Daniel Peterson and D&C 131.

[DrStakhanovite]

7.There is no such thing as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes;

8.We cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter.

The above passage is an unambiguous metaphysical declaration and (to some) a divine revelation that the immaterial is non-existent and that everything on a fundamental level is comprised of matter.

Daniel Peterson has made numerous and explicit denials of materialism.

What possible strategies could Daniel Peterson use to bring his metaphysics in accordance with the revealed truth from God in D&C 131?

[Moksha]

If we viewed Dr. P's protestations with purely spiritual eyes perhaps we could detect a white salamander.

[Failed Prophecy]

Some combination of tu quoque and changing the definition. Similar to his dealings with Mormonism and monotheism:

https://www.patheos.com/blogs/danpeterson?s=Monotheism

When dealing with Christians and monotheism, he changes/misunderstands Trinity (definition changing) so he can then tell Christians they aren't either. He gets double brownie points for pointing out that Muslims are the real monotheists.

Also linked there is the idea that the Book of Mormon and Mormon doctrine in general nuance the definition of monotheism. I get that he thinks nuance is happening, good for him. Outsiders scratch their head because to them it looks more like definition changing.

[huckelberry]

Matter more highly refined is a pretty flexible concept. One might consider it so flexible that it is not a concept at all. To say spirit is matter may only say spirit is as apposed to spirit is not.

The DC line does not say spirit is subatomic particles. It does not say it is part of our space time. It does not say it is involved in anyway with what physics has studied. It does not say what matter more highly refined is.

I do know how one would clarify how Mormon spirit matter is different than any other thoughts of what spirit would be.

I suppose you could contrast Mormon thought of matter being eternal and in its eternalness independent of God to the traditional theistic view of matters existence being a result of the power of God. There are strains of LDS thought seeing an eternal divine power underlying both the material spirits and the specific being God. Some comments by Peterson might indicate he is sympathetic to that way of seeing.

(my faint memories of the Lectures on Faith and perhaps Parley P Pratt).

[Philo Sofee]

7.There is no such thing as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes;

8.We cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter.

The above passage is an unambiguous metaphysical declaration and (to some) a divine revelation that the immaterial is non-existent and that everything on a fundamental level is comprised of matter.

Daniel Peterson has made numerous and explicit denials of materialism.

What possible strategies could Daniel Peterson use to bring his metaphysics in accordance with the revealed truth from God in D&C 131?

Uh, I don't see Peterson denying materialism at all in those posts. He is merely contexting it into a larger shall I dare say form? Lol. I think you are sort of misreading his view.

[Failed Prophecy]

Uh, I don't see Peterson denying materialism at all in those posts.

He is. He cites Nagel's Mind and Cosmos positively to refute materialism. He uses Nagel specifically because Nagel is the most prominent philosopher (who happens to be an atheist) to deny materialism in favor of something else. If I remember, he posits some form of Aristotelean final causes, but don't hold me to that, it's been a while since I read Mind and Cosmos.

He is merely contexting it into a larger shall I dare say form? Lol. I think you are sort of misreading his view.

Philosophers have discussed this and arrived at what for them is a good working definition of materialism. I have a hard time seeing philosophers disagreeing as to how to characterize it. When Peterson wades in there, that's the game he is playing. He seems to want to play in the philosopher's sandbox, therefore he's going to need to play by their rules.

[DrStakhanovite]

Thanks for giving this a shot Huckelberry. There really isn’t a venue for me to propose this to Mormon Apologists themselves.

Matter more highly refined is a pretty flexible concept.

Well there are some constraints to that flexibility. First is the universal commitment that there is nothing that can be immaterial:

7.There is no such thing as immaterial matter.

Then we have an equivalence commitment that “spirit” is “matter”

All spirit is matter

Then we get a clause about our ability to perceive:

but it is more fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes

This seems to state that what is usually regarded as spirit is ontologically matter, but it is matter in a different kind of modality or state.

One might consider it so flexible that it is not a concept at all.

I dunno, if the words are so semantically empty that they don’t carry conceptual content at all then we’ve entered into a territory not worth defending.

The DC line does not say spirit is subatomic particles.

Nope, materialism isn’t a commitment to the existence of particles.

It does not say it is part of our space time.

What kind of matter exists outside spacetime?

It does not say it is involved in anyway with what physics has studied.

19th century use of “matter” absolutely does.

[Philo Sofee]

Mr Stak
Huckelberry wrote:
It does not say it is involved in anyway with what physics has studied.
19th century use of “matter” absolutely does.

Now this is a sage observation. I get better why you made your post now, thank you. See? I gotta watch myself all the flippin time! I was thinking in today's concepts instead of the 19th century's...

[Philo Sofee]

Uh, I don't see Peterson denying materialism at all in those posts.

He is. He cites Nagel's Mind and Cosmos positively to refute materialism. He uses Nagel specifically because Nagel is the most prominent philosopher (who happens to be an atheist) to deny materialism in favor of something else. If I remember, he posits some form of Aristotelean final causes, but don't hold me to that, it's been a while since I read Mind and Cosmos.

He is merely contexting it into a larger shall I dare say form? Lol. I think you are sort of misreading his view.

Philosophers have discussed this and arrived at what for them is a good working definition of materialism. I have a hard time seeing philosophers disagreeing as to how to characterize it. When Peterson wades in there, that's the game he is playing. He seems to want to play in the philosopher's sandbox, therefore he's going to need to play by their rules.

Not to try and be difficult, but why on earth are we obliged to play by the rules of philosophers? I'm just askin is all. And, I confess I have not read Nagel, but I have read Daniel Whiteson, professor of experimental particle physics at the University of California, "We Have No Idea" (2017). And he would realistically agree that based on the only barely 4% knowledge of only 4% of the universe, we have no realistic logical reason to be confident in what we profess is knowledge, material or otherwise.

[DrStakhanovite]

Uh, I don't see Peterson denying materialism at all in those posts. He is merely contexting it into a larger shall I dare say form? Lol. I think you are sort of misreading his view.

Let's take 'Self-refuting materialism' and look at this quote from 'Miracles' by C.S. Lewis, someone whom Daniel greatly admires:

“If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true . . . and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. . . .

“A theory which explained everything else in the whole universe but which made it impossible to believe that our thinking was valid would be utterly out of court. For that theory would itself have been reached by thinking, and if thinking is not valid that theory would, of course, be demolished. It would have destroyed its own credentials. It would be an argument which proved that no argument was sound — a proof that there are no such things as proofs.”

If D&C 131 is correct, then everyone's mental processes are wholly determined by matter in motion. How do you think Daniel would argue contra Lewis, that his beliefs are true considering his brain and all his thoughts are essentially material?