault, Hegel, Kant, or - good heavens - Buckminster Fuller.

How come the entity we are supposed to be believing in suddenly got so much harder to detect in action?

Did he?

[_Droopy]

Droopy's argument is that atheists do not see evidence of God because they unjustifiably dismiss sensus divintus out of hand. He's really accusing atheists of engaging in grand metaphysical question-begging.

I think that's accurate, from the perspective of an assumed metaphysical naturalism. Eastern mystics would also point out there there are levels, or ranges of perception that are strictly delimited by the very level at which perception takes place.

Speaking for myself, I don't reject sensus divintus out of hand. I reject it because there is good reason to think it isn't legitimate.

Which takes us around the circle again back to my original point: what counts as evidence from within the level of perception at which such evidence is evaluated and determined to be evidence?