Personhood and Abortion Rights

[_Themis]

To say a person in the beginning stages of life, whether from fertilization, different trimesters, birth, infancy, adolescent, puberty, adulthood, and old age are not persons, is a man made concept to support ideologies. We do this to justify our conscience, for convenience, for money, for power...etc.

Racism uses this also...with slavery certain person were not given certain rights, based on the concept of personhood...if I am misunderstand this happened...please show me my error? we can P-hack the heck out of it...but the bottom line is generally american slavery did not allow perosonhood to slaves. And like wise many do not assign personhood to the child in the womb, which the right to life.

Not a easy discussion and I certainly don't have all the answers.

How can you use the word person in a sentence without having some man-made idea what is means? How can you ever hope to communicate anything to anyone?

[_EAllusion]

The principle justification for American slavery, in the end, was that those in slavery were not people and therefore did not have a right not be slaves. Hardcore pro-lifers tend to see this as darkly similar to the claim that fetuses aren't people. They tend to think of themselves like modern day abolitionists. Of course, just because America once got it wrong in calling a group of people not persons, it doesn't follow that every call like this is also likely wrong. We also don't legally (or morally) recognize the personhood status of mushrooms, and I'm pretty confident that's the right call. I'm much less confident about at least some animals not being persons, but fortunately hardcore pro-lifers and hardcore animal rights advocates don't overlap much.

The strangest people are those who think lobsters are persons, but 20 week old fetuses are not. Talk with them sometime.

[_EAllusion]

There's a pro-choice argument that goes something like this:

Because people can reasonably disagree on the correct moral position with respect to abortion, this is not a topic the law can easily ajudicate. Therefore, while abortion may plausibly be morally wrong, it is best left to a personal decision. A person should not face legal penalties for something they can reasonably do in good faith and plausibly may be proper.

The inverse pro-life argument goes something like this:

Because it is plausible that abortion entails the immoral ending of a life, it should be made illegal because it is appropriate for the law to force people to err on the side of caution when the stakes involve a realistic chance of depriving someone of their right to life.

If I accepted the premise underneath these arguments, I'm very much in favor of the latter. In fact, I'm pescatarian in part because I think it's plausible enough that our treatment of farm animals for food is morally wrong that I'd rather avoid it out of an abundance of caution. I think it's perfectly fine for the law to restrict people from doing things that plausibly might be improperly killing people.

I don't accept the premise here exactly, though. I'm very confident that personhood status relates to mental properties and things that lack those mental properties simply aren't persons. There is such a thing as too much caution. However, once you get to late stage fetuses, I come around and am open to restrictions on abortion purely for reasons of caution. My best guess on the personhood debate is not even live-born infants are persons yet. The kind of consciousness associated traits that personhood most plausibly relates to gradually come on line in development fairly late. This is not an uncommon view among philosophers, but I don't support the legality of killing newborns on the chance that I'm wrong.

(I do think it is messed up how young mothers who kill newborns out of desperation are treated as total monsters by virtually everyone when killing almost the exact same thing before birth is treated as Ok, if regrettable by many of those same people. People's reactions aren't proportional to the arbitrariness of the line they picked.)

[_Chap]

"Personhood" just refers to a status that entails having moral and legal rights. It is really difficult to figure out what should count as a person and why at the margins, but you can't escape having a view on this. Our entire moral and legal framework depends on taking definitive positions on that subject.

Really? It seems to me that for you the term 'person' simply refers to an entity having moral and legal rights.

So why don't we just decide to what kinds of entity we wish to attribute moral and legal rights (two separate decisions, by the way, since not all moral rights are commonly treated as legal rights, and vice versa)?

I do not see how it helps to posit the existence of this class of entities, 'persons', membership of which appears next to impossible to agree about, and then make membership of that class the deciding factor in attributing rights. Let's drop the metaphysics, and go straight to the decision about to what entities we, as a society, want to attribute rights. That's the practical; decision, and we might as well face it directly.

Of course, even when we have taken that decision, we then have to face up to how we deal with clashes of rights. Thus, my right to the peaceful enjoyment of my money may clash with the right of a destitute child to food and shelter, both of which could be assured if the government removed some of my money via tax against my will. And so on.

Ultimately, all law is a rickety makeshift, by which (for the convenience of living in a complex society where most people are strangers to us) we sub-contract our moral decision-making to a set of professionals whose methods of decision making are far from those we would want to see applied to anybody we truly loved or cared about. The consequences are inevitably messy.

[_EAllusion]

"Personhood" just refers to a status that entails having moral and legal rights. It is really difficult to figure out what should count as a person and why at the margins, but you can't escape having a view on this. Our entire moral and legal framework depends on taking definitive positions on that subject.

Really? It seems to me that for you the term 'person' simply refers to an entity having moral and legal rights.

So why don't we just decide to what kinds of entity we wish to attribute moral and legal rights (two separate decisions, by the way, since not all moral rights are commonly treated as legal rights, and vice versa)?

I do not see how it helps to posit the existence of this class of entities, 'persons', membership of which appears next to impossible to agree about, and then make membership of that class the deciding factor in attributing rights. Let's drop the metaphysics, and go straight to the decision about to what entities we, as a society, want to attribute rights. That's the practical; decision, and we might as well face it directly.

Of course, even when we have taken that decision, we then have to face up to how we deal with clashes of rights. Thus, my right to the peaceful enjoyment of my money may clash with the right of a destitute child to food and shelter, both of which could be assured if the government removed some of my money via tax against my will. And so on.

Ultimately, all law is a rickety makeshift, by which (for the convenience of living in a complex society where most people are strangers to us) we sub-contract our moral decision-making to a set of professionals whose methods of decision making are far from those we would want to see applied to anybody we truly loved or cared about. The consequences are inevitably messy.

Morality and laws are hard, yes.

Everyone has views on personhood. Either you do it with some self-awareness and thought put into whether those views make sense or you don't.

When you say, "I do not see how it helps to posit the existence of this class of entities, 'persons', membership of which appears next to impossible to agree about, and then make membership of that class the deciding factor in attributing rights. Let's drop the metaphysics, and go straight to the decision about to what entities we, as a society, want to attribute rights. That's the practical; decision, and we might as well face it directly."

All you are saying is let's dispense with understanding and justifying our views on personhood and just go straight to making declarations about it by political will.

That is how you end up with legal positions like blacks aren't people. It's pretty easy to declare that if you don't have to justify it and everyone's prejudices are already lined up with it.

[_Kevin Graham]

Misunderstanding what you wrote hardly makes me a liar Kevin, we all do it here, Sorry.

You didn't accuse me of saying these things in your response to me. Ignoring my point, then responding to it in the context of responding to someone else while recreating what I said to make it look like I'm the one operating from a "bad premise," isn't something we all do.

But it does not change the discussion at all, nor my belief.

It wasn't intended to change anything, only reinforce the point that you believe a "baby" begins at conception due to some religious conviction that is supported nowhere in science (or the Bible for that matter). This is why you reject the morning after pill. It appears to be a position based on identity politics. People will support something because that's what's expected of them if they're "Christian," and logic, science and reason have nothing to do with it.

[_Jersey Girl]

Moderators please do not SNIP this copy. I'm bringing it forward for a reason. I'm looking at you, Shades. ;-)

I don't disagree with you. I do have other ideas that compete with that concept. For example, a woman's right to make choices about her body, how she views her body, and exercise her beliefs in what constitutes a life, a baby, etc.

I can't bring myself to impose my beliefs on her. I don't live in her head. I don't live her life. I don't experience the world as she does. I am not her. She has as much a right to exercise and act on her beliefs as I do.

We should both have the right to exercise our beliefs and that's what we have. At the moment at least.


I think you have it right especially as you demonstrated in your examples regarding priesthood and slavery. I'll admit those comparisons were unexpected, but the comparison to slavery in particular tells me how you understand it and I do think you understand it.



I'll go you one better. How were women viewed in those old Bible times?


Again, I don't disagree.

But I will tell you this, too. I would just as easily support an unwed mother who wanted to keep her baby as I would accompany and provide after care for one who chose not to.

In my world, both hands would get held.

Where it get mo sticky...

Do you believe in late term abortions, say a week or two before birth? My guess is many if not most pro lifers don't. So in these cases it turns from the woman's right to choose, to the right of life for the child.

Just on this thread there are different lines, and most just move the time line of rights for the mother and rights for the child around. Government intervention (enforced laws) are implied , but not admitted too.

In regards to this conversation, my example about personhood and priesthood is getting lost...the example is to show certain people, living persons, are excluded from certain rights...slaves were, and the other tribes were, the brotherhood of carpenters do not allow the brotherhood of electricians to do carpenter work on a union job...etc. The point is, the term fill in the blank-hood is a man made ideology to limit others certain rights. I'll make one up here...there is a brotherhood of ex-Mormon's here, the some never-Mo's here that can not join this brotherhood.

To say a person in the beginning stages of life, whether from fertilization, different trimesters, birth, infancy, adolescent, puberty, adulthood, and old age are not persons, is a man made concept to support ideologies. We do this to justify our conscience, for convenience, for money, for power...etc.

Racism uses this also...with slavery certain person were not given certain rights, based on the concept of personhood...if I am misunderstand this happened...please show me my error? we can P-hack the heck out of it...but the bottom line is generally american slavery did not allow perosonhood to slaves. And like wise many do not assign personhood to the child in the womb, which the right to life.

Not a easy discussion and I certainly don't have all the answers.

Mark, it may not be clear and apparent to you and others, but when I involve myself in a topic as serious and complex as this, my comments are typically in direct response to what you (in this case) have stated, they are intended to build the conversation in a fairly methodical fashion, and I intentionally plant the seeds of possible sub-topic lines of discussion that are relevant to the topic. I did so in the post above.

When I get a response from you, I do not see a direct response to what I have written. It seems to me that you simply copy my post, and move forward on your own without consideration to what I have stated or questions I have posed.

Previously, you made comment regarding your understanding of "personhood". You drew out an example from the Old Testament. I validated your comparison in my posts and I asked you a question relevant to the sub-topic of "personhood". It went unanswered.

When I think that a critical point has not been addressed, I tend to dig in my heels until it is addressed. You and others may see my insistence as nit picky. I see it as important to maintaining the continuum of dialogue. I'm never happy hopping from one issue to another without reaching a point of understanding before moving forward. We're not talking about what music we like. We're attempting to discuss a topic, the complexities of which are near impossible to address on a message board but damned if I'm not knocking myself out here trying to pull from my end to painstakingly build these exchanges with you.

It takes two. You have my near undivided attention here. I would like to have yours in return.

So, before we move forward, I should like you to answer the question that I posed for it plants the seeds to further discuss the issue of "personhood", a concept that is critical to the overall topic and something you have gone on to address in your above. I think you are missing critical points regarding "personhood". If you answer this question, I think we can reach back far enough to see where the concept begins in terms of law as it relates to women to increase our understanding of how it developed into what we see today.

How were women viewed in those old Bible times?

Go for it.

[Guest]

So...far...behind....

Honor: My argument does, indeed, ignore personhood because it looks at the existing legal duties of one person to save the life of another. That's not an indication of disrespect of the argument -- it's just a different argument.

EA: If you take a look again at your violinist example, you'll note that the description of the hypothetical never relies on the proposition that the woman's body is property. The description of the cabin scenarios also carefully differentiate between control over the cabin "property" and control over the body. I first encountered the violinist in 1984, and it was not presented as a clash of property rights v. right to life. The woman's interest was described as personal/privacy or maybe liberty.

The court in McFall v. Shimp's description of the issue is pretty close to what I'm getting at. It was a case where one cousin tried to legally compel another cousin to donate bone marrow.

The question posed by plaintiff is that, in order to save the life of one of its members by the only means available, 91*91 may society infringe upon ones absolute right to his "bodily security"

...

Morally, this decision rests with defendant, and, in the view of the court, the refusal of defendant is morally indefensible. For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.

...

For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forceable extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.

[_Jersey Girl]

Mark see this here that you wrote?

In regards to this conversation, my example about personhood and priesthood is getting lost...the example is to show certain people, living persons, are excluded from certain rights...slaves were, and the other tribes were, the brotherhood of carpenters do not allow the brotherhood of electricians to do carpenter work on a union job...etc. The point is, the term fill in the blank-hood is a man made ideology to limit others certain rights. I'll make one up here...there is a brotherhood of ex-Mormon's here, the some never-Mo's here that can not join this brotherhood.

Until you answer the question that I posed to you, you will continue to skip over a critical and relevant issue. The evidence that you are missing it is found in your above.

Please answer the question that I posed to you.

[_EAllusion]

So...far...behind....

Honor: My argument does, indeed, ignore personhood because it looks at the existing legal duties of one person to save the life of another. That's not an indication of disrespect of the argument -- it's just a different argument.

EAllusion: If you take a look again at your violinist example, you'll note that the description of the hypothetical never relies on the proposition that the woman's body is property. The description of the cabin scenarios also carefully differentiate between control over the cabin "property" and control over the body. I first encountered the violinist in 1984, and it was not presented as a clash of property rights v. right to life. The woman's interest was described as personal/privacy or maybe liberty.

I've seen the rights of the person to refuse to be used characterized as bodily property rights (most common), bodily integrity justified on some basis other than self-ownership, or a more broad right to self-determination that we often call liberty. Privacy? No. I'm not sure how you can rest such a strong claim on such a weak countervailing interest. We normally think privacy is worth violating for far less than protecting someone's life.

The court in McFall v. Shimp's description of the issue is pretty close to what I'm getting at. It was a case where one cousin tried to legally compel another cousin to donate bone marrow.

...

The question posed by plaintiff is that, in order to save the life of one of its members by the only means available, 91*91 may society infringe upon ones absolute right to his "bodily security"

...

Morally, this decision rests with defendant, and, in the view of the court, the refusal of defendant is morally indefensible. For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.

...

For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forceable extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.

This sounds like a bodily integrity and/or bodily property rights argument, not a privacy one. It doesn't really spell out an argument underneath the revulsion, so we're left to guess. I think there's a lot less distance between taxing someone a substantial portion of their labor to make them pay for someone's health care and making them donate their bone marrow than this judge seems to think. No doubt our society tends to draw some firm lines at bodily intrusions, but I think this is more arbitrary than people suppose. I suspect an emotional disgust factor, what notorious ice cream hater Leon Kass called the wisdom of repugnance, is doing work there.