Universe where God exists vs. where he doesn't

[_Sethbag]

In a private offline chat Seth Payne and I were discussing what science can or cannot have to say about the existence of God.

Seth Payne asserted that science can have nothing to say about the existence of God.

I allow for the possibility that science can have nothing to say about the existence of God, but I believe that such a universe would have to be indistinguishable from a universe in which God did not exist.

My reasoning is simple: if the universe with God were not indistinguishable from a universe without God, then that means there would have to be something observable about the universe that differed based on whether God existed or not, and then science would have something to say about that.

If Seth Payne is correct, and science can have nothing to say about the existence of God, and I am correct, that such a universe is indistinguishable from a universe where God does not exist, then I am convinced that the question of the existence of God is no more meaningful than the question of whether Russell's teapot exists or not.

To Seth Payne, upon his assertion that under these conditions God does exist, I must answer: so what?

Would any of you like to step into the ring and comment? I would be particularly interested to hear from EAllusion, if he's reading this. But I'd love to read what any of you have to say about this.

[_Tobin]

Given what we know about science, God (or beings we would label as God) most likely exists.

Why?

1) Given the number of stars in the observable universe is nearly unimaginable ~9 × 10^21. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observable_universe
2) Given that number, if even a small fraction of those have habitable planets, there are likely billions if not trillions of planets.
3) Given that number, if even a few of those planets had intelligent life evolve on it, the number of civilizations could be in the thousands if not millions.
4) Given that number, if even a few of those formed a few billion years ago, they would have advanced to a technological level that we would consider them God or God-like in their abilities.

[_Sethbag]

Tobin apparently believes God is simply a more technologically advanced being than we are, but clearly "of this universe", rather than something outside of it.

If I'm understanding you correctly, Tobin, then that is not the kind of God I am talking about. I'm talking about the kind of God who could be the hypothesized "first cause", while what you seem to be proposing is a kind of being which must have come about millions if not billions of years after the universe began to unfold. Also, if I'm understanding you correctly, then if the universe had a beginning, and such technologically-advanced super-beings did not yet exist, then a time period must have existed in which there was no God in the universe, so my question still stands for that time period anyway.

[_Tobin]

Tobin apparently believes God is simply a more technologically advanced being than we are, but clearly "of this universe", rather than something outside of it.

If I'm understanding you correctly, Tobin, then that is not the kind of God I am talking about. I'm talking about the kind of God who could be the hypothesized "first cause", while what you seem to be proposing is a kind of being which must have come about millions if not billions of years after the universe began to unfold. Also, if I'm understanding you correctly, then if the universe had a beginning, and such technologically-advanced super-beings did not yet exist, then a time period must have existed in which there was no God in the universe, so my question still stands for that time period anyway.

You are under the impression that time is a factor here. Since relativity shows that time is relative to speed, direction, and distance - the time we experience can be completely different than what these beings may experience, so it is a rather meaningless concept. For example, as I've stated on here, a being far enough away from us can travel relative to our space-time into our distant past or our distant future simply by moving away or towards us. I'm sure beings so significantly more advanced than us would have even more impressive capabilities to utilize, observe, and even interact with our space-time in what we would consider magical ways.

If such beings exist (or came into existence at any point), that fact alone would establish God for all time if relativity is true.

[_Chap]

Tobin apparently believes God is simply a more technologically advanced being than we are, but clearly "of this universe", rather than something outside of it.

If I'm understanding you correctly, Tobin, then that is not the kind of God I am talking about. I'm talking about the kind of God who could be the hypothesized "first cause", while what you seem to be proposing is a kind of being which must have come about millions if not billions of years after the universe began to unfold. Also, if I'm understanding you correctly, then if the universe had a beginning, and such technologically-advanced super-beings did not yet exist, then a time period must have existed in which there was no God in the universe, so my question still stands for that time period anyway.

In other words, Sethbag is talking about the deity discussed by, for instance, the Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas:

I answer that it can be proved in five ways that God exists.

The first and plainest is the method that proceeds from the point of view of motion. It is certain and in accord with experience, that things on earth undergo change. Now, everything that is moved is moved by something; nothing, indeed, is changed, except it is changed to something which it is in potentiality. Moreover, anything moves in accordance with something actually existing; change itself, is nothing else than to bring forth something from potentiality into actuality. Now, nothing can be brought from potentiality to actual existence except through something actually existing: thus heat in action, as fire, makes fire-wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot actually, and through this process, changes itself. The same thing cannot at the same time be actually and potentially the same thing, but only in regard to different things. What is actually hot cannot be at the same time potentially hot, but it is possible for it at the same time to be potentially cold. It is impossible, then, that anything should be both mover and the thing moved, in regard to the same thing and in the same way, or that it should move itself. Everything, therefore, is moved by something else. If, then, that by which it is moved, is also moved, this must be moved by something still different, and this, again, by something else. But this process cannot go on to infinity because there would not be any first mover, nor, because of this fact, anything else in motion, as the succeeding things would not move except because of what is moved by the first mover, just as a stick is not moved except through what is moved from the hand. Therefore it is necessary to go back to some first mover, which is itself moved by nothing---and this all men know as God.

The second proof is from the nature of the efficient cause. We find in our experience that there is a chain of causes: nor is it found possible for anything to be the efficient cause of itself, since it would have to exist before itself, which is impossible. Nor in the case of efficient causes can the chain go back indefinitely, because in all chains of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the middle, and these of the last, whether they be one or many. If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. Hence if there is not a first cause, there will not be a last, nor a middle. But if the chain were to go back infinitely, there would be no first cause, and thus no ultimate effect, nor middle causes, which is admittedly false. Hence we must presuppose some first efficient cause---which all call God.

The third proof is taken from the natures of the merely possible and necessary. We find that certain things either may or may not exist, since they are found to come into being and be destroyed, and in consequence potentially, either existent or non-existent. But it is impossible for all things that are of this character to exist eternally, because what may not exist, at length will not. If, then, all things were merely possible (mere accidents), eventually nothing among things would exist. If this is true, even now there would be nothing, because what does not exist, does not take its beginning except through something that does exist. If then nothing existed, it would be impossible for anything to begin, and there would now be nothing existing, which is admittedly false. Hence not all things are mere accidents, but there must be one necessarily existing being. Now every necessary thing either has a cause of its necessary existence, or has not. In the case of necessary things that have a cause for their necessary existence, the chain of causes cannot go back infinitely, just as not in the case of efficient causes, as proved. Hence there must be presupposed something necessarily existing through its own nature, not having a cause elsewhere but being itself the cause of the necessary existence of other things---which all call God.

The fourth proof arises from the degrees that are found in things. For there is found a greater and a less degree of goodness, truth, nobility, and the like. But more or less are terms spoken of various things as they approach in diverse ways toward something that is the greatest, just as in the case of hotter (more hot) which approaches nearer the greatest heat. There exists therefore something that is the truest, and best, and most noble, and in consequence, the greatest being. For what are the greatest truths are the greatest beings, as is said in the Metaphysics Bk. II. 2. What moreover is the greatest in its way, in another way is the cause of all things of its own kind (or genus); thus fire, which is the greatest heat, is the cause of all heat, as is said in the same book (cf. Plato and Aristotle). Therefore there exists something that is the cause of the existence of all things and of the goodness and of every perfection whatsoever---and this we call God.

The fifth proof arises from the ordering of things for we see that some things which lack reason, such as natural bodies, are operated in accordance with a plan. It appears from this that they are operated always or the more frequently in this same way the closer they follow what is the Highest; whence it is clear that they do not arrive at the result by chance but because of a purpose. The things, moreover, that do not have intelligence do not tend toward a result unless directed by some one knowing and intelligent; just as an arrow is sent by an archer. Therefore there is something intelligent by which all natural things are arranged in accordance with a plan---and this we call God.

Tobin's deity is one he has made up out of his own imaginings. While I am interested in the great currents of European thought - in one of which we find Aquinas - I must confess to a lack of fascination with the tiny little rivulet that Tobin has dug with his finger in the mud of his own idiosyncratic backwater.

[_Chap]

Tobin apparently believes God is simply a more technologically advanced being than we are, but clearly "of this universe", rather than something outside of it.

If I'm understanding you correctly, Tobin, then that is not the kind of God I am talking about. I'm talking about the kind of God who could be the hypothesized "first cause", while what you seem to be proposing is a kind of being which must have come about millions if not billions of years after the universe began to unfold. Also, if I'm understanding you correctly, then if the universe had a beginning, and such technologically-advanced super-beings did not yet exist, then a time period must have existed in which there was no God in the universe, so my question still stands for that time period anyway.

You are under the impression that time is a factor here. Since relativity shows that time is relative to speed, direction, and distance - the time we experience can be completely different than what these beings may experience, so it is a rather meaningless concept. For example, as I've stated on here, a being far enough away from us can travel relative to our space-time into our distant past or our distant future simply by moving away or towards us. I'm sure beings so significantly more advanced than us would have even more impressive capabilities to utilize, observe, and even interact with our space-time in what we would consider magical ways.

If such beings exist (or came into existence at any point), that fact alone would establish God for all time if relativity is true.

Time, is by no means 'meaningless' in relativity. It is a quantity whose measurements will indeed vary from observer to observer, but those measurements can be subjected to precise calculations such that knowledge of the relative velocities of the observers enables one to predict the time between two events as timed by one observer from the time between the events observed by the other.

But there is an invariant quantity, the 'interval', s underlying the complete set of all measurements of the spatial and temporal separations of two events:



A quantity that enters into the calculation of an invariant quantity may be a variable, but we can hardly call it 'meaningless'.

The underlined sentence is a piece of magical handwaving like the kind mocked in this cartoon:



It's just Tobin's imagination at work. The final sentence:

If such beings exist (or came into existence at any point), that fact alone would establish God for all time if relativity is true.

actually means:

If such beings exist (or came into existence at any point), that fact alone would establish God for all time if my imaginary universe actually exists.

The reference to relativity is so misleading as to be mendacious.

[_Sethbag]

Chap, I deeply appreciate your replies. Please forgive me if I attempt to head off the temptation for this thread to become a Tobinfest. I had some questions I'd really like some input on.

To whit:

Must a universe in which God exists, but in which science can have nothing to say about God's existence or non-existence, be indistinguishable from an equivalent universe but in which God does not exist?

If this is true, then what is there about the idea of God's existence in such a universe that makes the question of any real interest? Why should we care?

by the way, I was thinking about this in terms that Mormons can appreciate.

1) Is there a difference, observable through science*, between a universe in which God's chosen people find their lost car keys at a higher rate than similar people not of God's chosen fanbase?

2) Is there a difference, observable through science, between a universe in which those "true" believers in God are healed of their sickness and disease at a higher rate than similar people not of God's true followers?

I think that, from a Mormon perspective at least, a universe in which science can have nothing to say about God is at the very least a universe where divine beings do not inspire people with the locations of their lost car keys.

Likewise, in such a universe, people administered to by Mormon priesthood holders would be healed of their sickness and disease at no higher rate than people not administered to, or in comparison with people administered to by people from another church who don't hold the Melchezidek Priesthood (I added that last bit to counter the placebo effect).

Likewise, in such a universe whether it rained or not in a given region would not be influenced by whether the people of that region prayed to God, or gave 10% of their income to the Mormon church (or any other church), etc.

*by science, think of something like "all things which are potentially knowable about the universe by people following the scientific method and applying the most advanced technology possible in order to observe and measure things", rather than "the things scientists can observe and know as of Octover 22, 2012".

[_Analytics]

I’d propose that anything that interacts with observable reality is subject to scientific scrutiny.

Here is a hypothetical case study. The pharmaceutical industry has well-developed methodologies for determining whether the administration any given substance is beneficial for treatmenting any given disease. This is true even if the mechanics of how the substance treats the disease are a total mystery. It would be a straight-forward application of well-developed methodology to test the efficacy of priesthood blessings. If the proper administration of priesthood blessings proved to be an effective treatment of disease, this would constitute evidence in favor of God.

But what if the test was administered and priesthood blessings were indistinguishable from the placebo? We would be left with two hypotheses: either “God” doesn’t exist, or “God” doesn’t interact with the observable world. Which hypothesis is true? How could one tell? If there is no way to tell, then by definition, the two universes are indistinguishable.

ETA: I wrote this before reading sethbag using the same analogy.

[_Chap]

I agree that Tobin's points are of little relevance to this thread, so let's get back to the OP.

Sethbag's questions are put with admirable restraint, but they cut to the very bone of the particular kind of Christian belief that is the theme of this board.

On the one hand we are repeatedly assured that 'faith' in the Mormon deity will produce all kinds of marvelous effects in our lives, from finding car keys up to otherwise inexplicable healings. So the universe should look very different because the Mormon God exists.

On the other hand, we are also warned that the Mormon God's obsession with getting people to believe in him without any convincing evidence will mean that ... well, the universe will not look any different because the Mormon God exists.

Both propositions have to be believed in simultaneously, it seems ... bit of a strain, that.

[_Sethbag]

I’d propose that anything that interacts with observable reality is subject to scientific scrutiny.

So:
P = "interacts with observable reality"
Q = "is subject to scientific scrutiny"

You propose that P -> Q. We know that if this is true, then !Q -> !P, or in other words:

Something is not subject to scientific scrutiny, therefore it does not interact with observable reality.

The problem is that the God that most people are talking about when they discuss God is one which does interact with observable reality. The Bible is full of stories of such interactions, the Book of Mormon is too, the D&C, Pearl of Great Price, etc. all are full of such stories, to put the LDS spin on it.

If the original proposition is true, then either the Mormon God is subject to scientific scrutiny in some way, or else the Mormon God does not interact with observable reality. Since Mormon scriptures represent God as doing so, it follows that Mormon God is, in theory, subject to scientific scrutiny.

To generalize beyond Mormonism, I think the vast majority of believers in some form of God, in this world, believe in a God who interacts with observable reality. If the original proposition is true, this means that the God claims of the vast majority of believers in the world is in theory amenable to scientific scrutiny.

by the way, in the interests of full disclosure, this line of argumentation arose in the context of a criticism of so-called "village atheism", and of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse and their various books, most prominently the books of Sam Harris. I have perceived a lot of criticism of the "popular atheism" of these people both in this forum and in other places, and I was rising to their defense.

In short: I believe that Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens (PBUH), and Dennet are writing books addressing the religious beliefs of the majority of religious believers around the world. They are not targeted to the hypothetical non-interacting, non-falsifiable, dare I say Deist hypotheses put forward by many of the same folks who most loudly criticize the Four Horsemen and their books.

My simple, perhaps even simplistic corollary to all of this is that the hypothetical, non-interacting, non-falsifiable Deist hypotheses that escape the wrath of Dawkins aren't even really very interesting, since A) nobody believes them anyway, B) they don't have much to do with us, so why should we care, and C) they seem to be the intellectual results of attempts to poke holes in the "village atheist" arguments, rather than serious proposals about what most likely really does exist in the universe, along with some reason why they should be viewed as such.

But what if the test was administered and priesthood blessings were indistinguishable from the placebo? We would be left with two hypotheses: either “God” doesn’t exist, or “God” doesn’t interact with the observable world. Which hypothesis is true? How could one tell? If there is no way to tell, then by definition, the two universes are indistinguishable.

ETA: I wrote this before reading sethbag using the same analogy.

Thanks for your contribution, and I think you expressed it better than I do, so you definitely added value.